THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 6 FEBRUARY 1965

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0005967505
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
6
Document Creation Date: 
September 16, 2015
Document Release Date: 
September 16, 2015
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 6, 1965
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A003400410001-4 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 6 FEBRUARY 1965 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A003400410001-4 50X1 23 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24: CIA-RDP79T00936A003400410001-4 DAILY BRIEF 6 FEBRUARY 1965 1, South Vietnam 2. Laos 3. Sudan 4. Cuba In talking to McGeorge Bundy yes- terday, General Khanh concentrated largely on eliciting information about US intentions. He asked whether the US could accept a military chief of government, suggesting that he has not abandoned the idea of his own acces- sion. Khanh also said he is having some trouble forming the new civilian- military council but hopes to have one next week. Generals Phoumi and Siho have turned up in Thailand, still with the hope of assembling forces for a march on Vientiane. The Laotian Government has made a strong demarche to Bangkok insisting that they be placed under house arrest far from the border. A coalition of conservative politi- cal, military, and religious leaders intends to demand an immediate and drastic reduction of Communist influence in the present government. If its de- mands are not met, the group is prepared to stage a coup, possibly within the next few days. A public trial of Joaquin Ordoqui, an old-guard pre-Castro Communist, for collaboration with Batista authorities is probably forthcoming. This will bring into the open again the long- simmering tensions between Cuba's "old" and "new" Communists and conceivably might lead to a purge of the Moscow- favored old-liners. However, Castro, for fear of Moscow's reaction, will prob- ably keep it from going that far. De- tails are at Annex. 50X1 50X1 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A003400410001-4 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24: CIA-RDP79T00936A003400410001-4 5, Greece Leftists sponsored the parliamen- tary motion adopted today to try former Prime Minister Karamanlis for alleged abuses of office. This apparent Com? - munist effort to distract public.atten- tion from the USSR's pro-Turkish stand on Cyprus is being supported tacitly by Prime Minister Papandreou for his own purposes. He seems to be trying to deflect attention from the shortcomings and mounting problems of his.administra- tion. The US Embassy feels that Greek conservatives will be further alarmed by this example of growing Communist "boldness" under Papandreou's regime. 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A003400410001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A003400410001-4 jxi ? ANNEX Castro and the Cuban Communists Cuba's "new" Communists--those who are loyal to Fidel above all else--have long castigated the pre-Castro Communists for waiting until the eve of victory to join the Castro revolution. Moreover, they argue that the old-line, Moscow-oriented Com- munists are not loyal supporters of Castro and the "Cuban revolution." The friction between these factions was sharply defined in March 1962 when old-guard Communist leader Anibal Escalante was publicly tried and exiled for, in effect, attempting to edge Castro's new Communist followers out of the hierarchy of his new Marxist- Leninist party and to replace them with former old- line Communists. The trial of Marcos Rodriguez last March for betraying four Cuban revolutionaries to Batista in 1957 was the next public chapter in this feud. Dur- ing the trial, the new Communists charged that the old Communists had been behind the betrayal. This trial disclosed that Joaquin Ordoqui, a pre-Castro Communist leader, and his wife had befriended Rodriguez after the betrayal and, in a sense, had covered up for him. Ordoqui 's wife was eased out last summer, and in November, Ordoqui himself was publicly suspended from his post as Cuban military quartermaster and from the party directorate. Cuba's new Communists have been pressing Castro hard for a public trial of Ordoqui. The Ordoqui issue has created a dilemma for Castro. His own power position seems unchallenged now. However, one plan for assuring this has been to play one Communist group off against another and a show trial now of a prominent old-guard Communist could shatter the vestiges of the pre-Castro party. (Continued) 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A003400410001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A003400410001-4 Moreover, /should a trial lead to a purge of old-line Communists, it could severely jolt Havana's relations with Moscow. Pre- sumably Castro wishes to avoid this. 50X1 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A003400410001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A003400410001-4 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A003400410001-4