THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 30 MARCH 1965

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005967599
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: March 30, 1965

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
30 MARCH 1965
-1MP-SEGIR-E.1_
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LAOS
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Ban Houei Sai
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DAILY BRIEF
30 MARCH 1965
1. Vietnam
The Communist "Liberation Radio"
has acknowledged that the bombing of the
US Embassy in Saigon was the work of the
Viet Cong. The broadcast at noon today
called the bombing a "very great exploit
of the armed forces" in response to a
central committee directive.
Hanoi radio proclaimed today. that
if the US commits "further crimes" against
the North, it will meet "increasingly
painful" results.
'A curious incident near Saigon sug-
gests that the Viet Cong are trying to
counter any uplift to local morale spring-
ing from the air strikes to the north.
Viet Cong personnel stopped a bus recently
and lectured the passengers to the effect
that the air strikes.have been ineffec-.
tive.
Other than the bombing in Saigon,
no major Viet Cong actions have been ,re-
ported. However, small-scale terrorism,
sabotage,, and harassment continue in
the countryside.
' No political developments of impor-
tance have been reported in the past
-twenty-four hours. Coup rumors .circu-
lating in the past few days still seem
to have no substance.
So far, there is nothing to sug-
gest that the impending transfer of So-
viet Ambassador Chervonenko from Pei-
ping to Prague reported in the press is
other than routine. It is true, however,
that the Chinese have given ChervOnenko
a rough ride lately on the Vietnam prob-
lem and other sticky issues.
Peiping and Hanoi continue to raise
the possibility that volunteers, as well
as arms, may be sent to South Vietnam.
So far, however, they have not actually
committed themselves to any new levels of
involvement. Further analytical comment
is at Annex.
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2. Cyprus
3. Laos
4. Saudi Arabia
All Greek Air Force personnel de-
tailed for training on the Soviet sur-
face-to-air missile have been recalled
from Cyprus to Greece
. None
pie had gone on to Egypt,
tual training was to have
istered.
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of these peo- 50X1
where the ac-
been admin-
Thakhek has now been recovered, and the
rebellion seems to be contained.
Meanwhile, Ambassador Sullivan says
it would take only one or two more "mon-
key shines" by Phoumi to cause serious
friction between Bangkok and Vientiane.
Efforts continue to get Phoumi and his
cohort, Siho, out of Thailand.
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5. USSR
. USSR
7. UAR
The Soviet-Turkish rapprochement
appears to be continuing despite the
recent furor over Soviet arms aid to
the Greek Cypriots.
Last
week a Turkish delegation in Moscow
completed a deal that will significantly
expand trade between the two countries
during 1965-66. Soviet diplomacy has
apparently skillfully exploited the
appeal of a joint opposition to enosis.
The Brief of 29 January reported
the discovery in satellite photography
of extensive trench networks at a stra-
tegic point on both sides of the Sino-
Soviet border. Re-examination of ear-
lier photography now suggests that those
trenches may have been built as early
as World War II. Close examination of
gun emplacements on the Soviet side in-
dicates they are empty.
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The Egyptians are in a serious
bind with respect to wheat and other
foodstuffs. Deputy Premier for Economy
Quaysuni says that they have only one
month's stock of wheat available. He
told Ambassador Battle that Egypt would
be "quite interested" in buying from the
US provided the price was right and credit
terms "reasonable."
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ANNEX
Volunteers for Vietnam
Talk of "volunteers" to aid the South Vietnam-
ese "people" continues. This talk was given further
prominence by Chinese Foreign Minister Chen I's
28 March message to the DRV foreign minister, which
stated that the Chinese people will exert every
effort to send the South Vietnamese people "the .
necessary material aid, including arms and all
other war material, and stand ready to dispatch
their men to fight shoulder to shoulder with the
South Vietnamese people whenever the latter so re-
quire." This warning was picked up in a People's
Daily editorial on 29 March, which asserted that
following the US "occupation" of South Vietnam and
"aggression" against North Vietnam, "its next step
will be aggression against China."
The NLF, Hanoi, and the Chinese Communists
are apparently trying to boost the morale of Com-
munist forces in South Vietnam. More importantly,
they are trying to raise the spectre of general war
on the Indochinese mainland in order to increase
the diplomatic and political pressure on the US
and to deter the US from continuing, and perhaps
increasing, its present policy line.
These statements do not appear to signal any
overt infusion of North Vietnamese or, especially,
Chinese strength into the war in South Vietnam
though there may be some increase in North Viet-
namese support to the Viet Cong. As the Communists
must certainly realize--indeed Peiping is almost
certainly counting heavily on just this--current
Chinese and Vietnamese statements raise recollec-
tions of Korea in the fall of 1950. Actually, the
Korean situation of a decade and a half ago and the
present situation in Vietnam differ in many mate-
rial aspects. In Korea, US forces had either ac-
tually reached or were rapidly advancing towards
the very borders of China itself, and all indigenous
(i.e., North Korean) opposition to such US advances
had been virtually eliminated. No comparable situa-
tion exists in Vietnam, north or south, at the
present time. Peiping and Hanoi almost certainly
intend to play heavily on US and free world fears
of another Korea, but the chances of the Communists'
responding in Vietnam within the near future as
they responded in Korea in 1950 now appear consider-
ably less than even.
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