THE KOREAN MILITARY BALANCE AND PROSPECTS FOR HOSTILITIES ON THE PENINSULA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: NORTH KOREA
• Keywords: KOREA
• Keywords: SOUTH KOREA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005569324
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2011
• Case Number: F-2010-01329
• Publication Date: March 1, 1987

Director of
Central
Intelligence
APPROVED FOR RELEASED
DATE: 12-06-2010
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
 THIS ESTIMATE 15 ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Departments of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Deportment of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
Intelligence
nauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sancti
WaW
 N I E 42/14.2-87
THE KOREAN MILITARY BALANCE
AND PROSPECTS FOR HOSTILITIES
ON THE PENINSULAn
Information available as of 26 March 1987 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence
Board on that date.
 CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
PROLOGUE: ASSESSING THE NORTH KOREAN THREAT ..... 5
DISCUSSION ............................................. ....................................... 7
The Current Balance ........................................................................ 7
The Balance in 1990 ......................................................................... 12
Implications for the United States ................................................... 13
ANNEX A: North Korean Special Operations Forces ...................... 17
ANNEX B: Present Force Comparison .............................................. 19
ANNEX C: Current Equipment and Personnel ................................ 25
ANNEX D: Future Force Developments: 1987-90 ........................... 27
ANNEX E: 1990 Projected Equipment and Personnel .................... 33
 The Korean Peninsula represents an area where the direct interests
of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China converge and, in the
event of a major conflict, one in which US forces would quickly become
exposed to hostile fire. Because of this, the security situation on the
peninsula has been reviewed regularly by the Intelligence Community.
In NIE 42/14.2-5-81 and the subsequent Memorandum to Holders
(March 1982) we concluded that North Korea had enhanced its overall
military advantage. Since that time, both Koreas have strengthened
their armed forces, both in terms of equipment quantity and quality
and in overall capabilities. This Estimate examines the effect of these
efforts on the military balance, discusses the projected balance in 1990,
and addresses the implications of our findings for the United States.
This Estimate focuses only on the military forces of the two Koreas,
recognizing that US forces and military assistance in the South and
external aid to the North are factors in the military calculations of both
sides. Comparisons of equipment inventories, manpower, and units
measure only potential capabilities. While we rate the morale of the
South's military as high and its leadership as good,
make judgments about similar factors regarding the North's forces
difficult. We have concentrated, therefore, on the strengths and
weaknesses of both Koreas in terms of their military capability-
potential to perform what we consider the most likely wartime
missions-and, in terms of overall readiness, ability to perform the
missions for which they were designed.
Although we highlight the economic and political factors that
impact on force improvements, and therefore the military balance, full
discussion of these factors is beyond the scope of this Estimate. Many of
these economic and political factors affecting the South were examined
in detail in SNIE 42-86: Potential for Political Instability in South
Korea. A similar look at North Korea, including the potential for
miscalculation by the North, an upcoming leadership transition, and the
North's foreign policy rationale, is planned during 1987.
This information is 3Nret'
 KEY JUDGMENTS
On balance, North Korea's military forces remain superior to those
of South Korea. P'yongyang's steady force improvements have created a
large armed force whose offensive potential overshadows Seoul's defen-
sive capabilities.
The North Korean Armed Forces continue to outnumber the forces
of South Korea by an approximate ratio of 3 to 2. Because many of its
forces are concentrated near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the North
can go to war with the important advantages of advance preparation
and of choosing the time and place of attack. Although these advantages
would be limited by South Korea's rugged and defensible terrain and by
manmade fortifications, the South employs a forward defense north of
Seoul that leaves it with little capability for flexible action.
Through the end of the decade, we anticipate relatively modest
growth in the strength of the armed forces of each country with reserve
forces and rapid mobilization assuming even greater importance. We
project that in 1990 the overall military balance will still favor North
Korea, although by a narrower margin than at present. By then, South
Korea's investment in a relatively modern military production capabili-
ty will begin to pay off as Seoul fields increasing amounts of more
advanced equipment, partially compensating for the North's overall
numerical advantage. A successful South Korean defense, however, will
continue to depend on timely warning, mobilization, and
reinforcement.
As critical as warning of attack is to a successful defense of South
Korea, we are not confident that sufficient notice would be provided to
allow extensive preparation time. Seoul is only 40 kilometers from the
DMZ, so it has little maneuver space to trade for mobilization time.
Moreover, surprise has been a basic tenet of North Korea's offensive
doctrine since the Korean conflict. If the North chose surprise, any
warning might be ambiguous at best. Warning of attack could easily
prove to be less than 24 hours, and a clear persuasive judgment may not
be issued. On the other hand, our ability to detect and warn of North
Korean preparations for a prolonged war have improved over the past
two years. Should the North decide to trade off surprise for extensive
preparations for prolonged war, we believe that the economic and social
disruptions resulting from these preparations would provide the time
necessary to inform policymakers that North Korea is taking steps to
prepare for war.
 Despite North Korea's advantages in military strength and its
potential to achieve surprise, we believe several factors deter it from
launching an attack. These include the US commitment to defend South
Korea-including the North's perception of a US nuclear deterrent-
the presence of US forces in the South, the strength of South Korea's
military forces, the relative stability of the South, the dismal shape of
the North's economy, and the desire of the Chinese and Soviets to
maintain the status quo on the peninsula.
Undoubtedly, there are those in the North who advocate the use of
the military option to reunify the Koreas sooner rather than later. They
recognize that, as the South's military improves, the gap between the
North and South is narrowing, and they realize that the window of
opportunity to use their numerical and tactical advantages is closing.
Should the United States' resolve, or ability, to honor its defense
obligation be lessened-either by voluntarily withdrawing forces al-
ready on the peninsula or, because of a crisis elsewhere requires
redeploying forces in the Pacific committed to Korea-we believe that
the North's commitment to reunification on its own terms could tempt
some in the leadership to advocate that P'yongyang immediately launch
a strike against the South. However, so long as P'yongyang faces a
cohesive ROK backed by the United States, we believe the likelihood of
full-scale, unprovoked North Korean aggression will be low.
Neither the Soviet Union nor China is in a position to veto a North
Korean attack-both would be loath to support a war not of their own
choice on the peninsula. However, should the North attack and fail and,
as a result, should either P'yongyang or the North Korean Government
appear threatened, the Soviets and/or Chinese probably would inter-
vene militarily in the North.
Although we cannot be certain how the many variables that can ef-
fect the military balance will develop in the next decade, we feel
cautiously optimistic. From our vantage point at this time, overall
trends appear favorable to the South. To the extent that these trends
continue, Seoul could be strong enough to withstand successfully an
unaided North Korean attack as early as the mid-1990s.
This information is -r t
 5
 DISCUSSION
The Current Balance
1. During the past five years, North Korea has put
considerable effort into maintaining a favorable mili-
tary balance on the Korean Peninsula. P'yongyang's
steady force improvements have created a large, rela-
tively modem armed force whose offensive potential
overshadows Seoul's defensive capabilities. The North
Korean armed forces continue to outnumber the forces
of South Korea by an overall ratio of about 3 to 2 (see
figure 1):
- On the ground, over 700,000 active-duty person-
nel are organized and deployed to conduct com-
bined-arms operations (see table 1).
- A key element of these armed forces is a large,
highly trained Special Operations Force (SOF)
designed for unconventional warfare in rear
areas (see annex A).
- The North Korean Air Force, with over 700 jet
fighters, trains in all phases of air operations. Also
under Air Force control is a large air defense
system of redundant radars, surface-to-air mis-
siles, and antiaircraft weapons deployed along
the nation's borders and around key industrial,
population, and military complexes.
- The North Korean Navy consists of more than
600 minor combatants, submarines, and landing
craft. Defense of coastal waters is its primary
mission. However, the Navy is capable of limited
amphibious operations, and its submarine force is
growing.
- Although the majority of the 5-million-man re-
serve force is lightly armed, North Korea's well-
equipped reserve infantry divisions are available
to immediately reinforce active operations or to
provide coastal and strategic area defense. (See
annexes B and C for a detailed comparison of the
current forces.
2. By pursuing cost-effective improvements in both.
offensive and defensive capabilities, P'yongyang has
managed to improve its overall military posture de-
spite a sluggish economy and limited foreign support.
The North's efforts have had a substantial impact on
the current military balance, partially because of the
Figure 1
Armed Forces: Active Duty Manpower
large investment in force expansion and military
production made in the 1970s and also because of
military equipment development and modification
efforts
3. Concurrently, North Korean reserve force equip-
ment upgrades and organizational improvements have
increased the North's national military readiness. Of
North Korea's 25 known ready-reserve divisions, some
nine to 12 now appear capable of Quickly augmenting
active forces in forward operations, thereby increasing
overall ground force strength without enlarging the
standing regular force. Of equal significance, P'yon-
gyang's ability to transition to a wartime posture has
been improved by the refinement of the mobilization
system, which integrates active and reserve forces, the
industrial sector, and the civil populace.
