THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 2 JULY 1965

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005967762
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: July 2, 1965

.. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A003800170001-7
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
2 JULY 1965
21
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DAILY BRIEF
2 JULY 1965
1. Communist China
2. North Vietnam
3. South Vietnam
There is an indication in an inter-
cepted message that military control may
have been imposed over at least some
rail lines not directly linking with
Vietnam. The message states that goods
could not go by rail from a point in
coastal East China to one in West China
without a "certificate of military trans-
port."
More information is required for
a firm assessment. One implication is
that other rail lines are feeding traf-
fic to the line into Vietnam. Another
is that there is generally heavy mili-
tary usage of the lines. For some weeks
there has been information that the usual
traffic on north-south rail links has
been disrupted.
The signs so far are that the North
Vietnamese spring rice crop, normally
about one third of the annual supply,
may equal last year's bumper crop. In
the next few months, therefore, there
should be no serious food shortage, ex-
cept those caused locally by disruptions
to transport.
After initially ordering some 36
Vietnamese language newspapers in Sai-
gon to shut down during July, Premier
Ky has been backing and filling. Yes-
terday he said he would reconsider after
a three-day shutdown. This controver-
sial episode, which is raising tempers
inside as well as outside the govern-
ment, will undoubtedly be followed by
others. At Annex today is an assess-
ment of the still uncertain mixture of
political assets and liabilities pro-
duced by the restoration of the mili-
tary to power.
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4. USSR
Soviet troop deployments to the
Chinese border during 1964 were more ex-
tensive than was first apparent.
5. Dominican Republic
Sino-Soviet border talks collapsed
last August during the intense war of
polemics, the Chinese accusing the USSR
of occupying their territory and of mass-
ing troops. Since Khrushchev's downfall,
however, the territorial issue has been
muted.
Rebels attacked another government
police unit this morning.
Last Saturday they raided a police
station in the northeastern part of the
republic. Today's attack was in the
southeastern town of Ramon Santana.
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two police were killed and three wounded
by an unknown number of rebels, armed
with at least one machine gun. Ramon
Santana is in the La Romana - San Pedro
de Macoris area,
(See map.)
The split in the rebel ranks is be-
coming more overt. The Fourteenth of
June Political Group--the largest of the
extremist groups--is now publicly oppos-
ing Caamano's discussions on the Organi-
zation of American States' proposals.
The group is apparently fearful the dis-
cussions will end in agreement to ban
its activities.
Most of the rebel leaders are re-
fusing to accept Garcia Godoy as provi-
sional president. They consider him a
representative of the oligarchy. Bosch,
however, believes he would be "acceptable,"
and there are indications that rebel op-
position may not be inflexible.
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6. Greece
7. Peru
8. Malawi
Premier Papandreou's confrontation
with King Constantine now seems inevi-
table.
The premier appears set on remov-
ing conservative Defense Minister Garou-
falias as well as the army's right-wing
chief of staff. He intends to take over
the Defense Ministry himself as a means
of suppressing information about his
son's involvement with a covert left-
of-center political group within the
army.
Papandreou is to meet the King on
the announcement of the birth of the
heir to the throne, which is expected
momentarily. If the King is adamant
in opposing the changes, Papandreou's
resignation may result. If not, right-
ist elements in the armed forces may
step up their contingency plotting
against the prime minister.
The pro-Cuban guerrilla threat in
Peru may be more serious than the gov-
ernment has let on.
On 27 June the rebels ambushed a
police unit in central Peru, killing
at least seven men. The rebels--re-
portedly in large numbers--were equipped
with modern automatic weapons, mortars,
and grenades. The rebel success will
probably compel the government to assign
regular army units to the ?antiguerrilla
campaign, replacing the poorly trained
police.
Malawi dissidents are reported plan-
ning to assassinate pro-Western Prime
Minister Banda. Malawi police have re-
ceived information that an attempt may
be made on 5 or 6 July.
The dissident guerrilla forces--
whose leader, Henry Chipembere, is in
the US for medical treatment--collapsed
last spring. Since then they have stated
that assassination is their only way to
oust Banda.
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ANNEX
The New Government in Saigon: Pros and Cons
There are several positive factors. The govern-
ment of General Thieu, chief of state, and Air Mar-
shal Ky, premier, probably more than any of its
predecessors, has struck a "revolutionary" public
posture. It is calling for an intensified mobiliza-
tion of the country's resources behind the war ef-
fort while at the same time proposing radical re-
forms. The cabinet itself consists largely of young
new faces--apparently dynamic and highly motivated
technicians with varied professional backgrounds.
At the same time, the retention of several members
of the Quat cabinet has maintained a degree of conti-
nuity in the government.
During the past month or so, the military leader-
ship has displayed a considerable degree of unity.
If it continues, this could generate the power and
authority long needed to implement the many programs
crucial to the war effort. Thus far, the military
leaders appear to have retained the support of Bud-
dhists and student elements, and at least temporarily
to have disarmed those Catholics, southern politicians,
.and labor leaders who had eventually forced Quat's '
ouster.
The negatives, however, are numerous. There
is little political sophistication among the pres-
ent military leaders, who show little grasp of the
immensity and complexity of the problems they face.
Though zealous and strongly nationalistic, they
tend to be impatient, to oversimplify issues, and
to propose extreme solutions with little prior plan-
ning or appreciation of their potential impact.
Some of the government's social, economic, and po-
litical proposals are so drastic that they risk an-
tagonizing the sophisticated and well-entrenched ur-
ban elements, and could strain the country's limited
bureaucratic resources
While success may galvanize the new leadership
and its supporters, failure or the realization that
some programs are not realistic could easily arouse
public opposition and even personal antagonisms with-
in the leadership. However united they may be at
the moment, it would be rash to assume that the
(Cont' d)
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ANNEX (Cont'd)
present military leaders will be immune to tempta-
tions to allow ambitions for power to override na-
tional interests. Nor will they be immune to mu-
tual suspicions such as have already been reported
between Ky and Colonel Lieu. As head of the Na-
tional Police, Lieu is also a close friend and pro-
tege of General Thi, the politically powerful commander
of I Corps (the five northern provinces).
Finally, at a time when the war appears to be
entering a new level of intensity, the preoccupation
of the generals with political matters could seriously
weaken Vietnamese military capabilities. It is pos-
sible that the military, though exercising real
power and holding the top posts, may actually dele-
gate considerable authority to civilian officials.
However, should this authority cover little more
than day-to-day operations, the political demands
on the generals would still be excessively distract-
ing.
At the present time, the new government seems
to enjoy relative freedom from open opposition de-
spite continuing undercurrents of skepticism and
criticism. Indeed, the new leadership appears to
have inspired a degree of acceptance reminiscent of--
though by no means equal to--that displayed after the
ouster of the Diem regime. However, its public image
so far is based on dynamically-stated goals rather
than on concrete action_
? The next month or so may be crucial, for it is
obvious that the government's supporters as well as
its critics are reserving final judgement until it
clearly demonstrates its capabilities.
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