THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 21 FEBRUARY 1966

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005968165
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: February 21, 1966

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
21 FEBRUARY 1966
2, 3
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DAILY BRIEF
21 FEBRUARY 1966
1. Dominican Republic
2. Soviet Union
Preliminary analysis of the sweep-
ing changes in local government officials
decreed last Friday by Garcia Godoy
strongly suggests that this was a maneuver
to replace many Bosch partisans with fol-
lowers of former president Balaguer. It
does not seem, however, that the changes
have been sufficiently extensive to elimi-
nate entirely the edge enjoyed by the
Bosch forces in the municipal and pro-
vincial governments.
Bosch called a sudden meeting of .
his party's executive committee for this
afternoon. He may well challenge Garcia
Godoy on the local government changes.
He will perhaps also attack the compro-
mise plan the president has been working
on to solve his most immediate problem
with the military chiefs.
There is as yet no word as to whether
the recalcitrant army and air force chiefs
have agreed to the compromise plan, under
which they would be replaced but remain
in the country to serve on an advisory
general staff. The plan apparently has
the backing of at least some military
figures and seems to be the kind of "dig-
nified" solution all could accept. Bosch,
however, might well attack the plan as
a "sellout."
The USSR may be scheduling its first
sea shipment of military eaninment to
North Vietnam.
There is as yet no information on what
kind of military equipment may be involved.
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3. South Vietnam
4, Indonesia
The South Vietnamese Communists have
publicly admitted that a "number of our
own comrades" have become discouraged
over increased US military aggressiveness
and new psychological warfare and pacifi-
cation efforts in South Vietnam. The ad-
mission was in an article calling for a
new "political struggle" and was published
in the journal of the People's Revolu-
tionary Party--the guiding group in the
National Liberation Front of South Viet-
nam.
The argumentation seemed to reflect
a feeling among the Communists that they
must take steps to counter Saigon's re-
cently announced programs of economic
and social reform.
Sukarno has issued his challenge
to the army. If he succeeds, as he ap-
pears so far to be doing, he will have
re-established himself as the pre-emi-
nent authority in Indonesia. He has re-
placed General Nasution as defense min-
ister and abolished his other post as
armed forces chief of staff. Nasution
is widely regarded by all factions in the
country as the leader of the arilly!s anti-
Communist campaign.
There were a number of other changes
in the cabinet, which seem to constitute
a significant shift to the left.
Army chief Suharto had strongly op-
posed Nasution's dismissal
/It is a
volatile situation but now that Sukarno's
decision is both official and public
it seems that the army may not contest
it. The longer Suharto fails to act, the
less likely it becomes he ever will. An
account of Sukarno's efforts to reassert
his severely damaged authority during the
past six months is at Annex.
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5. Soviet Union
?
rs..
Italy
Moscow's new five-year plan, unveiled
by the party plenum on Saturday, calls,
for a 40-percent increase in the national
income by 1970. The planners expect to
accomplish this largely through a rise
of some 50 percent in industrial output
and, apparently, a 25-percent increase in
agricultural production over that of the
last five years.
Judging by the official summary,
which presumably puts it in its most fa-
vorable light, the new five-year plan is
based generally on realistic projections
of recent trends. However, it does con-
tain some factors that make its complete
accomplishment doubtful. In agriculture,
for instance, great store is being set on
the success of recent and largely untried
worker incentive schemes.
There is little in the plan's sum-
mary to shed light on whether the hard
decisions have been taken on how to split
the country's limited resources among
the major claimants--industry, agricul-
ture, defense, and the consumer. Empha-
sis on consumer durables, however, does
suggest that rapid growth in defense ex-
penditures is not planned.
Premier-designate Moro is apparently
to present his cabinet to the president
tomorrow or Wednesday. The long crisis
may be ending although few of the politi-
cal factions involved are happy with the
solution. The crisis has demonstrated
once again the basic fragility of the
center-left coalition.
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7. France
De Gaulle's press conference today
was one of his milder ones, at least the
portions of direct interest to the US.
He did not, however, change any of his
fundamental positions.
His treatment of French plans regard-
ing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
seemed aimed at creating a favorable cli-
mate for bilateral talks with the US re-
garding US forces and bases in France.
He implied some flexibility in his ap-
proach by stating that he wanted to make
the required changes "so they will not
inconvenience France's allies."
The French president was surprisingly
general in his references to Vietnam and
avoided outright criticism of the US.
His statements on the matter reflected
his view that a negotiated settlement is
not now a real possibility.
De Gaulle made his expected pitch
for consultations among the Common Market
countries without specificall callin
for them himself.
De Gaulle reserved his toughest
language for Morocco and the Moroccan
interior minister whom he charged with
responsibility for the Ben Barka murder.
Further deterioration in French-Moroccan
relations is likely.
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8. Libya
Influential monarchists have gotten
wind of the old King's plan to establish
a republic and are making known their ve-
hement opposition.(
/republicanism seems to be becom-
ing something of a magic remedy in the
minds of progressive elements long frus-
trated by their inability to exercise
significant political influence. Pres-
sures from this source are likely to
continue.
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ANNEX
Sukarno Versus the Army
Sukarno's recent gains toward re-establishing
himself as the pre-eminent authority in Indonesia
are due largely to his continuous maneuvering since
the coup attempt on 1 October. This was not par-
ticularly difficult because the army--under General
Suharto and Defense Minister Nasution--showed no de-
sire to remove him or take over the government. Their
objectives were to destroy the Communist Party, to
reorient internal politics away from Communism, and
to break Indonesia's attachment to Peking.
Nevertheless, Sukarno at first found himself
badly tarnished by his implication in the plot and
he was left on the sidelines while the army addressed
itself to reversing the coup and destroying the Com-
munists. In this situation, his main problem was
that he had to operate without the support of the
Communist Party and its crucial resources for agi-
tation and propaganda.
Sukarno, however, has always acted on the premise
that "he who would retain power must use it," Although
his personal authority was badly eroded, he worked
from the beginning to use and expand what he retained.
Many of his initiatives did not prosper, but this
did not stop him from making new attempts or repeat-
ing old ones.
Sukarno's first asset was his own political
skill--no army figures or non-Communist political
leader has even been any match for him. Then there
was the increasingly obvious fact that the army ?did
not plan to move against him. Finally, there was the
realization that he was still accepted as the national
leader by all elements of the population.
Another factor in his favor was the chaos brought
on by the development of two administrative centers--
Sukarno and the army--at a time when the army realized
the necessity of re-establishing a unitary government.
(Cont d)
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ANNEX (Cont d)
A brief catalogue of Sukarno's other maneuvers
would include his continuing ability to purchase time
by first offering and then delaying his "political
solution;" his absolute refusal to ban the Communist
Party; his launching of a "Sukarno Front" last month;
and today his bold move of dismissing Nasution, the
"political leader"of the army.
Sukarno assumed that time was on his side and
that army momentum would slow as the urgency of the
postcoup situation di.ssipated. The army had hoped
to make the attempted coup a turning point in Indo-
nesian history; Sukarno insisted that it was merely
a "ripple in the revolution." Although there will
still be more maneuvering, foot dragging, and tempo-
rary intransigence, Sukarno, if he gets away with
his latest moves, will be well on his way again to
closing the ranks of Indonesian society behind him.
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