4. North Korea's reliance on production of proven,
but older, systems to increase overall inventories,
however, presents -a force improvement problem in
 Table 1
Comparison of Active Ground Forces
Mechanized divisions
0
2
Armor/tank brigades
15
2
Infantry brigades
4'
2 a
Mechanized brigades b
23
0
SOF brigades
21
7
Nonorganic Fire Support
a Includes Marine units.
b Many of these units include a mix of APC-equipped and truck-
equipped infantry and towed, vice self-propelled fire-support weap-
on systems. None are fully equipped with APCs, tanks, and self-
propelled artillery.
c Nondivisional/brigade artillery, MRL, and rocket (FROG, Honest
John) battalions are normally subordinate to corps or higher com-
mands in peacetime.
North Korea. The difficulty in acquiring newer, more
sophisticated military equipment underscores a con-
tinuing dilemma vis-a-vis P'yongyang's principal al-
lies, China and the Soviet Union. Historically, the
North has sought to use Sino-Soviet competition for
influence in P'yongyang to assist its force moderniza-
tion efforts. While this tactic has often worked, we
believe it has not satisfied North Korea's present
needs; even attempts to capitalize on newly revitalized
Soviet relations only have been partially successful.
Despite repeated requests for modern equipment,
Moscow has not shown a willingness-or Beijing the
ability-to supply the amount or type of hardware
desired by the North. In 1985, after a 10-year hiatus,
Moscow resumed limited deliveries of major weapons
to P'yongyang. So far, however, revitalized North
Korean-Soviet relations have only yielded notable
gains in the North's air and air defense capabilities.
P'yongyang must view this situation with alarm. The
MIG-23 fighters recently received have not changed
the qualitative air balance, which still favors the
South,.nor have the limited numbers of SA-3 surface-
to-air missiles delivered to P'yongyang satisfied the
North's air defense needs. To the extent that this
situation continues, Seoul's concentration on quality
armaments could eventually pay off with a favorable
shift in the military balance.F__1
Suffering from the economically debilitating military
expansion programs of the 1970s, Pyongyang has-
between 1981 and 1986-emphasized organizational
improvements supported by continued facility harden-
ing and supply stockpiling. By mating different weapon
systems already in production, the North has upgraded
active ground force mobility, ready reserve firepower,
and airfield defenses without depending on either
foreign acquisition or costly development of totally new
systems. F_~
Reorganization of conventional, mechanized, truck-
mobile, and armored elements created a force structure
better suited to exploitation and counteroffensive opera-
tions. The forward deployment of many of these mobile
units and the expansion of underground storage facili-
ties near the DMZ area have enhanced the North's
ability to achieve surprise and to more quickly exploit
any initial battlefield success.
A key element of P'yongyang's overall forces im-
provement has been the expansion, reorganization, and
equipment upgrading of the reserve forces. For exam-
ple, as the North equipped active forces with self-
propelled weapons, many of the the older, towed
systems were transferred to the ready reserves, signifi-
cantly improving their combat potential. The creation
of ready-reserve division and corps-level commands
facilitates integration of these units into the regular
Although North Korea's most notable military devel-
opments have occurred in the ground forces, naval and
Air Force improvements also have featured organiza-
tional refinement and equipment upgrades. Both ser-
vices have undergone limited reorganizations designed
to better control their forces and integrate their opera-
tions with national war plans. Increased air-sea, air
ground, and amphibious training exercises reflect
P'Yongyang's awareness of the importance of joint
ble exceptions of air defense fighters, illegally acquired
Hughes helicopters, and some surface-to-air missiles,
5. While the North has continued to concentrate on
military improvements at the expense or the civiiian
economy, the South has tried to balance the need for
steady domestic economic growth with the need
8
S CRE'F
 major force improvements. The South Korean armed
forces consist of:
- A ground force of nearly 550,000 personnel, 80
percent of which is deployed within 80 kilome-
ters of the Demilitarized Zone. A growing heli-
copter force provides limited mobility for the
ground forces and a good antitank/antipersonnel
capability.
- The South's Air Force is smaller than the North
Korean Air Force but contains more modern jet
fighters. The primary mission is air defense, but
increased training emphasis is being placed on
ground attack, especially close air support
operations.
- A large air defense radar system covers the entire
country, and surface-to-air missiles and antiair-
craft artillery (AAA) weapons provide limited
area and point coverage of critical urban and
military areas.
- Like the North, South Korea's primary naval
mission is coastal defense. While P'yongyang has
concentrated on acquiring or building subma-
rines and light, fast combat craft, the ROK has
developed a mixed force of destroyer/frigate-
sized ships and smaller attack/patrol boats.
- South Korean reserves number over 4.5 million
personnel, 12 divisions of which are designed to
augment forward defense forces, while 13 lightly
armed divisions provide rear area security.
6. In the South, emphasis has been placed on
acquiring quality foreign hardware and on developing
indigenous weapon systems. However, South Korea's
capability to change the balance through force im-
provement programs has been restricted by Seoul's
efforts to maintain economic growth. Austerity mea-
sures designed to ensure healthy economic expansion
without stimulating inflation have limited increases in
military spending and led to some funding reductions.
Seoul, however, has sought to maintain defense spend-
ing at nearly 6-percent GNP, a heavy commitment
compared to West European countries. South Korea's
decision to develop its own modern arms industry
offers several potential benefits-reduced reliance on
imports, creation of jobs, and some international sales.
However, volume production has been delayed and
many initial production problems are as yet unre-
solved. As a result, Seoul's force improvements have
lagged behind those in the North.
7. Although South Korea's improvement programs
have not been implemented with the same sense of
urgency as in the 1970s, when some US forces were
production begins
South Korean Force Improvements: 1981-86
South Korea, too, has made some structural changes
designed to increase capabilities without requiring ex-
tensive manpower expansion. The mechanization of an
additional division, and the formation of six ranger-type
regiments and four corps headquarters, including a
counteroffensive force headquarters in the forward
corps, improve the South's ability to conduct an active
defense north of Seoul. Reorganization and redeploy-
ment of naval forces afford increased potential to detect
and challenge seaborne attacks. Additionally, reserve
reorganization and the creation of counterinfiltration
brigades in rear areas assist security against the North's
Special Operations Forces. Operationally, increased re-
serve force training coupled with ongoing equipment
upgrades address a somewhat ne ected area that will
be critical to a successful defense
Qualitative hardware improvements in each service
have increased overall capabilities, reflecting Seoul's
determination to maintain a modern military force.
Coproduction of F-5 fighters and ongoing acquisition of
F-16 fighters permit the South to continue to lead in the
qualitative air balance, while purchase of new surface-
to-air missiles and continued coproduction of VULCAN
antiaircraft gun systems further strengthen ROK air
defenses. Ground forces firepower has increased with
coproduction of self-propelled howitzers and the indige-
nous production of limited numbers of long-range
towed howitzers and multiple rocket launchers. Manu-
facture of the K-1 tank and the K-200 infantry fighting
vehicle should significantly upgrade Seoul's armor
forces once initial defects are corrected and volume
sent home and it appeared additional units soon would
be withdrawn, ROK force modernization efforts over
the past five years have strengthened its armed forces
and, perhaps more important, have laid a foundation
for future defense improvements that North Korea
may find difficult to counter. At present, however, the
gap between North and South Korean military forces
noted in the 1981 NIE has not been closed (see figure
2).F_
8. P'yongyang enjoys not only a quantitative superi-
ority over Seoul but appears to have an edge in tactical
options as well. Because many of.its forces are concen-
trated near the DMZ, the North has the important
advantages of choosing the time and place of attack
and of massing superior forces in critical areas. Barring
timely warning of attack and effective reinforcement
by ROK reserves and US forces, North Korea would
have a good chance of making significant initial gains
of territory while neutralizing frontline ROK forces.
South Korea has chosen a less flexible position. Because
9
S
 Figure 2
Equipment and Personnel
Comparisons
Naval Equipment 0 Military Manpower d
North South
Korea Korea
1981
North South 0 North South
Korea Korea Korea Korea
1986 1981
9 Artillery, MRLs. tanks, and APCs.
b Fighters/bombers/transports/helicopters.
Surface combat/missile/patrol/submarine.
Active and reserve forces.
