AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT ON 5 JANUARY 1967 INVOLVING CYGNUS 125

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005632348
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2011
• Case Number: F-2010-01942
• Publication Date: January 13, 1967

3Trt'R-n
13 January 1967
APPROVED FOR RELEASED
DATE: 03-21-2011
MEMORANDUM FCR: Chief, Security OSA
FROM : Chief, Security Station D
.SUBJECT . Aircraft Accident on 5 January 1967 Involving
Cygnus 125
1. Cygnus Aircraft Number 125 with pilot Walter L. Ray at
the controls departed Station D (homeplate) at 1259 hours local on
5 January 1967 to fly a Shade Tree E route (see attachment A).
2. Ray successfully completed the first circle of the route
and was on the last circle when he encountered fuel problems. At
approximately 1530 hours local, Ray reported to homeplate that fuel
consumption was increasing rapidly beyond programmed consumption
curves. Part of the excessive consumption could be attributed to
head winds of approximately 120 knots, while the other appeared to
be an unexplained loss of fuel.
3. Ray changed altitude for more favorable winds, however
fuel consumption (loss) continued until the pilot reported a
critical flight profile. Homeplate rendered guidance toward the
only alternate field available to him. Delamar Dry Lake, used
by the X-15 for emergency landings, lay directly ahead approximately
25 miles. Ray stated that he did not think he could make Delamar.
At 1602 hours, approximate time Ray reported his engines had
stopped. He ejected at approximately 1603 hours. His last
transmission to homeplate was of his intention to eject.
4. The crash alarm was sounded immediately. All key
personnelreported to the Command Post.
5. At 1615 hours several charts were affixed with the estimated
longitude/latitude coordinates for both the impact area and ejection
point. Winds were plotted for the accident area from ground level
to flight altitude for estimation on impact point and pilot touch-
down. A F-101 chase plane from homeplate was on an intercept
course to Cygnus 125 and had him in sight for a brief moment at
the time that Ray ejected. Cloud layers and falling snow obscured
any further visual contact between the F-101 and. Cygnus 125.
Homeplate Thad a helicopter in the area at the same time which was
aiding a Nellis AFB ground rescue team in searching for a F-4C
which had gone doom in the same area approximately three hours
earlier. Both the F-101 and helicopter searched for #'125 until
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Fuel reserves dictated return to homeplate. Other homeplate
aircraft were dispatched and searched until darkness.
6. The Base Commander ordered) and a
ground rescue team to the crash scene at 1700 hours. The ground
rescue team was equipped with survival gear and both UHF and VHF
radios for maintaining contact with the aircraft aloft (CAPCOM)
and radio equipment to monitor the guard channel where it hopefully
expected a signal would come from the pilot's emergency radio
carried in his seat kit.
7. The ground rescue team arrived in Caliente, Nevada at
1930 hours where in a meeting with the Nellis rescue team it was
learned that a rancher may have heard a crash about 1600. hours.
Since no telephones exist in the area between Caliente and Moapa,
Nevada (approximately 100 miles) the Chief of Police of Caliente
was requested to join the rescue team as guide into the rugged
mountains. He consented. The group started toward the house
of the rancher who allegedly heard the crash. The team arrived at
the ranchers home and under questioning it was learned that he
had not heard a crash but had heard a sonic boom. The time in
question was not 1600 hours but 1200 hours.
8. The search patterns were predicated on plots and fixes
established earlier by homeplate Command Post. The ground teams were
split at Elgin, Nevada 20 miles south of Caliente. One unit turned
west at Elgin proceeded to search the area to the west and south
of Elgin. Other units searched due south of Elgin to.Moapa.
Others proceeded east and searched in the Mormon mountains.
Ground units continued to search all night in these areas hoping
to hear a signal on ground or see a strob light from the pilot.
Homeplate maintained a CAPCOM (aircraft at flight level 22,000
for communications and search all night). Communications among
ground ruiits was poor since ground units were working in canyons.
Communications between ground units and CAPCOM was, in most
instances, excellent'.
