SOVIET PUBLIC TREATMENT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN SINCE NOVEMBER 1980

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: UFO SPECIAL COLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005517513
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2011
• Case Number: F-2010-00651
• Publication Date: February 3, 1984

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1. YYYY/TS84-010
2. Report Date: 03 Feb 84
3. SOVIET TREATMENT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN SINCE NOVEMBER 1980
4. The treatment accorded an American president in Soviet
authoritative statements and media commentary is a sensitive
barometer of Soviet expectations for relations with Washington.
Historically, Soviet efforts to promote an improved climate of
relations with the United States have been accompanied by
corresponding restraints on public criticism of the President and his
policies.
5. Since President Reagan's election in November 1980, Moscow has
twice significantly modified its propaganda line to test the
prospects for reduced bilateral tensions. In the immediate aftermath
of the elections, Soviet media pictured the new Administration in
positive terms suggesting that it would reverse the deterioration in
bilateral relations and that President-elect Reagan h
anti-Soviet views he had expressed during the campaign. This early
period of professed optimism quickly gave way to strident low-level
media criticism of the Administration and to direct, if less
strident, attacks on the President himself. Soviet political leaders
continued to abide by their normal strictures against attacking a
U.S. president directly even though already by May 1981 they were
strongly indicting President Reagan's policies. These respective
media and leadership practices were followed until Brezhnev's death,
with the exception of a brief interlude of more moderate comment in
late 1981 between the time when the Administration agreed to begin
arms control talks in Geneva and the imposition of U.S. sanctions in
response to martial law in Poland.
6. Andropov's accession to power brought a second, more tentative
Soviet effort to promote an improved U.S.-Soviet climate. Soviet
leaders and prominent Soviet specialists on the United States muted
their attacks on Washington, which had become particularly harsh in
the last months of the Brezhnev regime, and expressed receptivity to
any U.S. gestures for improved relations. This selective restraint
on criticism--routine Soviet propaganda was little affected--lasted
only until early spring 1983, when the contention over INF
deployments and other issues took its toll.
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7. In the aftermath of the shooting down of the Korean airliner last
September Moscow gave what is almost surely the most abusive Soviet
treatment of an American President at least since Brezhnev became
CPSU general secretary in 1964. Moscow has reduced the sharpness of
its criticism only marginally since then in its routine propaganda.
The leadership, on the other hand, a more sensitive indicator of
changes in approach, has offered one significant indication of a
desire to lower the decibel level of its polemics directed against
the President: Andropov's 25 January PRAVDA interview, responding to
President Reagan's 16 January speech expressing interest in
U.S.-Soviet dialogue, avoided stridency while expressing Moscow's
unaltered assessment of U.S. policy.
8. Within this broad chronological framework, the attached Soviet
leadership statements and media commentaries reveal the varied
treatment accorded to President Reagan and his Administration by
three different elements in the Soviet Union at three different
levels of authority--the leadership itself, political commentators
with close ties to the leadership, and the routine media
commentators. The pattern of behavior of each of these groups is
distinctive:
9. o While obviously authorizing media attacks on the President, the
leadership until 1983 conspicuously avoided direct personal attacks
on the President. Even in Brezhnev's most strident criticism of U.S.
policy, such as in his 27 October 1982 speec -to a meeing o ov-let
military leaders, he attacked U.S. "ruling circles," "Washington,"
and "the line of the United States and those who follow it" without
naming President Reagan. The Soviet leadership broke this pattern in
the wake of charges by the President and other Administration
officials that the Soviet Union had deliberately and knowingly shot
down a passenger airliner last September. Andropov's January PRAVDA
interview suggests that the Kremlin prefers the more moderate role
traditionally assumed by the Soviet political leadership, according
to which the top Soviet leader, at the very least, stands aloof from
the excesses of the polemical fray.
10. o Well-connected political commentators, such as Aleksandr
Bovin, Georgiy Arbatov, Vadim Zagladin, and Nikolay Shishlin, have
been less restrained in discussing the President's responsibility for
the U.S. policies they have so sharply condemned. They have also
been the most sensitive indicator of changing perceptions about the
direction of U.S.-Soviet relations. It was in the comments of these
officials about the Administration that fluctuations in Soviet
expectations for U.S.-Soviet cooperation were most clearly
registered.
11. o Routine commentary has been the least sensitive barometer of
changes in the atmosphere for U.S.-Soviet relations. When President
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Reagan was elected, it was more optimistic than some Soviet political
observers. When the outlines of Administration policy toward the
Soviet Union became clear, the low-level commentary assumed a hostile
tone that it has periodically intensified but from which in general
it has not since departed.
13. Premier Nikolay Tikhonov, October Revolution anniversary speech
(PRAVDA, 7Nov 80)
14. Regarding our relations with the United States of America, just
as with any other country which belongs to a different social system,
they can only be built up on the basis of equality, noninterference
in internal affairs, not causing harm to the security of one another.
15. I would like to express the hope that the new Administration in
the White House will manifest a constructive approach to questions or
relations between our countries.
16. General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, Kremlin dinner speech
(PRAVDA, 18 Nov 80)
17. Much in the development of the international situation wilh_of
course, depend on the position of the United States. A new President
has now been elected there. I shall not dwell on what was said by
him and his supporters and opponents in the heat of the election
struggle. I can only state with full responsibility that any
constructive steps by the U.S. Administration in the field of
Soviet-American relations and urgent world problems will meet with a
positive response on our part.
18. TASS statement (PRAVDA, 3 Feb 81)
19. Soviet leading circles have taken note of a new anti-Soviet
hostile campaign being unfolded in the United States. This time they
ascribe to the Soviet Union involvement in "international terrorism."
Such inventions could be simply ignored as a new primitive trick by
professional anti-Soviets if not for the fact that this campaign was
started by high-ranking officials of the American Administration
including U.S. Secretary of State A. Haig. His statements, made at a
press conference on 28 January this year, and subsequent additional
comments made by another official representative of the U.S. State
Department, clearly indicate that this is not a matter of some
occasional unhappy expression but a deliberate political subversion.
20. Soviet leading circles would like to hope that they in
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Washington will give serious thought as to what the continuation
there of the campaign hostile to the Soviet Union can lead and will
take measures to stop it.
21. Soviet Minister of Defense Dmitriy Ustinov (PRAVDA, 21 Feb 81)
22. The new U.S. Administration is making increasingly clear
attempts to adopt an absolutely futile "position of strength" with
regard to the USSR. It is perfectly obvious that such an approach is
fundamentally at variance with the interests of both the American and
the Soviet peoples and with the interests of all mankind.
23. Brezhnev, speech to 26th CPSU Congress (PRAVDA, 24 Feb 81)
24. Unfortunately, the previous Washington Administration by no
means considered the development of relations, mutual understanding.
Attempting to exert pressure on us, it began to destroy all the
positive results which had been scored with no little difficulty in
Soviet-American relations over the preceding years. . . .
25. Even after the change of leadership in the White House, candidly
bellicose calls and statements are being heard from Washington, calls
and statements which seem to be specially intended to poison the
atmosphere of relations between our countries. In any case, we would
like to hope that those who now determine U.S. policy will ultimately
be able to look at things more realistically. . . .
26. The present state of relations between us and the sharpness of
international problems demanding solution dictate the need for
dialogue at all levels and, what is more, an active dialogue. We are
ready for dialogue. Experience shows that the decisive link here is
meetings at the highest level.
27. Brezhnev, speech in Kiev (PRAVDA, 10 May 81)
28. There are quite a few sober-minded people among those who today
shape the policy of capitalist countries. They understand that the
emphasis on strength, the emphasis on war in relations with the
socialist world is madness in our day and age, that there is only one
reasonable road--peaceful coexistence, mutually advantageous
cooperation.
29. But there are also such statesmen in the bourgeois world who,
judging by everything, are accustomed to thinking only in terms of
strength and diktat. They actually regard the attainment of military
superiority over the Soviet Union as their main political credo. The
solution of international problems by way of talks and mutually
advantageous agreements appears to be way down their list of
priorities, if they give serious thought to this at all.