North South
Korea Korea
1986
10
 Invasion Corridors Into Western South Korea
.10 '~20 ,r. ...r,'90?:. -.:~~~40 ,Miles\'
Seoul is only 40 kilometers from the DMZ, the South
has little space to trade for time. If defensive lines
north of Seoul were not stabilized, the potential for
widespread exploitation by the North's mobile forces
would increase dramatically (see figure 3)=
9. South Korea's dependence on adequate warning,
sufficient firepower reinforcement, and reserve force
deployment to counter P'yongyang's superiorities
could result in a critical situation in the early days of
war. A successful defense would largely be determined
by the South's ability to absorb successive assaults and
contain any breakthroughs. The ROTC has a well-
prepared defense that is capable of inflicting heavy
damage on an attacker, and that obviates the need for
extensive preparation time-several days-to meet the
initial ground attack. Three to five days are required
to mobilize and deploy sufficient forces to blunt
11
SE
 S~E "-T-
Table 2
US Forces in Korea, February 1987
Number of Units
1
Note: Additional US forces in the Pacific Theater and CONUS are
programed for commitment to Korea in the event of hostilities.
determined subsecluent attacks and maintain rear area
security. If the North could successfully destroy or
isolate major ROKA forward elements and penetrate
to the south, the ROK probably would have to choose
between abandoning Seoul or losing the ability to
maintain an effective defense. A successful defense of
South Korea, in such a case, could be difficult, even
with US assistance. (For a listing of US forces currently
in South Korea, see table 2.)0
10. As critical as the warning of an attack is to a
successful defense of South Korea, we are not confi-
dent that sufficient notice would be provided to allow
extensive reaction time. North Korea's forward de-
ployment of forces, extensive use of underground
facilities, stringent security procedures, and terrain
masking combine to make the warning environment
the most difficult in the world. Surprise has been a
basic tenet of North Korea's offensive doctrine since
the Korean conflict, and defectors and captured agents
repeatedly cite its primacy. Thus,, warning of attack
could easily prove to be less than 24 hours, and a clear
persuasive judgment may not be issued.
11. If, on the other hand, Pyongyang chose to
emphasize maximum force and engaged in extensive
preparations for a prolonged war, it is likely that these
preparations would be detected well in advance of
indicators of imminent attack. Initiatives within the
Intelligence Community under way over the last two
years have resulted in improvements in our ability to
provide warning of war. We would recognize the
major economic and social disruptions that would
accompany preparations for prolonged conflict, Mobi-
lization of some 5 million workers, for example, would
substantially disrupt the industrial and agricultural
sectors before it produces a benefit to military capabil-
ities. With existing collection resources and methods,
we are confident of detecting and reporting these
disruptions and of providing warning of war
The Balance in 1990
12. Through the end of the decade, we anticipate
that North and South Korea will continue recent force
development patterns. In 1990 we project that the
overall military balance will still favor North Korea,
although by a narrower margin than at present. (See
annexes D and E for more detailed discussion of the
future forces.) In both countries, attempts to fully
redress hardware and operational readiness weakness-
es will remain limited by economic and political
reality.' Relatively modest growth in the strength of
the armed services of each country will be supple-
mented by organizational changes and training em-
phasis designed to optimize force effectiveness. Re-
serve force capabilities and rapid national
mobilization will assume even greater importance to
both nations.)
' Both Koreas face leadership successions over the next few years.
In the North, Kim Chong-ils transition to power appears well under
way with probably little impact on the North's military situation. In
the South, differences between ruling and opposition parties carry
the potential for disruptive confrontation. If disturbances were
severe and prolonged, Pyongyang would consider seeking reunifica-
12
f
 -Warning of War is defined as the communication
of intelligence judgments to national policymakers
that a state or alliance intends war, or is on a course
that substantially increases the risk of war and is
taking steps to prepare for war.^
-Warning of Attack is defined as the communica-
tion of an intelligence judgment to national policy-
makers that an adversary not only is preparing its
armed forces for war but also intends to launch an
attack in the near future.n
13. Overall dependence on allies for advanced mili-
tary technology will continue, especially in the North,
despite growing research and development efforts.
The Soviet Union will remain the North's primary
source of modern military hardware, but P'yongyang
will actively seek technology transfers from both
Communist and non-Communist nations. We believe
North Korea will have limited success. Moscow's ap-
parent reluctance to supply significant amounts of
relatively modern equipment probably will continue,
and any assistance from other countries will be in
limited quantities. North Korea will be compelled to
concentrate on production of older, proven compo-
nents supplemented with limited foreign-acquired
technology. Although hindered by a sluggish economy,
the North's well-established arms industry will pro-
duce sufficient weapon systems and military equip-
ment to maintain P'yongyang's overall materiel lead.
14. Concern for domestic stability will continue to
limit South Korea's military spending, but a growing
GNP will permit defense budget increases in absolute
terms. Seoul's dependence on US imports will lessen if
current levels of force improvement funding are main-
tained and if the expanding military-industrial base
resolves initial quality control and production prob-
lems. Annual production rates of relatively sophisticat-
ed ground and naval material, however, will probably
continue to be less than those envisioned by ROK force
planners. South Korea's investment in a modern mili-
tary production capability, however, will begin to pay
off as Seoul fields increasing amounts of more ad-
vanced equipment, partially compensating for P'yong-
yang's overall numerical advantage. As the ROK's
defensive capabilities increase, the North's tactical
options will diminish. A successful South Korean de-
fense, however, will continue to depend on timely
warning, mobilization, and reinforcement-barring
major increases in planned force development pro-
grams.
Implications for the United States
15. Despite North Korean advantages in military
strength and its potential to achieve surprise, we
believe the North's leaders are deterred from initiating
hostilities by a complex mix of political, military, and
economic factors. These include: the US commitment
to defend South Korea-including the North's percep-
tion of a US nuclear deterrent; the presence of US
forces in the South; the strength of South Korea's
military forces; the relative stability of the South's
government; the dismal shape of the North's economy;
and the interests of the Chinese and the Soviets to
avoid conflict on the Korean Peninsula.
16. Although perhaps to a lesser extent than in the
past, North Korea's military options remain influenced
by the attitude of its principal allies, China and the
Soviet Union. Neither nation is in a position to veto a
North Korean attack-both would be loath to support
a war on the peninsula not of their own choice.
However, should the North attack and fail and, as a
result, should either Pyongyang or the North Korean
Government appear threatened, the Soviets and/or
Chinese probably would intervene militarily in the
North.=
17. Of more importance in P'yongyang's calcula-
tions are its perceptions of the United States' resolve
and ability to meet its security commitment and of the
relative stability of South Korea. Undoubtedly there
are those in North Korea who advocate the use of the
military option to reunify the Koreas sooner rather
than later. They recognize that, as the South's military
improves, the gap between the North and South is
narrowing, and they realize that the window of oppor-
tunity to use their numerical and tactical advantages is
closing. For those who advocate the near-term military
solution, however, the presence of US forces in the
South must be an important variable in their calcula-
tionsj
18. While US combat forces in the South are an
important element in Seoul's defenses, their primary
contribution is as an earnest of Washington's dedica-
tion to uphold its treaty obligations. Should the United
States' resolve, or ability, to honor its defense obliga-
tion be lessened-either by voluntarily withdrawing
forces already on the peninsula or, because a crisis
elsewhere requires redeploying forces in the Pacific
committed to Korea-we believe that the North's
desire for reunification on its own terms and its
tactical, manpower, and equipment advantages could
13
ae~Rr~
 arm
We believe that overall trends appear favorable for
an eventual balance between the forces on the peninsu-
]a. To the extent that these trends continue, Seoul could
be strong enough to successfully withstand an unaided
North Korean attack as early as the mid-1990s. Howev-
er, we note several trends that will affect the military
situation on the peninsula
South Korea's growing military capabilities will be a
source of friction and strength for US policies on the
peninsula:
Time is on Seoul's side. Shielded by the US
presence, ROK military power will increase
steadily without impeding domestic economic
growth. Yet, should events threaten continued
economic progress, Seoul will feel a need to reduce
force improvement funding, thereby slowing mili-
tary self-sufficiency.
On the other hand, growing nationalism and an
expectation that the United States will not sustain
present force levels indefinitely will provide moti-
vation to develop a unilateral deterrent ability.
As ROK military improvements create a stronger,
more modern armed force, rising nationalism will
accelerate demands for a greater role in control-
ling the combined ROK/US forces on the
peninsula.
- Improving military capabilities may lessen the
perceived need for in-country US forces. Addi-
tionally, expanding defense industries and increas-
ing materiel self-sufficiency may permit reduction
in the size-of the US assistance effort.
- Desire to capitalize on international arms sales will
cause further conflict with US restrictions on sales
to third countries. This may lead the ROK to
prefer foreign sources of advanced weaponry.
North Korean reaction to the South's increasing
military strength will continue to pose analytic and
policy challenges for the United States:
- North Korea will view the South's growing
strength and technological improvements with
alarm. It is likely that domestic economic prob-
lems cannot be resolved, and Pyongyang may
decide to seek large-scale Soviet assistance at some
cost to its independence.
14
- The North will pursue development of additional
combat force multipliers-for example, impro-
ved/guided munitions, surface-to-surface missiles,
and, possibly, chemical agents/munitions-as im-
proving ROK defensive capabilities lessen P'yon-
gyang's quantitative advantage. (Although devel-
opment of a nuclear weapon is constrained both
by its signing of the NPT, and by the international
safeguards we expect to be imposed soon by the
IAEA, Pyongyang is developing an indigenous
nuclear research reactor.)
- At the same time, the North has embarked on a
longer-term, more diplomatic approach, aiming
for an eventual US withdrawal through pursuit of
tension-reduction measures and dialogue with the
South. Present efforts at tension-reduction-estab-
lishing direct dialogue with the United States and
use of Chinese officials to convey messages urging
US exercise reduction-may increase. Additional-
ly, the North may attempt to use its Soviet and
Japanese connections as conduits for access to the
United States. In this scenario, the North would
concentrate on improving its economy and once
industrial capabilities permit, again embark on a
massive force modernization campaign.
