THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST 16 AUGUST 1961

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005959004
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: August 16, 1961

-? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/05/04: CIA-RDP79T00936A000200030001-1
THE PRESIDENT'S
INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST
16 AUGUST 1961
-7015-5EGREL.
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THE SITUATION IN BERLIN
50X1
tne population in general remained cowed in the face of Soviet- 50X1
East German force. In one district, however--Potsdam--party officials
are confronted bya more recalcitrant population, particularly in areas
adjacent to Berlin, while in Schwerin party officials are attempting
to overcome "softness" in some of their border guard units. No change
in the previously reported disposition of Soviet troops around Berlin
or in East Germany has been noted. Yesterday afternoon, US officials
noted a reduction in security forces at all crossing points into West
Berlin and in East Berlin itself.
The East German regime yesterday introduced new measures
designed to give it better control over the entry of West Berliners
and West Germans into East Berlin. West Berliners will be required
to secure permits for their vehicles, while West Germans now may
secure permits at only two sector border crossing points, instead of
the four originally specified in the 13 August decree. Although these
restrictions apparently are not applicable to the three Western
occupying Powers in West Berlin, they nevertheless violate--as do the
13 August decrees--the freedom of movement guaranteed in the Four
Power agreements related to Berlin. In an apparent effort to dis-
courage Bonn from taking economic countermeasures, the East Germans
have threatened to cut off West German freight traffic to West 50X1
Berlin, if Bonn interrupts interzonal trade.
There are signs that the calm of the- West Berlin population may
be giving way to considerable nervous tension. The people are not 50X1
afraid but appear to be excited and uncertain about the future. The
public rally scheduled for today in West Berlin is designed to permit
the population to let off steam and also to exert a psychological effect
on Berliners in bolstering their confidence in the leadership. Police
are making full prem7ations to control the crowds. 50X1
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For The President Only?Too Jecret 50)(1.,
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1. Political deterioration
in Singapore
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, whose
political position has eroded greatly
in recent weeks, has blamed the UK
Commissioner for breaking up the ruling
political party and leaving the govern-
ment with a one vote majority in the
national assembly. Lee apparently is
using British-baiting as a strategem
to regain his anti-Colonial image for 50X1
the electorate. The British High
Commissioner in Malaya has told London
the only way to halt the dangerous
drift toward a Communist-dominated
government is to arrest several high
ranking Communists in Singapore. The
UK Commissioner in Singapore is re-
luctant for the British to take
responsibility for the arrests. The
Malayan Prime Minister is in a hostile
mood over the present political situa-
tion in Singapore 50X1
50X1
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2. Laotian developments
L 1
a) Talks between Laotian factions
resumed Monday at Namone. The Pathet-
Lao attacked the government's proposal
that several names be submitted to the
King for the premiership and held to
the position that only a government
under Souvanna would be acceptable. 50X1
The Souvanna delegate proposed a cabinet
of eight neutralists and three or four
each from the Pathet Lao and the Boun
Oum - Phoumi group. He hinted, however,
that not all the neutralists need be
from the ?Xieng Khouang group, thus
leaving open the dOor for moderates now
nominally supporting the Boun Oum
government. 50X1
b) The pro-Souvanna military commander
in Phong Saly Province asked his head-
quarters' OK to bring back two
battalions of his troops which are
in Communist China. Earlier we had
information that about 1500 of his
troops were raining "abroad."
For The President Only--Top Secret
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3. Brazil urges other Latin
American countries to?
send observers to non-
aligned nations conference
Brazil,- which attended the preparatory
meeting for the conference (to be held
in September in Belgrade) as an
observer, is planning to go to the
conference itself in the same capacity.
Rio is now pressing Argentina, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico to
follow suit, arguing that "the interests
defended by" Cuba (a full participal50X1
"may be presented by misinformed
propaganda as those espoused by all 50X1
Latin America." Observers from other
Latin American countries would, Brazil
points out, clarify their "true posi-
tions" to the neutralist countries. We
have information that Ecuador and
Bolivia may send observers but that
Pwino is not planning to do so.
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4. Mikoyan's interview with
Japanese Foreign Affairs
Minister
The Soviet First Deputy Premier, visit?
ing Japan "unofficially" until next
Tuesday, paid a courtesy call Monda
on Forei n Minister Ko k 50X1
WA1
ed
50X1
For The President Only?Top Secret
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NOTES
A. One of the Air Jordan planes chartered by the UAR for cargo
flights to Stanleyville returned to Cairo 10 August with five
Congolese aboard who were slated to go on to the USSR for
military training.
B. Marshal Konev, assigned last week as commander of Soviet forces 50X1
in Germany, is reported to have assumed command of a new grouping
called the "Western Front of Warsaw Pact Forces" comprised of
Soviet forces in Germany, the East German Army, and Czech forces.
50X1
For The President Only?Too Secret
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?
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
Berlin Subcommittee Report--25 July to 14 August
1. The situation in East Berlin and East Germany has reached a
critical stage. If the recently introduced control measures remain
in effect and are vigorously enforced, increasingly severe local
demonstrations cannot be discounted. On the other hand the regime's
extensive display of force and determination together with its
initial success in preventing a violent reaction probably will deter
any such popular outbursts and prevent a large-scale uprising. In
contrast to the situation in June 1953, the regime has taken the
initiative and the East Germans and the Soviets are making an all
out effort to intimidate the populace from starting any kind of
uprising.
2. We believe that barring developments in East Germany which
could force a change in Soviet tactics, Khrushchev will adhere to his
previous position and timetable and continue to seek negotiations
prior to a separate treaty. However, Soviet willingness to endorse
and support the new control measures may reflect a greater willingness
to conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany without prior
negotiations with the West. Should events in East Germany and Berlin
reach the point where direct Soviet military intervention is required,
the USSR might consider a separate peace treaty as one way of salvaging
some vestige of East German sovereignty and authority.
For The President Only?Too Secret
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