THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 25 JUNE 1965

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005967750
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: June 25, 1965

' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A003800110001-3
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
25 JUNE 1965
23
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DAILY BRIEF
25 JUNE 1965
1, South Vietnam
2. North Vietnam
3. Algeria
Today's explosion at a floating
restaurant in Saigon may be the begin-
ning of a new Communist terrorist cam-
paign.
At last report, the waterfront
blast had killed 14 persons (9 US) and
wounded 28 (9 US). The Viet Cong also
announced today that a captured US serg-
eant had been executed in retaliation
for the government's execution of a ter-
rorist last Tuesday. A Soviet news cor-
respondent who recently visited the Viet
Cong is said to be predicting more at-
tacks against US personnel and installa-
tions.
?
No serious public reaction to the
new regime's austerity and mobilization
program has been noted.
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No major new developments were re-
ported today.
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PERSI AN GULF AREA
0Ahwaz
IRAQ
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Kuwait
NEUTRAL
ZONES
Abada
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Dhahran.
BAHRAIN.
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SAUDI ARABIA
Riyadh.
MILES
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IRAN
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GULF OF
OMAN
Muscat
SULTA N ATE
OF
MUSCAT
AND OMAN
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4. Indonesia
5. USSR
6. USSR
7. Trucial States
Sukarno and Communist Party chair-
man Aidit are scheduled to visit Moscow
next month. Aidit is also scheduled to
visit Peiping in late July, and Sukarno
may also turn up there. Aidit's travel
plans seem consistent with the Indonesian
party's set policy of keeping up fraternal
relations with both antagonists in the
Sino-Soviet dispute. An assessment of
the Communist Party's growing role in
Indonesia is Annex 1. 50X1
The USSR is apparently stepping up
its reconnaissance satellite program.
Cosmos 69 was launched this morning,
only ten days after Cosmos 68. The usual
period has been about twice that. 50X1
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The British may have stalled an
Arab League effort to extend its influ-
ence in the Persian Gulf area.
The league had been offering the
Trucial States economic aid. The Brit-
ish opposed this, and the five local
sheikhs had threatened to break their
longstanding Protectorate Treaties with
the US unless London acquiesced. Now,
however, their ringleader--the Sheikh of
Sharjah--has been ousted, almost certainly.
with British connivance. The other four
are likely to take the hint. (Map)
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z'
\
o Inter American
Peace Force
SANTO DOMINGO
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ISLANDS
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mg Principal Rebel-Held Area
cm Rebel-Infiltrated Area
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La Pomona
CARIBBEAN
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TENSION
19-
18
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8. Jordan
9. Ecuador
King Husayn told Ambassador Barnes
yesterday that the French have said they
are unable to fill his request for super-
sonic jet fighters. The King said he
is now appealing again for US assist-
ance. He feels that he must have a con-
tract by September, or bow to Arab League
demands that he either buy Soviet fighters
or allow other Arab states to station their
Soviet-equipped air units on Jordanian
soil.
Local police have warned the US
Consulate in Guayaquil of a plot by a
pro-Communist youth organization to bomb
the consulate and kidnap a US official.
The police say they expect "city-wide"
trouble during the next two weeks and
are taking precautions.
10. Dominican Republic Loyalist police and military re-
pulsed rebel attacks this morning in the
town of San Francisco de Macoris, re-
portedly killing seven and'wounding 40.
The rebels, some of whom may have exfil-
trated from the rebel stronghold in Santo
Domingo, had a number of automatic weapons.
There was trouble in this town back in
May, but elsewhere, rebel hopes of incit-
ing disorders have so far come to nothing.
Last night, Imbert for two hours
lectured a group of business and profes-
sional leaders in Santiago on the suc-
cesses of his government. His manner--
that of a chief of state--did not go
down well, nor did his neglect of the
efforts which members of his audience
had been making to find some way back
to national order.
In Santo Domingo, representatives of
the third-ranking Dominican political
party in point of size, the conserva-
tive National Civic Union, have provis-
ionally accepted the Organization of
American States' proposals, with a num-
ber of general reservations.
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ANNEX 1
Communist Gains in Indonesia
The Communist Party of Indonesia has substan-
tially expanded its governmental influence during
the past year. Sukarno seems to feel the need for
haste
in pressing toward his."SocialiSt" objectives for
the country, and is increasingly relying on the Com-
munist Party to help him. During the same period,
the. military--hitherto the main brake on the Commu-
.nists--has loyally supported Sukarno's policy, with
the result that its ability and Will to resist Com-
munist encroachment has been seriously eroded.
The results today are:
- Pro-Communists head several important ministries,
and hold a number of provincial governorships and
municipal and other local government offices
throughout the country.
