THE CHANGING SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: AFGHANISTAN
• Keywords: SOVIET INVASION
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• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2011
• Case Number: F-2010-01380
• Publication Date: June 1, 1985

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 MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS
NIE 13/11-84
THE CHANGING
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP
Information available as of 14 June 1985 was used
in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence
Board on 20 June 1985.
 THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of. Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
SMET
 SCOPE NOTE
This Memorandum to Holders covers the remaining two-year time
frame of NIE 13/11-84. It examines the incentives and constraints on
improvement in Sino-Soviet relations and indicates probable future
developments.
 KEY JUDGMENTS
Several significant events in Sino-Soviet relations in the past year
have led us to reexamine the conclusions of NIE 13/11-84, completed in
April 1984. In spite of the current leadership tensions apparent in
Beijing and the recent succession of Mikhail Gorbachev as Secretary
General in the Soviet Union, we judge that the Estimate's major
conclusions are still valid:
- Moscow's and Beijing's fundamental strategic outlooks will
remain at odds.
- The basic differences at the root of their animosity for more
than two decades will remain; each side will continue to be
deeply suspicious of the long-range intentions of the other.
- The Chinese leadership will continue to see the positive eco-
nomic and strategic value of China's relationship with the
United States.
- There will be a further warming in the atmosphere of the
relationship and expansion in trade, scientific, technological,
cultural, and educational ties.
The advances in the relationship over the past year have been
generally consistent with the Estimate's description of the most likely
course in Sino-Soviet relations the level of hostility between Moscow
and Beijing will decrease, and there will be additional agreements on
trade and economic and other such secondary matters. These changes
have come, however, a little more quickly and have gone a little further
than the Estimate of a year ago held likely.
Both Beijing and Moscow probably genuinely desire ways to lower
tensions for a variety of domestic political and economic reasons. Each
side appears to be testing the other's flexibility and intentions-to
determine whether something substantial can be attained at low cost.
Moreover, overtures by both sides earlier this year probably were also
intended for the benefit of third parties, particularly the United States.
Deng Xiaoping, for example, has sent signals that he wants more US co-
operation in helping to bring about reunification with Taiwan. Beijing's
positive gestures to the Soviets could be partly designed to pressure
Washington to be more responsive on this issue and less receptive to
Taiwan's interests in receiving more modern arms.
3
SEZ;RC?T
 We probably will witness continued advancement in the secondary
aspects of the relationship as well as limited party-to-party contacts that
may gradually take on a more formal character:
- Additional trade, scientific, technical, educational, and cultural
agreements will be signed; the Soviets will help refurbish a few
factories built with their aid during the 1950s.
- An agreement to open at least two, possibly four, consulates
probably will be signed; additional border crossing points will be
opened.
- There will probably be additional state-to-state contacts, such as
parliamentary exchanges; there may be consultations between
Foreign Ministers and possibly Premiers.
- There could be some agreement on Confidence Building Mea-
sures along the border, such as mutual advanced notification of
troop movements or exercises.
Neither Moscow nor Beijing, however, will make the concessions
necessary for their relationship to go beyond the bounds outlined above.
They almost certainly will not make any significant progress on matters
related to Afghanistan or Indochina. We now believe that talks on
border territorial issues are more likely to resume than the Estimate
predicted. However, even if border talks do begin again, we judge that
resolution of the border- territorial disputes as well as regional security
issues will remain elusive. An understanding to "thin out" or withdraw
some forces from the border is slightly more possible.
The most likely course of Sino-Soviet relations will not harm any
significant US interests. We judge that for the next two years and
probably longer Beijing will not move to an equidistant position in its
relations with Moscow and Washington. Chinese leaders keenly appre-
ciate the United States' value as a strategic counterweight to Moscow
and as a source of much-needed economic and military technology.
There are, however, several uncertainties that could affect our
analysis:
Moscow, under Gorbachev's new leadership, could make a
greater-than-expected effort to accommodate Chinese security
concerns, which might lead to a more substantial
rapprochement.
- A power struggle could erupt within the Chinese leadership
before or after Deng dies. We believe that disagreements over a
number of issues, primarily the pace and scope of economic
reform and leadership changes, have strained relations among
4
SS-ttRET-
 senior Chinese leaders. Questions concerning relations with the
United States and the USSR have become part of these debates.
Given our uncertainty over the outcome of these debates, we
cannot rule out the possibility of Beijing's taking steps sooner
than we anticipate to further improve relations with Moscow.
- Deng's ambitious economic reforms could experience serious
problems, which could lead to a weakening of his political
position and that of his chosen successors, A retreat from the
goals of Deng's economic program would diminish one of the
Chinese motivations for good relations with the United States-
the need for US technology and investment. However, because
the Soviets are not likely to make major force reductions along
the border, or to back away from their goals in Indochina and
Afghanistan, any new leadership in Beijing would face the same
strategic situation that currently limits close Sino-Soviet political
relations.
