SOVIET NAVAL STRATEGY: CONCEPTS AND FORCES FOR THEATER WAR AGAINST NATO

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: CIA Analysis of the Soviet Navy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005584947
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: June 19, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2017
• Case Number: SC-2007-00006
• Publication Date: January 1, 1975

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Intelligence Report
Soviet Naval Strategy: Concepts and Forces
for Theater War Against NATO
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Soviet Naval Strategy: Concepts and Forces
for Theater War Against NATO
Principal Conclusions
During the past decade, Soviet naval strategists have become more flexible in
their view of the possible course of development of a theater war with NATO. They
now see naval operations in such a war as evolving in up to five stages:
? a period of rising tensions during which surveillance operations
would begin
- a possible period of conventional (nonnuclear) hostilities
- possibly a period of limited nuclear operations in Europe, which
probably would be accompanied by widespread nuclear operations at
sea (Nuclear war at sea during a conventional conflict in Europe is
not currently an element of Soviet strategy.)
- theater-wide nuclear war
- a concluding phase during which the winning side would consolidate
its gains.
Soviet and other Warsaw Pact naval forces are organized into several theater
commands for war with NATO. Each theater naval command has several wartime
missions to which forces must be allocated. Soviet planners probably believe that the
forces currently earmarked for each theater are adequate to defend Pact territory
against seaborne attack and to limit damage from carrier-based aircraft strikes. They
probably consider their antisubmarine and interdiction forces inadequate to carry
out their missions in all theaters.
Likely future developments in Soviet naval strategy for theater war against
NATO include:
greater emphasis on open-ocean antisubmarine warfare
OM* greater use of submarine-launched ballistic missiles in theater war
- development of increased capabilities for conventional war at sea.
The Soviets might also adopt a doctrine permitting nuclear operations at sea
during conventional hostilities on land in Europe. This could be done in reaction to
Western discussions of such a strategy or in realization of the advantages that
selected nuclear strikes at sea would have over limited nuclear attacks on land?for
example, the absence of a collateral damage problem.
These considerations probably will stimulate Soviet production of attack sub-
marines, high-endurance surface ships, and strike and antisubmarine aircraft, as well
as provisions for logistic support.
To ret
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January 1975
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
January 1975
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Soviet Naval Strategy: Concepts and Forces
for Theater War Against NATO
Preface
Since the mid-sixties, Soviet strategy for em-
ploying naval forces in a NATO - Warsaw Pact theater
war has undergone important changes. These changes
were discussed in classified Soviet and Warsaw Pact
documents written in the late sixties. The documents,
acquired recently by CIA, have provided important in-
sights into Soviet plans for wartime naval operations
and form the basis for the major judgments of this
study.
This report discusses the evolution of Soviet
naval strategy in the post-Khrushchev era, the Soviet
scenario for naval actions in a NATO - Warsaw Pact
war, and the likely Soviet view of the adequacy of
naval resources for wartime operations. It provides
an estimate--consistent with Soviet documents
--of the types and numbers of Warsaw
Pact naval forces which might be assigned to various
wartime tasks in the open ocean and in coastal areas.
The study concludes with a discussion of likely de-
velopments in Soviet naval strategy in the next five
years and their implications for Soviet naval procure-
ment programs. It does not discuss Soviet employment
of naval forces in an intercontinental nuclear war
arising out of a NATO - Warsaw Pact theater conflict.
Note: This report was prepared in the
Office of Strategic Research in consultation with analysts
or e Defense Intelligence Agency and the Office of Naval Intel-
ligence, but without formal concurrence by intelligence offices
outside CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication
may be directed to
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Contents
Evolution of Soviet Naval Strategy
The Post-Ehrushchev Period
The Mid-Sixties--Reaction to
"Flexible Response"
Page
5
5
5
Recent Changes in Soviet Concepts
of Naval Warfare . ...
6
.Force Development ... 0 0 0
0
?