- Determining North Korean policy intentions will
remain difficult. We anticipate continued eco-
nomic problems that Soviet assistance alone will
not solve. Concurrent concern over inability to
counter growing ROK military strength may cause
the North to adopt a more open approach to
foreign investment and technical assistance. This,
in turn, may permit more access to the North and
yield a better perspective from which to assess
P'yongyang's intentions
 tempt some in the leadership to advocate that Pyon-
gyang immediately launch a strike against the South.
The danger of such an event would be most serious if a
change in the US deterrence equation coincided with
prolonged and widespread instability in South Korea
and/or a leadership transition in the North.0
19. Furthermore, in the event the United States
should decide over the longer term to withdraw its
forces at a point in time when the North-South
balance favors the South-perhaps in the 1990s-we
believe that the North would feel much less* con-
strained than now in using its massed forces along the
DMZ to attack the South-even though the window of
opportunity may have been completely closed. 0
20. The most important deterrent, therefore, now
and in the foreseeable future, will be the US role on
the peninsula. So long as P'yongyang faces a cohesive
ROK backed by the United States, we believe the
likelihood of full-scale, unprovoked North Korean
aggression will be low. Although the Chinese or Soviet
ability to restrain Pyongyang may lessen further as
domestic development and production capabilities ex-
pand, and, although the growing combat strength of
ROK forces will assume more importance in the
North's calculations, we believe that the mix of politi-
cal, economic, and military factors-particularly con-
siderations of the US resolve-that presently deter
North Korean aggression will continue to operate
through 1990. =
21, North Korea could consider a limited use of
force. Firing incidents along the DMZ could become
more frequent, and SOF infiltration attempts could
occur. North Korea could also resort to terrorism in an
attempt to promote instability in the South. If so, the
North probably would choose violence that could be
credited to either South Korean dissidents or third-
country terrorists. Should Pyongyang orchestrate a
prolonged campaign of violence, an aggressive South
Korean reaction could escalate into major hostilities.
(Although unlikely, such a scenario could offer the
North the hope of activating its mutual defense trea-
ties with Beijing and Moscow.)=
22. Although we cannot be certain how the many
variables that can affect the military balance will
develop in the next decade, we feel cautiously optimis-
tic. From our vantage point at this time, overall trends
appear favorable for an eventual balance between
forces on the peninsula. To the extent that these trends
continue, Seoul could be strong enough to successfully
withstand an unaided North Korean attack as early as
the mid-1990s.1
 ANNEX A
North Korean Special Operations Forces
1. North Korean Special Operations Forces (SOF)
are elite units trained to operate behind enemy lines
during both peace and war. SOF units consist of highly
trained independent reconnaissance battalions, sniper
brigades, and light infantry brigades. During peace-
time, SOF perform political assassinations and support
international terrorism. Wartime missions include in-
telligence collection, sabotage, and limited-scale con-
ventional attacks on key targets.0
2. Using insights gained from the recent North
Korean reorganization, the Intelligence Community
credits the North with approximately 55,000 SOF
personnel organized into 21 brigades. These figures
represent a reduction from previous estimates; de-
tailed analysis of North Korean training designators
and true unit designators has permitted us to eliminate
several units that had been double counted. Also, no
longer included within the SOF classification are
mechanized brigades, district command brigades, con-
ventional divisional and regimental reconnaissance,
light infantry assets, and Korean Workers' Party agent
elements. Finally, it appears that part of the North's
overall force reorganization included reduction in the
size of the average SOF brigade from nine battalions
to six or seven battalions.2 Even so, North Korea's SOF,
the second-largest such force in the world, remains a
significant, cost-effective combat force multiplier for
P'yongyang and a formidable threat to Seoul's defen-
sive plans.
3. SOF personnel are highly motivated and enjoy
benefits and prestige not accorded the average North
Korean soldier. Their training is intensive and realistic.
During operations in South Korea, SOF personnel
seldom have been captured alive. The North's SOF
have weaknesses, however, in several areas:
Lack of organic heavy weapons limits offensive
capabilities against alert, prepared defenses.
- Once inserted, limited sustainability will hamper
the conduct of follow-on; operations after initial
targets have been attacked.
- Limited amounts of air and sea transports restrict
the numbers of SOF that the North simulta-
neously can deploy against targets in both the
forward battle area and in strategic rear areas in
the South (see figure 4).
We calculate that Pyongyang could, at best, insert
about 8,500 SOF troops in ? a single air/sea lift. This
would force the North to limit the number of targets
attacked initially and could result in smaller sized
attack units for operations deep in the South. Also, we
believe the success of those subsequent insertion at-
tempts necessary to cover additional targets is likely to
be lower because ROK defenses would be fully alert.
Consequently, the North will have to rely on the use of
tunnels under the DMZ and overland insertion for the
majority of its SOF. This limits the number of targets
that can be attacked south of Seoul and, in turn, will
increase the risk of detection and, if conducted before
the ground attack commences, could provide warning
to ROK defenses.
4. South Korea has enjoyed some success in improv-
ing counterinfiltration defenses and providing warning
of peacetime attempts by the North to insert agents.
Increased use of ground surveillance radars, night
vision devices, and barriers have reduced the ability of
infiltrators from the North to cross the DMZ overland
without detection. At present, this has forced the
North to rely increasingly on sea insertion of agents.'
Additionally, the South's air defense network provides
good coverage of the most likely aerial infiltration
routes, although gaps in low-altitude surveillance re-
main. Nevertheless, overall ROK defenses are spread
thinly in some areas and could be saturated by an all-
out attack. We believe Seoul would be hard pressed to
stop initial penetration of significant numbers of SOF
should North Korea make the concentrated air/land/
sea assault that we would anticipate during an attack
on South Korea
5. During an attack, the North's SOF would at-
tempt to disrupt mobilization and command, control,
and communications (C3) networks; to interdict trans-
' For more information on sea infiltration, see the CIA's DI
Intelligence Assessment EA 86-100100 March 1986,
North Korean Intelligence Operations Against the South: The
Importance of Sea Infiltration.
 Figure 4. The AN-2 Colt can only carry eight soldiers and is not a modern aircraft. The North has about 270 of these aircraft
portation routes, and to attack key air defense, fire-
support, and materiel assets. We believe SOF activi-
ties, even if only partially successful, could greatly
assist the North's attack by hampering critical, initial
ROK air, C3, and reinforcement operations. Attacks
on ROK airfields, thereby degrading sortie generation
capability, will hamper the ROKAF's ability to pro-
vide air defense to the ROK . and timely ground
support. Additionally, efforts to shift in-place forward
reserves and key artillery and antitank assets will be
difficult if C3 is disrupted and if road and rail routes
are interdictedF--]
6. During the rest of the decade, we anticipate the
situation will remain essentially the same. Seoul will
continue to upgrade its counterinfiltration defenses
and strengthen rear security. These measures will be
counterbalanced by North Korean emphasis on pro-
duction and acquisition of additional and more sophis-
ticated insertion platforms and on refinement of SOF
techniques. Despite weaknesses, P'yongyang's SOF
will play an important role in any North-South hostil-
ities with continued potential to disrupt critical aspects
of Seoul's defensive plans.=
 Present Force Comparison
North Korean Plans and Military Capabilities
1. Should the North opt for war, we believe it
would attempt to conduct a coordinated, surprise
attack designed to overwhelm the South's war-fighting
capability and to occupy the ROK as quickly as
possible.' The decisive battle would be fought on the
ground with first-echelon infantry forces fixing ROK
forward defenders in place and opening gaps for
armored, mechanized, and motorized unit exploita-
tion. Attacks would be supported by insertion of SOF
troops overland, through tunnels under the Demilita-
rized Zone (DMZ), by sea, and by air (see figure 5).6
The North Korean Air Force (NKAF) would attempt
to neutralize Seoul's ability to conduct air superiority
and close-support operations by disrupting the ROK's
air defense control network, by attacking selected
airfields and logistic facilities, and by destroying as
many of the South's jet fighters as possible. The
North's Navy would insert SOF units along the coast-
line, bombard high-priority targets, disrupt ROK ship-
ping and port operations, protect North Korea's coast-
line, and attrite ROK naval forces=
2. North Korean armed forces enjoy significant
numerical and tactical advantages over those of the
ROK (see figure 6). On the ground, the North's ability
to mass at selected points of attack appears to be good,
although recent analysis indicates ready reserve aug-
mentation of active forces--a process that will take
more than five days for full mobilization-may be
necessary to ensure satisfactory overall attack ratios.6
P'yongyang's strategy is based on the need to rapidly defeat
ROK forces and occupy key areas throughout South Korea before
US reinforcements can decisively intervene and Seoul can mobilize
its larger population base. Reports indicate the North envisions a
successful short war would be over within about two weeks.
' Members of the USFK Eighth US Army G-2 Tunnel Neutraliza-
tion Team have identified 25 to 30 suspected new tunnels, and
underground activity leads them to conclude that the North is still
digging. Because they have not broken into tunnels at these
locations, they are officially unconfirmed.