- A deterioration of relations between the United States and
China over Taiwan could lead Beijing to attempt a much more
even balance in its relations with the two superpowers than
currently exists. We do not believe, however, that in loosening
ties to the United States the Chinese would move substantially
closer to the USSR.
Crises over Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indochina, Thailand, and
other areas could lead to a new estrangement in Sino-Soviet
relations.
- Soviet moves to draw North Korea closer could intensify
Chinese suspicions of Soviet intentions.
If our most likely scenario proves wrong and Moscow and Beijing
go substantially further in improving their relationship, then US
interests would be directly and adversely affected. Moves such as
rapidly establishing more formal party-to-party contacts, an agreement
to withdraw or draw down Soviet forces on the Sino-Soviet/Sino-
Mongolian border, and resolution of the border territorial disputes
would have a powerful impact on international perceptions. Other
countries might conclude that such developments meant that the United
States was "losing" a strategic asset and that Moscow had eased the
threat of a two-front war, thus strengthening its position vis-a-vis
NATO. More important, Soviet leaders might conclude that the general
strategic danger to the USSR had eased, leading them to adopt an even
more aggressive attitude toward the United States.
5
T_
 DISCUSSION
What Has Happened
1. Several significant events have occurred since the
Estimate was completed in April of last year (for
details, see Chronology in the annex). Two of these
events have been pivotal in further warming the
atmosphere of Sino-Soviet relations and increasing
trade and economic ties:
- First Deputy Premier Arkhipov was received in
Beijing in December 1984, making him the
highest ranking Soviet official to visit China in 16
years.'
- Mikhail Gorbachev was appointed Soviet Gener-
al Secretary after the death of Chernenko,
2. To create a positive atmosphere and ensure the
success of Arkhipov's visit, Beijing made unusual
efforts, such as remaining silent on the fifth anniversa-
ry of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and briefly
withdrawing troops from the Sino-Vietnamese border.
The visit was described by both sides as a success.
Moscow and Beijing signed an expanded trade agree-
ment plus new agreements on economic cooperation
and exchanges in science and technology. Moreover,
Vice Premier Yao Yilin was quoted by the official
Chinese news service as calling Arkhipov "comrade,"
and Chen Yun alluded to the socialist nature of both
countries.
3. Following Chernenko's death, both sides-but
particularly the Chinese-made a series of symbolic
gestures signaling a desire to improve relations. Gorba-
chev's acceptance speech called for serious improve-
ment in relations with China on a reciprocal basis.
Unlike the last speech attributed to Chernenko-a 22
February USSR Supreme Soviet election address-
Gorbachev's remarks did not mention "serious politi-
cal differences" dividing Moscow and Beijing. Follow-
ing this, Chinese National People's Congress Standing
Committee Chairman Peng Zhen called Gorbachev
"comrade." At a private Chinese request, Gorbachev
met with Vice Premier Li Peng, who conveyed party
General Se
. This
and talked w
cretary Hu Yaobang's congratulatory mes-
was the first Chinese party-to-party message
Results of Arkhipov's Visit,
December 1984
? Agreed to sign a five-year trade accord during the
first half of 1985 aimed at raising the level of trade
to US $5 or $6 billion by 1990 and increasing trade
in 1985 by about 60 to 70 percent.
? Agreed to establish a joint committee on economic,
trade, scientific, and technical cooperation to super-
vise and implement agreements and protocols.
? Agreed to exchange scientific and technical knowl-
edge and groups, scholars, and experts, as well as
train each other's technical personnel.
? Agreed to discuss Soviet help in refurbishing fac-
tories built with Soviet assistance during the 1950s
and to exchange and mutually study production
technology.
? Agreed to hold bilateral economic talks at the
"specialist" level in early 1985.
? Agreed to consider signing a cultural cooperation
agreement.
in 18 years.' Li also referred to the USSR as a
"socialist" country for the first time since the 1960s
and expressed a willingness to raise the political
dialogue to the same level as the dialogues on econom-
ics, culture, and technology. This series of important
gestures led us to reexamine trends in Sino-Soviet
relations.
Chinese and Soviet Motivations
4. We have little reporting about either side's mo-
tives and calculations in this latest round of symbolic
gestures. We believe that both sides probably have
been engaged in tactical maneuvering, testing each
other's flexibility and intentions and determining
whether something substantial can be attained at low
cost. Both Beijing and Moscow probably genuinely
desire to lower tensions for a variety of domestic
political and economic reasons.
5. We believe that the recent shifts in atmosphere
are to a large extent also intended to influence the
' After Mao Zedong's death, the Soviets sent a party message to
Beijing, which the Chinese did not accept or acknowledge.