9
Naval Strategy for War in Europe: Current
Soviet Concepts
9
Overall Scenario ....... . . . .
?
?
.
9
Naval Operations in a Theater War
With NATO ...... . . . . . . ..
11
Theaters of Operations
13
Ocean Theaters
14
Continental Theaters . . . . . ? .
.
.
.
24
Distant Areas . ........ .
.
.
.
28
Disposition of Forces
28
Allocation of Combat Forces to Theaters
28
Allocation of Forces to Missions
32
Soviet Perceptions of Force Level
Constraints ........ .
33
Outlook
36
Antisubmarine Warfare and the Strategic
Balance
36
Naval Forces in Theater Nuclear War .
?
?
37
Nuclear War at Sea
38
Force Implications
38
Summary
41
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Page
Maps
Chart
Warsaw Pact Naval Command Relationships for
Theater War Against NATO
Photographs
Recent Additions to the Soviet Navy
15
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Evolution of Soviet Naval Strategy
The Post-Khrushchev Period
In the early sixties, Soviet naval strategy for
war against NATO was predicated on a short, decisive
nuclear conflict. This doctrine called for the early,
massive use of nuclear weapons to forestall enemy nu-
clear attacks from the sea. The principal forces to
be employed were cruise missile and torpedo attack
submarines and missile-equipped strike aircraft.
These were to establish a defense in depth against
Western carrier task forces attempting to penetrate
to within striking range of the USSR. Defense against
Western ballistic missile submarines was to be ac-
complished by a combination of antisubmarine barriers
and area searches by submarines and aircraft. Major
surface ships were to play a secondary role in anti-
submarine searches and anticarrier defense. Inter-
diction of NATO's sea lines of communications was
accorded a low priority since Soviet strategists be-
lieved that the war would be concluded successfully
before seaborne reinforcement of Europe could begin
to have an impact.
The Mid-Sixties--Reaction to
"Flexible Response"
By the mid-sixties, Soviet views on the nature
and course of a NATO - Warsaw Pact war had begun to
change. A major factor for change was the strategy
of "flexible response" which had been introduced
into US and NATO plans and exercises. In response
to this shift in Western strategy, Soviet military
theorists gave increased attention to the importance
of armed forces equipped and trained for conventional
as well as nuclear operations.
classified documents,
including lectures on strategy delivered at courses
for non-Soviet Pact military officers, indicate that
in the mid-sixties the plans for war in Europe in-
cluded a possible brief period of conventional hostil-
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ities preceding theater-wide nuclear war. The entire
campaign was still envisaged as short, however, with
most of the action completed within a few weeks.
Naval strategists shared the views of other Soviet
military analysts. In a classified document written
in 1966, Rear Admiral Kruchenykh, an instructor at
the General Staff Academy, argued that NATO's flexible
response doctrine obliged the Soviet Navy to be ready
for both conventional and nuclear war at sea.
A particular problem for naval strategists was the
determination of the proper mix of nuclear and conven-
tional weapons for deployed naval forces. Kruchenykh
recommended that most units carry both types of weapons;
he noted, however, that submarines equipped with anti-
ship missiles but having only a few missile tithes might
be armed only with nuclear weapons. He probably was
referring to the J class (four launchers) and the modi-
fied W classes (two or four launchers).
Recent Changes in Soviet Concepts
of Naval Warfare
Soviet naval strategy continued to evolve through
the late sixties, and Soviet naval writings
of that period emphasized flexibility in
employment of naval forces.
the
The missions of Soviet naval forces--except some
ballistic missile submarines--were reexamined in the
context of conventional, limited nuclear, and theater-
wide nuclear war. Several naval authors emphasized
the need to attack Polaris submarines during a pos-
sible conventional phase. This view was also re-
flected in classified Warsaw Pact strategy lectures
of the late sixties (see box).
In 1969 Marshal Zakharov, then chief of the Gen-
eral Staff, discussed in a classified article the
possibility of a war which would include conventional,
tactical nuclear, and large-scale nuclear phases.