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30. Among them there are also those who openly state that peace is
not the most important matter, that there are things more important
than peace.
31. Just think, comrades: Can one imagine a more horrendous
position, a more cynical disregard for the destinies of peoples,
including one's own people, for the lives of hundreds of millions of
people! . . .
32. This is not to mention how absurd are any plans which are
intended by means of threats, economic blockade or military
aggression to impede the development of socialist countries or the
struggle of peoples for national freedom and social justice. . . .
33. As for the Soviet Union, it is not the first time that we are
hearing inventions about our policy, slander, and threats. But we do
not give in to intimidations.
34. Marshal Viktor Kulikov, First Deputy Minister of Defense, and
Commander in Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact
Nations (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Jun 81)
35. If you look at the statements of the leaders of the present U.S.
Administration, you cannot help noticing in them a similarity with
the aims set by the Hitlerite leadership in attacking the Soviet
Union. Speaking at Notre Dame in June, R. Reagan said: "The West
will outlive communism. . . . We will write it off as a sad,
unnatural chapter in the history of mankind."
36. Ustinov (PRAVDA, 25 Jul 81)
37. The ruling circles of Washington have decided to overturn all
the positive elements in Soviet-American relations achieved during
the seventies and to break down the approximate equality in the
military sphere between the USSR and the United States.
38. Without putting forward any positive initiatives the Reagan
Administration has taken a standpoint of unconcealed anti-Sovietism.
At the same time it is grossly interfering in the affairs of other
states and is high-handedly dictating its demands to them.
Washington has launched a broad offensive against the
national-liberation movements in Africa, Asia and particularly in
Latin America, is giving every sort of support to antipopular
regimes, and is putting arms, equipment, military advisers and money
at their disposal. . . .
39. The ruling circles of the United States are intensifying
international tension and exacerbating Soviet-American relations.
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40. The present American Administration is elevating to the rank of
state policy interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states
and the open attack against national liberation movements. . . .
41. Washington, once again, as a decade ago, is trying to speak to
the Soviet Union in the language of "cold war." At the same time, its
disregard for agreements which were reached between our two countries
in the field of arms restriction is demonstrated. A. Haig states:
"We are not very concerned about the understandings of 1972, although
they were agreed by both sides."
42. Brezhnev, interview with DER SPIEGEL (PRAVDA, 3 Nov 81)
43. There is no quiet in the world today. 'Hot spots' are emerging
in different parts of the world. The race of death-carrying weapons
is continuing. New types of them are created, which are particularly
dangerous because they, as experts say, lower the threshold of
nuclear war, i.e., make its outbreak more probable. Under these
conditions the speculation of some strategists and politicians in the
West on the admissibility of some 'limited' nuclear war and the
possibility to win a victory in it looks particularly insidious. . .
44. So, those who possibly hope to. set fie to nuclear power
keg, while themselves sitting snug aside, should not entertain any
illusions. . . .
45. Unfortunately, the leading powers of the West, above all, the
NATO bloc, do not show so far a serious interest in talks on all of
these questions that are vital to mankind and its peaceful future.
Some people there are by far more willing to speak not on detente,
but on confrontation; not on peaceful mutually beneficial
cooperation, but on the use of trade to military-strategic ends; not
on agreements on the basis of equality and equal security, but on
diktat from the positions of military supremacy; not on the
elimination by joint efforts of seats of conflicts, but on the
creation of ever new military bases, on the buildup of their military
presence in various parts of the world; not on curbing the arms race,
but on 'rearmament'; not on a limitation or prohibition of some or
other types of weapons, but on the creation of ever new, even more
destructive means of mass annihilation of people.
46. This way, unfortunately, they not only speak, but also act in
practice. You, certainly, understand that I have in mind, above all,
the policy of the present U.S. Administration, the way it was
manifest both in statements by high-ranking statesmen of that country
and, which is even more important, in their practical deeds.
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47. All of it is actually an opposite to detente, blunt disregard
for the striving of all peoples for lasting peace. And it is,
certainly, profoundly deplorable that the leaders of one of the
world's biggest powers have deemed it possible to build their policy
on such a basis. . . .
48. President Reagan has recently expressed the readiness of the
United States to discuss with the Soviet Union also other problems,
which cause differences between the two countries. We welcome such
readiness, as we have always considered talks to be the most
appropriate method of resolving international problems. The main
thing, of course, is that appropriate practical deeds should be
matched to correct words.
49. And it would be better to abandon dreams of ensuring military
supremacy over the USSR.
50. Minister of Defense Ustinov, October Revolution anniversary
speech (PRAVDA, 7 Nov 81)
51. Washington is accelerating the buildup of the might of the NATO
military machine and is seeking an expansion of the field of action
of that aggressive bloc, spreading the system of its military bases
to new territories. . . .
52. The Washington Administration is with increasing frequency
resorting to frankly inflammatory language. High-ranking U.S.
representatives, with cynical disregard for the fate of the peoples,
state that there are allegedly some things more important than peace.
53. The preservation of peace is inseparable from the curbing of the
arms race--from stage-by-stage disarmament. Important steps in that
direction were taken in the seventies. But the present U.S.
Administration is intent on casting doubt on all the positive things
that have been jointly achieved in the field of Soviet-U.S.
relations. It openly declares its intention to speak to the Soviet
Union from positions of strength.
54. TASS statement on U.S. Stance on Poland (PRAVDA, 14 Jan 82)
55. The United States and its NATO allies are continuing attempts at
crudely interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state--the
Polish People's Republic, at whipping up international tensions.
This has been most clearly revealed also in the statement, which was
issued on 11 January by the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic
Alliance.
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56. It is well known that the whole of this disgraceful farce has
been initiated by the U.S. Administration. Its style is felt both in
the impudent distortion of facts, the high-handed tones, and
excessive political ambitions.
57. Yes, Washington makes no little effort to try to bring abut a
turnaround in international politics from detente to confrontation
between blocs. Why is it done? It is not too difficult to answer
this question.
58. What it amounts to is above all an attempt at crowding socialism
and impairing the positions of the USSR and other socialist countries
on the European and world scene. Certain figures of the imperialist
camp are day and night beset by nightmares because socialism is
growing stronger. The international positions of socialism rely on
the existing balance of forces in Europe and in the world, and are
guaranteed by the might of the socialist community.
59. Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, First Deputy Minister of Defense and
Chief of the General Staff (ALWAYS IN READINESS TO DEFEND THE
HOMELAND, Moscow: Voenizdat, approved for publication 26 Jan 82)
60. World imperialism, and particularly U.S. imperialism, is seeking
to extend its tentacles into every part of the world. Militant U.S.
circles have openly adopted a course of polite aimed at undermining__
detente, engagement in a massive arms race, and vigorous jaktivnuyul
preparations for nuclear war. The various actions and acts of
sabotage against the USSR and the other nations of the socialist
community and against progressive forces throughout the world which
they are presently conducting are of a coordinated nature and are
joined together by a. common scheme. The main goal which the U.S.
imperialists have set for themselves is gradually and sequentially to
weaken and undermine socialism as a system, using any and all methods
and means, and ultimately to establish their world domination.
61. This is not a new phenomenon. History has seen many claimants
to world domination. Napoleon persistently sought to achieve world
domination, as did Hitler at a later time. The outcome of their
ambitions is well known. An even harsher outcome may await these
latter-day claimants.
62. Brezhnev, Soviet Trade Union Congress speech (PRAVDA, 17 Mar 82)
63. The newly fledged devotees of cold war and dangerous balancing
on the brink of a real war would like nothing better than to tear up
the legal and ethical norms of relations between states that have
taken shape over the centuries and to cancel their independence and
sovereignty. They are trying to retailer the political map of the
world, and have declared large regions on all continents as zones of
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their "vital interests." They have arrogated the "right" to command
some countries, and to judge and punish" others. Unembarrassed,
they publicly announce, and try to carry out, plans for economic and
political "destablization" of governments and states that are not to
their liking. With unexampled cynicism they gloat over difficulties
experienced by this or that nation. They are trying to substitute
"sanctions" and blockades for normal communications and international
trade, and endless threats of armed force, not short of threats to
use nuclear weapons, for contacts and negotiations.
