THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST 19 OCTOBER 1964

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005959492
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: October 19, 1964

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THE PRESIDENT'S
INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST
ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
19 OCTOBER 1964
-TOP-H-GR.E1_
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1. USSR Leadership
a. The new team in the Kremlin
is trying to project a business-as-
usual image. Slogans for the Octo-
ber revolution celebrations, pub-
lished yesterday, seem designed to
reinforce the impression of an
essential continuity of overall
Soviet policy.
b.
the changeover has been
accepted quietly. The reaction of
the man on the street has bordered
on the apathetic. Some criticism
has been heard, largely of the
way in which the ouster was han-
dled.
c. We doubt that the present
arrangements will last for long.
Other high level figures are likely
to follow the leader. For example,
as long as Podgorny is around, he
will be a threat to the new leaders.
d. The Brezhnev-Kosygin
tandem is also trying to dfssuade
the West from taking advantage of,
the turmoil. A weekend communique
marking the Dorticos visit warned
that Castro still enjoys "resolute"
Soviet support.
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2. East Europe
3. South Vietnam
a. East European satellite
leaders are worried and disturbed
by the fall of Khrushchev.
b. Many of them attribute
the increased breathing space
they enjoy nowadays to Khru-
shchev, and they are watching
apprehensively the first moves
of the new leaders.
d. We do not expect sweep-
ing changes in East Europe straight
away, though some satellite leaders--
Zhivkov in Bulgaria for example--
relied a good deal on Khrushchev's
personal support.
a. The rift between Khanh and
Minh is wider than ever as a result
of a draft constitution drawn up
by the High National Council.
(Cont'd)
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4, Communist China
b. The draft conferred wide
powers on the new chief of state,
very likely in the expectation that
Minh would get the job.
c. Khanh rejected this ver-
sion, advising the council to go
back to the drafting table and
produce a document which provides
a place for the mili- 50X1
tar
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gnvi
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5. Congo
a. Rebel leaders in Stanley-
'vine are being counselled to
take a more moderate course toward
the Americans they hold.
C. It is uncertain, as
always, whether the leaders can
control their followers.
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6. Turkey
7: UAR -Iraq
a. There are signs that
the Turkish military is getting
restive again.
d. Any move against the
government would need the support
of senior officers to be success-
ful. So far they seem loyal to
Inonu.
a. Egyptian officials in
Cairo are passing off last Fri-
day's communiqu?alling for a
unified political command as the
"smallest commitment" they could
possibly have made in the face of
"Arab pressure."
(Cont 'd)
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b. We agree. Nasir has long
seemed considerably less than eager
to get involved in the complex and
seemingly insoluble internal prob-
lems of Iraq.
c. The question is whether
this sop to staunchly pro-union
Iraqis will be enough to sustain
their local position. They have
been pushing hard for close formal
ties at the earliest possible date
and had built up popular expecta-
tions that these were in the works.
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NOTES
A. Panama The Robles government is facing a new
groundswell of public grumbling over the lack
of progress in talks with the US on the Canal.
This is being fed by opposition elements, in-
cluding the ambitious Miguel Moreno who is blam-
ing the US and predicting "grave disorders" if
progress is not made before the 9 January anni-
versary of last year's disturbances.
For The President Only - Too Secret
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