SOVIET POLICY IN ASIA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005564324
• Release Decision: IPPUB U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2011
• Case Number: F-2010-01671
• Publication Date: April 15, 1971

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE
Soviet Policy in Asia
Annex
APPROVED FOR RELEASE - CIA INFO^ DATE: 05-17-2011
TO
NIE 11-9-71
15 April 1971
TS 0040233
 THIS ESTIMATE IS SUBMITTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AND CONCURRED IN BY THE UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE BOARD.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
the estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart-
ments of State and Defense, and the NSA.
Concurring:
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, National Security Agency
Abstaining:
The Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Assistant
to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of
their jurisdiction.
This material contains informa- ftj+ ffecting the Nationa
within the meaning of the espionage la e 1
mission or revelation of which in any ma
,srt r to a
tense of the United States
C, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
quthorized person is prohibited.
 N I E 11-9-71
SOVIET POLICY IN ASIA
 THE SINO-SOVIET MILITARY BALANCE
A. The Soviet Side
1. Strategic Forces. The Soviets have long
possessed massive strategic offensive and de-
fensive capabilities which could be employed
against China in the event of full-scale war.
Any Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) could be targeted against China.
There are more than 200 heavy and medium
bombers in the Far East Long Range Air
Army (FELRAA), and sufficient airfield
space in the eastern USSR to accommodate
about 500 more bombers from other Long
Range Aviation (LRA) units. These bombers
could deliver either conventional or nuclear
strikes on Chinese strategic targets. The Soviet
Pacific Fleet headquartered at Vladivostok has
about 150 major surface combatant ships and
submarines, and more than 250 combat air-
craft and helicopters. Soviet air defenses
(PVO) within about 300 miles of the Chinese
border include about 500 interceptor aircraft
and about 200 occupied surface-to-air missile
(SAM) sites (SA-2, SA-3, and SA-5). In addi-
tion, the Soviets have begun to deploy SA-4
missile units to the border region. These can
be used either in their primary role for de-
fense of ground forces or for defense of critical
areas.
2. We can identify certain changes in Soviet
strategic forces over the past few years which
seem to be related to Soviet concern for China.
About 27 to 36 SS-12 (Scaleboard, 500-mile
range) mobile ballistic missile launchers have
been deployed in the border area since early
1967. (On the other hand, within the last
two years the Strategic Rocket Force (SRF)
has removed about 40 medium-range and in-
termediate-range ballistic missile (MRBM/
IRBM) launchers from the Soviet Far East.)
It is also clear that the Long Range Air Force
has devoted increased attention to China-
oriented operations. The headquarters of the
FELRAA was recently relocated to the Trans-
Baikal area. Also it is believed that in the past
year or so, bombers have engaged in exercise
activity simulating China as a target.
3. Border Guards and General Purpose
Forces. There are some 70,000 KGB Border
Guards stationed along the Chinese border.
The Border Guards are well-trained and
equipped. They are deployed along the entire
border and to some extent cover gaps be-
tween major ground force concentrations. They
bore the brunt of the fighting during the
frontier clashes of the 1960s.
4. The Soviet ground and tactical air forces
have undergone the most striking changes di-
TO CRET TS 0040233
 rectly attributable to the China problem. At
present the Soviets have about 40 ground
force divisions in the border regions and in
Mongolia in locations which indicate they are
primarily earmarked for operations against
China. This figure is nearly triple the number
in the same area in 1965, when the buildup
began. The area itself embraces the present
Central Asian, Trans-Baikal, and most of the
Far Eastern Military Districts (MDs), plus
Mongolia. Four divisions in the Siberian MD
are available for use as reinforcements to the
border region if required. In addition there are
about seven divisions in the Turkestan MD,
and three in the Far Eastern MD, which also
probably would be available.
5. In general, we believe that the ground
forces are prepared for defensive and-with-
out reinforcement-limited offsensive con-
tingencies. Only a few divisions are fully com-
bat ready. Among those which are not, some
lack one or more regiments, but most have
one or more combat regiments and some com-
bat support elements sufficiently manned and
equipped for immediate commitment. They
lack varying amounts of combat and logistical
equipment, and probably manpower. For the
most part, the understrength divisions are be-
ing developed. In the forces located in the
southern Primorskiy Kray, conventional field
artillery support is at a higher level than that
found in forces opposing NATO.
6. The forces are well prepared to conduct
tactical nuclear war. In addition to the pre-
viously mentioned Scaleboards, there are four
brigades of 150 mile Scud missiles and a unit
of four 300 mile Shaddock cruise-missile
launchers. Most of the divisions have free
rocket over ground (FROG) battalions of 3
or 4 launchers with a firing range of 19 to
38 miles, depending on the model.