64. It is simply astonishing to see it all. And you cannot help
asking yourself: What is there more of in this
policy--thoughtlessness and lack of experience in international
affairs, or irresponsibility and, to say it bluntly, an adventurist
approach to problems crucial for the destiny of mankind? Not in our
country, but in the columns of respectable organs of the U.S.
bourgeois press this policy was described as "a course to political
disaster." It is hard to deny the validity of this description.
65. Brezhnev, PRAVDA interview (PRAVDA, 18 Apr 82)
66. I already spoke on the value of an active dialogue with the
United states at all levels, especially emphasizing that the decisive
link here is summit level meetings. Today we also support such
meetings. It is understandable that a meeting between the_U.S.
President and myself must be well-prepared and conducted properly,
not just in passing in connection with some international forum or
other.
67. Yuriy Andropov, Politburo member and Chairman of the KGB, Lenin
anniversary speech (PRAVDA, 23 Apr 82)
68. The imperialist bourgeoisie, frightened by the upsurge of the
antiwar movements, is making ever-wider use of the weapons of lies
and sophisticated deception. What is Washington doing now? One
hysterical propaganda campaign replaces the other. People are at one
moment being persuaded of a Soviet military threat, then lied to
unscrupulously about the lagging behind of the United States,
intimidated with international terrorism, fed cock-and-bull stories
about events in Poland, Central America, South and Southeast Asia.
69. Attempts are made to make use of diplomatic talks themselves in
order to deceive the public, among them talks on the limitation of
arms and on disarmament. The impression is created that often they
are entered into only to create illusions and, by lulling public
vigilance, continue the arms race. . . .
70. But certain governments as well as people are inclined, as is
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apparent, to forget the experience and lessons of history. It would
seem that this is now happening to the Washington Administration,
which is trying to steer the entire development of international
relations onto a dangerous path. Of course the United States will
not be successful in this. But we must not ignore the fact that such
policies on the whole worsen the situation and increase the danger of
war.
71. The only answer to this can be increased vigilance and, at the
same time, a still more stubborn struggle to preserve peace.
72. Brezhnev, Komsomol congress speech (PRAVDA, 19 May 82)
73. President Reagan, on his part, has now declared that the United
States is ready for the resumption of the talks. In our opinion,
this is a step in the right direction. It is , however, important
that the talks should begin immediately in the right key.
74. In the same speech the President said that the United States at
the talks would be in favor of substantial reductions. Well, we have
always been in favor of substantial reductions of strategic arms,
there is no need to persuade us in this respect.
75. But if one looks at the essence of the ideas voiced by the U.S.
President on such reductions, one notes unfortunately that the
American position is absolutely unilateral in nature. Above all,
because the United States would like in general to exclude from the
talks the strategic arms it is now most intensively developing.
76. Brezhnev speech at Kremlin meeting of military commanders
(PRAVDA, 28 Oct 82)
77. The ruling circles of the United States of America have launched
a political, ideological, and economic offensive on socialism and
have raised the intensity of their military preparations to an
unprecedented level. . . .
78. The masses of people on all continents angrily protest against
Washington's aggressive policy which is threatening to push the world
into the flames of a nuclear war. The adventurism, rudeness, and
undisguised egoism of this policy arouse growing indignation in many
countries, including those allied with the United States. . . .
79. The line of the United States and those who follow it is a line
for deepening tension and aggravating the situation to a maximum.
They are dreaming of isolating politically and weakening economically
the USSR and its friends. They have unfolded an unprecedented arms
race, especially a nuclear arms race, and are trying to attain
military superiority. Having stepped on this road, imperialism is
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irresponsibly playing with the destinies of the peoples.
80. TASS report of 15 November 1982 meeting between General
Secretary Andropov and Vice President Bush (PRAVDA, 16 Nov 82)
81. In this respect Yu. V. Andropov stressed that the Soviet Union,
consistently carrying out a policy of peace, is prepared to build
relations with the United States on a basis of full equality,
noninterference, mutual respect in the interests of the peoples of
both countries, and normalization [ozdorovleniye] of the
international situation.
82. Tikhonov, Kremlin dinner speech to U.S. trade delegation
(PRAVDA, 19 Nov 82)
83. We are meeting with you at a time which is not the best for
Soviet-American relations. Their climate has considerably cooled and
to be frank, not through our fault.
84. The official stand taken in the United States towards the Soviet
Union, naturally, is also reflected in trade between our countries.
All sorts of discriminatory measures, attempts to use various
sanctions, embargoes, etc., against our country do not, of course,
inspire kind feelings, but rather undermine the confidence of Soviet
foreign trade organizations in the American market. . . .
85. The Soviet Union has been and is for normal, and even better,
friendly relations with the United States. There were such relations
in the past, and they can again become a reality. This would meet
the interests of our countries and the interests of universal peace.
I am confident that this is precisely what our peoples wish. They
wish lasting peace and mutually beneficial cooperation.
86. Andropov, speech at CPSU Central Committee plenum (PRAVDA, 23
Nov 82)
87. All are equally interested in preserving peace and detente.
Therefore, statements in which the readiness for normalizing
relations is linked with the demand that the Soviet Union pay for
this with preliminary concessions in different fields, do not sound
serious, to say the least. We shall not agree to this and, properly
speaking, we have nothing to cancel: We did not introduce sanctions
against anyone, we did not denounce treaties and agreements that were
signed, and we did not interrupt talks that were started. I should
like to stress once more that the Soviet Union stands for accord but
this should be sought on the basis of reciprocity and equality.
88. In our opinion the point of talks with the United States and
other Western countries, primarily on questions of restraining the
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arms race, does not lie in the statement of differences. For us
talks are a way of joining efforts by different states in order to
achieve' results useful to all sides. The problems will not disappear
by themselves if the talks are held for the sake of talks, as it
unfortunately happens not infrequently. We are for the search on a
healthy basis, acceptable to the sides concerned, for a settlement of
the most complicated problems, especially of course, the problems of
curbing the arms race, involving both nuclear and conventional arms.
But let no one expect unilateral disarmament from us. We are not
naive people.
89. We do not demand unilateral disarmament from the Vest. We are
for equality, for consideration for the interests of both sides, for
honest agreement. We are ready for this.
90. Ustinov, TASS interview (PRAVDA, 7 Dec 82)
91. [President Ronald Reagan) said in his speech of 22 November that
the Soviet Union now has a clear margin in practically any type of
military power. Such assertions are not in keeping with reality.
They are calculated at deceiving the public and have the purpose of
justifying the United States' unprecedented military programs and
aggressive doctrines. It is regrettable that such attempts to
convince people of the existence of what does not exist in nature,
are made by the leader of a great power whose very position
presupposes realism and responsibility in assessing rea y. .-.---
92. At the same time, the President's speech contains an attempt to
sow distrust in the Soviet Union's stand. He stated that the Soviet
Union violates the unilateral moratorium it announced on the
deployment of its medium-range missiles in the European part of the
USSR. I state quite definitely that the USSR is true to its word.
93. Andropov, PRAVDA interview responding to President Reagan's Open
Letter (PRAVDA, 2 Feb 83)
94. I must say quite definitely that there is nothing new in
President R. Reagan's proposal. What it is all about--and this all
the world's news agencies have immediately taken note of--is the same
"zero option." That it is patently unacceptable to the Soviet Union
now is already generally recognized. Really, can one seriously speak
about a proposal according to which the Soviet Union would have to
scrap unilaterally all its medium-range missiles, while the United
States and its NATO allies would retain all their nuclear weapons of
this category?
95. It is precisely this unrealistic position of the United States
that has blocked, and this is well known, progress at the talks in
Geneva. That now the U.S. President has reiterated again this
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position indicates one thing: The United States does not want to look
for a mutually acceptable accord with the Soviet Union and thereby
deliberately dooms the Geneva talks to failure. . . .