7
'SEISMT
M
 behavior and perceptions of third parties, particularly
the United States. China would like to obtain greater
room for maneuvering between the United States and
the USSR while in the long run establishing itself as the
swing partner in the triangular relationship. Beijing
does not want to appear to be standing still in the
tripolar relationship while the other two sides negoti-
ate. Instead, Beijing probably decided to see if its hand
could be strengthened in dealing with both superpow-
ers. Since December, Deng has sent signals that he
wants more US cooperation in helping to bring about
reunification with Taiwan. Chinese gestures to the
Soviets could be designed in part as a prelude to
pressuring Washington on this issue, or as a means to
test US susceptibility to such pressure. The Chinese
may also hope that an improved relationship with
Moscow would enhance Beijing's contacts and influ-
ence with Eastern Europe and other Soviet allies.
6. Chinese domestic policy disputes and political
frictions probably also have played a part in China's
positive gestures to the Soviet Union in March. C
disagree-
ments over a number of issues-primarily the pace
and scope of economic reform and. leadership
changes-have strained relations among senior leaders.
Questions concerning relations with the United States
and the USSR have become part of these debates.. We
are less clear about Denis role in the positive gestures
to Moscow-whether Deng was merely placating con-
servative critics or whether Deng also believed the
time was right for more balance in relations with the
superpowers, In either case, we have no convincing
evidence of a clearly defined group in the Chinese
leadership that is pushing for a major reorientation of
Chinese foreign policy or that holds a very different
strategic outlook. We strongly believe, moreover, that
no specifically pro-Soviet faction exists in the Chinese
leadership. Debates in Beijing probably focus on the
degree of "tilt" toward the United States or the USSR
and on how to find a balance that best serves Chinese
interests.
7. On the Soviet side, we have little hard evidence
concerning Gorbachev's foreign policy agenda. Initial
statements by him suggest a desire to improve relations
with China. The Soviets have been assiduously culti-
vating Gorbachev's image-domestically, but also for
foreign audiences-as a dynamic, active leader. Gor-
bachev has already assumed a far more demanding
schedule of meetings with foreign officials than either
Andropov or Chernenko. Moscow may view relations
with the Chinese as an area of opportunity to project a
more activist foreign policy at the perceived expense
of Washington.
that the Gorbachev leadership wants to
establish an image of toughness and immunity to
pressure toward all the USSR's adversaries, clients, and
allies. This aim constrains Soviet flexibility in dealing
with the real security issues that concern China. We
believe Moscow is looking for modest improvements in
relations with Beijing, but only in areas that would not
necessitate fundamental Soviet concessions.
8. Each side appears to doubt that the other is
prepared to offer substantial concessions.
Soviet
officials are optimistic about a further warming in
relations but skeptical that Beijing's gestures will lead
to substantive changes. For their part, the Chinese
have also confided that they believe it will be several
years before Gorbachev will have enough power, even
if he has the desire, to reorient Soviet policy toward
Beijing.
Strategic Constraints and Allied Concerns
9. There is no evidence that either Beijing
Moscow has altered its fundamental strategic outlook
toward the other. We are confident that the basic
differences at the root of their animosity for more than
two decades remain and that the underlying issues that
divide China and the USSR, as outlined in the Esti-
mate, are still valid. Thus: .
- Each views the other as harboring expansionistic
ambitions that clash with its own regional politi-
cal aspirations.
- Ideological estrangement and nationalistic hostil-
ities persist.
- Beijing still has some bitter memories of the high
costs of a very close association with Moscow.
10. The three obstacles posed by Beijing-Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan, Soviet support to the Viet-
namese in Cambodia, and Soviet forces along the
Chinese border and in Mongolia-still remain a signif-
icant constraint on improvement in Sino-Soviet politi-
cal relations. We conclude that the Chinese were
trying to maximize their negotiating room before the
recent Sixth Round of Talks in Moscow, either by
omitting all references to the three security issues or
by elliptically mentioning only more general "obsta-
cles."
 hinese nego-
tiators at the talks did raise all three issues once again.
Moreover, while the talks were in session and after-
ward, Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang reiterated the
importance of removing these obstacles. We believe
these statements were intended, among other reasons,
to put pressure on the USSR to respond to Chinese
security concerns.
11. In recent years, top Chinese officials have urged
Moscow to accommodate them on at least one of the
three issues. This suggests China's willingness to im-
prove relations further if the Soviets begin to deal with
one of the issues, without the Chinese dropping their
demand that the USSR give them satisfaction eventu-
ally on all three. Lately, Deng Xiaoping, Foreign
Minister Wu Xuegian, and Vice Foreign Minister
Qian Qichen have all reiterated the Chinese position
that Soviet support to Vietnam in Cambodia might be
the "easiest" one to solve or is the most important of
the three obstacles. The Chinese probably made such
recent remarks in part to encourage Vietnamese suspi-
cions of Soviet intentions.