7. More than 800 combat aircraft and some
300 helicopters assigned to tactical air forces
(TAF) are available to support the ground
forces in the border area. Excluding heli-
copters, this represents an increase of about
600 TAF aircraft since 1965. More than 100
of these TAF aircraft are capable of carrying
out nuclear missions.
8. With respect to logistics, there appears
to be sufficient depot capacity to permit
stockpiling of enough ammunition to sustain
the ground and TAFs for about 60 days and
enough petroleum for 120 days. The Trans-
Siberian Railroad, if utilized only for military
traffic, could transport the equivalent of 3
divisions per day on the section west of Lake
Baikal and slightly less east of it. It would
take, by rail, nearly three weeks to bring
existing forces to their full offensive combat
strength. In an emergency the Soviets could
sustain an airlift of approximately 10,000 men
and 4,300 metric tons of cargo a day from the
European USSR to the border area, but could
handle only a small number of military vehi-
cles. Soviet airlift capability will increase sub-
stantially with the expected rise in the inven-
tory of AN-22 heavy transports-which can
carry almost any type of ground force equip-
ment. The Soviet merchant marine has sub-
stantial sealift capability. At present, however,
it takes about 45 days sailing time (at 15
knots) from either Odessa or Leningrad to
Vladivostok. With the Suez Canal open, it
would still take about 25 days from Odessa,
or 35 days from Leningrad.
9. The existing build up of forces near
China probably has slowed the moderniza-
tion of Soviet forces in the west. Some types
of modern equipment, such as the T-62 me-
dium tank and the FROG-7 tactical missile
system, have been delivered to some Soviet
units near China while Soviet forces in East-
ern Europe were not yet fully equipped with
these items. Other types of military equipment
have been assigned to the China border in
significant numbers prior to their deployment
west of the Urals. Some pilots and certain
TS 0040233 TOP RET
 IN
other specially qualified military personnel
have been assigned on a priority basis to the
China border area.
10. In sum, the combined manpower of
KGB Border Guards, Ground Forces and TAF
in all the MDs mentioned above (Turkestan,
Central Asian, Siberian, Trans-Baikal, and Far
East), and in Mongolia, probably is on the
order of 500,000. There are some 40,000 Mon-
golian troops, mainly ground forces and border
guards. There are in addition substantial num-
bers of personnel manning other units in the
area-PVO, LRA, SRF, and the Pacific Fleet.
B. The Chinese Side
11. Strategic Forces. Although the very
modest Chinese strategic offensive capabilities
are growing, no operational ballistic surface-
to-surface missile (SSM) sites have yet been
identified. The Chinese apparently have con-
ducted troop training on the MRBM which
could be targeted on almost all major Soviet
cities in Soviet east Central Area (e.g., Tash-
kent, Alma-Ata), Siberia (e.g., Novosibirsk,
Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk), and the Far East (e.g.,
Chita, Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk, Vladivostok).
This MRBM, however, probably is a cryogenic
system and may be deployed only in limited
numbers.
12. The Chinese have also been testing and
conducting training with a missile in the
IRBM class, which they may ultimately deploy
in silos. The exact range and payload capabil-
ities of this missile have not yet been deter-
mined. But it seems probable the missile will
be able to reach some Soviet cities west of
the Urals. The Chinese also are working on
an ICBM system; we remain uncertain regard-
ing its state of development. In any event, by
the mid-1970s, the Chinese could have a mixed
force of deployed strategic missiles, probably
totaling something well short of 100 launchers.
This total might include some ICBMs.
13. The Chinese have about a dozen obso-
lete (propeller-driven) TU-4 bombers, over
300 IL-28 jet light bombers, and over 30
TU-16 jet medium bombers. It is probable
that the TU-16s are assigned a strategic nu-
clear mission. (The IL-28 could deliver fission
weapons or possibly thermonuclear weapons;
TU-16 production began in
1968, and the Chinese could build up a force
of some 200 TU-16s by the mid-1970s. The
TU-16s could deliver three megaton bombs to
Soviet targets within range, although they
would be highly vulnerable to Soviet air
defenses.
14. Although the Chinese have undertaken
an extensive shipbuilding program, they will
not for some time constitute a significant
threat to the USSR. The Chinese Navy (CCN)
is primarily a coastal defense force with about
40 submarines, backed up by over 30 Osa/
Komar type patrol boats, constituting the ma-
jority of its attack force. Current construction
of a Chinese designed destroyer along with
additional submarines and guided missile
patrol boats will increase the CCN's coastal
defensive capabilities over the next five years.