96. We have believed and still believe that summit meetings have
special significance to resolving complicated problems. This
determines our serious approach to them.
97. For us this is not a matter of a political or a propaganda game.
A meeting between the leaders of the USSR and the United States aimed
at finding mutually acceptable solutions to urgent problems and at
developing relations between our countries, would be useful both to
the Soviet Union and to the United States of America, to Europe, and
to the whole world.
98. But when the U.S. President makes the meeting conditional on the
Soviet Union's consent to the patently unacceptable solution to the
problem of nuclear armaments in Europe, proposed by him, this by no
means testifies to the seriousness of the American leadership's
approach to the whole of this issue. This can only be regretted.
99. Andropov, PRAVDA interview (PRAVDA, 27 Mar 83)
100. The President pretends that almost a thousand medium-range
nuclear systems of the United States and it_s_ NATO allies da not ostensibly exist in the zone of Europe, and that it is unknown to him
that NATO has a 1.5-1 advantage over the USSR in the aggregate number
of nuclear warheads on those systems.
101. The President not only keeps silent about all that. He tells a
deliberate untruth [on govorit zavedomuyu nepravduj, asserting that
the Soviet Union does not observe its own unilateral moratorium on
the deployment of medium-range missiles. . . .
102. The incumbent U.S. Administration continues to tread an
extremely perilous path. The issues of war and peace must not be
treated so flippantly. All attempts at achieving military
superiority over the USSR are futile. . . . It is time they stopped
devising one option after another in search of the best ways of
unleashing nuclear war in the hope of winning it. Engaging in this
is not just irresponsible, it is insane.
103. Andropov, speech to CPSU Central Committee plenum (PRAVDA, 16
Jun 83)
104. This period is marked by a confrontation, unprecedented in the
entire post-war period by its intensity and sharpness, of two
diametrically opposite world outlooks, two political
courses--socialism and imperialism. A struggle is going on for the
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minds and hearts of billions of people in the world. And the future
of mankind depends in no small measure on the outcome of this
ideological struggle. ...It is no less important to skillfully expose
the lying, subversive nature of imperialist propaganda. . . .
105. On the one hand, as has already been said, the aggressiveness
of ultrareactionary forces led by U.S. imperialism has sharply
increased. Attempts are being made to reverse the course of events
at all costs. Of course, this policy will not bring imperialists
success but, being adventuristic, it is extremely dangerous to
mankind. This is why it is meeting with powerful opposition on the
part of the peoples, which, undoubtedly, will grow even further.
106. In the present-day capitalist world, however, there are also
other trends and other politicians who take a more realistic account
of the international situation.
107. Gromyko, TASS interview (PRAVDA, 22 Jun 83)
108. Naturally, a [summit] meeting which could produce major results
for both bilateral Soviet-U.S. relations and the international
situation would be useful.
109. Quite a few words are now being said in the Vest, particularly
in Washington, about a Soviet-American summit. An outsider can even
get the impression that Washington is indeed giving serious thought
to such a meeting. But if we look into the crux of the matter, the
situation, regrettably, is different.
110. Obviously, proper preconditions are needed to hold a meeting of
the top leaders of the two major powers. First, it is necessary to
have a certain degree of mutual understanding on major issues which
are fundamental to the state of relations between the two countries
and the overall international situation. There also is a need for
the desire of both sides actually to strive for positive
developments, or even better, for a breakthrough in their mutual
relations.
111. If we consider the state of affairs from this point of view, it
becomes clear that the discourses of American figures on a meeting
are not backed by anything. U.S. policy on relations with the Soviet
Union does not pursue any constructive goals at all, of which
American leaders make no secret. Moreover, it is oriented in the
totally opposite direction.
112. When there appear in American politics real signs of a
readiness to conduct affairs in a serious and constructive manner,
the question of the possibility of a summit will appear in a
different light.
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113. TASS statement on Korean airline incident (PRAVDA, 3 Sep 83)
114. The intrusion into the air space by the aforementioned plane
cannot be regarded in any other way than a preplanned act. It was
obviously thought possible to attain special intelligence aims
without hindrance using civilian planes as a cover. -
115. More than that, there is reason to believe that those who
organized this provocation deliberately desired a further aggravation
of the international situation striving to smear the Soviet Union, to
sow hostility towards it and to cast aspersions on the Soviet
peace-loving policy.
116. This is illustrated also by the impudent, slanderous statement
in respect to the Soviet Union that was made instantly by President
Reagan of the United States.
117. USSR Government statement on Korean airliner incident (PRAVDA,
7 Sep 83)
118. The assertion of the U.S. President that Soviet pilots knew
that it was a civilian aircraft are absolutely not in keeping with
reality. . . .
119. It is the sovereign right of every state to protect its
borders. . . . So the U.S. President makes himself out as an
ignoramus saying, as he did in his address on 5 September, that the
Soviet Union "arbitrarily proclaims" its borders in the airspace
[sic].
120. But the point here, of course, is not the ignorance of one U.S.
official or another. The point is a deliberate preplanned action in
an area that is strategically important to the Soviet Union. The
instigators of that action could not help realizing what its outcome
could be, but vent ahead with a major intelligence operation with the
use, as is now becoming clear, of a civilian plane, deliberately
exposing its passengers to mortal danger. . . .
121. This conclusion is confirmed by all subsequent actions of the
U.S Administration. Its leaders, including the U.S. President,
launched a malicious and hostile anti-Soviet campaign over a very
short time, clearly using a prearranged script. Its essence has been
revealed in its most concentrated form in the televised speech of
U.S. President R. Reagan :on 5 September--to try to blacken the image
of the Soviet Union and discredit its social system, to provoke a
feeling of hatred toward the Soviet people, to present the aims of
the USSR foreign policy in a distorted perspective, and to distract
attention from its peace initiatives.
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122. The entire responsibility for this tragedy rests wholly and
fully with the leaders of the United States of America.
123. Ogarkov article (IZVESTIYA, 23 Sep 83)
124. The struggle for peace in our times has acquired special
significance. That is due primarily to the sharply enhanced
aggressiveness of international imperialism, Zionism, and reaction
headed by the United States. In recent years their actions have been
significantly reminiscent of fascism's actions in the thirties.
Having adopted flagrant lies and slander, the United States and its
allies have launched a global offensive against socialism on all
fronts, initiating, as they openly assert, a new "crusade" against
us. The Washington Administration is nurturing sinister plans.
Expatiating on its alleged adherence to peace, the U.S.
Administration, through its defense secretary, blasphemously states
that "the path to peace is marked by preparation for war." The
"directive in the defense field for fiscal 1984," drafted on
instructions from the U.S. President, is evidence of how far the U.S.
"hawks" have gone. This official document sets as its main aim "the
destruction of socialism as a sociopolitical system." That's allt
There is no need to explain this gibberish. Commentary is
superfluous, as they say. We can only marvel at the sheer ignorance
and self-sufficiency of the transatlantic strategists, so infinitely
far removed from a knowledge of the elementary ou-n atfons an "w-----
of the development of human society.
125. Andropov statement (PRAVDA, 29 Sep 83)
126. The Soviet leadership deems it necessary to inform the Soviet
people, other peoples, and all who are responsible for determining
states' policy of its assessment of the course pursued in
international affairs by the current U.S. Administration.
127. In short, it is a militarist course that represents a serious
threat to peace. Its essence is to try to ensure a dominating
position in the world for the United States of America regardless of
the interests of other states and peoples. . . .
128. When the U.S. President bombastically declares from the UN
rostrum his commitment to the cause of peace, self-determination, and
sovereignty of the peoples, these rhetorical declarations can
convince no one.
129. If anyone has any illusions about the possibility of an
evolution for the better in the present American Administration's
policy, recent events have dispelled them once and for all. The
Administration is going so far for the sake of achieving its imperial
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objectives that one cannot help doubting whether any restraints
[tormoza] at all exist for Washington to prevent it from crossing a
line before which any thinking person ought to stop.