12. On the Soviet side, there are fundamental inhi-
bitions to making concessions regarding the three
obstacles. On Afghanistan and Indochina, agreeing to
negotiate or to compromise by any degree would
undermine the legitimacy of these Soviet interests,
while major concessions would blunt Moscow's efforts
to project its influence and power in Asia. Although
the Soviets have some room to maneuver on force
deployments near the border-and possible economic
incentives for a thinning out of active forces-they
value the existing force balance as a source of pressure
on Chinese behavior. In return for easing that pres-
sure, the Soviets would want a significant political
concession rather than just reciprocal military moves
from the weaker party.
13. Concern for the perceptions of allies and other
friendly countries is yet another constraint on the pace
and nature of improvements in Sino-Soviet relations.
The Chinese have made special efforts to reassure the
United States and other friendly countries that no
dramatic change in policy toward the Soviet Union is
expected, and that they are pessimistic. about progress
on political and security issues. Beijing is aware that a
significant breakthrough in Sino-Soviet relations fol-
lowing such private reassurances would strain relations
with the United States, Japan, Thailand, Pakistan, and
others. If relations with the Soviet Union move too far,
too fast, Beijing runs the risk of undercutting its effort
to obtain US technology and weapons and enhancing
Taiwan's leverage with Washington. Moscow is simi-
larly concerned about the possible damage to its
relations with friendly countries and allies, most im-
portant, Vietnam, India, and North Korea.
The Sixth Round of Talks
14. The Sixth Round of Talks, which was held in
Moscow from 9 to 22 April, was the first formal
opportunity since Gorbachev's accession for Moscow
and Beijing to engage in concrete bargaining. On the
basis of public press reports and private official state-
ments, we conclude that the talks did not result in any
significant concessions by either side. F_
both
Beijing and Moscow were disappointed that the talks
were setpiece presentations rather than real exchanges.
China's dissatisfaction with the outcome was apparent
in its official press account of Vice Foreign Minister
Qian Qichen's meeting with Foreign Minister Gromy-
ko. Xinhua, the official Chinese press, highlighted
Qian's reminder that Moscow had expressed a wish for
"significant improvement" in relations and that "Chi-
na waits for the Soviet Union to make a move in this
regard."
15. The Soviets repeated in the talks their previous
call for a "juridical document" governing relations (a
bilateral declaration of principles) and a resumption of
border talks. They offered to discuss mutual troop thin
outs along their common border but refused to talk
about their forces in Mongolia. The Chinese parried
these suggestions by insisting that there must first be
progress on outstanding. regional issues. No date was
set for official talks at a higher level, such as between
Foreign Ministers.
16. There were, however, two new wrinkles. First,
both sides agreed to hold a bilateral conference relat-
ing to the Sino-Sovict border. We do not know the
agenda of the conference. The Soviets have been
pushing for a resumption of the border talks that were
suspended at Chinese initiative in June 1978. We
believe the Chinese may have agreed now to only a
conference in order to probe for Moscow's possible
proposals before deciding whether to participate in the
border talks once again.
17. Secondly, a joint press statement carried in
TASS following the talks' conclusion mentioned, for
the first time, that progress in "political relations" was
expected in the future. Beijing expressed interest in
9
_tf4REi
 better political ties when Vice Premier Li Peng met
Gorbachev at Chernenko's funeral. Mention of this
point following the talks reflects an improved climate
in relations. We assume that both sides are leaving the
possibility open for more movement during the com-
ing year, perhaps during Vice Premier Yao Yilin's visit
to Moscow this July or at the Seventh Round of Talks
this fall, The Soviets, in particular, have gone out of
their way since the talks' conclusion to reaffirm their
interest in improving ties through positive recent
statements by both Gorbachev and Politburo Member
Aliyev.
What's Ahead
18. The developments listed in the inset are those
we judge will occur over the next two years. In
addition, we believe that there will be additional
party-to-party contacts and that these contacts may
gradually acquire a more formal and routine charac-
ter. In pursuing additional party-to-party contacts,
both sides could agree to reestablish trade union ties
and exchange propaganda officials and/or press dele-
gations. During future leadership visits, increasing
mention could be made of party titles, and written as
well as oral party greetings could be exchanged.
19. In conversation with US officials, the Chinese
continue to claim that party-to-party relations with the
Soviet Union will not be resumed. We are somewhat
skeptical of these statements in light of Hu Yaobang's
greetings to Gorbachev and the joint press statement
following the last round of talks. But, because of these
reassurances to the United States and other friendly
countries, as well as for other reasons, we believe that
Beijing will try to maintain a deliberate ambiguity
concerning the character of their party contacts with
Moscow for the next several years.
