THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 8 APRIL 1965

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005967615
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: April 8, 1965

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A003600150001-1
CENTRAL INT
EILLIGENCE AGE
NCY
HE PRESIDENTS
DAILY BRIEF
8 APRIL 1965
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DAILY BRIEF
8 APRIL 1965
U-2 photography of 5 April has pro-
vided the first solid evidence of a SAM
site in North Vietnam. The site is about
15 miles southeast of Hanoi and is in
the late stages of construction. No mis-
sile equipment was noted, however. Much
of the area was cloud-covered and a com-
plete search for other sites was not pos-
sible.
50
Press sources have been quoting So-
viet officials in Moscow as saying that
Soviet military equipment is definitely
en route to North Vietnam. The officials
allegedly claim that "procedural" dif-
ficulties with Peiping have been cleared
up.
1
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2. North Vietnam
3. South Vietnam
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Yesterday's appointment of North
Vietnamese politburo member and Deputy
Premier Nguyen Duy Trinh as foreign min-
ister upgrades the status of this post,
held since 1961 by Central Committee
members who ranked relatively low on
Hanoi's power ladder. At the least, it
probably means that Hanoi anticipates
or intends a new intensification of ac-
tivity in the international political
and diplomatic arena. Until Trinh be-
gins showing his hand, however, it is too
early to determine what significance his
appointment may have regarding an in-
tention to initiate negotiations over
South Vietnam. An analysis is at Annex.
A small group of disgruntled sub-
ordinate naval commanders-.
-have apparently
succeeded in getting Admiral Cang and
his deputy relieved from command of the
navy.
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Press reports that a "mutiny" has oc-
curred seem luridly overdrawn, since not
a shot has been fired, nor voices raised
in anger.
The Armed Forces Council is to
meet urgently to discuss the char es
against Cang.
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4, President's Speech Communist reactions to the Presi-
dent's 7 April speech are only begin-
ning to come in and so far provide no
real key to the Communist response.
Hanoi has not yet been heard from.
Peiping, in an initial domestic broad-
cast this afternoon, quoted passages
of the speech, but branded it as "full
of lies and fraud." The broadcast said
the offer to discuss Vietnam without
conditions was "old stuff with new
decorations," whose aim was to allow US
troops to carry out their "aggression."
Moscow has broadcast several sparse
press items on the speech, but has not
yet commented authoritatively. Party
leader Brezhnev, in a speech today in
Warsaw which denounced US policy in
Vietnam and asserted Moscow's readiness
to assist North Vietnam in "strength-
ening its defenses," avoided any men-
tion of the President's remarks.
5. Berlin
6. Bolivia
Bonn is still considering holding
the 28-30 April meeting of the West Ger-
man upper house--the Bundesrat--in West
Berlin. A decision is likely tomorrow.
?An affirmative decision would probably
provoke a continuation or an intensifi-
cation of the Communist harassing ac-
tivities of the past few days.
Hernan Siles' Nationalist Revolu-
tionary Movement may try to stage demon-
strations in La Paz tomorrow, despite
the junta's decree prohibiting them.
The junta has taken security precau-
tions, but some violence may occur. Siles
seems bent on forcing junta president Bar-
rientos to form a political alliance with
his party and is testing the junta's nerve.
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Cyprus
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1 UF LIET UC.)NTAINS SIGIN I AND KEYHOLE MATERIAL
ANNEX
Hanoi's New Foreign Minister
Nguyen Duy Trinh, 55, was born in southern
Vietnam and fought there with the Viet Minh against
the French. Considered a most competent technician,
he has long been a top economic administrator, hold-
ing the regime's top planning post since 1958. He
has been one of five deputy premiers since 1961,
during the past year the most active public figure
in this group, and a member of the eleven-man party
politburo since 1957.
Xuan Thuy, replaced as foreign minister on the
grounds of ill health, has been absent for several
months from official functions where he might have
been expected to put in an appearance and may in-
deed be ill. However, Xuan Thuy has apparently
served more as a spokesman and factotum than as a
policy maker. There is no doubt that his replace-
ment by a man with Trinh's credentials upgrades the
foreign ministry post, which,since 1961 when it was
relinquished by present Premier Pham Van Dong, has
been held by men of lesser stature.
This undoubtedly means Hanoi sees a forthcom-
ing period of intense international political and
diplomatic activity and that the regime therefore
wishes to place the conduct of its foreign relations
in the hands of a man high in its counsels.
Beyond this, until Trinh tips his hand, pub-
licly or through diplomatic channels, it is diffi-
cult to determine the significance of his appoint-
ment and whether or not Hanoi intends to change di-
rection in its policy.
Trinh has not been prominent in the party po-
lemics between the hard-line pro-Peiping and the
more moderate pro-Moscow factions. He has worked
closely with the Soviets in negotiating economic
agreements, has been to Moscow at least four times,
and has written of the need for close bloc economic
cooperation. Some observers have characterized him
as a hard-line extremist, basing this primarily on
his delivery of several pro-Chinese speeches in Al-
bania. He may lean personally toward the militant
and uncompromising position of the pro-Peiping fac-
tion, but the evidence is not convincing.
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On the other hand, his earlier southern his-
tory and his past personal identification with the
resistance movement in the south could imply that
Hanoi foresees or intends new developments in its
relationships with the Viet Cong and the south which
might overshadow in importance its relationships
elsewhere.
Several previous changes in the foreign min-
istry post have subsequently seemed to foreshadow
changes in the course of North Vietnamese policy.
In 1963, for example, a probable "moderate" was
dumped in favor of Xuan Thuy, regarded by some ob-
servers as more pro-Chinese. Somewhat later, .a
shift in North Vietnamese foreign policy toward
Chinese views did become evident.
More indications are required before we can
attempt to read a change in policy direction into
yesterday's appointment.
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