130. The sophisticated provocation organized by the U.S. special
services using a South Korean plane is also an example of extreme
adventurism in policy. . . .
131. In their endeavor somehow to justify their dangerous,
misanthropic policy, they are heaping mountains of slander on the
Soviet Union and socialism as a social system, and the tone is being
set by the U.S. President himself. It must be frankly said that it
is an unseemly spectacle when, having set themselves the aim of
denigrating the Soviet people, the leaders of a country like the
United States resort to what is virtually foul-mouthed abuse mingled
with hypocritical sermons on morality and humanity. . . .
132. Now Washington, in addition to morality, is also flouting
elementary rules of decency, displaying disrespect not only for
statesmen and states but also.for the United Nations. . . .
133. Of course, malicious attacks on the Soviet Union arouse in us a
natural sense of indignation, but we have strong nerves, and we do
not build our policy on emotions. It is founded on common sense,
realism, and profound responsibility for the destiny of peace.
134. Report of Politburo meeting (PRAVDA, 8 Oct 83)
135. [The 28 September Andropov] statement gives a clear-cut class
analysis of the situation that has taken shape in the world, a
principled appraisal of the militarist course stirred by the present
U.S. Administration in international politics, and a fitting rebuff
to wanton fabrications and malicious attacks of President Reagan
against the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist
community.
136. Ustinov article (PRAVDA, 19 Nov 83)
137. The aggressiveness of ultrareactionary imperialist forces
increased sharply when the R. Reagan Administration came to power in
the United States. They have declared a "crusade" against socialism.
138. The R. Reagan Administration, in blatant contradiction with
this commitment, is now stating its "right" to inflict a first
nuclear strike in the hope of victory. . . .
139. The Washington Administration's war preparations are
accompanied by shameless anti-Soviet hysteria. Discarding all
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decency, top U.S. officials are slandering the USSR, its people and
policy, and the socialist way of life. Lies, disinformation,
juggling with facts, and provocations are being brought into play.
It is'with the aid of such methods that Washington figures, heating
up the international situation, are counting on ensuring the
unobstructed implementation of their course aimed at an unrestrained
arms race. This policy on the part of the White House leaders does
not consist solely of emotions or rhetoric. It is a consciously and
coldly and deliberately implemented long-term strategy aimed at
broadening confrontation and thus increasing the danger of war.
140. Andropov statement (PRAVDA, 25 Nov 83)
141. The leadership of the Soviet Union has already apprised Soviet
people and other peoples of its assessment of the present U.S.
Administration's militarist course and warned the U.S. Government and
the, Western countries which are at one with it about the dangerous
consequences of that course. . . .
142. The Soviet leadership appeals to the leaders of the United
States and of the states of Western Europe to weigh up once again all
the consequences with which the implementation of the plans for the
deployment of the new U.S. missiles in Europe threatens their own
peoples and all mankind.
143. We are already living, even now, in a peace that is too
fragile. Responsible statesmen must therefore evaluate what is
taking place and make a rational decision. Only human reason can and
must safeguard mankind from the awesome danger. We call upon those
who are nudging the world along the path of an ever more dangerous
arms race to renounce the unrealizable calculations of achieving
military superiority by such a path with the aim of dictating their
will to other peoples and states.
144. Gromyko speech at Conference on Disarmament in Europe (PRAVDA,
19 Jan 84)
145. Instead of conducting talks and displaying a desire to work for
accord, the U.S. Administration has chosen a course of breaking the
existing alignment of forces. . . .
146. The incumbent U.S. Administration is an administration thinking
in categories of war and acting accordingly. . . .
147. What is needed is deeds and not verbal equilibristics, the
resort to which has been made particularly often in Washington
lately. They clearly are a sign of short-term considerations, and
people already know sufficiently well the worth of such tricks. No
matter how hard one tries to lie--be it a crude lie or a virtuoso
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one--this will change nothing in the actual state of affairs. What
is needed is a turn of substance in policy--from the policy of
militarism and aggression to a policy of peace and international
cooperation.
148. Andropov interview (PRAVDA, 25 Jan 84)
149. Interstate relations have found themselves in an atmosphere of
dangerous tension. The leaders of the United States, the U.S.
Administration bear full responsibility for this turn of events.
150. So, one may ask, why is the present situation in the world
being deliberately distorted in the statements of. American leaders?
First of all to try to dispel the concern of the peoples, which has
been mounting with every day, over Washington's militaristic policy
and to undercut the growing resistance-to this policy. . . .
151. There is no need to convince us of the usefulness and
expedience of dialogue. This is our policy. But the dialogue should
be conducted on an equal footing and not from a position of strength,
as it is proposed by Ronald Reagan. The dialogue should not be
conducted for the sake of dialogue. It should be directed at the
attainment of concrete accords. It should be conducted honestly and
no attempts should be made to use it for_sefi~aims
152. The American leadership, as all signs indicate, has not given
up its intentions to conduct talks with us from positions of
strength, from positions of threats and pressure.
154. Oleg Anichkin, CPSU Central Committee official (Soviet domestic
radio, 14Nov 80)
155. Reagan is in favor of stepping up American military might and
the achievement of U.S. military supremacy. . . .
156. At the same time his advisers direct attention to such points.
The nearer Reagan has approached the White House, the more moderate
have been his enunciations. One can suppose that this process will
continue.
157. Aleksandr Bovin, IZVESTIYA political observer and reputed
adviser to Presidents Brezhnev and Andropov (Soviet domestic radio, 7
Dec 80)
158. Reagan, of course, realizes that he cannot get away from
continuing talks with the Soviet Union. But, by all accounts, it
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seems to me, in general, that a harder line U.S. policy is at hand,
particularly where it concerns, for example, the problems of
disarmament and military detente. It seems to me that soon we will
have to confront a harder line of this kind and preparations for this
should be made, although in general I do not exclude the possibility
that after a while everything may return to the beaten track, as we
say.
159. Georgiy Arbatov, director of the USA and Canada Institute
(Soviet television, 29 Nov 80)
160. It has become clear in any case that both Reagan and many in
his entourage have come to some serious conclusions during the course
of this campaign. The shift to the center has begun. This is
generally typical of U.S. political life. Whichever candidate stands
away from the center will shift. If he is left of center, he will
drift to the right. If he is right of center, he will drift slightly
to the left remaining at some distance, but even so will approach the
center. Reagan is a rather experienced man in this respect. I would
like to say that I have heard and read in the foreign press that as a
film actor he is a man without much experience. However, it is
difficult to judge from the past. There were excellent presidents
who were former loggers..
161. The fact itself that moderate statements are made s
important to me, because quite a few obstacles were left over from
the election campaign. This certainly does not mean that we will be
rancorous and will not let anything pass, including what was said in
the heat of the election struggle. We have already said publicly
that we will not act like that. However, even words are deeds to a
certain extent at present, because they influence atmosphere and
climate. Atmosphere and climate are rather important in politics and
any beginnings depend on them.
162. Vitaliy Kobysh, CPSU Central Committee official (LITERATURNAYA
GAZETA, 1Jan 81)
163. Reagan, with his reputation for being a politician belonging to
the extreme right wing of the Republican Party, has formed his
cabinet from people of basically moderate views. . . .
164. "When taking over," every new administrator strives to show
that it is different from the previous one and that its policy will
meet the country's interests to a greater degree. Statements by
Reagan and some of his closest assistants indicate that they consider
the status to which the Carter-Brzezinski administration has reduced
Soviet-U.S. relations to be abnormal and that they see the
normalization of these relations as the next U.S. Government's
foremost priority. At the same time they stress that they will
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pursue a "tough policy," in other words, they will act from a
"position of strength." We will see how all this will appear in
practice.
165. TASS report on President Reagan's 29 January press conference
(PRAVDA, 31 Jan 81)
166. Referring to the Soviet Union's policy, the U.S. President
permitted a number of premeditated distortions in his assessment of
the aims-and character of the USSR's international activities. He
said, in particular, that up to now detente has been a one-way street
which the Soviet Union has used for the achievement of its own aims,
and that detente is more favorable to the Soviet Union than to the
United States. . . .
