PROPOSED PLAN OF ACTION FOR CUBA IN THE LIGHT OF:

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
• Keywords: MCAULIFFE
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005640605
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: November 23, 2011
• Case Number: F-2011-00196
• Publication Date: August 21, 1962

APPROVED FOR RELEASED
DATE: 11-08-2011
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
August 21, 1962
Proposed plan of action for Cuba in the light of:
(a) The arrival of four to five thousand Soviet/Bloc tech-
nicians and possibly military personnel during July-August.
(b) Arrival of many ship loads of equipment and materiel
during July and August.
(c) The conclusion that stepped up plan (b) will not, in the
opinion (of the National Board of Estimates, accomplish the stated
purpose of overthrowing. Castro from within, and moreover will be
attributable to the United States and cause loss of face by the United
States, and
(d) Modified plan (b) will contribute importantly to our
intelligence gathering and will impede Castro regime's economic
progress but will not be sufficient to frustrate the regime's progress
in view of the evidences of substantial Soviet technical assistance.
The above all lead to the conclusion that with the passage
of time, it is possible there will evolve in Cuba a stronger rather
than a weaker. Castro dominated communist state, fully oriented to
Moscow, to serve on the one hand as a model for similar actions by
disciplined groups throughout Latin America, and on the other as a
bridgehead for Soviet subversive activities in Central and South
America. Being dominated by Moscow, such a Cuba would also
serve as a possible location for MRBMs, for COMINT and ELINT
facilities targetted against United States activities, most particularly
Canaveral, and finally as an ECM station which might adversely
affect our space and missile work.
Therefore it seems to me a more aggressive action is
indicated than any heretofore considered, and should be patterned
along the following lines:
 (1) An immediate continuing aggressive political action
designed to awaken and alarm all of Latin America and all of the
free world as to the extreme dangers inherent in the present Cuban
situation,
Appropriate actions should be taken through domestic
and foreign press media to inform and alarm the people, through
the United Nations, through the Organization of American States
and its subcommittees, by contact with each free world country
at the level of head of state, foreign minister and ambassador,
and through semi-public or private organizations such as labor,
church, farm cooperatives, youth groups, et cetera.
(3) The instanteous commitment of sufficient armed forces
to occupy the country, destroy the regime, free the people, and
establish in Cuba a peaceful country which will be a member of the
community of American states.
It is possible, though in my opinion improbable, that actions
taken under (1) above would in themselves be sufficient to cause
destruction of the Castro regime from dissension and disaffections
within the regime itself which would obviate steps (2) or (3).
Alternatively, actions under (1) above might cause internal
strife of sufficient proportion to prompt the action outlined under (3)
above with no further provocation.
Concurrently with this plan, we should go forward with all
possible activities called for under plan (b).
J. A. M.