- The Communists have demonstrated their power by
their redent successful efforts against US offi-
cial and economic enterprises.
-The political fortunes of anti-Communist ele-
ments have declined. The most prominent anti-
? Communist politicians are in eclipse; shorn of
their once considerable administrative authority.
Sukarno has in effect made anti-Communism a spe-
cies of felony, thereby discouraging all but the
most determined oppositionists.
- The army has been forced to accede--after long
opposition--to a limited program of training and
arming a "people's militia." By Sukarno's.fiat,
military doctrine taught in the army's schools
now holds that "Western imperialists" rather than
the Communist Chinese are the likely national
enemy. Senior officers, hitherto pro-Western,
are trimming their sails, or have already suc-
cumbed to the new line. In the lower ranks, it
is fair to conclude that significant Communist
influence exists.
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ANNEX 1 (Cont'd)
While Sukarno lives, the likely prospects are:
- The trend toward increased Communist power under
Sukarno's sponsorship will continue.
- Sukarno will appoint more Communists and pro-Com-
munists to national and local government offices.
- Sukarno will probably ?continue harassing and grad-
ually confiscating remaining US and other foreign
economic interests.
- The Indonesian economy will continue to deterio-
rate seriously, though 80 percent of the popula-
tion which lives a relatively self-sufficient
rural life will not be greatly disturbed. In any
case, Sukarno will not be gentle in using the,
army and police to put down any civil disorders
that may ensue.
However, Sukarno's main object is probably not
to create a Communist state in Indonesia, but rather
to create a genuinely unified radical-nationalist
community loyal to himself and his policies. He
probably regards the Communist Party'as a fitting-
instrument handy to his purposes. As long as the
army remains essentially hostile to the Communists,
Sukarno will feel no danger that they will threaten
his personal dominance. For their part, the Commu-
nists are probably counting on present gains to place
them,in entrenched positions from Which they:cannot
be dislodged when Sukarno.leaves.the scene,
-2-
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? (10 SMALL SINGLE SILOS IN A CIRCULAR PATTERN)
Nautical Miles
TYURA TAM LAUNCH AREAS
KEY
65,2511
? ROAD
RAILROAD
? TRACK
? SAM SITE
? SOFT LAUNCH PAD
? LARGE SINGLE SILO
? SMALL SINGLE SILO
??? OLD TRIPLE SILO SYSTEM
G9
G3
G4
450,411 :6
7
G LAUNCH AREA
A LAUNCH AREA
Al
Soft pad
55-6 & Space
GI & 2
2 Soft pods
A2
Soft pod
SS-8 & ?
G3 & 4
2 Soft pads
A3
Large Single Silo
?
G.5 & 6
2 Soft pads
A4
Soft pad
G7
Large Single Silo
G8 & 9
2 Small Single Silos
B LAUNCH AREA
El Soft pad
B2 Large Single Silo
B3 Soft pad
C LAUNCH AREA
Cl & 2 2 Soft pads SS-7
C3 Soft pad
D LAUNCH AREA
DI 3 Silos SS-7
D2 3 Silos SS-9
E LAUNCH AREA
El &2 2 Soft pads SS-8
E3 Soft pod SS-8
SS-6 & Space
SS-7 & Poss. SS-9
F LAUNCH AREA
3 Silos SS-8
H LAUNCH AREAS
HI &2 .2 Soft pads
55-10
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I LAUNCH AREA
Large Single Silo
- ? -
J LAUNCH AREA
Undetermined
K LAUNCH AREA
K1 Large Single Silo
K2 Large Single Silo
K3 Small Single Silo
SS-9
L LAUNCH AREA
10 Small Single Silos
I. Silos A3, 82, & I area single system
2. Silos KI, K2, & G7 area single system similar to A3/B2/1 system.
3. Silos G8 & G9 are a silo system similar to soft system at G5 & G6.
6506112C
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ANNEX 2
The Soviet ICBM Development Program
as many as four liquicLfueled
ICBM development and modification programs are go-
ing forward at the Tyuratam rangehead.
Some of these programs may also be related to
space launch systems.
Additional test programs may become evident
soon. For example, at the last Moscow parade we
saw one new liquid-fueled and one new solid-fueled
ICBM, neither of which has yet been identified in
Tyuratam testing.
From satellite photography we know of three
types of soft launch pads recently completed at
Tyuratam, and two types of hardened single silos
under rapid construction there. (See graphic.)
Also from photography we know that similar
silos of both- types are being deployed in substan-
tial numbers at operational sites.
We are still sorting out and correlating these
various developmental and deployment programs. They
are clearly designed to give the Soviet Strategic
Rocket Forces a more effective, less vulnerable ar-
senal of long-range missiles.
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