THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 24 FEBRUARY 1966 SPECIAL STUDY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005968173
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: February 24, 1966

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
SPECIAL STUDY:
Chinese Decision Making; The Long March and the Long War
24 FEBRUARY 1966
TOP SECRET
'7
4 'V C II V A
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THE LONG MARCH
The Long March left an indelible mark on Mao Tse-tung
and his comrades. Chiang Kai-shek and various warlords
harried them across 6,000 miles of China, and only one-
fifth of the group lived to make it to Yenan. Mao spent the
next 12 years in the Yenan badlands fashioning a revolution
which brought his Communists to power in 1949. Their
attitudes today remain deeply colored by the experience.
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CHINESE DECISION MAKING:
THE LONG MARCH AND THE LONG WAR
Summary
The men who control China's destiny today are
veterans of the Long March and the revolution.
These years molded them and still condition. their
attitudes toward the struggle they are waging ?
against the "American imperialists," which they
think of as the Long War.
These leaders are acutely conscious of their
Chinese heritage. This means they are quite
sure of their own superiority and their duty
to gain redress for the humiliation China
has suffered at the hands of foreigners.
The chief enemy to be overcome is the US.
- They are also Communists. This means that
they are predisposed.to totalitarian ways
- of doing business. This also means that
they see the world divided into two irrec-
oncilable camps;
- They are dominated by Mao Tse-tung. He is
A thorough-going militarist with a history
of violent conspiratorial activity. This
makes him and the group around him ruthless
and tough-minded.
- They are ambitious to make China a great
world power. They are old and ailing, yet
still command only a weak base. This has
led them to try to do too much, too soon,
sometimes with.painful results.
- They have slim resources to parcel out.
This has meant they cannot simultaneously
satisfy even the minimum demands of agri-
culture, industry, the military, the party
machine, and the government apparatus.
- They see? themselves as virtually alone in
a hostile world. This has created a Siege
mentality but has not dimmed their convic-
tion of eventual Victory.
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MAJOR FOREIGN ENCLAVES
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SPHERES OF INTEREST
British
French
German
Russian
Japanese
British and
French
?
Kunming
Note: Taiwan was occupied by the Japanese
0 City having foreign enclave
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CHINESE DECISION MAKING:
THE LONG MARCH AND THE LONG WAR
The Leaders have a Chinese heritage.
In the first place, the men in Peking are
acutely conscious of their Chinese heritage. Be-
ing Chinese, they carry a strong conviction of
their superiority, in race and culture, to all
foreigners. The Chinese call their country the
"Middle Kingdom" and for 4,000 years have con-
sidered it the civilized center of the universe,
surrounded by barbarians. To most Chinese, Chi-
nese art is the finest, Chinese poetry the rich-
est, Chinese food the tastiest, Chinese women the
most desirable, and so on.
China is also a dirt poor, agricultural
country. Most Chinese are peasants whose life
is nasty, brutish, and short. Life has always
been cheap, 'the individual counting for little.
Emphasis is on survival of the family or social
group. The Chinese peasant lives in small vil-
lages, not in individual farm dwellings. Mao Tse-
tung and his closest collaborators, except for
the mandarin Chou En-lai, come from this land and
out of this tradition. It helps make them hard-
bitten and indifferent to suffering.
They are strongly nationalistic.
The Chinese have regarded the foreigner with
disdain ot contempt. After more than a century of
exploitation by one foreign power after another,
this turned to hatred. Starting early in the 19th
century, foreigners came with weapons the Chinese
could not match. The foreigners, although contempt-
ible, repeatedly defeated the weak Chinese armies.
China was carved up into spheres of influence, and
enclaves were set up where the foreigner could live
on Chinese soil free of Chinese authority. Such
treatment would leave deep scars on any people.
It left the arrogant Chinese thirsting for revenge.
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THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARtY ORGANIZATION
PARTY CHAIRMAN
MAO TSE-TUNG.
