LETTER TO DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FROM RALPH L. CLARK RE TRANSMITTAL OF COMMITTEE REPORT

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005615969
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2011
• Case Number: F-2011-00412
• Publication Date: June 9, 1950

APPROVED FOR RELEASEfI
DATE: 14-Mar-2011
Chairman;~~~C~Id,.Iioc;oommi:ttee_.on~Sovietr+.tl.amming o# Voice^,of Am_ erica
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1. There is'.submitted herewith the report o# the IAC Ad Hoc
Committee on Soviet Jamming of the~Voi.ce o~.tlmeri.ca, established
by the DCI, in response to the request of the Special Assistant
to the Secretary of State and concurred in by the IAC.
~ 2, The Commmittee has examined the problem placed before it
~' and makes recommendations asset forth in the report, The report
~~ has the unanimous concurrence of the Committee.
i~
3. This report bears a direct relationship to NSC 66, now
pending before the Security Council,
Lt. Twenty-five additional copies are attached for distribution
as follovrs, if you so desire:
a. Nineteen copies for the IAC, of which six copies
s~ are complete with all attacYmtents, and thirteen copies are
J minus attachments.
.,...
~~ b. Six copies for use of the Security Council, supplied
without attachment.
Attachment:
Copy of report
JY ~N N b li
euOY RECORDED
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 25
~EEPOHT OF fiH$ I6C AD HOC COMMITTEE,
OH SOVIET JAT~ASII6G 0 THE VOICE OF 9MEBICA
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 Statement of Problem. The problem, and the .stated~purpoae of the
.~
IAC Ad Hoc Committee oa'VOA Jamming, is to determine the intelligence
effort which should be undertaken to assure that the Department of State
is provided all possible 'and reasonable support in the development of
technical intelligence wherewith to penetrate Soviet jamming of the, .
Voice of America. To .determine this intelligen~ee effort, the operational
and the research and 'development aspects of the problem must both be
considered. .,,~ _
Backeronnd of Problem, Organized jamming of"the VOA by the~Soviets
commenced in February 1948 and steadily increased in intensity until. it,
a meeting of the Iaterdepartmental,Conavltative Group on 6 July 1949 the
CIA was asked and agreed to accept responsibility for providing the.co=
to CIA at that time,
ordinated intelli~eace support,neeiled by~State in order to determine
future measures in connec,tioa with Soviet jamming. .In addition, the
support of the Department of Defense and the FCO was solicited by the.
State Department and was;=ggreed to. A CIA report aSI-1-50 published
20 January 1950 and entitled ~~Hiatorical Developments.in the Jamming of
the VOA by the IISSE" sets forth all the intelligence on the subject kaocm
On 31 March 195G+ the IAC met, at the request of the Special Assistant,
Intelligence Department of State, to consider his memorandum, dated 24 March
on the subject,of 6oviet jamming of VOA, At this meeting, the IAC
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established an Ad Hoc Committee to examine the problem of intelligence
support for the POA on the basis of recommendations set forth in that
memorandum,
Deliberations of Ad Hoe Committee. Although the problem referred to the
Ad Hoo Committee by the IAC teas stated primarily in terms of intelligence
requirements and capacities, it was realized that review of technical and
other aspects of the problem was prerequisite to consideration of the
intelligence aspects. Consequently, representatives selected by the Depart-
ments for membership on the Ad Hoc Committee included those qualified in the
fields of intelligence, communications, and electronic countermeasures. The
CTA membership included all the activities concerned erith intelligence
collection and production in this field,
Three meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee were held during which the
Committee considered the following aspects of the problem.
1, Technical feasibility of devising methods to overcome Soviet
jammin"g?
? 2, Operational usefulness to POA of technical intelligence,
3, The need to pass available pertinent information promptly to
POA on a continni.ng basis, Thia included a discussion of
special conditions to be attached to the use of such information,
particularly with regard to,p a; security of ,sources, and
b, channels of dissemination.
4?, Detailed consideration of each item of information needed as
set forth in Tab B, Appendix I hereto9 faith regard to hoer such
intelligence might be obtained through the use of monitoring
facilitiea9 covert operations or other means now available among
the intelligence agenoi\\es,
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 5, Allocation and use of existing monitoring facilities,
6, Exploitation of existing non-monitoring souroes,
7. Extent and usefulness of additional monitoring effort.
A detailed account of these deliberations is contained in the minutes
of the meetings of this Ad Hoc Committee,
Conclusions. _
1, Existing scientific knowledge and techniques do.not offer
a solution which will enable the 40A to overcome the Soviet damming,
2, The effectiveness of the efforts of the 40A to penetrate
this ,jamming can be inoreased by knowledgeable manipulation of the
transmitting facilities, increased number of stations, inoreased
radiated power, etc. If the Soviets counter all such efforts, as
now appears to be their intention, the effectivenesa of penetration,
though increased, wovld'be temporary and limited in scope.
3, Technical inte113gence on Soviet jamming would assist in policy
considerations to determine the effort and facilities which should be
allocated to the 409 and world be essential to effective operational
manipulation, Currently available intelligence is not sufficient for
these purpoa.es.
4, The total information requirements as set forth by the 409 itt
Tab B of Appettdia 1 are beyond the combined capabilities of all existing
intelligence facilities of the FCC, CYA, and the Department of Defers?,
A small percentage of the 40A requirementts eouId be met by these com-
bined facilities, but only if they dropped most of their present priority
commitments,
5; Answers to most of bhe intelligence requirements of the 40A. as
listed in Tab B of Appendix 1 hereto can be obtained only by covert means,
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 6. Ax`q increase beyond the present intelligence effort on
behalf of the 90A can be accomplished only by9
a. A substantial readjustment of priorities with existing
facilities, which caould be at the expense of the intelligence
activities directed at determining Soviet capabilities and in-
tentions in the fields of Atomic Energy, Air Defense, Submarine
t+~arfare, Order of Battle, etc; or
b, The establishment of additional monitoring facilities
directed specifically at the POA problem,
Recommendations,
1. All available information~partinent to the YQA problem should
be furnished promptly to State by all IAC agencies and that OSI~CIA be
designated as the collection point for such information, OSI~CIA caith
the assistance of the Office of the Special Assistant, Intelligence,
Department of State, should be charged to determine and establish such
security arrangements and channels of dissemination as may be required
to pass this information to the International. Broadcasting Division,
Department of State; these arrangements and channels to be determined
in the light of materials made available,
2. A readjustment of priorities among existing intelligence tasks
or a reallocation of the use of existing intelligence facilities ahoald
not be undertaken,
3, That the IAC recommend consideration by ftSC of the establishment
of an additional monitoring facility, provided that such consideration is
undertaken in the light of the limited amount of technical intelligence
for YQA which could be obtained (se\e Conclusions 4 and 5 above) and the
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 probable utility of such a facility in any future intensification of the
telecommunications war; and further provided that:
a. Such nets facilities do .not interfere with existing monitoring
programs, particularly from the standpoint of equipmettt and personnel.
b, Such new facilities are thoroughly coordinated with existing
monitoring activities.
Such facilities should be organized and. equipped to locate the sources
and determine the characteristics of -radio signals emanating from within
the Soviet IInion and satellite states throughout the frequency bands
normally used For communications, _
4. That the 9d Hoc Committee be dissolved upon acceptance of this
report.