THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 25 FEBRUARY 1967
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0005968805
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
September 16, 2015
Document Release Date:
September 16, 2015
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 25, 1967
File:
Attachment | Size |
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DOC_0005968805.pdf | 104.39 KB |
Body:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005000240001-5
The President's Daily Brief
Top Secret 25 February 1967
23
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DAILY BRIEF
25 FEBRUARY 1967
1. South Vietnam
We are beginning to see signs that
Communist forces in the Highlands are
getting more than usually hard up for
food and that the local populace on occa-50x1
sion has resisted increased Viet Cong
rice levies.
Tribal resistance to Communist rice
collectors is probably not yet very
widespread, but any large increase in
Viet Cong demands could have an important
snowballing effect. Even before the
North Vietnamese arrived in strength, the
local Viet Cong units had a hard enough
time producing and seizing enough food
to keep themselves going.
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3. Indonesia
4. Soviet Union
25 Feb 67
The principal conclusions of the
National Intelligence Estimate just pub-
lished on Indonesia are:
--Suharto and his anti-Communist
coalition are clearly in charge
and are likely to remain so, at
least for the next year or so;
--Sukarno's influence will probably
continue to decline, leaving him,
at most, only the capability to
offer occasional encouragement to
frustrated leftist elements;
--There will be major problems of
political adjustment. Civilian
politicians, for instance, will
be in conflict with military
leaders reluctant to share power;
--The need for foreign economic as-
sistance--which can only be ex-
pected from the US, Japan, and
Western Europe--virtually assures
continuation of Indonesia's new
Western-leaning foreign policies.
The speeches and editorials in ob-
servance of this year's Red Army anni-
versary were marked by obvious-reflections
of Moscow's increasing concern about
security along the Chinese border. Also,
for the first time, the Soviets officially
confirmed that there had been a shooting
incident on the border earlier this month.
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5. Nigeria
25 Feb 67
It is becoming increasingly clear
that the country cannot be put together
again. In fact, the danger of war among
the fragmented pieces is rising.
Peace talks in Ghana last month
failed to result in any progress toward
a solution. Relations between the prin-
cipal antagonists, Colonel Gowon of the
Federal Government and the recalcitrant
governor of the Eastern Region, are now
much worse than before. Both are now
talking about, and perhaps planning,
military action against the other.
The degeneration of relations be-
tween the Federal Government and the East
is not the only threat. Tensions and
rivalries are growing among a number of
heterogeneous tribal and sectional lead-
ers. Between 6,000 and 7,000 US nationals
are scattered throughout Nigeria and
could be endangered if the trend toward
violence continues.
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Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005000240001-5