? Despite the North's forward deployment of additional forces
during the past several years, some preattack movement will still be
necessary to achieve favorable force ratios. Ready reserve augmen-
tation would permit more flexibility in assignment of active forces to
the initial attack.)
Figure S. ROK soldier inside one of the North Korean infiltration
Large-scale deployment of key units could be made
under the guise of an exercise with final forward
movement conducted at night. Artillery and multiple
rocket fire could have a devastating effect on ROK
defenders because of the North's greater explosive
delivery capability and larger number of long-range
pieces. The North Korean Army's (NKA) mobile fol-
low-on elements have the potential to exploit break-
throughs in the South's forward defenses, although the
effectiveness of these units will be reduced somewhat
because they have only limited numbers of armored
vehicles.' North Korea's well-trained SOF troops could
compound the South's defensive problems, even
though limited transportation for behind-the-lines in-
sertion is available.)
3. The North's advantages are lessened, however,
by the ROK's prepared defenses. Furthermore, restric-
' Currently, many of these forces are mechanized in name only.
Numerous mechanized brigades include a mix of armored personnel
carrier (APC) and truck-equipped infantry, supported by towed
antitank and field artillery weapons. Some of these brigades do not
have any armored vehicles, while none are fully equipped with
19
 ET
Figure 6
North-South Ground Force
Comparison
NKA to present a lucrative target of massed armored/
mechanized forces. Extensive antiaircraft artillery
(AAA) forces, while equipped with older weapon
systems, are capable of effective air defense of the
North and the initial ground battle. However, a
would hamper a North Korean advance. Weaknesses
in range and mobility of tactical AAA units would be
readily apparent during rapid advances.)
9,270 4,080 4. With its advantage in total numbers of combat
aircraft, the NKAF could expect to launch a large
initial air attack while maintaining first priority home-
land defense operations. Relatively restricted range/
time-on-target and light payload capacity would limit
the effectiveness of the NKAF against hardened tar-
gets, although success against soft or unwarned targets
such as radars, unprotected aircraft, and flightlines
Tanks b could be high. Lack of precision munitions, limited
electronic countermeasures capability, and a general
dependence on clear weather for large-scale opera-
3,570 1,330 tions will hamper the NKAF. Although the NKAF can
attack ground targets, a responsive close air support
capability does not exist. =
5. We estimate that the North Korean Navy (NKN)
has enough vessels to conduct simultaneous offensive
and defensive operations. The North has a strong
antisurface ship capability within its coastal waters, a
credible antishipping capability, and a limited antisub-
marine warfare ability. Also, the NKN has sufficient
amphibious and fire-support forces to land-company-
sized conventional or SOF units on undefended or
li
h
l
defend
h
-- - `L _
' ' '
d b
g
t
y
eac
e Ho
N t
e
'Artillery and MLRs.
Includes assault guns.
Active forces including ROK marines.
312248 387
attack.
unit for unit, are smaller and less heavily armed than
those of the South and possess only a limited conven-
tional antiaircraft capability.
6. North Korean reserve forces could significantly
assist an attack by assuming responsibility for coastal
and rear area security, thus freeing regular units for
active employment. Of the North's estimated 5 million
reserves, some 700,000 are believed in the ready
reserves. At present, 23 to 25 ready reserve divisions
are assessed to be organized and equipped along
regular Army lines. Further, it appears that nine to 12
of these divisions would be available to augment
forward operations while the remainder served as full-
time rear security forces. Other reserve units would
provide casualty replacements for the active forces
and defend their workplaces if under immediate
five terrain at the DMZ limits avenues for large-scale 7. At present, we have no conclusive evidence
attacks, invites channelization, and could cause the indicating that North Korea has produced or is now
 producing chemical warfare (CW) munitions/agents
or that offensive CW employment is part of the
North's war-fighting doctrine. North Korea has posses-
sion of weapon systems compatible with CW delivery
and has conducted extensive field and garrison train-
ing in simulated CW environments. In addition, we
believe the North has a limited CW capability based
on its chemical production capabilities and on the
resources it has applied to chemical warfare protection
and defense. Chemical units appear to be well trained
and adequately equipped, and combat forces are
judged capable of operating in a nonpersistent CW
environment. Therefore, we cannot rule out North
Korean use of CW munitions/agents as a combat force
8. The North's electronic warfare (EW) and signals
intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities are limited.? Even
so, its strategic and tactical SIGINT equipment proba-
bly could be used quite successfully against unencrypt-
multiplier against selected targets.8
9. North Korean military materiel stockpiles are
believed sufficient to support several months of com-
bat operations without external assistance. Additional-
ly, a significant portion of these supplies is positioned
in forward areas that would assist offensive operations
and partially compensate for the vulnerability of the
North's transportation system to interdiction.
cient stocks to support its short war scenario.
10. Reports of fuel shortages reveal part of an
increasingly chaotic energy situation in North Korea.
At present, P'yongyang appears unable to supply
enough energy to operate simultaneously all sectors of
the economy at full capacity and to meet all military
training requirements. This does not mean the North
lacks sufficient fuel to go to war, for if all known
storage tanks were full, fuel capacity would permit
several months of combat. We doubt that the North
currently has adequate reserves to sustain a prolonged
conflict, but estimate that P'yongyang maintains suffi-
Chemical Warfare Capability,.
? All North Korean services possess a limited jamming capability.
The NKAF and NKN rely on chaff for electronic countermeasures.
North Korean Readiness
11. Traditionally, the North's military readiness has
been rated high, aided in part by a long-eight to 10
years-term of service. However, proficiency training
levels in some areas-annual flight-hours per pilot or
artillery crew live-firing, for example-habitually
have been well below ROK and US standards. We
have little information about operational ready rates
but judge that maintenance of considerable numbers
of old equipment probably creates spare part and
repair problems for P'yongyang. Furthermore, the
North's logistic support system appears ill equipped to
sustain rapid operations. Recent reorganizations have
created potentially more effective mobile regular units
and ready reserves, but anticipated training emphasis
with these forces has not occurred. In fact, since 1983,
despite the recent upsurge in medium unit training
rates, both overall major unit training rates and large-
scale operational exercises generally have declined in
all services.
12. The short-term result, we believe, is some re-
duction in force readiness, especially for major units
and joint operations. Training in basic combat skills
and low-level unit operations has continued. Except
for the MKAF, proficiency of basic combat units-
squad to battalion and individual naval vessel-should
still be good. NKAF readiness, due to severely lower
sortie rates, probably is only fair.10
13. During war, all units undergo an initial learning
period when peacetime training is modified by the
realities of combat: Commanders and staffs are con-
stantly confronted with unforeseen, rapidly changing
situations that threaten successful operations. Recent
field practice for all echelons greatly aids efficient
operations during this critical time. We believe the
current lack of full-scale field training degrades the
North's overall military readiness.)
South Korean Plans and Military Capabilities
14. South Korea's defense plans aim to destroy the
attacking force well north of Seoul." Upon being
alerted, ROK frontline units would fully man defen-
1? The North could reverse this situation by embarking on an
intensive program of unit training and large exercises. Obviously,
the longer Pyongyang allows readiness to suffer, the more resources
and time will be needed to upgrade proficiency. Further, if exercise
and training rates continue at present low levels, a notable increase
in rates could provide warning of a possible change in North Korean
policy.
it Current plans call for the defense of Seoul at all costs. Seoul
contains over a fifth of the population of South Korea. Because it is
the commercial, industrial, educational, political, and communica-
tions heart of the country, its loss would have a traumatic psycholog-
21
 Reduced Military Exercises and Training
We believe the decline in training and large-scale
exercises in the North over the last few years derives in
part from P'yongyang's foreign policy initiatives and
the North's growing economic problems. Viewing the
pattern of major exercises over the past 10 years, we
note an interesting (if circumstantial) correlation be-
tween levels of major exercise activity and North
Korea's foreign policy tactics.
- In 1977 the United States announced its intention
to withdraw gradually its forces from South Korea.
The frequency of large exercises in the North
dropped dramatically as, we believe, the North
attempted to avoid any moves that would reverse
US policy.
- Cancellation of withdrawal plans, announced in
1979, may have prompted P'yongyang to drop
efforts to project a nonbelligerent image toward
the United States and South Korea. A new round
of major exercises was initiated in 1980-82.
- After 1983, as Pyongyang again sought to project
a moderate image, exercise levels declined. Fol-
lowing declaration of a unilateral exercise morato-
rium in 1986, large field exercises ceased.
P'yongyang's latest decision to reduce exercise levels
probably was made with full intent to continue normal
military training. The North may have calculated that
overall armed forces readiness would not suffer signifi-
cantly if individual brigade and division tactical field
training were supplemented by corps and higher eche-
lon command post exercises (CPX). If conducted with-
out large troop deployments, CPXs could be difficult to
detect, yet could provide minimum essential training to
high-level commanders and staffs. At the same time,
Pyongyang could truthfully point to the lack of large-
scale, multiunit field maneuvers as proof of its dedica-
tion to tension reduction.