The supreme aUthority
POLITBURO STANDING COMMITTEE
moo's comrades-in-arms; his closest advisors
NATIONAL PARTY
CONGRESS
Last met 1956
CONTROL
POLITBURO
17 FULL MEMBERS
The second circle of Mao's advisors,
each having his own specialties
MILITARY
'AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE
Oversees'
armed forces
SECRETARIAT,
Executes policy on a'
day-to-day basis ?
REGIONAL BUREAUS
Oversees part;,, aPpsaratus
in several provinces ,
? THEORETICALLY ELECTS
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CONTROL
COMMISSION
Guards against
backsliding in
party
CENTRAL DEPARTMENTS
Guide party work in special
fields, such as propaganda,
relations with foreign
parties, industry,
agriculture
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Under Mao and the Communists this hatred of
foreigners has been focused on the US. In their
eyes, the US sought to keep them from power. The
US opposed them in Korea and interposed its forces
to prevent them from seizing Taiwan. It continues
to support the "renegade" Chiang as the legitimate
ruler of all China. The US stands between them
and their larger design of extending their sway
over the former vassal states surrounding China.
The US does its best to put down the very revolu-
tions the Chinese support. Most of all, they fear
that the US means to do them in. China has from,
time to time suggested that it is permissible un-
der some circumstances to work with certain im-
perialists--but never with the US.
Though expressed in terms of fundamental Com-
munist principle, Mao's fight with the Soviets is
heavily nationalistic. In the late 1950s the Chi-
nese leaders became aware that the post-Stalin
group in the Kremlin would not, any more than Sta-
lin himself, place Soviet power at Mao's disposal.
Peking could see that the Soviets were dragging
their feet on giving China nuclear weapons. The
crowning blow fell in 1959 when Khrushchev went
to the US and began, in Mao's eyes, to consort
with the main enemy. Khrushchev stopped off in
Peking on his way back but no bands played, no
crowds cheered, not a handshake was offered.
They are Communists "steeled in struggle."
As Communists the Chinese subscribe to the
view that the world is divided into two camps en-
gaged in an all-out struggle which the Communists
are fated to win. China today is an orthodox Com-
munist state in which the party alone makes policy
and supervises its execution. The government and
the armed forces are kept under constant party sur-
veillance. The aim is total control, and in China
it has virtually been achieved.
Being rigidly orthodox Communists, Mao and ,
his associates must try to force the non-Communist
world into the preconceived framework of nineteenth
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MAO TSE-TUNG AND HIS COMRADES-IN-ARMS--
MAO TSE-TUNG
Ago 72. Party Chairman. Top man since 1935. Health declining,
often out of public view for months No evidence he is losing control ,
Has never visited a non-Communist country. Understanding of the
West limited and warped. Gasp of internal affairs may be slipping.
A supreme egotist, considers himself to be the rightful leader of
world communism.
LIU SHAO-CHI
Age 68. Mao's first lieutenant and his designated successor. A
frail man, a colorless personality, he may be too weak to hold the
top position long after Mao goes.
CHOU EN-LAI
Age 68, Once the most modelate member of the inner circle,
reasonably well informed about the outside world. His relative
moderation seems to be waning as he glows older. Runs the govern-
ment. Has little party strength and little chance to win the struggle
for succession.
T?ENG HSIAO-PING
Age 66. Tough, extremely militant, ambitious: Runs the executive
arm of the party which puts him in a good spot to take over after
Mao and Liu go.
? PENG CHEN
Age 66. Smooth, capable, and tough. The,most recent entry to
the inner circle.. Has played a key role in Chinese cont.rontations
With the Russians.
LIN PIA()
Age 58. The only military man in the lot.
as a !evolutionary field commander.
Seldom appears in public. Recently credited with
authoring article affirming Chinese intention to foment "anti-
imperialist" revolutions wherever possible in Asia, Africa, and
Latin America.
