IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING KEY MILESTONES IN OUR ASSESSMENTS OF IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005607098
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: June 23, 2011
• Case Number: F-2006-00667
• Publication Date: September 14, 2002

APPROVED FOR RELEASED
DATE: 06-13-2011
In 1979 and 1980, the Intelligence Community concluded there was no hard evidence that Iraq had
decided to acquire nuclear weapons but judged Baghdad had positioned itself to do so by developing its
nuclear infrastructure. These assessments, based on foreign nuclear cooperation projects underway with
suppliers from Russia, France, and Italy, accurately captured Iraq's weapons potential.
- We now believe, based on subsequent inspection and defector information, that Saddam had
decided to pursue nuclear weapons by the late 1970s
~
srael's destruction of the
Osirak reactor in 1981 and war-related economic difficulties had not dampened Iraqi interest in
enhancing its nuclear capabilities. CIA anticipated that once the war with Iran ended, which happened in
1988, the nuclear program would accelerate. .
- This assessment erred in putting Baghdad at least a decade away from having nuclear facilities
with the potential to support a weapons program, underestimating Iraq's potential by seven
years. F-----]
that it could complete a weapon in less than.10 years from a go-ahead decision.
- Accompanying these strengthened judgments was a worst case scenario in which CIA assessed
Baghdad could have a weapon in as little as two to four years if it had a clandestine source of
fissile material.
 produce a weapon b the late 1990s, CIA became surer of these conclusions
ut mistakenly put less emphasis on the prospect for a worst case scenario.
The current analytical debate over Iraq's ultimate use of high-strength aluminum tubes mirrors some of
the pre-war interagency disagreements on whether Iraq had a nuclear weapons program. While all
agencies agree that the aluminum tubes could be used in centrifuges, today's debate centers on whether