Growing economic problems, however, probably de-
railed these plans. Energy shortfalls of unexpected
magnitude, especially in refined fuel, combined with a
continuing need to supplement the civilian labor force
apparently compelled the North to shift some military
resources to its ailing economy. As P'yongyang's eco-
nomic malaise increased, reduction of brigade and
division training offered at least a temporary, partial
sive positions and activate barriers to channel attackers
into preselected zones of fire. National mobilization
would fill regular units to wartime strength, provide
12 additional infantry divisions, and activate 13 lightly
armed rear area security divisions. The South's air
defense forces would detect and destroy or divert
attacking aircraft and rapidly achieve air superiority
over the ground battlefield. The ROK Navy initially
would defend against amphibious raids and attempt to
counterattack or neutralize the North's antiship opera-
tions in the waters surrounding South Korea.
15. The ROK Army has a well-prepared defense
capable of inflicting heavy damage on an attacker.
Natural and manmade barriers could slow or stall
ground assaults, but total effectiveness would depend
on timely warning. Several hours' notice is required
for full manning of forward defenses and the installa-
tion of several key barriers. Artillery and antitank fire
will be critical during initial operations, and the South
has made significant increases in its weapons inven-
tories, .but acquisitions of artillery-enhancing systems
such as counterbattery radars have not been fully
implemented. The North's quantitative, range, and
mobility advantages in artillery- and multiple rocket
launchers will hamper ROK fire-support and antitank
operations while increasing the South's dependence on
its outnumbered air force0
16. The ROK Air Force (ROKAF) is prepared to
defend against a major air attack, given 12 to 24 hours'
warning. Air defense command and control is highly
centralized and effective but could be saturated dur-
ing a large-scale attack. Although P'yongyang has
more aircraft, in 1-on-1 combat ROK fighters and
crews should be more than a match for the North.
North Korean aircraft range and payload limitations
and overall shortage of advanced electronic counter-
measure equipment are factors that favor the South.
Given the North's numerical superiority, however, the
ROKAF could be hard pressed to gain needed air
superiority quickly and provide timely close support to
the initial ground battle.0
17. South Korea's recent naval reorganization and
redeployment affords increased potential to detect and
challenge seaborne attacks, although widespread oper-
ations conducted at night and in small formations will
be difficult to counter. Qualitative advantages in
certain naval equipment (large ships and longer range
ship-to-ship missiles, for example) are balanced by the
larger North Korean vessel inventory. Limited anti-
submarine capabilities will restrict the South's efforts
to counter the North's attacks on port and shipping
operations.
18. South Korean reserves number over 4.5 million
personnel. The major ready reserve units are orga-
nized into 25 divisions, 12 of which would deploy
22
 SECRET-
21. South Korea's materiel stocks are considerably
lower than those we estimate for the North, and
external resupply would be needed much sooner.
Efforts to increase critical ammunition and fuel stocks
and storage facilities have been only partially success-
ful, with serious shortages remaining, especially in
supplies for the Air Force. Resupply, moreover, must
come by airlift or sealift, and then must be transported
forward along vulnerable rail and road networks.
forward while the remainder provide rear security.
While equipment upgrades have increased the capa-
bilities of this crucial element in ROK defensive plans,
shortages still limit full combat effectiveness. More-
over, successful reserve mobilization and deployment,
which will take three to five days, remain dependent
on adequate warning of attack (see figure 7). Under
less than optimum conditions, the likelihood of com-
plete reserve force deployment before a North Korean
attack is questionable.
19. The South has no known offensive CW employ-
ment doctrine, but awareness of the North's potential
chemical threat has led to an increased emphasis on
protective training and to a growth in -chemical de-
fense organizations. Shortages of protective CW equip-
ment in many chemical, combat support, and reserve
units will severely hamper combat operations should
the North employ chemical munitions or agents.
20. The EW and SIGINT capabilities of the R OK
alone, like the North, are limited,'
" Although the ROKAF has some electronic countermeasures pods,
chaff and flares remain the primary defensive EW measures. The
ROKN also relies on chaff. While the ROKA is in the process of field-
ing a total of six EW battalions, only one company currently has been
formed, and the acquisition of jammers, receivers, and direction-
finding equipment is progressing slowly due to limited funds.)
South Korean Readiness
22. We consider the overall combat capability of
ROK forces as good. South Korean conscripts' higher
education and technical skill levels compensate, to
some extent, for a short-normally 30 months-mini-
mum term of service. Individual and unit training
standards are high and equipment operational ready
rates are adequate. Regular major training exercises,
such as Team Spirit, sustain large unit readiness and
reinforce Seoul's ability to conduct joint and combined
operations. On the other hand, combat support defi-
ciencies, especially shortages in war reserves, restrict
the South's ability to conduct sustained combat opera-
tions unaided. Further, South Korea's need for timely
warning of war is?a serious limitation to total readiness.
Conclusions
23. We believe that the present force comparison
on the Korean Peninsula favors North Korea. Pyong-
yang enjoys a quantitative superiority over Seoul and
can choose the time and place of attack. These
advantages potentially allow the North to employ
superior forces against critical air and naval targets
and opposite key ground avenues of approach. F_
23
SE
 24. Despite recent degradations in readiness, the
North, with a minimum of preparation, maintains the
ability to launch a formidable initial assault. So long as
P'yongyang quickly penetrates forward defenses and
disrupts ROK reinforcement operations, the North has
a good chance of making significant short-term territo-
rial gains. Potential weaknesses in command and
control and logistic operations caused by lack of recent
field training probably would be minimized if the
North's operations proceeded according to plan.
25. The South's dependence on adequate warning,
sufficient firepower reinforcement, and reserve force
deployment to counter the North could result in a
critical situation during the early days of war. South
Korean defensive options are limited, with little capa-
bility for flexible action. Because Seoul is only 40
kilometers from the DMZ, the South has little maneu-
ver space to trade for time. The ability of forward
elements to maintain a cohesive defense by giving
ground is restricted, yet, a do-or-die defense, while
slowing the North's advance, could invite defeat in
detail by isolated elements.=
26. A successful defense would largely be deter-
mined by the South's ability to absorb successive
assaults and contain any breakthroughs. Forward de-
ployment of the bulk of the ROKA obviates the need
for extensive preparation time to meet the initial
ground attack. At least three to five days, however, are
required to mobilize and deploy sufficient forces in
depth to. ensure subsequent breakthrough attacks are
defeated and ROK rear areas are secured.=
27. Given sufficient reaction time, South Korea's
chances of limiting the battle to the forward area and
seizing the initiative appear reasonable. With limited
warning, stabilization of the defenses north of Seoul
would be less likely. If the North could successfully
destroy or isolate major ROKA forward elements and
penetrate to the south, the ROK would be forced to
choose between abandoning Seoul or losing the ability
to maintain an effective defense)
 ANNEX C
Personnel
743,000
Equipment
Artillery
7,220
4,040
Multiple rocket launchers
2,050
40
Medium tanks
2,710
1,330
Light tanks
660
0
Assault guns
200
0
Armored personnel carriers
1,610
940
Air Forces
Personnel
56,000
Equipment
Transports
Helicopters d
Naval forces
206 MIG-21/23 272 F-4/F-5E/F/F-16
505 MJG-15/17/19/SU-7 153 F-86/F-5A/B
83 0 C
Patrol 364
Amphibious 129
Submarine 23
91
388
Surface combat 3 27
Missile attack 36 11
Midget submarine 41
Mine warfare 23
Reserve forces
Ready reserves r 717,000
Total reserves 4,900,000
Total active forces 839,500
Total armed forces s 5,739,500
Personnel figures rounded to the nearest 100 and equipment
figures rounded to the nearest 10. Equipment figures include
reserve force weapons.
b Includes 25,000 Marines.
South Korean F-4 fighters carry bomb loads of up to 7,200
kilograms, as compared with 3,000 kg for the North's IL-28s.
d All services. Of the total, the South has 56 aircraft equipped with
antitank guided missiles. The North may be trying to develop a
This table is
7
8
315,000
4,500,000
605,600
5,105,000
Includes 22 landing craft converted for possible patrol use which
are still capable of transporting troops.
rNorth Korean Reserve Military Training Units and South Korean
Homeland Reserve and Mobilization Reserve Divisions.
e Both states have made efforts to overcome constraints posed by the
size of their population base eligible for military service. The North
utilizes women and has raised the upper age limit for military
service. The South uses women to a lesser extent and employs
limited duty personnel whenever possible. In a long war, the South's
larger manpower pool-twice that of the North-would be a
significant advantage.