These programs currently being pursued re-
flect Peking's concern regarding the vulner-
ability of China's long maritime frontier and
the need for an adequate seaward defense.
15. Chinese air defenses remain thin but not
negligible. Prior to 1965 the Chinese had less
than 12 operational SAM (CSA-1) units. There
are now about 35 operational CSA-i units in
China, of which 20 are in the Hsian, Peking
' TU-16 operating radii are as follows: maximum
coverage with normal load (6,600 pounds) is 1,650
miles with no refueling, 2,300 miles with one refuel-
ing; maximum coverage with maximum load (20,000
pounds) is 1,300 miles with no refueling, 1,950 miles
with one refueling.
 and Shenyang Air Districts.' Prior to 1965
few Chinese SAM units were used to deter
reconnaissance overflights. The present pattern
appears to emphasize defense of key strategic
areas, such as Peking, Lanchou, and other
nuclear, missile, and population centers.
Despite the continuing increase in numbers,
Chinese SAM capabilities will remain modest
over the next five years.
16. The Chinese have improved their radar
coverage near the Soviet and Mongolian
borders over the last several years. In addi-
tion, Chinese-manufactured jet fighters are
being added to the fighter inventory. Many
of the fighters have been assigned to the
three northern Air Districts since 1965. These
changes, however, should be considered more
as a modernization and natural upgrading,
rather than urgent increases in areas imme-
diately adjacent to the border. The Chinese
Air Force probably could not thwart a large-
scale Soviet bomber attack, but could make
repeated attacks costly.
17. General Purpose Forces. China's prin-
cipal advantage over the USSR is the obvious
one of military manpower potential. Chinese
reaction to the Soviet military buildup, in
terms of redeployment of their own ground
force divisions, has been relatively modest.
In 1965, in the area encompassed by the pres-
ent four northern MRs there were some 65
divisions. By 1969 this figure had been re-
duced to about 60 as the result of withdrawals
from the Shenyang MR during the Cultural
Revolution. Since the border incidents, the
Chinese have deployed units northward, so
that there are about 70 divisions in the four
MRs. The change since 1969 indicates that
2 These three Air Districts cover the same area as
the four northern Military Regions (MRs).
the Chinese have made a limited response
to the overall Soviet threat. Overall Chinese
Communist Army troop strength in the four
MRs bordering the USSR and Mongolia num-
bers about 1 million. To date, no major mili-
tary elements have moved to the border itself;
instead the bulk of ground force deployments
and construction of defense positions are well
back from the border (200 to 500 miles).
Chinese strategy seems based on defense in
depth involving harassment of invaders as
they move into China. This strategy may en-
visage some role played by elements of two
paramilitary organizations, the Production and
Construction Corps (PCC) and the Armed
Militia. Despite the impressive size of these
forces, however, we do not believe they would
be capable of conducting an effective defense
against a large-scale Soviet invasion.
18. A Chinese ground force division is be-
lieved to have nearly 14,000 men at full
strength; its Soviet counterpart at full strength
has about 10,000 or less. But the best of the
Chinese divisions in those four MRs are be-
lieved to have barely a third of the artillery
and wheeled vehicles, and a sixth of the
tracked vehicles of their Soviet counterparts
across the border. The Chinese are developing
and manufacturing their own armored per-
sonnel carriers and at least two different types
of tanks. Even so, it is doubtful the Chinese
could do much to overcome the qualitative
disparity between their divisions and the
Soviet counterparts prior to the mid-1970s.
19. The Chinese have emphasized strategic
requirements in their nuclear weapons pro-
gram, and apparently have not provided their
ground or air forces with tactical nuclear
weapons. Moreover, weapons systems com-
parable to the Soviet FROG or Scud are
not known to exist in the CCA inventory.
 Estimated Total Soviet and Chinese Military Strengths
USSR
CHINA
Personnel
000*
000
3
On active duty
3,778,000
,
,
Reaching military
age annually
2,319,000
9,000,000
Fit for military
service
49,000,000
113,000,000
179
Ground force divisions
161+
Aircraft in operational units
11,900
4,600+
Naval combatants
2,000+
1,000
Not including Production and Construction Corps or Armed Militia.
 TO RET Ts* 004.0233/1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
22 April 1971
MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF NIE 11-9-71: SOVIET POLICY IN ASIA
1. Your attention is directed to the separate issuance of a TOP
SECRET Annex to this National Intelligence Estimate. The title of the
Annex is "The Sino-Soviet Military Balance"
2. In the Annex, page 4, paragraph 15, please change the third
sentence to read: "Prior to 1965 the few Chinese SAM units available
were used primarily to deter reconnaissance overflights. "
JOHN HUIZENGA
Director
National Estimates
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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