167. In an unworthy manner Reagan went on to talk about some sort of
insidiousness in the Soviet Union's policy which allegedly aims to
establish a worldwide socialist or communist state. . . .
168. Referring to a most important problem, the SALT II treaty, the
President permitted obvious misinterpretations [perederzhki] of the
treaty's essence. He alleged that in its present form the treaty
would lead not to strategic arms limitation but to their buildup. He
called for the holding of new negotiations. However, it followed
from Reagan's statement that the principal function of such
negotiations will not be the discussion of conditions for limiting
the arms race, but the linking of this problem to other questions
which are not relevant to this topic.
169. Anichkin (Soviet domestic radio, 6 Feb 81)
170. On the whole President Reagan [at his press conference on 29
January] said nothing new in comparison with what he said during the
election campaign. He attributed to the Soviet Union designs to
establish world domination and to set up a worldwide socialist or
communist state. Then he declared that the Soviet Union is using
detente for its own ends and has allegedly turned it into a one-way
street. All of this is untrue. . . .
171. It is one thing when minor politicians are talking in this
spirit; it is another when such words are being pronounced by the
President. After all, it is a question of the deliberate distortion
of Soviet policy....
172. In the words of the WASHINGTON POST, Reagan had adopted a tone
which is very strikingly different form the Republican and Democratic
administrations of the 60's and 70's. The President, the same
newspaper writes, spoke of the Soviet Union in terms that recall the
most difficult times of the cold war.
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173. "I. Aleksandrov," pseudonym used in officially inspired
articles (PRAVDA, 25 Mar 81)
174. Regretfully, from their very first public statements and
practical steps the leaders of the new U.S. Government appear to be
bent not on rectifying but on multiplying the errors of the previous
administration, on facilitating not a lessening of international
tension but its growth. . . .
175. The leaders of the Washington Administration and some hawkish
lawmakers are now engaged in a competition of belligerent
phraseology, are trying to outdo one another by the hugeness of
military programs.
176. Bovin (Soviet television, 29 Mar 81)
177. I now think that the essential outlines of the new foreign
policy course, of Reagan's foreign policy, have now become
sufficiently visible. It is a harsh, conservative, power policy, it
is a policy whose cornerstone comprises extremely primitive
anticommunist concepts. In general the views of Reagan and his
supporters on world developments are extremely simple: Anything they
do not like, anything that is contrary to the interests of
imperialism, they say is all the result of the insidious actions of
the Soviet Union. From this primitive package a simple conclusion is
drawn: The time for playing at detente is over, it is necessary to
rearm immediately, it is necessary to strive for military strategic
superiority over the Soviet Union, and on this basis impose the will
of America the Great on the whole world.
178. Well, this is approximately the philosophy. Let us now examine
the practice. We all know that during the past decade, let us say,
despite all the difficulties and complexities, between the Soviet
Union and the United States there became established a fairly
well-developed structure of mutual relations which was formulated in
dozens of different agreements. Nov the new Administration is
beginning to break up this structure and deal a mean blow to its
foundation, the process of strategic arms limitation.
179. Arbatov (PRAVDA, 4 May 81)
180. Most observers agree that, even by late April, no in any way
coherent U.S. foreign policy has emerged--at any rate when it comes
to actions. There have been plenty of words and rhetoric--so much
that the Administration itself has more than once had to backpedal.
But can words and rhetoric be regarded as policy?
181. They probably can be, in some respects.
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182. First of all, they can shed light on political views and
intentions. In this light the "noises" from Washington are almost
unambiguous: They indicate a desire to accelerate the arms race in
every possible way and to secure military superiority, a wish to
switch relations with the USSR and the other socialist countries onto
the road of confrontation and power struggle, to rule according to
whim the fate of the countries that have liberated themselves from
colonialism, to dictate unceremoniously to the allies. The very fact
that the people who have come to power in the United States talk at
length and insistently of these desires and intentions cannot be left
out of account. The fact must be viewed as an objective reality.
But another fact remains no less a reality--the fact that intentions
and wishes alone are not enough to constitute a policy. Politics has
been and will remain the art of the possible. And the possibilities,
the realities of the modern world certainly do not leave a great deal
of room for the imperial ambitions which people in Washington are
today going on about with new force.
183. The question whether the new U.S. Administration has formulated
its foreign policy should be left'open, I think. Some may hope that
it has not been formulated yet, others may think differently. It is
clear, however, that the continuation of the existing situation would
itself pose grave dangers, particularly the attempts to transform
bombastic propaganda slogans into practical policy premises. All
this is dangerous not only for other countries
United States itself and for its national interests, which need more
than ever before a realistic, sober analysis.
184. Leonid Zamyatin, chief of the CPSU Central Committee
International Information Department (Soviet television, 16 May 81)
185. On many questions the foreign policy concept of the new Reagan
Administration has already been formulated. . . .
186. On the basis of speeches, although at times you could say they
are quite saturated with anti-Soviet rhetoric, and on the basis of
documents which have already been published, it can be definitely
concluded that the new U.S. Administration has chosen a sharp
whipping up of the arms race as its course. The new Administration
considers that opposition to the Soviet Union--as its leaders, the
leaders of the United States, say--in the economic, political, and
other fields is its main foreign policy concept. Besides, they
maintain that this opposition must be on a global scale.
187. Reagan recently said: I do not wish to live in a world where
the Soviet Union is first. What does this mean? If these words of
Reagan's are translated into another language--into the language of
politics from everyday language--this means that the United States
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has chosen military supremacy over the Soviet Union as its political
concept; that it is rejecting the policy of peaceful coexistence, the
policy of detente; and that it is making a stake on sharply raising
the military presence of the United States in various parts of the
world, including along the perimeter of Soviet borders. It is also
attempting, by increasing its military potential, to put pressure on
the Soviet Union.
188. Arbatov (Soviet Television, 31 Oct 81)
189. If we are to speak about American policy, then of course we can
say that the most extremist views have prevailed in the question of
military spending, and generally in American behavior in the
international arena. Well, of course, many say that maybe these
people bark more than they bite. It is still difficult and too early
to judge. But they do in fact bark a lot, and a lot of militaristic
talk can be heard coming from Washington every day. This is not just
talk. There are military appropriation decisions on military
programs, certain U.S. positions and actions on various continents,
and interference into the affairs of a number of countries--all of
this has become a reality. Therefore, we are undoubtedly seeing a
period which gives cause to remember the cold war and to suspect that
quite a lot has been done to sweep aside all the positive things that
were accumulated at the expense of great labor in international
relations and thus a big step has been taken toward a cold war. . . .
190. So things in the economy are not turning out quite the way the
President figured, and to a certain extent this can be a limiting
factor for many far-reaching American plans. . . .
191. All of these realities are just beginning to appear--after all
this government has not been in power very long--and these political
and social mechanisms, which demand some kind of accommodation on the
part of the Administration, have just been set in motion.
192. Of course, there are people there who . it is difficult to
imagine that they can reform. But overall--and we have seen this in
history more than once--even the most conservative politicians have
been sufficiently pragmatic in understanding what can be done and
what cannot be done. . . .
193. Even in America, they are beginning to somehow understand that
the question is becoming extremely acute, that some kind of reaction
to it is necessary, that in Europe and the world as a whole--and even
in the United States, as a matter of fact--some sentiments are
appearing.
194. Bovin, Soviet domestic radio, 29 November 1981
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195. In fact, what did this Reagan speech of 18 November mean? Does
it, to some degree. . . . signify a reassessment of the U.S.
position, or . . . is it an attempt to gain a political alibi with
respect to the pressures being exerted by America's allies in Europe?
As for which of these elements was more evident in the speech, this
is an open question both for us and for Europe. We will find out
when the talks begin.
