SPAIN: REACTION TO MILITARY MANIFESTO

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005630057
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2011
• Case Number: F-2010-00505
• Publication Date: December 9, 1981

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National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
9 December 1981
APPROVED FOR RELEASED
DATE: 05-25-2011
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253
 SPAIN: Reaction to Military. Manifesto
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The manifesto supports those implicated in the coup
attempt in February, attacks the press for maligning the
armed forces, and accuses politicians of interfering
with military autonomy. These sentiments are widely
The joint chiefs of staff have warned twice since
Saturday that they would brook no support for the mani-
festo and have placed its signers under house arrest.
Officers sympathetic to the manifesto apparently have
been seeking more military hacking before King Juan
Carlos returns today from a visit to the Middle East.
The King has been instrumental in placating the military
and played a key role in suppressing the coup attempt.
Despite their opposition to the manifesto, senior
commanders probably will urge the King privately to exert
his influence to redress military grievances. The joint
chiefs, in their first public statement after the mani-
festo, acknowled edg that legitimate wrongs may have led
to the protest.
The King will be constrained, however, by his
limited constitutional role and by fear of becoming
enmeshed in controversial civil-military issues. Prime
Minister Calvo Sotelo also has limited options, because
military restiveness is as ill focused as it is intense
and cannot be easily addressed through specific actions.[
Tensions will rise in the military when officers
implicated in the coup plot are brought to trial, prob-
ably in midwinter. Hotheads in the middle ranks could
again force senior generals to choose between their
constitutional duty to civilian politicians they do not
respect and their loyalty to their troops. The more
frequently the generals are forced to make this choice,
the more difficult it will become--particularly if there
9 December 1981
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