Has a brilliant record
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century capitalism as Marx saw it. This require-
ment, coupled with an almost total lack of personal
exposure to the non-Communist world, makes them
parochial men. They do not really understand
just what it is that motivates Westerners. Mao
and his associates are the hard-bitten survivors
of a savage struggle against enemies within the
party, against the Chinese Nationalists, and
against the Japanese. In their early years to-
gether they were hunted like animals, and Mao's
wife died at the hands of Chiang Kai-shek's po-
lice. The party was almost wiped out in 1927.
Later, in 1934, Chiang forced them to pull up
stakes and move their base of operations to the
Yenan caves in the northwest. This was the Long
March, during the bloody course of which Mao
seized control of the party. This history of
prolonged armed struggle has left the leaders
thoroughgoing militarists. Even political and
social problems are attacked through military
concepts, military directives, military organiza-
tion, military discipline.
They are dominated by Mao Tse-tung.
Since the Long March, Mao has been paramount
in the Chinese Communist movement. Only Stalin
exercised a comparable measure of power. Mao's
prejudices, opinions, and idiosyncrasies are per-
haps the most important single element in framing
Peking's policy. For all of his being Chinese,
Mao is like Stalin in some ways. Like Stalin,
Mao is a true totalitarian, seeking total control,
including control of thought, and demanding total
obedience, including professions of adoration.
Like Stalin, Mao is vain and cruel, encourages a
"cult," and relies on exhortation. And like Stalin,
Mao is less an international than a national Commu-
nist.
The importance of military force is at the
center of Mao's world view. He has even said
that Chiang Kai-shek "did a good thing in mas-
sacring Communists" because this taught them how
to wage war. He,says, over and over again, "All'
political power cotes out of the barrel of a gun."
Thils his foreign policy is distinctively based on
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PEKING'S LOST EMPIRE
f?
Great North West 1864 The Great North East)
'
1858
?
1860
Pamirs 1896
Nepal 1898
Sikkim 1889
CHINA
Bhutan 1889
Assam 1886
Burma )46-0
Thailand 1904
Andaman Is. 1886?:
.:""Ryukyu Is. 1910
l4.-Taiwan & Penghu Is. 1895
-
Annam 1885
Malaya 1895
1895
61248
This map was used by the 'Communists in a 1953
history text to show students how "imperialists"
had seized territory once a part of China or
under Chinese sway during the great days of the
old Empire.
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t.))(1
international tension and revolutionary war, and
he incites these small wars wherever he can.
Mao prefers, wherever possible, to
let others do the fighting and is cautious about
committing his own forces. Chinese troops poured
into Korea only when the US advance posed, to
Mao's way of thinking, a direct threat to China
and its most important industrial region. More-
over, Mao saw it as necessary to prevent the de-
struction of a neighboring Communist State.
In Mao's view, talks with the enemy are pos-
sible, even advisable, as a device to buy time or
gain an advantage. This does not mean that he be-
lieves in real give-and-take negotiations--only
take, since the real solution is the destruction
of the adversary.
Furious with the Soviets, the Chinese today
assert their pre-eminence in doctrinal matters.
They see themselves as the only true interpreters
of the old texts, and Mao as the only Communist
since Stalin to enrich the doctrine with creative
additions. The Chinese now speak of the three
great epochs of modern man--the epoch of Marx and
Engels, the epoch of Lenin and Stalin, and the
epoch of Mao Tse-tung. Only Mao has the stature
to stand alone.
The combination of Chinese chauvinism and
Mao's egotism is such a strong force that in re-
cent years he has even changed his basic concept
that the world is divided into Communist .and im-
perialist camps. Since 1960 he has seen the world
as divided into those countries responsive to his
concepts and therefore in his camp, and those antag-
onistic to his views and therefore in the enemy
camp. The Soviet Union is in the "enemy" camp,
since Mao regards it as working with the US to
frustrate and to bring down China.