The concept of limited nuclear operations in Europe
may have been evaluated
but limited nuclear operations
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Antisubmarine and Antioarrier Missions
in Conventional Operations
Excerpts from Warsaw Pact lectures on strategy for war in Europe delivered in
1969-1970:
The enemy, under conditions of a critical situation, may go over to the employment
of nuclear weapons.... Therefore, it is necessary to use all means [during a possible
conventional phase to destroy his launchers and nuclear delivery aircraft...
Peculiarities in the conduct of an offensive operation with conventional weapons
[include the need toj ...engage in joint operations of naval and long-range aircraft to
destroy the main forces of the enemy fleet, especially missile submarines.
Features of the conduct of operations with employment of conventional means of
destruction [include] ...at sea, a joint operation of fleets and Long Range Aviation to
destroy enemy naval forces?aircraft carriers and missile submarines.
at sea have not been discussed explicitly in avail-
able Soviet writings
A classified article, written in 1968 by Captain
First Rank Vyunenko and Rear Admiral Tuz, discussed
the possibility of a period of limited nuclear hos-
tilities in a NATO - Warsaw Pact war, in which there
would be widespread use of tactical nuclear weapons
at sea. They advocated that Soviet naval forces use
all the nuclear means at their disposal during limited
nuclear operations in Europe, with the exception of
some submarine-launched ballistic missiles earmarked
for use against strategic land targets. Other sub-
marine-launched ballistic missiles--those with lower
yields--were to be used as tactical weapons against
targets in the European theater--enemy troop concen-
trations, ports, naval bases, airfields, shore-based
antisubmarine detection systems, and navigation and
communications stations supporting missile submarines.
The changing concepts brought renewed interest in
the interdiction of NATO sea lines of communications.
Zakharov noted in his 1969 article that interdiction
could become important in the closing stages of a
NATO - Warsaw Pact war, to prevent seaborne reinforce-
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Recent Additions to the Soviet Navy
10.142 BEAR AntIsubm' AinEAR
_
KARA Class GuitltdMisst, Cruistr
- AtIvl
BORIS CHILIKIA ReAllAIsImeAt ORAf
KRIVAK CI113 flestroyr.
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ment of NATO's ground forces. A 1974 article noted
the importance to NATO of sea lines of communications
for both military and economic support of Europe.
Attacking NATO shipping still had a lower priority
than antisubmarine or anticarrier warfare, however,
and Soviet strategists still stressed a relatively
short war--one that probably would be essentially
over before NATO could mount a major reinforcement
from the sea.
Force Development
The new Soviet naval systems which became opera-
tional during the early seventies reflected the
strategic concepts developed in the sixties. Newer
classes of combatants were built with better living
conditions and greater endurance than earlier classes,
enabling the ships to stay at sea for longer periods
of time. They were equipped with improved air defense
systems to enhance combat effectiveness in areas
beyond the cover of land-based aviation. Naval
logistic support also received increased attention;
two new auxiliary ship classes were introduced, though
only a few of these ships were built, suggesting that
Soviet planners saw little urgency in providing logis-
tic support for extended combat operations. A new
long-range antisubmarine aircraft--the TU-142, a modi-
fication of the TU-95 Bear heavy bomber--was developed
and deployed in small numbers in recognition of the need
to conduct antisubmarine operations in the open ocean.
Naval Strategy for War in Europe:
Current Soviet Concepts
Overall Scenario
Classified Soviet documents
reflect a flexible
scenario for a NATO - Warsaw Pact war. Zakharov's
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1969 article described five possible stages in such
a war:
IOW*
A period of warning, with rising tensions
and deteriorating political relations, during
which both sides would make preparations for
conflict.
A phase of conventional o?erations. The pri-
mary focus of Pact operations in this phase
is on breaking through NATO's forward defenses
and disrupting its theater nuclear strike
capability, including that of naval forces.
