IN RESPONSE TO AN INQUIRY ABOUT WHAT THE IRAQIS ARE LIKELY TO DISCLOSE IF THEY USE THE US AND BRITISH "WHITE PAPER" AS A GUIDE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005607097
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: June 23, 2011
• Case Number: F-2006-00667
• Publication Date: November 27, 2002

APPROVED FOR RELEASE[] DATE:
06-13-2011
Senior Executive Memorandum
This memorandum should not be reproduced.
In response to an Inquiry about what the Iraqis are likely to disclose if they use the
US and British "white papers" as a guide:
Iraq probably will disclose much of, or perhaps even all of the activities listed in the
US and UK "white papers" but probaglb+ irilIaJjrn sortie points are either permitted or are
innocuous activities. Iraq will not dec re As ost im ant ongoing programs and will
attempt to hide its illicit procuremen`efforts.
Missiles. Iraq may provide a detailed iecl ' tidrrof Uf*1 ? rrnitted 150 km missile
programs to cloak its longer-range efforts. It may declare a number of facilities, not _
mentioned in the "white papers," where its permitted AI Samoud and Ababil-100 missiles
have been deployed and may admit that the missiles have slightly exceeded their permitted
ranges, possibly by accident.
Ira
may provide data to e p resolve cu missile an w ea
accounting issues.
- Baghdad is unlikely to disclose its extended-range versions of the permitted
missiles, work on longer-range systems, omits recent procurement activities.
amem A
Chemical Weapons. Iraq mad .rovide fr i her atioh on the disposition of its
pre-Gulf war stock of weapons, bul _ geent 2recu and may turn over data on
chemical weapons usage during the IranIraq war.
will claim, as in the past, that the chlorine and phenol produced there are for
legitimate purposes.
- Baghdad may provide data explaining the status of missing 155-mm mustard
rounds and other munitions and may offer additional data on VX production
after May 1988.
- Iraq is likely to deny ongoing chemical weapons activities. It probably will try to
conceal its recent efforts to procure dual-use chemicals and it may continue to
 Biological Weapons. Iraq might make additional disclosureo wW
program.
- Baghdad might offer new information to explain the disposition of bacterial
growth media and may provide new figures on agent production and
weaponization for past programs.
- It is unlikely to fully disclose its mobile production facilities or to disclose
any ongoing weaponization or dispersal efforts.' 5#NEL
- Iraq probably will offer alternate explanations for its procurement of aluminum
tubes, perhaps claiming they are intended for artillery rocket production, but
probably will deny any ongoing uranium enrichment activities.
ro ram
- Its nuclear declaration most like) will focus on Iraq's re-Gulf warp
_ but ma i nore current activities
Iraq's nuclear scientists and engineers, whom it will claim are
engaged in other activities.}
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Iraq may declare much of its L-29 aircraft-
based UAV activities but is unlikely to disclose the UAVs' full capabilities or acknowledge
any role in dispersing chemical or biological agents. It also may disclose information on
its newer UAVs but is unlikely to declare its extensive UAV procurement efforts or the
autonomous flight capabilities of its UAVs.
- Iraq probably will assert that its UAVs are intended as target drones or
reconnaissance platforms, and Baghdad may argue, as it did in the 1990s,
that Security Council resolutions neither limit UAV range to 150 kilometers
nor subject UAV programs to monitoring: TSWNli).