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THE SECOND LEVEL OF
LEADERSHIP Age Principal Posts
k 1
*CHEN Yl
*LI FU-CHUN
*LI FISIEN-NIEN
65 Minister of Foreign Affairs
66 Chairman, State Planning Commission;
Member, Party Secretariat
59 Minister of Finance; Member, Party
Secretariat
*TAN CHEN-LIN 63 Director, Agriculture and Forestry Staff
'r Office, State Council; Member',
Party Secretariat
*LU TING-1
*KANG SHENG
*PO I-PO
*L0 JUI-CHING
*NIEH JUNG-CHEN
65 Director, Propaganda Department;
Minister of Culture
67 Member, Party Secretariat; intelligence
specialist '
59 Chairman, State Economic Commission
59 Chief, PLA General Staff; Secretary,
Military Affairs Committee; Member,
Secretariat
67 Member, Military Affairs Committee;
Chairman,? Scientific and Technological
Commission
*HSIEH FU-CHIH Minister of Public Security
*LI CHING-CHUAN 61 .1st Secretary, Southwest Regional Bureau
of the Party
TAO CHU 58 1st Secretary, Central-South Regional
Bureau of the Party
LI HSUEH-FENG 60 1st Secretary, North China Regional Bureau
of the Party
*LIU LAN-TAO 62 1st Secretary, Northwest Regional Bureau
of the arty.
*SUNG JEN-CHIUNG 62 1st Secretary, Northeast Regional Bureau
of the Party
*High-ranking party members since at least the early 1930s. The
majority accompanied Mao Tse-tung on the Long March to Yenan
61197 in 1934-35.
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They are old, ailing and isolated.
The men at the very top have been together
for a long time. Mao has been a member of the
party since it was founded in a back street of
Shanghai in 1921. So has Chou En-lai. Virtually
every meaningful post is filled by a veteran of .30
or more years in theupper levels. Rivalries have
been submerged or suppressed and may remain so
until the kingpin is removed. Mao believes
strongly that the only really trustworthy men are
those case-hardened through the crucible of revolu-
tion.
The Chinese leaders are old men. The average
age of the seven top men is nearly 68. Decades of
wielding virtually absolute power has left them
fixed in their ways. Certain of their policies,
some obviously bad, have been set in concrete by
the very myth of infallibility they nurture so as-
siduously. They are increasingly intolerant of
independent thinking outside their tight little
circle, and Mao may not put up with much debate
inside. It is hard for new ideas or suggestions
to penetrate such barriers.
Mao and his favorites have therefore tended
to become isolated, like the less successful em-
perors of old./
They do not get all the facts they need for their
own decisions, and have little feel forthe.fac
tots that enter into policy decisions elsewhere.
Today the aging Chinese tyrants are in ill
health and are deeply disturbed about what will
happen to their revolution when they are gone.
/The leaders are plainly fear-
ful about the younger generation, even though
Chinese Youth has been stuffed with Mao's propa-
ganda since weaning. Mao suspects, and perhaps
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GRAIN
FANTASTIC PRODUCTION CLAIMS
of the
'GREAT LEAP FORWARD' (1958-60)
imam
19586laims or plans
1959-60_cliairns or plans
S estimates of actuat
production
Figures are in
millions of tons
375 initial
?claim
250 revised
claim
200
CRUDE STEEL
61198
525 plan
297 plan
1957 958 1959 1960
NNW
1958-60 claims or plans
U S estimates of actual production
Figures are in
millions of tons
11 ? 13
12
1961 DATA
NOT
AVAILABLE
35-40
planned
7:5
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
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with some reason, that once the Long Marchers are
gone, the locomotive will be removed from the Chi-
nese Communist revolution and it will grind to a
halt.
They have vaulting ambitions.