.A possible period of limited nuclear opera-
tions. The scale of nuclear activity in this
phase is not well defined. Limited use of
nuclear weapons in Europe may have been
evaluated 4
but
there is no evidence that limited nuclear
operations at sea have been dealt with in
exercises. Some Soviet naval strategists
have contended that limited nuclear opera-
tions in Europe would signal widespread nu-
clear waxfare at sea.
Theater-wide nuclear war, regarded as a
period of "decisive nuclear action." During
this phase, massive nuclear strikes would be
conducted. The scenario most often discussed
and practiced involves a preemptive nuclear
strike delivered on receiving warning of an
imminent large-scale NATO nuclear attack. This
phase may coincide with the start of intercon-
tinental nuclear warfare but the Soviets may
no longer see a necessary connection between
the two as they did in the early sixties.
A concluding phase during which Pact forces
would consolidate their territorial gains,
eliminate pockets of enemy resistance, and
assess requirements for further operations.
Soviet writers point out that this progression is
not inevitable and that a war in Europe could begin
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not only with conventional operations but also with
limited nuclear warfare or a large-scale nuclear
exchange. They nonetheless continue to stress the
likelihood of escalation to widespread nuclear war.
Naval Operations in a Theater War With NATO
Over the last decade, the Soviet Navy has prac-
ticed all of the combat tasks ap-
plicaLe to a NATO - warsaw Pact theater war, but
it has rehearsed them in fragments--never integrated
into a complete war scenario. Classified writings,
and especially classified lectures on strategy for
war in Europe given to Warsaw Pact officers in the
late sixties, provide a framework
to Soviet war plans. According to these
sources, naval actions in a NATO - Warsaw Pact war
would follow the basic scenario for war in Europe
and the escalation of the naval conflict would be
keyed to the course of operations on the continent.
The documentary evidence indicate that
the Soviets expect naval actions to untold as out-
lined below.
Warning Period. During the period of warning,
the Soviets would increase the readiness of Pact
naval forces and' deploy naval units to combat sta-
tions both near Soviet shores and in the open ocean
to begin surveillance operations, concentrating on
enemy aircraft carriers and ballistic missile sub-
marines. The forces normally deployed during peace-
time would be sufficient to carry out surveillance
in Warsaw Pact home waters and in the Black and
Baltic Seas. The Soviet naval squadron in the Med-
iterranean has sufficient strength to conduct routine
surveillance of NATO surface ships, but its-antisub-
marine forces would require reinforcement even for
limited operations. Augmentation of the Mediterranean
squadron to full wartime levels probably would re-
quire about two weeks. Naval forces deployed routinely
in the Atlantic and Pacific are only a fraction of ,,
estimated wartime requirements; reinforcement in these
areas probably would require a week to ten days.
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Conventional Phase. The Soviets think it likely
that a NATO - Warsaw Pact war would soon become nuclear
and therefore plan conventional operations to weaken the
enemy's nuclear capability. Pact naval forces (in-
cluding naval air elements), assisted by some bombers
of Long Range Aviation, probably would attempt to de-
stroy enemy naval units at sea and at their bases in
Europe early in the conventional phase, again concen-
trating on aircraft carriers and ballistic missile
submarines.*
these attacks would be coor inate
with the "Air Operation" conducted by Pact tactical
air forces and elements of Long Range Aviation against
NATO's European-based nuclear delivery systems
According to Warsaw Pact strategy lectures, amphibious
assaults would begin in the opening days of the con-
flict and efforts would be made to control the Baltic
and Black Seas. NATO ASW forces would be attacked in
an effort to facilitate Soviet submarine deployment.
Limited Nuclear Operations. There is no direct
evidence in writings to indicate that
the Soviet Navy plans to conduct limited nuclear
operations at sea, even though its forces have the
capability to do so. According to one Soviet classi-
fied article, limited nuclear operations on the European
continent might trigger widespread nuclear warfare at
* It is possible, if the Soviets saw the opportunity to contain
the conflict at a conventional level and given the very low
probability that they could actually destroy an enemy ballistic
missile submarine, that the Soviet leadership would refrain from
attacking SSBNs in order to reduce the chances of escalation.
