THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 FEBRUARY 1967

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005968767
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: February 3, 1967

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24: CIA-RDP79T00936A005000050001-6
The President's Daily Brief
''rop?s-e.6.x,el_. 3 February 1967
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005000050001-6
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DAILY BRIEF
3 FEBRUARY 1967
1. Sino-Soviet
Relations
2. South Vietnam
Peking continues its all-out ffort
to provoke Moscow, but the latter still
seems to be resisting the temptation to
respond by a formal and complete break
in relations.
Moscow could, however, be preparing
for something just a little short of
such a break./
The rice situation continues to
worsen as people stock up for the Tet
holiday; prices have risen 30 percent
during the past month and stocks are at
very low levels. Ky has yet to follow
through with his promise to try to nego-
tiate a rice deal with Thailand.
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3. Korea
4. East-West Europe
3 Feb 67
The North Korean raid this morning,
although it apparently did not result
in any South Korean casualties, will
give new ammunition to South Korea's
hawks, who are already seething over
the sinking of a patrol boat last month.
The South Korean defense minister is
almost surely urging a quick retaliatory
action against North Korean positions in
Ahe Demilitarized Zone.
Bonn's drive for better relations
with Eastern Europe is becoming a divi-
sive issue among Moscow's former satel-
lites. On the one side is Rumania, the
first to break solidarity on this issue.
On the other is East Germany, angrily
lobbying--without much effect--among its
allies for a continued policy of treat-
ing Bonn as an outcast.
Even the Poles, among the wariest
recipients of initiatives from Bonn,
are beginning to feel isolated on the
issue. There are some signs that War-
saw has made its own tentative soundings
in Bonn.
.Moscow is reacting cautiously to
this -confusion. There is not much. the
Soviets could do now, assuming-they-want
to head off further moves toward. East
-European-- West German rapprochement.
A Warsaw Pact foreign ministers meeting
is apparently-to convene in Berlin next
-week. It will surely discuss Bonn's
initiatives, but any agreement on a com-
mon response is.highly unlikely.
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5. Egypt
6. Bolivia
3 Feb 67
We see signs that the Egyptians
expect a broad confrontation with the
US.
This Tuesday Nasir's vice president
told US officials that relations were
even worse than during the Middle East
crises in the '50s. He insinuated that
US support of Jordan and Saudi Arabia
was chiefly responsible for this state
of affairs. Along the way, he admitted
that last week's bombing of a Saudi
border town was intended as "pressure"
on Faysal to desist from supporting the
Yemeni royalists.
The vice president admitted Egypt's
economic situation was not good, and
seemed to see something sinister in US
delay on Egyptian aid requests.
We think this is probably:an ac-
curate reflection of Nasir's present
mood. We cannot be sure, however,
whether it is a prelude to some new move
against Western interests, or simply an
outgrowth of Nasir's fantasy that the
West is out to get him.
Before the Bolivian Congress ad-
journed this week, it acted to enable
'President Barrientos to leave the coun-
try for the Inter-American summit meet-
ing. If he chooses, he can use this to
justify a retreat from his threat not to
go unless the American presidents agree
to discuss Bolivia's access to the sea--
a perennial grudge against Chile.
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Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005000050001-6