THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 20 SEPTEMBER 1966

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0005968535
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
6
Document Creation Date: 
September 16, 2015
Document Release Date: 
September 16, 2015
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 20, 1966
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004700220001-1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 20 SEPTEMBER 1966 7t771-SEG-PR-E,_1_ 23 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004700220001-1 50X1 50X1 ouX1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004700220001-1 DAILY BRIEF 20 SEPTEMBER 1966 1. North Vietnam 2. North Vietnam 3. Vietnam 4. At Annex today is a brief discus- sion of North Vietnam's agricultural difficulties--between bad weather and the dislocation of war, prospects for the 1966 grain harvest are less than bright. 50X1 50X1 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004700220001-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004700220001-1 50X1 5. Great Britain 6. West Germany After three meetings with Erhard during the past week, General Julius Klein says that the chancellor is "very much a harassed and anxious man" about his trip to Washington. The majority of Erhard's advisers are'counseling him to call the visit off, and if this is not possible, are telling him that he must come back with some success or he will be politically finished. Since prospects for success on the offset question are considered dim, the only idea the chancellor has had so far is to get President Johnson to agree to visit West Germany "to show his interest in Europe." 50X6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004700220001-1 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004700220001-1, jxi 7. 50X1 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004700220001-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004700220001-1 ANNEX North Vietnam: Agricultural Difficulties There are strong indications that belts will be worn tighter in North Vietnam this winter. The prospects for the 1966 grain harvest are not promis- ing. Grain, especially rice, is the country's major food source. There are two rice harvests each year-- one in the spring that provides about one third of the supply and one in the fall that produces most of the remainder. This year the spring crop was well short of last year's and the regime is being con- spicuously silent about the upcoming harvest. Usually Hanoi trumpets predictions of great success well in advance. Rice is a tender crop to raise--abundant water is needed at one stage; too much at another stage will ruin the crop--and North Vietnam has been hav- ing some poor luck on weather. But a contributing factor is the dislocation caused by war. With the logistic system damaged by bombing, and the priority use of the system for movement of war supplies, food shipment from the villages to heavily populated areas takes second place. -Then there are also war-related shortages of manpower. There will be no starvation, but one immediate effect has been a rise in food prices on the free market. The regime is certainly capable of keeping the lid on inflation but this in turn creates prob- lems with black markets and hoarding. 50X1 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004700220001-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004700220001-1- TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004700220001-1