25
3FCRET__
 Future Force Developments: 1987-90
Overview
1. Projections of future force developments on the
Korean Peninsula are challenging because we have no
information on North Korean plans and because South
Korea's plans may be subject to significant modifica-
tion. Equally important, both countries will be influ-
enced by internal and external forces whose ultimate
effect, at this time, is uncertain. Nonetheless, we
believe that recent approaches to force improvement
by the North and the South will provide clues to the
direction of future developments
2. Each country will seek to maintain an effective
military capability, but economic considerations and
continued dependence on allies for advanced equip-
ment will hamper their ability to make more than
modest improvements. The North will maintain its
quantitative edge, but the South's growing capabilities
will threaten P'yongyang's ability to maintain a favor-
able military balance in the next decade.'3
North Korean Goals
3. The North will remain committed to a continual
program of force improvement. Resource limitations
will continue to place a premium on cost-effective
measures, which will not disrupt further the ailing
economy. Operationally, the North will concentrate on
structural and tactical improvements designed to per-
mit rapid, continuous operations. We anticipate P'yon-
gyang's goals will include overall improvement in
combined arms and joint operations; command, con-
trol, and communications (CS); rear area security, and
Sustatnability
4. P'yongyang will expect to extract maximum
mileage from its large armaments industry by mating
newer technology with proven production lines.
Equipment development efforts will aim to supplement
and exploit foreign technology. Although markets are
scare, the North will try to expand its role as an
international arms merchant-both as a middleman and
weapons producer-in part to gain much needed foreign
currency but also in hope of acquiring otherwise inacces-
sible advanced technology from its clients.=
5. Equipment improvement goals will center on
correction of weaknesses in the areas of tactical air
defense, C3, electronic warfare (EW), and mobility.
The North will also emphasize continuing antitank
and fire-support hardware upgrades. Additionally,
P'yongyang will be forced to address maintenance,
repair parts, and replacement problems caused by an
aging equipment inventory.F_~
South Korean Goals
6. South Korea, too, will attempt to economically
improve the capabilities of its armed forces. Organiza-
tional refinement, rather than manpower growth, will
be used whenever possible to increase military effec-
tiveness. Improvements will be sought in counteroffen-
sive and rear security operations and in rapid reserve
mobilization and deployment.
7. Like the North, the South will attempt to extract
maximum efficiency from major equipment develop-
ments by creating families of systems with common
chassis, powerpacks, and so forth and through sales in
the international arms market. Seoul will attempt to
capitalize on the South's technological edge over the
North and apply this advantage to the weapons indus-
try. The emphasis will be on fielding quality hardware
whose superior performance compensates for North
Korea's numbers (see figure 8). Sustainability, in terms
of supply stockpiles and maintenance operations will
also receive limited emphasis.F___1
" A healthy economy gives Seoul a distinct advantage over the
North. The South's GNP is currently almost three times larger than
the North's estimated GNP and this gap is continually widening.
Thus, while the North devotes an estimated 20 to 25 percent of GNP
to the defense sector and the South only 5.7 percent, in estimated
real terms, Seoul is spending about as much now on defense as
P'yongyang. By 1990, South Korean defense spending is projected to
be higher-perhaps over 25 percent higher-than that of the North,
although generally higher budgetary costs for procurement and
personnel would lessen somewhat Seoul's advantage. F--]
North Korea--Internal and External Factors
8. The pressures North Korea faces on the domestic
front-ensuring the leadership succession and reviving
the economy-will affect P'yongyang's ability to make
large-scale force improvements. Kim II-song and Kim
Chong-il will seek to ensure the military's loyalty to
the succession. On the other hand, shifting the priority
27
I
 R
Figure 8. ROK workers reassemble an ungraded M-48 medium
tanker 1
in allocation of resources to the civil economy proba-
bly will be necessary to correct deep-seated problems.
Temporary reallocation of resources from the military
to civil sectors has occurred in the past, although not
perhaps on the present scale nor with the same effect
on military readiness. To the extent that current trends
continue, military production could begin to suffer.
Even so, the North's present lead over the South is
such that, were P'yongyang to cease military produc-
tion and Seoul to achieve its planned force improve-
ments, the North would still have the overall quantita-
tive edge in 1990,
9. Pyongyang will continue attempts to supple-
ment domestic force improvements with foreign mili-
tary assistance. To varying extents, the Chinese and
Soviets have the capability to provide both economic
and military aid to the North. Lacking hard currency,
the North will try to expand barter trade, especially
raw materials, and services-small ship construction,
for example-as part payment. However, P'yon-
gyang's limited ability to fully and promptly repay its
debts will continue to affect the amount and type of
military assistance available.
10. Suspicions of North Korean unpredictability
will continue to worry its potential patrons. Moscow,
Gauging the health of North Korea's economy and its
ability to support further large-scale military improve-
ments is extremely difficult. Over the past two decades,
P'yongyang's ability to juggle conflicting economic and
military priorities has appeared remarkable, but time
may be running out for the North. P'yongyang contin-
ues to suffer from food, energy, and resource shortages
that severely limit economic growth. Additionally, the
North enjoys one of the worst credit ratings in the
Defense spending at past high levels appears suicidal,
yet we note further growth in weapons inventories and
see additional military materiel production facility ex-
pansion.
The renewed relationship with the Soviet Union
probably was prompted in part by realization that the
North lacked the economic and technological strength
to sustain further large-scale military development.
Moderate weapons deliveries in and of themselves
probably will not solve P'yongyang's problems. Over
the period of this Estimate, even if the Soviets provide
increased assistance, North Korea's economic outlook
appears bleak. At best, we believe Pyongyang faces
continued problems and difficult economic decisions.
the North's primary source of modern military hard-
ware, probably will remain hesitant to provide the
types and amounts of newer equipment desired by
P'yongyang. We believe the Soviets will weigh careful-
ly the size and type of any future military assistance in
order to avoid dramatically upsetting the regional
balance, putting Sino-Soviet relations at risk, or en-
couraging North Korean adventurism.'
11. To offset this, the North will consider noneco-
nomic concessions such as increased Soviet military
access and North Korean support for Soviet policy
positions. Additionally, P'yongyang may attempt to
use Seoul's future military improvements as leverage
for further support from its allies. North Korea may
realize only limited success with either tactic:
- In the past, North Korea's xenophobia and con-
cern for Chinese sensitivities have limited P'yon-
gyang's ability to make meaningful concessions
" Nonetheless, even nonmilitary, economic assistance could aid
P'Yongyang s defense efforts somewhat by relieving current resource
shortages, improving industrial efficiency, and, possibly, by intro-
duction of advanced technology. The immediate impact on the
North's armed forces, however, would be less than direct military
deliveries=
28
5 ET
 to the USSR. Future decisions to seek increased
Soviet contacts will depend on P'yongyang's per-
ception of a complex mix of factors that are
beyond the scope of this Estimate. Recent un-
precedented cooperation with the Soviets, how-
ever, may signal a North Korean willingness to
risk additional Chinese displeasure in return for
continued Soviet support.
- The extent to which the North may gain leverage
from ROK force improvements appears limited.
Given the nature of Seoul's planned improve-
ments and Moscow's past reluctance to deliver
offensive weapons such as ground-attack fighters,
we judge that Soviet systems provided to offset
ROK military improvements would also be pri-
marily defensive."
While past patterns of Soviet military assistance and
North Korean policy swings between Beijing and Mos-
cow lead us to expect modest future USSR aid, alterna-
tive scenarios are possible:
- Soviet perception of how best to further its strate-
gic aims in Northeast Asia, regardless of P'yong-
yang's inability to repay or reluctance to make
diplomatic or sovereignty concessions, could lead
to unexpected benefits for the North. Moscow
might be willing to provide additional assistance in
hopes of gaining increased influence in P'yong-
yang or as a counter to closer Sino-US relations.
- Alternatively, Pyongyang could feel compelled to
seek increased Soviet aid, even at some cost to its
independence. North Korean anxieties over con-
tinuing domestic economic problems or adverse
external trends-Seoul's growing economic and
military strength and international prestige, for
example-might lead P'yongyang to accept a
greater Soviet presence in return for increased
assistance.=
The end result, in either case, could include Soviet
military equipment deliveries beyond recent moderate
levels as well as technical assistance for P'yongyang's
weapons development programs. Although we expect
Moscow would be reluctant to provide its more ad-
vanced hardware or technology, the exact nature of
such aid-in terms of quality and quantity-would be
situation dependent=
" As the South's equipment grows in sophistication, Moscow may
become less reluctant to provide newer hardware or technology to
Pyongyang. If so, development of the K-1 tank by Seoul, for
example, could result in the North receiving T-72 tanks, newer
antitank missiles, or assistance with reactive armor development.
12. The North will attempt to compensate for
Soviet reluctance to supply newer systems by seeking
military technology from other countries. Internation-
al arms sales will provide opportunities to again
acquire limited amounts of advanced equipment. Such
a strategy, however, would degrade North Korea's
military capability somewhat, because the acquisition
of non-Soviet equipment would lead to the noninter-
changeability of parts and to repair and maintenance
problems.
South Korea-Internal and External Factors
13. Seoul, also, will face political succession and
economic issues, which promise to affect future force
improvements. Never a popular leader, President
Chun realizes that continued economic prosperity is a
necessary ingredient to successful perpetuation of his
party's rule. The South has little or no control over
external factors--the price of oil, access to markets,
protectionism, and the availability of credit-which
help determine economic performance. On the other
hand, Seoul generally maintains tight control over such
internal influences as the military budget. Should
events cause a downturn in the economy and threaten
Chun's succession plans, some cuts in the rate of
growth of force development funding are most likely,
although the influence of the ROK military will ensure
that major programs continue
14. South Korean dependence on imports has de-
creased as the domestic arms industry has grown.
