ARGENTINA-CHILE: BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE AND THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005617746
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2011
• Case Number: F-2009-01666
• Publication Date: December 8, 1979

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NATI L SECURIT NFORMATION
Unaut zed Disclosure Subject t riminal Sanctions
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dir"AW, 'iff'off !;~ 'A
 The Director of Central Intelligence
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3.5(c)-
Copy 7'7 _
.8. DEC 1979
SUBJECT Argentina-Chile: Beagle Channel Dispute and the
Potential for Conflict n
Argentina continues to move substantial military forces, equipment,
and naval units south with the apparent intent to strengthen its
territorial claims to the South Atlantic by seizing a'couple of
uninhabited islands south of the Beagle Channel (probably the Evout and
Barnevelt Islands), and possibly some Chilean territory on the mainland.
Although Argentina and Chile have agreed to have their Foreign Ministers
meet on 12 December to identify a mutually acceptable mediator for,their
dispute and to work out issues related to territorial jurisdiction in
the region, it seems unlikely that any substantive progress will be made.
Argentina will be prepared to make a military move after.15 December.
Should hostihti_gs break out, Chile will almost certainly.invoke the
NI IAM 78-1003J
 Copy 77
8 December 1978
ALERT MEMORANDUM*
ARGENTINA-CHILE--THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE
POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT (U)
We have increasing indications that Argentina's
armed forces are prepared to initiate hostilities
over the Beagle Channel dispute in mid-December if
Chile does not make substantial concessions at the
Foreign Ministers' meeting scheduled for 12 December.
By,15 December, three days after the Foreign Minis-
ters of Argentina and Chile meet in what may be the final
peaceful attempt to resolve the Beagle Channel crisis,.
both nations will be ready for large-scale military ac-
tions in four potential theaters of operation that in-
clude northeastern Chile as well as the Beagle Channel -
Cape Horn area..
*The Alert Memorandum is an interagency publication issued
by the Director of Central Intelligence on behalf of the
Intelligence Community. The Alert Memorandum was in use
from 1974 through 1976, and the procedures for this-inteZ-
Zigence alerting device were last approved by the United
States Intelligence Board on 9 January 1975. The DCI re-
cently reorganized the warning structure within the InteZ-
Zigence Community and appointed a National InteZZigence. Of-
ficer for Warning to oversee the development of procedures
and to assist the Community in developing an increased
awareness of its warning responsibilities. The revival of
the Alert Memorandum is undertaken as a part of those re-
sponsibilities. Comments on the procedures for warning
should be addressed to the National Intelligence Officer
for Warning This memorandum has been prepared
in consultation with he Bureau of Intelligence and Re-
search, Department of State, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the National Security Agency. F-1
 All warships stationed in Puerto Belgrano--the main
Argentine naval base--are already in a 24-hour readiness
posture. Final Argentine Army deployments are to begin
this week with combat units from the Army's four corps
.to be positioned along the border and in the disputed
area; six or seven new regiments of conscripts and re-
cAntIv trained reservists have reportedly been activated.
This massive deployment of force could mean that:
-- Argentina is continuing its efforts to intim-
idate the Chileans into territorial con-
cessions;
-- Argentina is making a tactical move to hold
down Chilean military forces along the Andean
border while it attacks one of the Beagle
islands or smaller islets near Cape Horn;
-- Argentina is prepa-red, either as a primary or
secondary military move, to occupy Chilean
territory outside of the Beagle area as well.
All available information suggests that if hostili-
ties ensue, Argentina will be the aggressor. Hardline.
Argentine military commanders are highly critical of
President Videla's efforts to reach a peaceful settle-
ment, and the President probably is losing control of
the situation.. Videla is being faulted not only for
what hardliners perceive to be inept handling of the
Beagle Channel issue but also for the inefficiency of
his system of consensus government and his firm support
of his economics minister. Since Videla retired from
the Army on 1 August and turned over command of that ser-
vice to an Army colleague his presidential authority has
eroded. Reports in early November suggested that nation-
alistic officers were talking of replacing Videla, but we
have no firm evidence of serious coup plotting.
These hardline commanders apparently do not expect
results from the Foreign Ministers' conference and are
TO
 insisting on a major policy role in the Beagle Channel
dis ute.
This information--buttressed by other
sources--re ects the Argentine high command's deter-
mination to take decisive action to resolve the dispute
At the same time, there are indications that the
Argentine Foreign Ministry is actively seeking-to re-
solve
The Argentine high command reportedly has ordered
all operational units of the armed forces to be fully
deployed and ready for combat by 15 December. In recent
months, Argentina has purchased between $550 million and
$750 million of military equipment and ammunition abroad--
only some of which, however, has been delivered and is
ready for use.
Earlier estimates by the Chileans that Argentina
was bluffing--a possible factor in their previous diplo-
matic inflexibility--have changed to pessimism about a
peaceful outcome. Whether the Chi.leans think Argentine
military moves would be local or general is not known.
Given their present pessimism, however, they doubtless
fear both possibilities and are preparing for them. The
Chilean riposte to a localized Argentine attack most
likely would be a limited military countermove and a
heavy reliance on quick international pressure to end
the hostilities. Argentine occupation of Chilean terri-
tory well away from the southern zone wi y bring
a full-scale Chilean military response.
T T
 TO ET
TOP T
 *BUENOS AIRES
PUERTO BEEGRANO
^ (Administered by
U.K., claimed by
f- 1~
Cape Horn Merirha)
~4 Argentine claim
Islands and appurtenant islets and rocks awarded to Chile
by International Arbitration Court in May 1977.
+ Airfield
? Naval Station
0 Kilamamra 100