THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 24 OCTOBER 1966

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005968593
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: October 24, 1966

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
24 OCTOBER 1966
TOr--S-Ec,-IREL
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DAILY BRIEF
24 OCTOBER 1966
1. South Vietnam
2. North Vietnam
The Buddhist congress that met
last Thursday and broke up in confusion
on Saturday has now produced a formal
split in the Buddhist movement.
The militant faction reconvened
and elected their own chairman of the
Buddhist Institute on Sunday. Since
Tam Chau maintains that he is still
chairman, this leaves two chairmen,
each with his own supporters and head-
quarters.
These developments make any recon-
ciliation between moderates and mili-
tants much more difficult and further
weaken the Buddhists as a political
force. They will, however, add to
other political problems: most moder-
ates are northerners sympathetic to Ky,
while the militants tend to sympathize
with the opposition southerners in the
cabinet and constituent assembly.
who recently
spent nearly three months in Hanoi
found morale and discipline generally
good and essential services functioning.
The populace was busily--and ap-
parently willingly--working in support
of the war effort and the economy.
Much work was being done by families.
For example, petroleum containers were
being manufactured in back yards all
over Hanoi. These were collected daily
and used for dispersed storage.
Although rice was rationed, food
was sufficient ?and the transportation
and electric power systems were ade-
quate. Streets and roads were kept in
good repair. The authorities were still
trying to move people out of the city
but they tended to drift back at night
and on weekends.
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3. Soviet Union
4. Poland
5. Brazil
Panama
The United States Intelligence
Board has just completed work on the
annual National Intelligence Estimate,
"Soviet Capabilities for Strategic At-
tack," The Director of Central Intel-
ligence has summarized its findings at
Annex.
A journalist source has told the
Warsaw embassy that President Johnson's
speech of 7 October made such an impact
on Gomulka and company that the word
was passed to the Polish press to stop
attacking the President. We think
there may be some exaggeration here,
but note that this report is generally
in line with other high-level reaction
out of Warsaw.
Ambassador Tuthill believes that
the government may cancel the congres-
sional elections set for next month if
the opposition mounts a particularly
hard-hitting campaign against Castello
Branco's "dictatorial" policies.
As for president-elect Costa e
.Silva, he has up to now expressed strong
support for the president, but the am-
bassador believes that many of his sup-
porters are far from pleased with
Castello Branco's dissolution of con-
gress and his efforts to stifle the op-
position. Some of them even fear that
the government's action could result
in an opposition victory.
An antigovernment .and anti-US stu-
dent demonstration in the Canal Zone on
20 October is quite likely to be fol-
lowed by more incidents next week when
Panama celebrates a national holiday.
The National Guard is already alerted
and Canal Zone authorities are review-
ing border control measures.
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ANNEX
DCI Summary of NIE 11-8-66
In my judgment the conclusions of NIE 11-8-66,
on "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack," can
be summarized as follows:
The Soviets are building powerful strategic
attack forces along with the strategic defense and
other elements of their military establishment.
Their main object in building these forces is to
deter the US and support their own foreign policy.
Over the past year, the Soviets have started
to build ICBM launchers in larger numbers than ever
before. By 1968, they will have a considerably
bigger operational force than we anticipated in our
estimate of a year ago. Most of the ICBM's will be
in dispersed silos to protect them from attack.
This force should give the Soviet leaders greater
confidence in their deterrent because of its ability
to inflict mass destruction upon the US even if the
US were to strike first.
,In their planning for the years beyond 1968,
the Soviets must consider such things as the cost
of building more ICBM launchers, their technical
ability to develop better systems, and the possible
course of US military, programs. They, may decide
that there is little strategic advantage in build-
ing an ICBM force much larger than the one they will
have in 1968. On the other hand, they may seek to
strengthen their deterrent and military power still
more by increasing their ICBM force to about the
size of the one now planned by the US: In either
case, they will probably introduce new ICBM's with
greater ability to survive US attack and greater
effectiveness to strike at US forces. But the So-
viet leaders almost certainly do not expect to
build forces so powerful that they could launch a
first strike against the US without receiving un-
acceptable damage in return.
The Soviet strategic attack forces will con-
tinue to include numerous missile submarines. In
about 1968, the fleet will probably begin to have
(Cont'd)
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ANNEX (Cont'd)
improved submarines with longer range missiles, more
like US Polaris submarines than are present Soviet
types. Missile submarines will increase their
patrolling in the open seas, and in a few years a
number of them may be on station within missile
range of the US. The USSR will keep large numbers
of bombers and missiles which could deliver massive-
attacks against Europe and Asia. It will continue
to have a small force of bombers to use against the
US.
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
US Air Force, does not agree with certain major
views expressed in the estimate. He estimates that
"programs already underway, plus a continuing strong
research and development effort, reflect a Soviet
determination to rise from a position of strategic
inferiority to one of at least numerical parity
?with the US in the belief that such .a position
would markedly enhance the aggressive pursuit of
Communist aims." He considers that the Soviets
will build somewhat more ICBM launchers than fore-
cast in the estimate and that the estimate under-
plays the role of bombardment aviation in Soviet
intercontinental attack capabilities.
Official copies of this National Intelligence
Estimate will be distributed on 27 October. This
estimate will be followed within the next few weeks
by estimates setting forth our latest findings on
Soviet strategic defenses and Soviet general pur-
pose military forces.
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