KOREAN FIELD INTELLIGENCE - LEE, DUNCAN CHAPLIN

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005657579
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2011
• Case Number: F-2009-01397
• Publication Date: February 1, 1945

(b)(6)
durvey of r'.;ret(n i:z:F,rts N6.. fork
HAJor Duncitn Lee
trio i't ight
Korean Field Intelligence
APPROVED FOR RELEASE[]
DATE: 07-Jun-2011
This wi.:1 serve to cor)fira. siondayts converstticn during
which I gave you s brief outline of results so f-r obt:aned from
our vr.riol.is interviews on the above subject. The.,* opinions ?;:ply
particularly to aarthwect !Lorca in which region the various inter-
viewees resided for mPny years. They may be sumsr.rized as followst
1. A white man, regardless of previous famill rlty with
the country, would have virtually no chance of survival for any
useful period of time if sent in under present conditions.
2. A native-born Korean with certain :iualific.,tlons, as
saectfied hereafter, would have t fc:ir ch:.nee of keeping alive and
being of so-me use.
and
Both these men ere attached to the Marykno 1
Catholic Mission in Korea --nd lived In the northwestern region
for shots twentr veer returning to this country on the Gripsholm
in 1942, had his own car in which he traveled
frequently from his hu oehin Mir sicin to HeiJo, Shingishu and
other pkrts of northwest Korea. wss hn architect
Pnd spent most of his time in the erection of scission buildings.
In connection with this he operated his own supply trucks
wu for twenty years in
Korea ^orking under the sus ces of the Yrerbyterien Board of
F---:reign iissinns. He wrs st:;ticned in Kok.-i ..nd Is generally
famili''r with the surrounding country. lie returned to the United
St tea in 1340.
a Methodist csismion;iry
who returns to this c:'un ry in d 1, r:ft, r a rfsldence of .8 years
In the Heilo area of Korea. His n,.rticult.r job w.--:s the establish-
ment and management of prin-ry And secondary schools. In this
connection he often traveled to other frts of the country
although his gr4-;:test f4,t*i1izz:rity is of course with his own
immediate area.
 the 9_ ryknoll is it Society for fifteen veern xu st: ti,): - ad
et Youngyn, approximately twenty glee from Ffeijo. 'he. returned
to this country on the Gripsh'}lm in 184k.
Index slits on all of the foregoing re rons for tnec:e o; ir:lont. rot
1. The close surveill>:nce ov.r t.-iv local o;,ul tion which
is m:'1ntk.ined by the J anew- tort ;ti olive. This control is some-
whet stricter in northwest Koren. then in the centred ::r:1 southern
regions t:s the - res 1-- regr.rded na; store enti-J6p nose tan other
sectl^nx. As a result the controls '.re very strict and of course
include the No Chia system to which rigid adherence is insisted
upon. This ?-raters, which consists of forming every eoxrunity into
groups of ten fvri'Lies or multiples thereof with one man as leader
in eneh group, requires that the presence of an unregistered
individual in a given house be re;..orted to the police within 94
hours. This a;+?lies to my Individual.a, however close a relative
or however transient a visitor, and the penf.litles for noncompli-
ence with the regulati >n -: rs. very severe.
The belief th:t very few :.oretna could be trusted
under existing coaditinns n .)t to denounce an occidental to the
aut',,rlties. In the o;'ini)n of our interviewees this would apply
even though such a. man hod been well rrid fe:vorebly known to them
for yet+rs prior to the war. This is due to the long pcri.d of
J1=rrnese d7minett:on and their close police su;:erviaion which has
lowered the r.ornle of the people to a ;rolnt where Iittle or no
reliknce could be placed u,?on them to This
7Aniin arts strongly held h, sub;ects sand
cumstrnnces exiled torenns mtf,ht be used ns intelligence agents.
Aside from the s:uestinn of basic reliability, rueh nen should
not have been sway from Korea too long, i.e., not over seven or
eight yn?rr,, end sh?u.id hFve :lone ties which they nain-
t:ined n won ;;ossible. In other words,
 their on field of operxti.cns would have to be confined to the
rrenernl rep of .their own town or village e:n they would have to
de end for protection and help upon the loyalty of relatives with
whoa the ties of blood would outweigh the very real element of
danger in concealing a nonregistered individual. This would swan
that such Korean Agents would be strictly limited in their on
personal movements while in the country, but it is thought that they
would be able to obtain valuable second-hand informati m and
establish ^ources of future intelligence, aping close relatives for
the purpose.
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