9. At daybreak homeplate incorporated into the search all
available aircraft and helicopters (2 from homeplate - 1 UHIF
#657963 from Indian Springs AFB). A Nellis fighter pilot who
allegedly saw #125 impact was brought to the scene and was flown
over it in a helicopter. Ironically, the helicopter had flown pract-
ically over the impact area and didn't see the wreckage, as had
other aircraft. The reason that a sighting of the wreckage was not
made immediately was attributed to; the lack of a large fire usually'
associated with a crash showing scorched earth; the impact point
on the down slope of a ridge had the markings of other gouged areas
and did not stand out per se; the lack of trees to give tell-tale
evidence by having a swath out through them; the fact the entire
plane was broken up into incredibly small pieces.and finally the
fact the debris was scattered through three canyons. In addition
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 to several aircraft joinhe search, homeplate had dispatched
other ground units to
10. Owas instructed to establish a base camp. He
selected Leith, Nevada (en abandoned railroad siding) since it
was the center of the ejection/impact area. The ground party was
fed, base camp ground communication was established. Homeplate
provided a communications technician on hand to maintain the
communication gear. Further search sectors were given each ground
unit and the search continued.
11. Searching continued until a helicopter flown by Capt
Charles Trapp reported at 1525 hours on 6 January 1967 that the
wreckage had been located at coordinates 370 131 N and 114 28k'w
approximately 21 miles due west of Leith, Nevada. Personnel were
dropped off at the wreckage site.
12. A search was made of the impact area to ascertain whether
the pilot was in the wreckage. He was not found. DCM and LAC
representatives cont' probe the wreckage for flight data
recording equipment. earched the wreckage area for the
large aircraft cameras or any other components considered more
sensitive. The wreckage was broken up so badly that nothing was
larger than a basketball. Three tapes were found and sent back to
homeplate by helicopter.
13. The DCS.arrived with road grading equipment needed to
cut a road into the impact area. He surveyed the area and deter-
mined the best route to take from an accessible point through a
canyon to the wreckage. He instructed his blade operators to begin
cutting a road. The blade operators reported to base camp at 2200
hours on the 7th that the road had been cut through the canyon. The
distance to travel from the new base camp.(mentioned later in this
report) to the wreckage was approximately 4 miles. It was the
shortest route that could be taken by road.
14. A new plot was computed for the estimated touchdown point
for the downed pilot for both ground and air rescue units. Searching
continued all through the day and night of the 6th. 1200 hours of
the 7th, permission was requested to rent horses for the ground
parties to be used to reach the highest ground in the search area.
With permission horses and two ranchers were added to the ground
team. At this point the Chief of Police, Caliente asked to be
relieved to tend to police duties.
15. At 1455 hours on the 7th one of homeplates C-47's reported
spotting what appeared to be a parachute panel. The C-47 flew as
low as possible over the area and confirmed that it was a parachute
but they could not see the pilot.
16. Boxer CAPCOM directed the nearest helicopter to the scene.
StMT
 ,The helicopter reported at 1505 hours that they had located the
pilot. CAPCOM directed a doctor and paramedics be dropped to give
an immediate reading on the condition of the pilot. At 1515 hours
the helicopter reported the pilot to be dead. By prior instructions,
it was agreed to fly the body to Nellie, if the pilot were dead.
17. CAPCOM directed a larger UHIF helicopter to pick-up the
body of the pilot and proceed with it to Nellie AFB Hospital.
Homeplate flew Dr. Dake, Chief Fli ht-Surgeon at Station D. to
Nellie to meet the helicopter. Deputy Chief,
Security-Staff contact security represent-
ative in Las Vegas to meet the helicopter. The facts concerning
efforts at the Nellie hospital and at the Palm Mortuary in Las
Vegas shall be covered inreport (attached).
18. Orders were issued by homeplate to continue search for the
canopy and specifically, the instrumentation cameras attached to
the canopy. The scene, where the body was found, was protected
to permit prima facie investigation by members of the Norton team,
Personal Equipment Experts and the engineer for the pilots seat.
19. Twenty persons were directed to the scene to begin a
systematic search for the cameras. Searching continued until dark
at which time all personnel were brought down from the mountains
and sent to Caliente for a. nights rest.
20. Ground teams at base camp were directed to remain at base
camp.. The only activity during the night of the 7th was retrieving
two disabled vehicles with ground searchers aboard. A C-130 overhead
directed rescue vehicles from base camp to the disabled vehicles.
A mechanic effected sufficient repairs to move them. This operation
was completed at 0100 hours on the 8th. At this time, the C-130
returned to homeplate. All personnel were accounted for and were
either at homeplate, in motels in Caliente or at base camp.