Mao and his friends have set out to restore
China to what they regard as its proper place as
a great power in the shortest possible time. ?They
started fast in the early 1950s. For the first
time in decades a sense of unity and purpose was
imparted to the nation. The people backed the
regime and with Soviet helpgood progress was
made.
Then in 1958 Mao's hubris found expression
in two extreme programs. The first was the "Great
Leap Forward" and the other was the commune move-
ment. In the Leap, Mao tried by a massive appli-
cation of manpower and exhortation to achieve a
radical speedup in economic and military develop-
ment.
These were heady days for the leaders, who
for a time thought they had achieved a real break-
through. With "politics in command," the party
machinery reported what they wanted to hear.
Statistics showing incredible gains showered in
on them and were, strangely enough, believed. At
one point Mao was so impressed with grain produc-
tion claims that he announced a plan to let one-
third of the arable land grow all the grain China
needed. A crash program for steel production led
to the follies of the backyard furnaces. Primi-
tive equipment .blossomed in every village and
city and turned out millions of tons of useless
slag.
At the same time Mao ordered that the na-
tion's peasants be jammed into communes. These
monster collectives embraced 20,000-50,000 souls
who would (Mao thought), work, eat, and live to-
gether--the sexes properly separated except for
work heroes on "lucky Saturday night." The com-
munes did not work, but Mao went even further.
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BASIC ECONOMIC WEAKNESSES
3 775
CA
-c)
72
67
c.
o
a.
04 62.
1
'
.
763
')OPULATI
ON
.
,
GRAIN
IDRODUCTI
ON .
.
175
957 195R 1959 . 19611
1961.
1967
. 1963 ? 196A 191
300 '
? 0
250
200T
150
5
? POPULATION GROWS STEADILY WHILE,AGRICULTURE STAGNATES
LAKE
JAMMU
AND
KASHMIR
!status in dispute)
NORTH
KOREA
SOUTH
KOREA
YELLOW
SEA
INDIA
INDIA
TOTAL LAND AREA
(million acres)
CULTIVATED AREA
(million acres)
US CHINA
2,300 2,370
460 265
BURMA
CULTIVATED AREA 2.4 0.5
PER CAPITA
NORTH
VIETNAM
EAST
CHINA
SEA
TAIWAN
KOM:
I WI , ?
I ? PHILIPPINES
SOUTH CHINA SEA
er ====
THAILAND
IS
? ONLY 11 PERCENT OF THE LAND IS ARABLE, AND THIS IS ALREADY INTENSIVELY CULTIVATED
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He
He decided that every Chinese male should become
a militiaman. Dutifully, lists were compiled
and Peking gravely announced that China had
200 million militiamen, a figure greater than
the total number of Chinese males of military
age.
These harebrained ventures had by 1960 se--,
riously weakened Chinese industry and agricul-
ture. At this juncture Soviet help was abruptly
withdrawn. Disrter followed. China's economic
and military advance came to a screeching halt.
The Chinese are only now beginning to emerge from
the ensuing depression and have yet to come to
grips with China's basic economic shortcomings.
They need to get the economy going again.
Foremost among their weaknesses is the pres-
sure of too many Chinese on existing resources.
Last year grain output was about the same as in
the year before the Great Leap. Now there are
100 million more mouths to feed.
Agriculture is the critical sector of the
economy. Shortcomings here are the chief impedi-
ment to the development of a modern economy, Chi.-
nese agriculture requires massive investment and
new technology. But the top command parcels
these out in small amounts, preferring tb put. its
resources elsewhere. The farmers need also to be
freed from the fetters of the collective system.
As in other Communist states, the tiny private
plots allowed the peasantsare far more productive
than the collective land. But a departure from
collective farming is unthinkable. Retreat here,
Mao has said, would inevitably lead to a resurrec-
tion of capitalism. Finally, the situation calls
for ruthless birth control measures, for which
Mao long saw no need. He has recently permitted
a limited program to begin in the cities, but
even there it is too little and far too late.
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They need to improve their military machine.