196. Nikolay Shishlin, CPSU Central Committee official, Soviet
television, 5 December 1981
197. Regarding the fact of an alteration in the U.S. foreign policy
course taking place, an alteration in the U.S. foreign policy course
beginning to become perceptible--this is true. . . . It seems that in
this respect in particular we are right in talking neither of a
cosmetic operation nor of a break with,past policies, but rather of a
certain alteration in course, a certain adaptation of American
policies to reality.
198. Bovin, Soviet domestic radio, 20 December 1981
199. One of the main problems for Europe at the moment is the
problem of the so-called Eurostrategic weapons. . . . One can view
these [INF] talks in different ways. On the one hand, the talks have
a specific object--medium-range weapons. But their principal
significance is the fact that after a woe year of-a -zion-an----
alarm and hysterical kinds of statements by Washington, generally
speaking things there are quietly beginning to stabilize.
200. TASS report on U.S. sanctions after the imposition of martial
law in Poland (PRAVDA, 30 Dec 81)
201. The U.S. Administration has taken a provocative step the
purpose of which is to poison the international climate even more, to
exacerbate tensions, to worsen confrontation and toughen the
militarist foreign policy course. . . .
202. President R. Reagan has published a statement, announcing the
introduction of a whole number of unilateral discriminatory measures
with regard to the Soviet Union, ranging from a suspension of
Aeroflot service to the USA to a review of bilateral Soviet-U.S.
agreements in trade and scientific-technical cooperation, agreements
signed by the Government of the United States.
203. To justify this crude diktat with regard to a sovereign state
unprecedented and absolutely inadmissible in universally accepted
international practice, the head of the U.S. Administration has
resorted to direct forgery and lies, maintaining that the Soviet
Union allegedly "interfered" in Polish affairs and bears "direct
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responsibility" for the situation in Poland.
204. Arbatov (PRAVDA, 1 Jan 82)
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205. "Seeking a crisis" is precisely how Washington's stance
regarding Poland can be described. . . . Attempts are being made to
"internationalize" the crisis and to exploit the events to still
further exacerbate the international situation and relations with the
USSR in particular.
206. The question naturally arises of the true motives and true aims
of the campaign unleashed by the United States over the events in
Poland. . . .
207. I want immediately to stipulate that in mentioning the present
leaders, I mean not only the President and his most influential
ministers but also a broader stratum of the Washington bureaucracy,
above all the stratum comprising the deputy and assistant cabinet
members, the President's chief advisers and entourage, the heads of a
number of departments, and so forth. . . . And with the utmost
responsibility I would venture to claim that as a group, this "second
echelon" is in considerable part composed of extremists representing
the far right wing, extreme militarist flank of the U.S. ruling
class. . . . A whole series of conclusions can be derived from all
that is known of these people. One is that they are people who rose
to prominence on a wave of crisis and feel e s u- of-water-- -
outside a crisis. . . .
208. A certain circle of American figures now needs a crisis as a
condition of its political success, even political survival. And it
is apparently prepared to go to any lengths for the sake of that.
209. Aleksandr Kaverznev, Soviet television political observer
(Hungarian domestic radio, 18 Feb 82)
210. We are of the opinion that the coming years will be difficult.
In the beginning, when the Reagan Administration came to power in the
United States, we had certain hopes that the President would not
implement the policy he announced during his election campaign. We
hoped that life would oblige him to see many things in a different
way. But now we are forced to conclude that for the entire duration
of the Reagan Administration we can hardly expect a different U.S.
policy.
211. Shishlin (Soviet domestic radio, 11 Apr 82)
212. Reagan, it must be said, has garnished these rather bellicose
statements with the somewhat curious assertion that he, the President
of the United States, is willing to meet Leonid Ilich Brezhnev in the
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summer at the second special session of the UN General Assembly on
disarmament. And there is a rather strange contradiction here.
Actually, the idea of a summit meetinj=-a Soviet-American summit
meeting--was proposed over one year ago from the platform of the 26th
party congress. In that time, the Soviet Union has covered a
considerable part of the distance toward finding ground for mutually
acceptable solutions in the interests of improving Soviet-American
relations. We saw nothing of the kind from the American side. And
now into the midst of these rather definite statements, which can
only be called militaristic, he inserts the claim that he is ready
for a Soviet-American summit meeting.
213. Ernst Genri, prominent journalist (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 14 Jul
82)
214. Consequently, has the failure of Hitler's blitzkrieg against
the USSR taught the U.S. militarists nothing? By all accounts, this
is exactly the case and must be taken into account. It is not hard
to understand what is guiding the Pentagon's thinkers.
215. They are not taking the failure of the Hitlerite adventure into
account simply because there has been a revolution in military
hardware since then. It is now proposed to deliver a surprise strike
against the USSR not by means of tanks and conventional aircraft, but
by nuclear missiles and other "super weapons" whichcan__fly_thousands
of kilometers in a few minutes.
216. Arbatov (PRAVDA, 16 Jul 82)
217. U.S. policy would be good to the extent to which it is not
allowed to be bad, safe (not only for us but also for America itself
and its allies) to the extent to which it is not allowed to become
dangerous. It will not be allowed to evolve in those directions by
economic and political realities, by the policies of other countries,
by the Americans' common sense and by the striving of the peoples for
self-preservation. I hope that these factors will be enough for the
continued political processes to bolster the realistic principles and
to return American policy to an understanding of not only the
existing contradictions but also of very serious and vitally
important common interests, the interests of peace and survival,
which require not only talks but also agreements as well as the
overall improvement of relations between the two countries. What if
this does not come to pass? I personally would find solace in the
thought that a time will come and it will be possible to say: It is
not with this Administration that history began, and it is not with
it that it has ended.
218. Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central
Committee International Department (Czechoslovak domestic radio, 30
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Jul 82)
219. Reagan and his Administration--and I deliberately do not say
the United States since there are various internal groupings--Reagan
and his Administration represent that part of the capitalist world of
monopoly capital, which is convinced that the solution of questions
of the future, of problems of mutual relations between the two
systems, can be achieved only by means of force. Circles currently
in the leadership of a substantial part of European countries take a
completely different viewpoint. It is not easy for them but they
give preference to a peaceful development of relations and to solving
questions by competition in a peaceful atmosphere. . . .
220. Extreme views exist; there are people who say that the
situation is so complex and difficult that there is no way out, that
only the worst can be expected, that we are on the very threshold of
war. That of course is an extreme view and is incorrect because
there are a number of positive factors; the head-on struggle and
existing equilibrium of forces is a guarantee that we can advance and
not allow imperialism to realize its plans.
221. On the other hand there are some people who say that there have
been all kinds of crises; this will pass, too. We are strong; we
have the strength of the Soviet Union, the strength of the socialist
countries; it will all pass of its own accord. It will not pass of
its own accord; of course that, too, is nc ro rect.
222. Yes, without doubt we are capable of defending ourselves, of
rebuffing the imperialist wave, but that depends on us, on the
situation of our countries and in our countries, on the unity of our
countries and their joint activity in the international arena.
223. Bovin (IZVESTIYA, 6 Aug 82)
224. In general it is hard to deal with the Americans now. They
dissemble, twist and turn, say one thing and do another. They have
many ambitions and a great deal of self-esteem. They have little
responsibility. But what can you do? We do not choose our partners,
they are given us by destiny, by history. We have to talk and
negotiate with them although, to be frank, I do not believe that any
serious agreement can be reached with the Americans as long as Reagan
is in the White House.
225. Vladimir Ostrogorskiy, commentator (Moscow radio in German, 22
Aug 82)
226. If Reagan knew history better and made its lessons his own, he
would not harbor any illusions, since there were people before him
who, like Hitler, had a special liking for using the miraculous
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weapon of inflammatory propaganda on the air.
It is typical for
aspirants to world domination to rely on miraculous weapons. It is,
however, well known how they usually have ended.
227. Bovin (IZVESTIYA, 5 Nov 82)
228. Nov let us allow the skeptic to have his say. He is bound to
ask: Are we not overestimating our own strength? Can international
security and international cooperation seriously be expected when the
world is divided into opposing sociopolitical systems? Is the
"Reagan phenomenon" an accident? The questions are not farfetched.