21. Orders arrived from homeplate at 0800 hours on the 8th
to break base camp at Leith, Nevada and move it to the wreckage
site. At 0900 hours,, all fires were extinguished, all-equipment
loaded and the helicopter landing pole removed. The convoy left
the old base camp for the new camp.
22. Homeplate simultaneously was dropping 30 searchers from
helicopters at the canopy area. Searchers proceeded on foot and
continued until dark on the 8th without finding the cameras. They
did however find sundry items associated with the seat, seat kit
and suit.
23. At approximately 1000 hours on the 8th ground searchers
made contact at the impact area with Mobile 7 commanded by Col
James Anderson. Col Anderson had arrived from home plate with a
large task force to begin retrieving the wreckage. Retrieval
of wreckage began prior to completion of the base camp. The base
camp was completed at 1630 hours on the 8th with the construction
 of tents, vehicle repair, garbage dump, vehicle parking, vehicle
refueling, base communication areas and a heliport.
24. Col Anderson departed for homeplate on the last helicopter
on the 8th at 1700 hours instructing to take charge of all
ground operations. He further stated that one ground operations
were secured for the day for Zubon to return to homeplate. 0
Security Officer who had arrived from homeplate with
a bus and power wagon was left at base camp with three guards and
instructions for the night.
25. Mr. Glenn Fulkerson, LAC in charge of retrieval had 25
members of the aircraft ground crew along with 20 Air Force
personnel as a force. His procedure consisted of loading the pieces
on trucks, hauling it out of the narrow canyons to base camp where
it was placed in bins aboard flat beds for transportation back to
homeplate. The crews were either flown back by helicopter or
bussed back to homeplate. Canopy ground searchers were sent to
Caliente for the night. Fulkerson and crew worked until darkness
on the 8th.
26. The canopy search parties were led to Caliente and
quartered in motels. They were given instructions for the next
morning. then proceeded back to homeplate arriving there
at 2200 hours where he and the Base Commander had a meeting in the
Commander's quarters at 2230 hours.
27. Homeplate Command Post called at 1.400 hours on the 9th
wishing assistance to rent 5 hourses and 4 riders in the Caliente/Elgin
area. The horses and riders were made available and in position by the
railroad station at Elgin. A helicopter dropped one AF personnel off
at Elgin at which time he and the riders departed for the mountains
to search for the canopy and cameras. The searching continued
through the 10th and 11th without results. Twenty foot searchers
were on scene in addition to 5 riders.
28. On the 12th.fresh horses and riders were brought to the
scene. Twenty foot searchers continued. This pattern is expected
until Friday night 13 January at which time the search will be
discontinued until Monday morning 16 January to allow crews rest
for the ground searchers. Security will maintain personnel on the
scene throughout the weekend.
29. The ground crew picking up wreckage continued until
darkness on the 11th, at which time all discernable pieces had
been retrieved. Base camp was disassembled and all parties and
equipment returned to homeplate. One last group will go to the
impact area on the 13th and make a final sweep for debris.
30. The Norton Investigation Board continues to meet at
homeplate hopefully expecting to complete their report by 17
January 1967. As of this writing the board has not established the
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 cause of aircraft failure. Probability rests with total depletion
of fuel and resulting engine failure. The cause of failure of the
pilots seat may never be established. Probability as mentioned by
some experts may rest with a recent'seat modification made predicated
on death of one man in an SR-71 over Tucumcarri, New Mexico.
Another probability involves malfunctioning of the lap belt (see
attachment B). The information contained in this report on
probability is not to be construed as absolute. The findings will
be forthcoming in the official report to be completed by the Norton
Accident Investigation Board.
31. The sabotage sector has been broached tentatively by Area
Security. Initial reaction to this sector tends to negat the
possibility of sabotage based upon probabilities as rendered
unofficially as of this writing by an au fait members of the DCM,
DCO and Investigation Board.
32. A constant evaluation of the security of Station D has
been taking place since the accident. Through sources in Las
Vegas (0SI) and other areas in Nevada it has been determined that
the cover story concerning Cygnus 125 has been accepted as gospel.
There have been no indication to the contrary.
33. ~ report has been attached to detail activity at
Station D during the accident (see attachment C).
34. See attachment D for location of the impact area and
area which pilots body was found.
Chief, Security Staff
'ATTACHMENTS:
A Shade Tree E Route
B Seat
C Report
D Impact, ea