Chinese industry took a terrible buffeting
from the follies of the Leap Forward. It still
shows idle capacity, wasted manpower, and techno-
logical lags. Resources for investment are so
scarce, however, that industry cannot be moved
ahead as a whole. There is not even enough for
heavy industry alone. Accordingly, competition
for resources is fierce. The military-minded
Mao always shows a marked preference for the war
industries. In recent years he has turned to ad-
vanced weapons.
/the Chinese nuclear force
will be taken most seriously by other nations of
the Far East. Since the ultimate objective is to
reach the US, Mao will Surely press ahead on an in-
tercontinental ballfstic missile or a nuclear-pow-
ered missile submarine as fast as he can.
Until this hope becomes reality, Mao must rely
on his large infantry force. Any war Mao fights
must be a land war in or near China. Moreover, he
has to cut his military doctrine to fit this cloth.
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So Mao's soldiers are taught that man is superior
to imperialist weapons. A current slogan runs, "the
best weapon is not the atom bomb but the thought
Mao Tse-tung."
Actually the Chinese leaders greatly fear US nu-
clear strike capability. This fear lies behind the
deep caution they display. It leads them to avoid
direct engagement with US forces and wherever pos-
sible to fight their Long War with the US through
proxies like the Vietnamese Communists.
They need to reinvigorate their people.
Mao and his circle face a number of serious
morale problems at home. Once they had the support
Of virtually all functionaries, the armed forces,
and the people at large, but since the Leap Forward,
that support has fallen away. Disappointed hopes
lie all about. Peasants are sullen and apathetic.
The intellectual is alienated. The lower ranks of
the party and the army are beginning to wonder.
The sense Of purpose has been lost and the Chinese
have begun to suspect that Mao, after all, may not
have the mandate of heaven.
Mao and the party are still exacting compliance,
but they have to lean much harder on the people to
get it. Much of the party's energy is burned up in
the effort. For example, the party has greatly in-
creased the number of watchdogs spotted all through
the armed forces and government bureaucracy to 04-
sure that Mao's will is carried out. Mao has had
experience with disgruntled generals. The last big
challenge to_him cable in 1959 from a group around
Defense Minister Peng Teh-huai.\
Mao still believes that it is possible to moti-
vate and control people by exhortation. He has
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Strengths and Weaknesses of the Military Establishment
CHINA HAS
THE WORLD'S LARGEST STANDING ARMY, FOURTH LARGEST AIR FORCE, AND THE THIRD LARGEST SUBMARINE FLEET.
,-- ?
ARMY ' AIR FORCE
. ? ?
Men: 2.3 million . Men: 148,000
Tanks: . 5,000 ' Jet fighters: 2,050
Artillery: 10,500 Jet light bombers: 270
Antiaircraft .
guns: 3,500
NAVY
Men: 76,500
Submarines: . 34
Major surface
vessels: 8
BUT-CHINAS MILITARY HARDWARE IS OLD AND OBSOLESCENT BY WESTERN STANCiARDS.
?
For example, nearly 85% of China's
jet interceptors are of the old
MIG-15/17 (Fagot/Fresco) variety,
aircraft comparable to the US
F-86 (Sabrejet)
-Class
MIG-l7 FRESCO
Radius:
Speed:
Displacement:
Length:
Surface range at
18-knot maximum speed: 2,800 NM
800 tons
249 feet
Over half of China's tank
inventory is made up. of the
World War II- designed
1-34 medium lank.
Submerged range
at I3-knot max speed 13 NM
at 2,5-knot cruise speed 150 NM
Main Armanent:
four bow 21" and
two stern 21" torpedo tubes
T-34
540 n.m.
545 knots
Combat ceiling: 54,500 ft.
Span: 31 ft.
Length: 38 ft.
China's large submarine
fleet is made up almost
entirely of the old
"W"-Class medium range
torpedo attack submarine.