A policy of prohibiting attacks on SSBNs would pose problems
for the Soviet Navy since its forces would be unable to dis-
tinguish enemy ballistic missile submarines in the open ocean
from attack submarines which would pose a threat to Soviet sub-
marines and surface ships.
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sea, but other articles do not reflect
such a concept. Nor does Soviet doctrine appear to
sanction nuclear warfare at sea while the war in
Europe remains conventional. If the Soviets were to
employ nuclear weapons at sea during a limited nuclear
phase, they probably would allocate some Long Range
Aviation heavy bombers to augment naval anticarrier
attacks using nuclpar mi1a
There has been limited discus-
sion in Soviet military writings of the use of land-
based ballistic missiles a ainst naval shi s
It is possible
--but unlikely--that some ballistic missile submarines
would make selective nuclear strikes against theater
land targets.
Theater-Wide Nuclear War. With a transition to
theater-wide nuclear war, Soviet naval forces would
begin an almost unlimited use of tactical nuclear
weapons, if they had not done so earlier. Some older
G and H class ballistic missile submarines probably
would deliver nuclear strikes against European tar-
gets. Pact lecture notes indicate that their targets
would be naval facilities, troop concentrations, and
airfields. Strategic missiles carried by Y and D
class submarines probably would be withheld as a
strategic deterrent as long as the conflict remained
confined to Europe and the surrounding seas and oceans.
Concluding Phase. Elements of the Soviet sub-
marine force probably would attempt to interdict
NATO seaborne reinforcements during the concluding
phase of a NATO - Warsaw Pact theater war. As this
phase progressed--assuming an outcome favorable to the
Pact--naval forces would assist the ground forces in
establishing control over occupied territory and would
eliminate resistance by enemy naval units.
Theaters of Operations
A classified article written in 1970 by the Soviet
Navy commander in chief, Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, in-
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reinforced by the requirement--probably recognized by
Soviet planners--to replace many of the ships, sub-
marines, and aircraft which were procured in the
fifties and which still comprise a major portion of
the Soviet naval force.
The difficulties of the ASW mission probably
will require increased production of nuclear-powered
attack submarines. If the Vladivostok strategic
arms limitation accord is implemented successfully,
some reductions in the size and possibly changes in
the mix of Soviet strategic forces would be required.
It is not clear how this would affect the submarine
force, but one Soviet option would be to maintain a
ballistic missile submarine force at or below the
level of 62 units permitted under the Interim Agree-?
ment and shift more shipyard resources to attack sub-
marine programs.
Faced with a renewed interest in sea lane inter-
diction, the Soviets might also step up production of
diesel-powered submarines. These submarines would
be effective against lightly defended Western convoys
and would be much less expensive than nuclear-powered
submarines. Conventional war requirements probably
will result in increased interest in flexible, high-
endurance surface ships, such as the Kara class
cruiser and the Kiev class ASW aircraft carrier now
under construction; in logistic support ships, such
as the Boris Chilikin class replenishment oiler;
and in access to overseas base facilities.
Greater flexibility, in land-based naval air
power probably will be sought with the deployment
of the Backfire bomber to Soviet naval air units.
The Backfire will improve the Navy's capability to
strike naval targets at great distances from land
and to penetrate NATO defenses in attacking both sea
targets and naval-related land targets. More atten-
tion probably also will be given to the development
and production of long-range antisubmarine aircraft
--far more than the dozen or so currently in the
inventory.
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Summary
During the early sixties, Soviet naval strategy
for a possible war.against NATO was predicated on the
likelihood that the war would be a short, decisive
nuclear conflict. By the mid-sixties this view had
changed and the Soviet Navy was planning and develop-
ing forces for both conventional and nuclear war. In
the late sixties and early seventies selective use of
tactical nuclear weapons in naval warfare probably
was considered by Soviet strategists. The Soviets
continued to believe, however, that a war with NATO
would be brief, with the main campaign not exceeding
several weeks, and that there was a high probability
of escalation to theater-wide nuclear war.
