THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 27 MARCH 1965

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005967595
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: March 27, 1965

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A003600050001-2
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
27 MARCH 1965
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DAILY BRIEF
27 MARCH 1965
1. Cyprus
The possibility of disturbances
this weekend..within the Turkish commu-
nity because-of a shortage of wheat and
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has been averted by :a government decision
to issue an advance ration from next
week's quota. This is another example
of Makarios' virtuoso touch in judging
when to ease pressures on the Turks.
Both Papandreou and Makarios ex-
pect that UN mediator Plaza's report
next week will recommend new negotiations.
Papandreou, in conversation with.Ambassa-
dor Jernegan yesterday, was evasive on
the question of negotiations with the
Turks, although he said that with the
submission of Plaza's report, the period
in which talks are "inadvisable" would
be "drawing to an. end." Makarios, on
the other hand, reportedly is all set
to call for bilateral negotiations with
the Turkish Cypriots alone.
Ambassador Hare reports that the
Turks, despite the absence of emotional
public drum-beating, are united in be-
lieving that the time has come fora
showdown. He points out that :this con-
sensus embraces the government, the
parliament, and the military, and has
been achieved during the-past week or
so "seriously, stolidly, and resolutely."
The Turks are considering military ac-
tion against Greece itself as a last re-.50X1
sort.
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2. Vietnam
3. Laos
4. Lebanon
No significant changes have been
reported since yesterday in the military
and political situation in South Vietnam.
Couve de Murville told Ambassador
Bohlen yesterday that the French have
heard nothing recently on the Vietnamese
situation from Hanoi or Peiping. He gave
the impression that Paris has for the
moment abandoned any hopes of eliciting 50x1
a favorable reaction on a conference.
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5. Congo
6. British Guiana
The Burnham government may have found
.a .solution to its rice surplus, thanks to
the Puerto Ricans, who have tentatively
agreed to buy 10,000 tons now and up to
40,000 tons annually. The deal will freeze
Cuba out of this trade and give Burnham a
boost at the expense of Cheddi Jagan, who
is even now in Havana.
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ANNEX
"Volunteers" for Vietnam
statements on this subject by the National Libera-
tion Front for South Vietnam (issued Monday), the
USSR (Tuesday) and Communist China (Friday).1
Hanoi; "The Front statement is a major one.
It would not have been issued except at the direc-
tion of Hanoi. It makes clear that the North Viet-
namese have not been deterred by US air action from
continuing the war in South Vietnam. It may, how-
ever, reflect a growing awareness among the authori-
ties in Hanoi of the likely painful consequences
if the US air attacks are continued and gradually
increased in intensity.
"The statement itself rehearses the well-known
North Vietnamese and Liberation Front aims; namely,
'to drive out the US imperialists, liberate the South
and reunify the country.' No mention is made of an
independent or neutral Vietnam. On 'volunteers,'
the Front says it will call for them if the US con-
tinues to commit combat troops and extend the war
to North Vietnam and Laos."
Moscow; "Brezhnev's statement on Tuesday did
not refer to the Front statement and was studiously
vague about volunteers. He said that Soviet citizens
were expressing their readiness to take part in the
struggle of the Vietnamese people, but said nothing
about the Soviet Government being ready to send them.
He did, however, specifically state that the Soviet
Union was already, taking the necessary measures to
help the defensive capacity of North Vietnam. We
still are convinced that the Soviet Government is
likely to wish to avoid going beyond sending mili-
tary equipment which the North Vietnamese can operate
themselves. We consider that the Soviet Government
will be reluctant to commit personnel in a situation
where their control of events is so limited and
where the North Vietnamese and Chinese are in a po-
sition to continue the war if they so wish."
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Peiping: "The Chinese.waited until Friday, but
then went further than the-Russians. They responded
directly and almost:word.for word to the Front state-
ment (which suggests prior consultation), promising
to-send..all necessary material aid, including arms
and all other war materials, and expressing readiness
to send their own men 'whenever the South Vietnamese
people want them.' We consider that the Chinese,.
like the North Vietnamese and indeed the Russians,
are-aiming mainly, to raise the temperature and thus
to bring:pressure to bear on the-United States.
Nevertheless, the Chinese have thus deliberately
taken a-small step-nearer direct Chinese involve-
ment (which would not necessarily, if-decided upon,
be in South Vietnam)."
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