During the past decade, Seoul has gained invaluable
experience in fighter aircraft and helicopter coassem-
bly, and in the production of armored vehicles, artil-
lery and air defense weapons, and capital ships.
Nevertheless, Seoul will need foreign assistance in the
areas of advanced electronics, aircraft and submarine
production, and sophisticated design engineering.
While the United States met most of these needs in the
past, the situation is changing and we anticipate that
future attempts to acquire foreign technology may
meet with mixed results.)
Future Developments
15. Despite constraints, North Korea will have some
success in achieving its force improvement goals. We
expect the North to maintain the overall quantitative
advantage on the Peninsula. In some areas-firstline
fighter aircraft and attack helicopters, for example-
the North probably- will not be able to overtake the
South's lead. Also, as Seoul's arms industry overcomes
initial production problems, South Korea will field
increasing amounts of more advanced equipment,
29
SEtRET
 Seoul probably will continue to encounter funding,
production, and technology transfer difficulties in its
attempts to acquire and produce advanced military
hardware.
Foreign military sales credits from the United
States have permitted the South to make steady
qualitative improvements to its armed forces with-
out impairing economic growth. These credits
ended this year. In the future, Seoul may be hard
pressed to locate foreign sources, which combine
comparable equipment performance and favor-
able repayment terms. Foreign acquisitions would
complicate US-ROK interoperability.
Recent attempts to combine various pieces of
foreign hardware into cost-effective, domestically
produced equipment-the K-1 tank and the K-
200 Infantry Fighting Vehicle, for example-have
encountered production and reliability problems
that underscore the South's continuing need for
sophisticated foreign engineering and manufactur-
ing expertise.
Seoul has already run afoul of US restrictions on
technology transfer to third parties. Sale of equip-
ment incorporating low-technology items-power
trains, basic suspensions, and so forth-may not
raise objections from non-US sources, but we
believe the South will meet resistance if it tries to
sell advanced European or Japanese technology
thout- pgying for the necessary permission.
The combined effect of these factors will not stop the
South from acquiring advanced technology. Rather, we
anticipate that they will tend to prolong the acquisition
and production processes. In turn, this probably will
delay operational deployment to ROK forces.F_~
partially compensating for P'yongyang's overall nu-
merical advantage=
16. Even if North Korean military production rates
decline in response to resource limitations, sufficient
equipment should be produced to continue the in-
creases in overall stocks of older-design, indigenously
developed hardware. During the period of this Esti-
mate, the North probably will begin field deployment
of some of the new equipment displayed in Pyon-
gyang last year. For example, we anticipate that the
ground forces will receive self-propelled, radar-con-
trolled antiaircraft gun systems and new light tanks.
Additionally, initial production of a more modern
medium tank may begin.
17. South Korea's armed forces will benefit from
increased weapons production, although over the near
term Seoul's reported annual production rate goals
appear somewhat optimistic. By the end of the de-
cade, however, the South's armament industry should
be in a better position to satisfy both domestic and
export needs. Development efforts should complement
a growing production sophistication with continued
emphasis on advanced missiles and aircraft and elec-
tronic components
18. The North's development base also will grow in
sophistication and product range, although depen-
dence on foreign sources for advanced electronics,
optics, and some design engineering will continue to
hamper P'yongyang's efforts. Nevertheless, some rela-
tively advanced prototypes may be produced includ-
ing tube-launched antitank guided missiles, and, possi-
bly, a jet aircraft. Recent successful launches of a
surface-to-surface missile will most likely lead to a
Scud-like weapon system before the end of the decade.
19. P'yongyang's operational improvements proba-
bly will include more sophisticated joint and combined
arms operations, although foreign policy and economic
considerations may continue to limit the size and
frequency of such training.16 Aerial operations, espe-
cially support to ground units, probably will receive .
more emphasis. When resources permit, field training
of maneuver forces will seek to fully integrate ground
firepower and mobility operations with air and naval
support. Structurally, the North may try to emulate
the USSR by creating battalion-size tank and mecha-
nized infantry units and, possibly, airmobile-type
units.
20. South Korean operational improvements will
increase ROK ability to limit any initial penetrations
and strike subsequent echelons and logistic lines. Use
of night vision devices will complement antiarmor and
fire-support systems and aid around-the-clock opera-
tions. Emphasis on refinement of reserve force capa-
bilities including mobilization and deployment should
tighten rear area security operations and add depth to
the forward defense.=
21. Reserve force improvements will strengthen the
North's rear area security and provide a significant
number of ready reserve units that can augment active
1? As noted in annex D, recent North Korean large-scale training
has declined, probably in response to economic and political factors.
While this degrades short term readiness, the North could reverse
the situation and rapidly increase combat proficiency by instituting
intensive service-wide training.
30
L
 Armed forces command, control, and communica-
tions (C3) will probably represent the North's greatest
operational improvement challenge. We anticipate that
current weaknesses involving span of control and joint
operations planning eventually will be solved by reorga-
nization, creation of additional headquarters, and em-
phasizing C3 procedures in training
Control of rapidly moving combined arms forces on
an integrated battlefield, however, will pose a challenge
to the North's doctrinaire combat leaders. Reliance on
strict adherence to higher level plans, regardless of the
evolving tactical situation, may not assure success. We
believe P'yongyang will need additional effort to create
a solid corps of middle- and lower-level battlefield
leaders who can react quickly to unforeseen tactical
problems and initiate corrective action without await-
ing the traditional direction from above. (This problem
is mirrored, albeit to a lesser extent, in the ROK forces.)
ground elements. We anticipate continued upgrading
of P'yongyang's reserves, with growing equipment
inventories, structural sophistication, and further em-
phasis on rapid mobilization and combat training. As
in the South, when newer hardware is issued to regular
forces, older equipment will go to the reserves.
22. The North will continue to increase military
stockpiles and hardened facilities. As armed forces
equipment inventories increase in size and sophistica-
tion, maintenance operations will assume greater im-
portance. We believe P'yongyang will continue to
emphasize rear service transportation needs as well as
road and rail network improvements. During the next
few years, the North will approach six-months sustain-
ability in most supply categories except those pertain-
perhaps, refined fuel products.
23. Seoul will improve the sustainability of its forces
by increasing supply stockpiles somewhat, upgrading
forward lines of communication, and acquiring heavy
maintenance equipment. The latter should be espe-
cially important in view of the new armored systems
now being fielded. If the South diversifies its equip-
ment inventory with foreign acquisitions, however,
sustainabdity of these systems could suffer from limit-
ed spare parts and repair know-how.
The 1990 Military Balance
24. We believe that the overall military balance in
1990 will continue to favor the North, although proba-
bly by a narrower margin than at present. Pyongyang
will still maintain larger forces and more equipment
than Seoul, but the North's hardware inventory will
heavily rely on dated technology, barring large-scale,
quality Soviet equipment deliveries and technical
assistance. On the other hand, South Korean equip-
ment improvements, if carried out as now planned,
promise to reduce P'yongyang's advantages. In some
areas-improved/guided munitions and missiles, air-
mobility, and modern fighters-the South should sur-
pass the North in quality and quantity
25. The margin by which P'yongyang could expect
to achieve tactical success likely will decrease, as Seoul
increases its military capabilities and sustains overall
force readiness. Additionally, the North's combat
readiness will decline, if P'yongyang does not reverse
the recent downward trend in large-scale training."
" We doubt P'yongyang can permit overall readiness to continue
to suffer due to lack of large-scale training. Future exercise and unit
training rates may provide clues to both the extent of the North's
economic troubles and the seriousness of P'yongyang's desire for
 Personnel
755,000
Equipment
Artillery
7,830
Multiple rocket launchers
2,400
70
Medium tanks
2,910
1,530
Light tanks
660
0
Armored personnel carriers
1,880
1,140
Air Forces
Personnel
Equipment
Jet fighters
710
450
226 MIG-21/23
484 MIG-15/17/19/SU-7
80
300 F-4/F-5E/F/F-16
150 F-86/F-5A/B
0.
Transports
316 (includes 284 AN-2s)
Helicopters d
300
Naval Forces
Personnel
Equipment
Surface combat
94
132 c
35
26
0
Midget submarine
45
Mine warfare
30
Reserve forces
Ready reserves r
745,000
325,000
Total reserves
4,950,000
4,540,000
Total active forces
854,500
610,300
Total armed forces
5,804,000
5,150,000
9 All personnel figures rounded to the nearest 100 and equipment
figures rounded to the nearest 10. Equipment figures include
reserve forces weapons.
h Includes Marines.
c South Korean F-4 fighters carry bomb loads of up to 7,200
kilograms, as compared with 3,000 kg for the North's IL-28s.
This annex is Se
d All services.
Includes landing craft converted for possible patrol use, which are
still capable of transporting troops.
These include North Korean Reserve Military Training Units and
South Korean Homeland Reserve and Mobilization Reserve
Divisions.
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