THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 1 FEBRUARY 1965

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005967495
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: February 1, 1965

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
1 FEBRUARY 1965
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DAILY BRIEF
1 FEBRUARY 1965
1. South Vietnam
2. Laos
3. Sudan
The Vietnamese New Year holidays
will last most of this week and may
slow down political wrangling. The
Viet Cong cease-fire appears to be in
effect,and military activity has dropped
following a brief, pre-holiday upsurge.
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The Communists are increasing their
military activity. They have resumed
operations in the Thakhek area in cen-
tral Laos and have forced Meo guerrilla
units out of their positions near Muong
Sal. They are also maintaining pres-
sure on the Meo near Sam Neua. (See
map.)
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4. North Vietnam
. USSR
6. France-Germany
Moscow's decision to send Premier
Kosygin to North Vietnam underscores
both its desire to regain influence in
Hanoi at Peiping's expense and its con-
cern over the possibility of escalation
in the Indochina conflict. Kosygin's
delegation will probably arrange for a
substantial increase in economic and
military aid to North Vietnam. A dis-
cussion comprises Annex 1.
Bonn is now seeking ways to imple-
ment the De Gaulle-Erhard agreement at
their 19-20 January talks to seek new
Western meetingson German reunification,
possibly initially among the ambassadors
in Washington. De Gaulle is slated for
one of his semi-annual press "confer-
ences" on 4 February and may indicate
then whether or not the meeting of the
.two leaders is to have a real impact
on European affairs. Erhard and De
Gaulle, without major concessions on
either side, did manage to bring about
a temporary aura of good-feeling be-
tween Bonn and Paris.
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SELECTED SOVIET?OFFICIAL DATA ON ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Percent of Increase (or Decrease) Compared with Preceding Year
Previous* Planned Rate**
1963 1964 Data of Increase
(if different) for 1964
GROSS SOCIAL PRODUCTION 5
7
NA
NATIONAL INCOME ?NA
7+
5
7.7
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION . 8.5
7.1
7.8
6.7
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION NA
12
NA
STATE PLANNED INVESTMENT 6
8
6.8
10.8
NEW FIXED CAPITAL 8
6
7.4
5.9
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN. INDUSTRY 6
4
4.6
.
,
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY 16
15 .
16.6
METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY 9
8
NA
FUELS INDUSTRY 10
7
NA
LIGHT INDUSTRY 2
3
NA
FOOD INDUSTRY 5
2
NA
MACHINE BUILDING and 13
9
NA
METAL WORKING
ELECTRICITY 12
11
9.7
STEEL 5
6
4.7
FERTILIZER 15
28
28
SYNTHETIC FIBERS 11
17
17
OIL 11
9
7.7
CHEMICAL EQUIPMENT 9
19
24.5
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY 17
1
NA
HOUSING -4
-3
-5
0
TELEVISION SETS 14
18
NA
REFRIGERATORS 9
25
NA
WASHING MACHINES 27
25
NA
* Data in this column are from Premier Kosygin's 9 December 1964 report
on the Economic Plan for 1965.
** In most instances the planned rate is the implied annual rate necessary .
to achieve the goals of the 1964-1965 plan.
(NA) Not Available
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7. Communist China
8. USSR
The Soviet economic report for
1964 indicates that growth rates in
industry continue to lag. The announced
7.1 percent rise is the lowest for any
year since World War II. Agricultural
production rose only 12 percent from
1963's abnormal low, and grain produc-
tion figures were omitted for the
second straight year. (See chart.)
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ANNEX 1
The Kosygin Delegation to North Vietnam
High-ranking military and economic officials
are in the Kosygin delegation. New Soviet military
aid may well include such defensive weapons as sur-
face-to-air missiles, antiaircraft weapons, and na-
val torpedo and patrol craft, and possibly even ad-
vanced jet fighters. A Soviet economic aid mission
is already in Hanoi to study implementation of ex-
isting economic aid agreements. Most aid under ear-
lier programs is believed to have been utilized.
In exchange for this support, the Soviets prob-
ably will press for a greater voice in the formula-
tion of Communist policy in South Vietnam and Laos.
Kosygin probably will urge the North Vietnamese to
avoid actions which might provoke US reprisals and
lead to a dangerous military escalation. The So-
viets may also discuss political initiatives de-
signed to inhibit US freedom of action, such as ex-
erting greater pressure toward reconvening the 14-
nation conference on Laos.
The main lines of an agreement between Hanoi
and Moscow on economic and military assistance may
already have been worked out in advance. Following
a visit by North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong
to Moscow last November, Hanoi began to mute its
propaganda critical of Moscow policy, suggesting
it had received new assurances of Soviet support.
In an apparent effort to lessen the impact of
the Kosygin mission on the US, Pravda has for the
first time warmly welcomed President Johnson's
State of the Union remarks about US-Soviet relations.
Pravda said that the President's statements concern-
ing the expansion of Soviet-American contacts were
favorably received in the USSR.
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