20. The resumption of Sino-Soviet party relations
would clearly enhance the image of a closer overall
relationship. The real content of that relationship is
another matter, however. Considerations of ideology
and leadership politics could intrude to complicate the
relationship in new ways. China has embarked on an
ambitious course of liberalizing economic reform that
is politically contentious. The Soviet Union under
Gorbachev is, at the same time, trying to hammer out
a new, probably much more conservative, course of
economic revival that is also bound to be politically
controversial. Soviet elites are certainly watching Chi-
nese reforms, some hopeful and others fearful of their
success. Interest by each side in the other's leadership
Projected Developments in Sino-Soviet Relations
in the Next Two Years
- The long-term trade agreement will be signed this
July.
- The Soviets will help refurbish a few factories
built with their aid during the 1950s.
- There will be additional agreements on economic,
educational, and cultural matters.
- There will be additional state-to-state contacts,
such as parliamentary exchanges; there may be
consultations between Foreign Ministers and possi-
bly Premiers.
- An agreement to open two, possibly four, consul-
ates will be signed; additional border crossing
points will be opened.
- The number of Soviet economic and technical
advisers in China will increase. (We are unsure
how many, if any, Soviet advisers are currently
stationed in China.)
- The number of Sino-Soviet students will increase.
(Approximately 70 Soviet students currently are in
China and 70 Chinese students in the Soviet
Union. In comparison, for the academic year
1984/85 there were 15,000 Chinese students in the
United States.)
could lead to the same sort of suspicions about internal
political interference that bedeviled Sino-Soviet rela-
tions in the 1950s and 1960s. Internal disputes over
economic reforms on one side could lead to the use of
the other side's performance as a polemical foil,
producing new ideological frictions, China has before
it the tricky doctrinal problem of explaining how a
"socialist" USSR can also be hegemonist, Historical
suspicions and conflicting strategic interests will tend
to make expanded party ties as fractious as the overall
relationship because restoration of such ties could give
China greater freedom to expand contacts with pro-
Soviet parties and to compete with the Soviets for
influence within the Communist movement.
21. the Chinese have
agreed to a conference to discuss border relations.
Therefore, we now judge that it is more probable than
the Estimate predicted that the border talks on territo-
rial issues will resume. Such negotiations may lead to
agreement on Confidence Building Measures such as
mutual notification of troop exercises along their
10
 common border. Even if border talks resume, we
believe the current stalemate on the territorial issues
will continue through the next two years.
22. We further assess that resolution of broader
security concerns will remain elusive and that the
following situations will continue:
- Soviet presence in Afghanistan and support to
Vietnam.
- Chinese support to Afghan insurgents, commit-
ment to the Khmer resistance, and military
pressure on the Vietnamese border.
An Alternative Outcome on the Border
23. While it is highly unlikely that Moscow and
Beijing will make significant progress on the Afghan or
Indochinese issues in the next two years, it is somewhat
more likely that they could reach an understanding to
reduce forces along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongo-
lian borders. The constraints against such moves as
listed in the Estimate-such as the limited room to
pull back Soviet forces because of the presence in the
easternmost sector near the border of large vulnerable
cities and the Trans-Siberian Railroad-are still valid.
However, the military imbalance favoring the Soviets
gives them the option to make some conciliatory
gestures, if they choose to do so, while retaining their
military superiority. For example, the Soviets could
withdraw one or more of their divisions stationed in
the Soviet Far East near the Chinese border or in
Mongolia. They could also thin out various units by
reducing manpower or relocating selected equipment.
24. Likewise, an agreement on the territorial dis-
putes would require strong leadership in both capitals
and a willingness to compromise. We do not know
how such negotiations might proceed-what conces-
sions might be offered by each side and how the other
might respond. We believe, however, that the Soviets
might be willing to concede some of the minor islands
in the Amur and Ussuri Rivers as well as to agree to
some compromise on the Pamirs; but they would be
less likely to yield on ownership of Tarabarov and
Bol'shoy Ussurjysk Islands (called Heixiazi by the
Chinese), opposite the Soviet city of Khabarovsk and a
section of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. The Chinese, in
turn, would probably want to consider any compre-
hensive territorial border settlement in conjunction
with Soviet force withdrawals, particularly of some
divisions in Mongolia, and admittance by the Soviets
of the "unequal" nature of the Tsarist treaties. A key
indicator of China's desire to compromise on this issue
would be its willingness to drop its demand that the
USSR withdraw its troops from all "disputed areas"
while a territorial settlement is negotiated. This de-
mand has prevented any progress in past negotiations.