Weight: 35.2 short tons
Speed: 35 mph
Cruising range on roads: 186 miles
Main armament: 85mm tank gun MI944 ?
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recently launched another of the seemingly endless
indoctrination drives. This one is backed up by a
campaign to emulate two synthetic heroes; one a
"rustproof screw" of the revolutionary machine,
the second an "all-purpose screw." Both are said
to have been simple soldiers who, so Peking's ver-
sion goes, martyred themselves for the glory of
Mao. They are presented as diligent readers of
Mao's works, which made them frugal, diligent,
selfless servants of the party. Returns on this
sort of thing have been diminishing, and it is
doubtful the leaders will get the success they so
badly need at home through these tired devices and
methods.
They feel besieged by foreign enemies.
If Mao's outlook at home is dim, it is scarcely
brighter abroad. The Chinese have absorbed a pain-
ful series of setbacks lately in Asia, Africa, and
Latin America. Through stupidity and bad timing
they have managed to turn sympathy into hostility.
The border war with India alienated a sympathetic
New Delhi. Bungling during last fall's Kashmir
war soured the Pakistanis. The Chinese position in
Indonesia has suffered greatly since the 30 Septem-
ber coup attempt. Japan is more wary and neighbors
to the south more fearful. Peking's stock in the
Afro-Asian world and in Latin America has fallen as
a result of a series of arrogant efforts to force
acceptance of Chinese positions. And even in the
most radical part of the Communist world, the circle
of loyal Chinese followers has been shrinking as
more and more Communist leaders take exception to
Chinese self-righteousness.
Just outside China's back door stands a great
wall of Soviet hostility. The Chinese can no longer
count on Moscow to honor its treaty commitment to
China's defense.f
I In
December 1963 Chen Yi declared that Soviet assur-
ances of defending China were of no value. Chou En-
lai told that the USSR
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would not assist China in the event of an.American
attack, nor would-Moscow attempt to prevent such an
'attack. The Soviets have done nothing to reassure
the Chinese.
Peering anxiously from Peking, the Chinese
leaders now profess to see themselves surrounded by
enemies and threatened by attack. As they formulate
it, a cabal, led by the US and including the treach-
erous Soviets, the militaristic Japanese, the de-
pendent British, and the running dog Indians, is
tightening a ring around China. Although this view
has paranoid elements, there is also a measure of
truth in it. What Mao does not realize is that he
has brought this state of affairs on himself.
? 'Nevertheless, Mao has been in many tight cor-
ners before. He spent more than a decade in the
caves of Yenan and emerged to destroy the Chinese
Nationalists-. He remains convinced that his policy
will again triumph, because, as before,his enemies
(capitalist and Communist) are soft, stupid, and
lacking in staying power.
They have hopes in Vietnam.
In this time of adversity, the men in Peking
place great importance on Vietnam. Besides a nat-
ural interest in the outcome of a war so close to
the China mainland, they feel, as Chinese, that
Vietnam is an area which rightfully should be under
their influence. Although the war has brought
added US power too close for real comfort, it is
still a confrontation to Mao's liking. It is a
war against the US being fought by proxies. Mao
needs provide'only military support and loud po-
litical backing.
Moreover, it offers a test case for Mao's
theory on "liberation wars," that is, that small
wars such as this can be fought and won without
provoking a US nuclear response against either the
local Communists or their larger sponsors. This
idea is part of Mao's dispute with the Soviets.
As Peking sees it, a military victory in Vietnam
would deal a heavy blow to Mao's principal enemies,
the hated Americans and the despised Russians.
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For all of the war's importance to Mao, he is
constrained in what he can do about the outcome by
the weakness of his military machine and by his
fear, however he may cloak it, of a US nuclear
punch against China. He must, therefore, do all
he can to keep the Vietnamese Communists in the
fight until the moment comes when the 'US wearies
of the struggle and gets out. His whole experience
tells him that this will inevitably happen, if only
the Communists persist long enough.
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