CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY--OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005719004
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: December 16, 2011
• Case Number: F-2010-01914
• Publication Date: September 8, 1955

(CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 20
OCI NO. 7427/55
8 -September 1955
(b)(3)
APPROVED FOR RELEASE^ DATE:
12-07-2011
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A J A
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE- AGENCY
III OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY :a'~Fl'.~
8 September 1955
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
ADENAUER',s VISIT TO MOSCOW
West Germans expect that
Chancellor Adenauer's visit to
Moscow will have few tangible
results other than the, release
of some German citizens who have
been held in Soviet custody ,
since World War II. (For a
detailed discussion, see Part
III, p.l:)
West German expectations
about the gains which Adenauer
might attain during the visit
have been modified considerably
since the Geneva. conference.
Soviet firmness in opposing Ger-
man reunification at Geneva has
disillusioned many West Germans
a.s to the possibility of real
progress on this subject in
the near future. According to
German officials, Chancellor
Adenauer anticipates that the
conference will .only define the
issues between the two govern-
ments and consider some princi-
ples for their eventual solu-
tion, with specific agreement
'to be reached possibly in the
case of detained German citi-
zens.
Many Bonn politicians be-
lieve that Moscow's willingness
to recognize the Federal Repub-
lic is merely a device to gain
eventual .recognition of the
East German government by non-
Soviet bloc countries--a devel-
opment which would formalize
the division of the nation.
To avoid jeopardizing Ger-
man unification, Bonu govern-
ment spokesmen have indicated ..
that an exchange of represen-
tatives.will'not occur unless
Moscow gives some .assurance on
unity, accepts Bonn's policy
of ncinrecognition of East Ger-.
many and the postwar German
boundaries, and consents to
release 'German citizens. Should
sufficient progress occur dur-
ing the meeting, Adenauer may
cQnsent.to exchange diploaratic
representatives immediately.
Most West German observeirs
expect the Soviet Union to free
many of the estimated 17,.000
German prisoners of. war.. The
chancellor has referred in pub.-
lic statements, however, only
to "Germans,".a term which
would also apply to an estlmate.d
115-,000 civilian internees who,
according to the German Rid
Cross, are still believed. to be
in the Soviet Union.
not be realized now.
If Adenauer returns from
Moscow without a concrete under-
standing with the Soviet Union
on reunification, this would
not be accounted a great personal
failure in West Germany, since
most West Germans continue to
believe that.reunificati=on can-
Failure of the London
conference to find agreement on
the Cyprus question has resulted
in severe tension between Greece
a.nd Turkey. Co-operation on de-
fen~oe planning in the. eastern
Mediterranean will probably suf-
fer, a.nd for the first time
PART I OF IMMEDI ','~ EftEST Page 1 of ~
 violence on Cyprus is likely
to be directed against the Tur-
kish minority as .well as the
British colonial government.
The conference of Britain,
Greece and Turkey was "sus-..
pended" indefinitely on 7 Sep-
tember after British foreign
secretary. Macmillan offered
Cyprus limited self-government,
together with the creation of
a tripartite committee to ex-
amine details of the proposed
new constitution for Cyprus..
The Greek reaction to the
proposal. was noncommittal, but
Athens will almost certainly re-
~ect it because of the omission
of any assurance regarding self-
determination for the island's
predominantly Greek population.
Turkey's immediate reaction
was "very negative." Ankara,
howeverx will probably accept,
on condition that the self-
government proposal be amended
to provide for equal representa-
tion of the Greek and Turkish
populations of Cyprus.
The rebuff to Greece in
London will probably weaken the
Rally government still further
and increase maneuvering among
the Rally's disparate factions.
King Paul, who has been con-
cerned over the government's
lack of an effective leader
during the prolonged illness of
Prime Minister Papagos, may
appoint a provisional prime
minister and call for new gen-
eral elections.
Acting Foreign Minister
Kanellopoulos told the American
chargd in Athens on 6 September
that Turkish delegate Zorlu's
"intolerable" press statements
in London had deeply wounded
Greek national honor. If Greece
were forced tv_accept Turkish.
views on Cyprus, Kanellopoulos
said., his government would have
to resign and might be replaced
by one less well disposed to-
ward. the West.
Any Greek government will
be ;committed.in advance to
pressing the appeal regarding
Cyprus in the UN General Assem-
bly. Greek anger at the anti-
Greek outbreaks in Istanbul and
Izmir on 6 September will prob-.
ably be vented in intensified
preparations for a bitter UN
debate with Britain and Turkey
over the Cyprus issue and in
more open encouragement to the
Cypriot Nationalists.
As a result of the Turkish
riots, which revealed a. deep
religious antagonism toward
the Greek Orthodox Church, the
NATO Council was summoned to an
unprecedented meeting on 8 Sep-
temb~er. Also, .the Turkish Grand
Nati~~nal Assembly has been galled
into a spc;cial session bn 12
September.
Like the Greeks since the
beginning of the London con-
ference, the Turks appear willing
to s~~.crifice the short-lived
frie~idship between their two
countries over the Cyprus issue.
Both may now give free rein:tp
the many divisive issues which
have lately been submerged.
NATO will have increased diffi-
culty co-ordinating Greek and
Turkilsh contributions to Euro-
pean defense, and the Balkan
allif~nce will probably atrophy
or be: re~blaced by a Greek-
PART I OF IMMEDIA~S~~~EST Page 2 of 4