Implications for the United States
25. If, as we believe most likely, the USSR and
China limit the improvement in their relationship to
such measures as trade, cultural, and educational
agreements, limited party-to-party exchanges, and
some Confidence Building Measures on the border-
important US interests will not be significantly affect-
ed. For their part, the Chinese continue to recognize
their need for good relations with the United States:
- Beijing remains committed to modernizing its
economy, for which it needs Western, and par-
ticularly US, technology and investment. China
has much to gain from a long-term economic
relationship with Japan and the West-particu-
larly the United States-and less from one with
the Soviet Union, especially as,' Beijing moves
forward on its economic reform.
- Beijing remains committed to modernizing its
armed forces gradually and needs Western, par-
ticularly US, arms and military technology.
26. Hence, certainly for the next two years and
probably well beyond, china is not likely to adopt a
genuinely equidistant position in its relations with
Moscow and with Washington and its allies. Patterns
may be modified somewhat, but not substantially,
from the current imbalance in . relations with the
superpowers. For example, in the academic year
1984/85, there were some 15,000 Chinese students in
the United States and approximately 70 in the Soviet
Union. Last year China's total trade with the United
States was about $6 billion and with Japan $13 billion,
compared with just over $1 billion with the Soviet
Union, It would be a long time, if ever, before such
statistics would balance out.
27. Most important, the US-Sino-Soviet triangular
relationship probably will never be really "balanced"
as long as both Beijing and Washington believe the
Soviet Union is the primary threat to their security.
Sino-US military contacts have suffered a setback with
the postponement of the US port call to Shanghai.
However, as long as the US relationship with China, in
general, continues to progress and the Chinese do not
fundamentally alter their strategic outlook, Moscow
11
 will find it hard to use China as an effective "card"
with the United States, and it will be difficult for
China to play the USSR against the United States.
28. In the coming months, Beijing may try to press
Washington into a more direct role in promoting
negotiations for the reunification of Taiwan. We do
not believe, however, that the Chinese want the
Taiwan issue to impede overall relations with Wash-
ington, and they will not revert to former confronta-
tional, badgering tactics unless they perceive the Unit-
ed States as violating its commitment to a "One
China" policy or agreements on arms sales to Taiwan.
A deterioration of relations between the United States
and China over such issues could lead China to
attempt a far greater balance in its relations with the
two superpowers than currently exists. This could lead
the USSR to be more demanding toward Beijing,
however. We do not believe that modestly increased
frictions with the United States would move the
Chinese substantially closer to the USSR.
29. Given our uncertainty over the outcome of
current policy debates in Beijing, we cannot rule out
the possibility of China's taking additional steps much
sooner than we anticipate to improve relations with
Moscow further. If Beijing and Moscow do go further
than we expect in improving relations, then US inter-
ests will be affected. Moves such as reaching a compre-
hensive agreement on border issues involving a reduc-
tion in Soviet forces would probably have a greater
impact on international perceptions than the actual
substance of such agreements or ties should merit.
Other countries might interpret such developments as
meaning the United States was "losing" a strategic
asset while the Soviets were lessening the threat of a
two-front war and, thus, strengthening their position
vis-a-vis NATO. More important, Soviet leaders might
also conclude that the strategic danger to the USSR
had eased, and this might lead them to adopt a more
aggressive attitude toward the United States. We do
not foresee a resolution of Sino-Soviet differences over
Afghanistan and Indochina in our time frame. Howev-
er, US interests would be served to the extent that the
Soviets in pursuit of a closer relationship with Beijing
made concessions regarding these issues.
30. We also do not rule out the possibility of a new
estrangement in Sino-Soviet relations over the next two
years. Such a development could spring from many
sources: an increase in Chinese support to the Afghan
resistance groups, escalation of Vietnam's military
campaign in Cambodia and along the border of
Thailand, Soviet moves to draw North Korea closer, a
more overt Soviet military threat to Pakistan or prog-
ress in Moscow's covert attempts to destabilize Presi-
dent Zia, as well as a variety of other potential crises
around the world, Up to a point, the United States
benefits from a more hostile Sino-Soviet relationship.
Beijing would probably be more receptive to US
policies and cooperate more fully against Soviet ac-
tions around the world.
31. Finally, our analysis might be altered:
- If a power struggle erupts within the Chinese
leadership before or after Deng dies that results
in the weakening of his chosen successors.
- If Deng's ambitious economic reforms experi-
ence serious problems, which in turn lead to a
weakening of Deng's political position or those of
his chosen successors.
- If Moscow under Gorbachev's direction makes a
greater-than-expected effort to accommodate the
Chinese.
A retreat from the goals of.Deng's economic program
would diminish one of the Chinese motivations for
good relations with the United States-the need for US
technology and investment. This retreat could be
accompanied by a surge of anti-Westernism that
might be directed particularly against the United
States. However, because the Soviets are not likely to
make major force reductions along the border, or to
back away from their goals in Indochina and Afghani-
stan, any new leadership in Beijing would face the
same strategic situation that currently inhibits close
Sino-Soviet political relations.
 SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
A CHRONOLOGY
March 1984
Fourth Round of Sino-Soviet Talks convenes.
16 March 1984
1984-85 protocol on student exchanges signed in Mos-
cow, increasing the number of students eligible to
travel between the two nations from 10 to 70.
26 April 1984
President Reagan arrives in China.
April/May 1984
Soviets, angered over positive aspects of Reagan's trip,
increase media criticism of Beijing's policies.
4 May 1984
TASS criticizes Chinese "military provocations" on the
Sino-Vietnamese border.
9 May 1984
Soviets cancel planned visit of First Deputy Premier
Arkhipov, claiming the delegation is not prepared for
the talks; Chinese interpret cancellation as a result of
Reagan's visit, recent activity in Vietnam, and Soviet
domestic infighting.
18 May 1984
General Secretary Hu Yaobang meets with President
of the Yugoslav League of Communists Dragoslav
Mowkovic and indicates that the territorial aspect of
the border dispute with the USSR is minor and can be
easily settled. This statement was subsequently contra-
dicted by a Chinese diplomat.
11 June 1984
Chernenko meets with Vietnamese party leader Le
Duan and Premier Pham Van Dong, criticizing Chi-
nese foreign policy with some of the strongest lan-
guage used since October 1982.
15 June 1984
Chinese Defense Minister Zhang Aiping visits the
United States, France, and Japan.
27 June 1984
Soviet photo exhibition opens in Moscow, highlighting
Chinese "aggressive activity" on the Sino-Vietnamese
border.
30 June 1984
Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, Beijing's
top Soviet expert, arrives in Moscow for talks with
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa.
10 July 1984
Beijing press assails Chernenko's foreign policy, claim-
ing it is "a destructive force slowing the course of Sino-
Soviet normalization and derailing US-Soviet arms
talks."
10 August 1984
Chinese rebut a Soviet article on the Nonaligned
Movement.
August 1984
Beijing accuses Soviets of navigation violations on the
Ussuri River.
21 September 1984
Foreign Ministers Wu Xueqian and Andrey Gromyko
meet during UNGA; talks are calm, but not
substantive.
18 October 1984
Fifth Round of Sino-Soviet Talks convenes in Beijing.
15 November 1984
Soviet journal International Life prints a strong criti-
cism of Chinese domestic and international politics.
30 November 1984
Bilateral trade agreement signed increasing the vol-
ume of trade to about US $1.3 billion.
6 December 1984
Chen Jie, head of a Chinese trade delegation to
Moscow, signs the 1985 goods exchange and payment
agreement based on the 30 November trade agree-
ment.
21 December 1984
First Deputy Premier Arkhipov arrives on a highly
publicized trip to Beijing. Three agreements signed,
calling for bilateral economic and technical coopera-
tion; bilateral scientific and technical cooperation; and
the establishment of a commission on economic, trade,
and scientific and technical cooperation.
28 December 1984
Bilateral agreement to increase the volume of trade
from approximately US $1.3 billion to $13 billion in
1985.
13
s T
 9 January 1985
The last public reference by the Chinese to their
concerns over the "three obstacles" until the Sixth
Round of Talks convenes in April 1985.
12 January 1985
General Vessey, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of
Staff, arrives in China.
15 January 1985
Chinese Ambassador to Burma, after only one month
in the country, hosts a private dinner for the high-
ranking officers of the Soviet Embassy; the Ambassa-
dor claims the dinner was possible because of improv-
ing relations between the two countries.
January 1985
Chinese name new Ambassador and DCM to Moscow,
both of whom are experienced Soviet hands.
13 February 1985
Izvestiya article's hard-hitting anti-Chinese critique
typifies increased Soviet media criticism of Chinese
policies.
22 February 1985
Chernenko's "election speech" casts a more positive
tone on Sino-Soviet relations, initiating an easing of
Soviet press comments.
3-14 March 1985
Chinese National People's Congress delegation visits
Moscow, the first parliamentary exchange in two
decades.
10 March 1985
Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko dies; Mikhail
Gorbachev is named his successor.
11 March 1985
Gorbachev states in his acceptance speech that the
Soviets desire a serious improvement in relations with
China, given reciprocity in the talks.
12 March 1985
While signing condolences book at Soviet Embassy,
NPC Standing Committee Chairman Peng Zhen con-
gratulates Gorbachev, calling him "comrade."
14 March 1985
Vice Premier Li Peng, head of the delegation to
Chernenko's funeral, meets Gorbachev, the highest
ranking meeting between the two countries in 20
years. Li conveys General Secretary Hu Yaobang's
congratulatory message and calls the Soviet Union a
"socialist" country. Li states China's hopes for an
improvement in "political relations."