In the current Soviet view, Warsaw Pact naval
operations against NATO would be keyed to hostili-
ties in Europe and their duration would depend on
the course of the ground war. Naval operations
could develop in several stages:
-- A period of rising tensions and deteriorating
political relations, during which naval forces would
deploy to combat stations and begin surveillance
operations.
-- A possible period of conventional hostilities
in which the Warsaw Pact navies would attempt to es-
tablish control over the Baltic and Black Seas, con-
duct amphibious landings in the Turkish and Danish
Straits and possibly northern Norway, and attempt
to destroy NATO naval forces--especially nuclear
delivery systems such as aircraft carriers and
ballistic missile submarines--using conventional
weapons.*
-- Possibly a period of widespread nuclear oper-
ations at sea, triggered by limited nuclear operations
* Conventional attacks on aircraft carriers and missile subma-
rines are justified in Soviet doctrine as necessary to improve the
Pact's position for the probable nuclear phase. It is possible
that, if the Soviet leaders thought they could successfully con-
tain the conflict at the conventional level, they would refrain
from attacking enemy ballistic missile submarines in order to
reduce the chances of escalation.
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in Europe. Current Soviet doctrine does not appear
to support a nuclear war at sea while the war in Europe
remains conventional.
-- Theater-wide nuclear war, including unlimited
use of nuclear weapons at sea and probably strikes
against NATO targets in Europe by older Soviet bal-
listic missile submarines.
-- A final phase of theater war during which the
Warsaw Pact navies would assist the ground forces in
establishing control over occupied territory and at-
tempt to interdict NATO reinforcement of Europe by
sea.
To carry out these tasks, the Warsaw Pact navies
would be organized into regional commands called
"theaters of military operations." The tasks of de-
stroying NATO's nuclear-capable naval forces and pre-
venting seaborne reinforcement of Europe would fall
primarily on forces in the ocean theaters--the
Atlantic, the Pacific, and probably the Mediterranean.
Naval forces assigned to the three continental theaters
of military operations in Europe--the northern Euro-
pean, central European, and southern European--would
have the tasks of controlling closed seas, conducting
amphibious assaults, and supporting Warsaw Pact ground
forces. Pact naval forces probably would require
from one to two weeks to bring naval forces in all
theaters up to wartime strength, although limited
combat operations in some areas probably could begin
almost immediately.
Because of the great variety of wartime naval
tasks, the geographic separation of the Warsaw Pact
fleets, and the growing requirement to prepare for
both conventional and nuclear war, Soviet planners
have had to establish priorities in allocating forces
to wartime missions. They probably are confident
that current coastal defense and anticarrier forces--
either conventional or nuclear--can prevent a NATO
seaborne invasion of Pact territory and signifi-
cantly limit damage from carrier-based air strikes.
They almost certainly consider their antisubmarine
force level inadequate, however, and believe that
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their antisubmarine warfare requirements limit se-
verely their ability to assign forces to lower
priority missions such as interdiction of NATO's
sea communications.
The next five years probably will see a continua-
tion of recent trends in Soviet naval strategy. Em-
phasis on open-ocean antisubmarine warfare probably
will increase, but there is no evidence that the
Soviets will be able to solve the critical open-ocean
submarine detection and identification problems in the
next decade Ballistic missile submarines may gain
a greater role in theater nuclear war, and Soviet
strategists might consider the possibility of a nu-
clear war at sea while hostilities in Europe remain
conventional. The Soviets probably will attempt to
increase the Navy's firepower, endurance, and sur-
vivability in conventional war. These considerations,
as well as the need to modernize their force, prob-
ably will stimulate increased production of attack
submarines, high-endurance surface ships, logistic
support ships, and strike and antisubmarine aircraft.
They probably also will induce the USSR to attempt
to acquire greater access for its naval forces to
overseas ports and airfields.
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