15 March 1985
Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian meets with ambassa-
dors from the European Economic Community claim-
ing that the messages to Gorbachev were protocol in
nature, but a signal that atmospherics are improving.
18 March 1985
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Armacost
meets Vice Foreign Minister Zhu Qizhen; Chinese
state that normalization still depends on resolution of
the three obstacles.
Vice Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and Deputy For-
eign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa both attend the UN
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the
Pacific meeting in Bangkok.
21 March 1985
High-level economic delegation led by State Economic
Commission Vice Minister Zhao Weichang meets with
Arkhipov to discuss bilateral transportation issues.
26 March 1985
Chinese invite officials from. Moscow's Institute of the
Far East, once renowned as a hotbed of anti-Chinese
propaganda, to a reception in Moscow.
28 March 1985
Soviet'Politburo at a regular weekly meeting discusses
questions related to a further expansion of trade and
economic ties with China and notes importance of
such progress,
29 March 1985
Second high-level economic delegation led by State
Economic Commission Vice Minister Wang Lei travels
to Moscow to discuss Soviet economics and pricing
techniques.
30 March 1985
Soviets brief the Chinese on Schultz-Gromyko meet-
ings in Geneva; Soviets state hopes for reciprocity in
these talks.
4 April 1985
Soviet friendship delegation arrives in China and on
15 April signs plan for 1985 program.
5 April 1985
Bilateral protocol signed in Beijing calling for the
exchange of 200 students and trainees during the
1985/86 academic year.
9 April 1985
Sixth Round of Sino-Soviet Talks convenes in Moscow.
14
 10 April 1985
Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang meets with Hong
Kong press, claiming that China is willing to upgrade
the level of official contacts as the Soviets desire. He
cites the possibility of future meetings at the Foreign
Minister/Prime Minister level.
11 April 1985
Renmin Mao carries a front-page interview with Hu
Xaobang. Hu announces the upcoming US naval ship
visit and states that China has received US assurances
that only conventional ships will make the trip.
15 April 1985
COCOM meets to discuss adopting less stringent con-
trols on exports to China.
In talks with Australian Prime Minister Hawke, Hu
Yaobang states that "threats to China's borders must
be removed no matter whether the threats are in the
north or the south."
17 April 1985
In answering a reporter's question, Deng Xiaoping
mentions the gravity of the three obstacles and states
that the Soviets must make some effort to remove
them if they hope to see a complete normalization of
relations. This is the first explicit mention of the three
obstacles since January 1985. Deng also identifies
Indochina as the "easiest" obstacle for the Soviets to
overcome.
18 April 1985
During talks with former Prime Minister Heath, Deng
states that the three. obstacles must be removed before
relations with the Soviets will improve, and that the
Soviets could start by removing just one of them.
21 April 1985
Peng Zhen, Chairman of the Standing Committee of
China's National People's Congress, arrives in Japan
for a nine-day visit.
22 April 1985
Sixth Round of Sino-Soviet Talks concludes in Moscow.
TASS carries a joint statement identifying among other
areas "political relations" as an issue for improvement.
23 April 1985
Wang Jiachong, Vice President of the All-China Fed-
eration of Trade Unions, announces that China may
restore relations with trade unions in the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe. These relations have been sus-
pended since 1967.
23 April 1985
In a speech celebrating Lenin's 115th birthday,
Geydar Aliyev, First Deputy Chairman of the Council
of Ministers, states that the Soviet Union is striving
seriously for an improvement of relations with China
based on reciprocity.
24 April 1985
In a Central Committee plenum speech, Gorbachev
reaffirms Moscow's commitment to improved ties with
Beijing without mentioning "reciprocity."
25 April 1985
Pravda carries a joint communique signed by the
Soviets and the North Koreans. Of particular interest is
DPRK's signal in an official document of its growing
divergence with China on a number of issues, includ-
ing Cambodia. Gromyko also accepts an invitation to
visit P'yongyang; if he goes, he would become the first
Soviet Foreign Minister to visit the nation.
8-12 May 1985
Soviets and North Koreans mark VE Day with ex-
change of air squadrons.
9-15 May 1985
Visit to China by Japanese Vice Defense Minister.
4 June 1985
Protocol signed for a short-term exchange of TASS and
Xinhua staff members.
What Lies Ahead
Early July 1985
Vice Premier Yao Yilin is scheduled to visit Moscow
and sign a five-year bilateral trade agreement.
Summer 1985
August 1985
USSR Supreme Soviet delegation may visit Beijing.
Fall 1985
Japanese Defense Minister may visit China.
September 1985
Foreign Ministers Wu and Gromyko may meet at the
United Nations in New York.
October 1985
Seventh Round of Sino-Soviet Talks will convene in
Beijing,
Spring 1986
Possible port calls by Japanese naval vessels.
75
_E68E`
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