The difficulties are indeed huge. Militarism and aggressiveness are
inherent in imperialism. We do not choose our partners; fate,
history hands them to us.
229. All that is true. Nonetheless, the hope is realistic. The
hope is realistic because the forces advocating that detente get a
"second wind" represent a real, weighty factor in world politics.
The Soviet Union is a mighty power. People across the Atlantic
cannot help but take this into account--whatever team is assembled in
the White House, it is still not a suicide team. The socialist
community and the communist and workers' parties are with us. Dozens
of nonaligned states advocate detente and disarmament and oppose the
division of the world into military-political blocs. The
antinuclear, antiwar movement is gaining unprecedented scope and its
social and political spectrum is becoming ncrea ing . . -
230. I repeat, we would like to reach agreement, even with Reagan.
What if this does not happen? We will wait.
231. Shishlin (Soviet domestic radio, 21 Nov 82)
232. Actions for the benefit of peace would carry a lot more weight
than conciliatory words. If we were to see a real shift in the
American position at the talks that are being held on strategic
armaments, on European armaments, on conventional armaments in
Central Europe--that would surely be more substantial than the words
spoken by the American statesmen. So the situation remains pretty
difficult. . . .
233. PRAVDA editorial (PRAVDA, 21 Nov 82)
234. Judging by international reactions, Andropov's meetings with
foreign delegations gave new impetus to people's hopes for the
maintenance and development of the detente process. The Soviet Union
is always ready for honest, equal, and mutually advantageous
cooperation with any state which wishes it, particularly with the
United States. Normal, or better still, friendly Soviet-American
relations would accord with the interests of both peoples and of
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world peace.
235. Gennadiy Gerasimov, Novosti deputy chairman (Soviet television,.
28 Nov 82)
236. The events of the last weeks in Moscow, by the very nature of
things, have caused a certain pause in international relations. The
world has been watching Moscow to see what will happen and, in its
turn, Moscow has been watching the world attentively, too. American
Senator Robert Dole, a prominent figure in the Republican
Party--Reagan's party--has been in Moscow during these days. He
stated that he observes an advancement by the Reagan Administration
toward a new beginning--that is how he expressed himself. Some
observers have begun cautiously seeking signs of a thaw, even a weak
one, in American-Soviet relations.
237. Arbatov, speech to U.S. trade delegation (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA,
8 Dec 82)
238. In the last few days many people's hopes regarding the
prospects of Soviet-American relations have revived. The dramatic
nature of the moment, when events are prompting reflection on the
most serious problems perturbing people, may even have helped in a
way. . . .
239. Something seems to be beginning to c a~iigor the Tietfer- -
Something has happened and something positive too. I think it is a
good thing that ASTEC has met. It seems to me that it is an
important event and shows that many Americans (and Soviet people,
too, of course) understand the fundamental interests of their
countries and "gas for pipes" deal. We assessed positively the
American leaders' expression of condolences on the death of Leonid
Ilich Brezhnev and the fact that the U.S. President personally
visited the Soviet Embassy and sent the U.S. vice president and
secretary of state to Moscow. We have carefully followed the words
spoken in this connection, and the positive [khoroshiye) words we
have greeted positively.
240. But if I were asked if I could assess these facts as evidence
of the abandonment by the United States of a policy that in our
country--I must be frank with you--is seen as a policy of cold war
and as a course of a headlong arms race and of unbounded--mortal, as
the saying goes--enmity? [sentence as published) Or is what has
happened in the last few days merely a maneuver aimed at reassuring
the public at large and the allies so that they do not prevent this
policy of total enmity from being pursued in the future? If I were
asked those questions, I would honestly say that as yet I have no
answer.
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241. Bovin (Soviet television, 30 Dec 82)
242. It is difficult to escape the impression that the opponents of
detente in Washington are gradually beginning to give ground. I
would even risk making the following conclusion: The isolation of
Reagan and his policy is growing both within the United States and
outside it. Evidently, we can assume that this will force the White
House to intensify its maneuvering. But at the moment it is
difficult to say whether this will affect the essence of the foreign
policy course or only its form, as has already been the case.
243. Commentators Aleksandr Korshunov and Oleg Blinov (Soviet
domestic radio, 12 Jan 83)
244. At the end of his [latest radio] speech, Reagan stated the
readiness of the United States--and I quote--to sit down at the
conference table with the Russians to discuss practical measures
capable of resolving the problems and leading to a more durable and
genuine improvement of relations between East and Vest. If this is
really so, then one can only welcome the U.S. President's utterances.
The Soviet Union believes that the path toward mutual talks is open
and that our two countries could make an important contribution to
the cause of creating a climate of mutual trust, mutual understanding
and cooperation in the world.
245. His Holiness Pimen, Patriarch of lfioscow--arid ~Yl Russia fTf1SE,
Apr 83)
246. It is with bitterness and grief in my heart that I read your
belligerent calls which sow the seeds of hatred and hostility against
my motherland and threaten peace all over the world. These calls are
the more sinful as they are wrapped in the attire of Christian
morals. . . .
247. But you, Mr. President, teach war in your remarks; you teach
war against my nation and my motherland. Can one really be faithful
to the commandment thou shalt not kill and at the same time speak
about the possibility of a limited nuclear war, about total nuclear
war, first nuclear strike, victory in a nuclear war and other
criminal and sinful conceptions? War, war, war. . . and where is the
place for thou shalt not kill, Mr. President?
248. Valentin Zorin, Soviet television political observer (Moscow
radio [in English] to North America, 3 Apr 83)
249. But the leaders in Washington are not only rude and tactless in
their political styles, they also break another unwritten rule of
statesmanship. It is unfortunate when the mass media juggles with
facts but it is inexcusable when leaders in positions of utmost
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responsibility resort to overt lies. There have been many instances
when the current leaders in Washington have flagrantly distorted the
truth and deliberately lied to the public. That was the case in the
most recent statements made by President Reagan about Soviet policy.
250. Kobysh (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 6 Apr 83)
251. [In his] 1 April speech and in previous speeches, R. Reagan
cast aside all Easter rhetoric and explained quite clearly and
bluntly that the Administration that he heads, far from intending to
renounce its military preparations on a monstrous scale and its
hegemonist aggressive course, actually contemplates something still
more sinister. Playing with words, he presented to the public in the
guise of "ABM defense" the announcement that the United States is
embarking on the implementation of a vast new, purely aggressive
program of military preparations, mainly covering space. This
announcement was further evidence that the present U.S. Government is
not simply preparing for nuclear war, but has set a course toward
unleashing such a war.
252. Valentin Falin, IZVESTIYA political observer (IZVESTIYA, 14 Aug
83)
253. And what does the U.S. leadership think now? It links the
maintenance of peace between our states to the United States'
acquisition of military superiority in addition to Lhe USSR
renunciation of a socialist social system. In other words, the
Soviet Union must learn to be at the United States' beck and call or
it will only have itself to blame. It is perfectly obvious that this
view has nothing in common with the "Basic Principles of Mutual
Relations between the USSR and the United States" which the U.S.
leader sealed with his signature in May 1972. . . .
254. True, for some time now representatives of the present
administration have been going in for soft-pedaling. They have been
transforming R. Reagan from a dashing mindless horseman into a
soft-hearted "peace champion." A broad stream of misinformation is
being broadcast in which they want to whitewash the U.S. stance at
the talks on nuclear arms in Europe and on strategic arms limitation
and reduction.
255. Arkadiy Sakhnin (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 5 Oct 83)
256. Under pressure from the peoples, imperialism seemed to accept
the incipient detente. But it could not keep it up. What do you
mean, detente?1 So much power! Must rule the world!
257. A familiar turn. We heard it from the madman [Hitler]. It was
also heard by a smart master of ceremonies, an actor from the
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"General Electric Theater" television program. He was advertising
washing machines and detergents. He got it into his head: A career
can be built round this tune. He selected the words to the tune and
rehearsed the pose of sovereign. He uttered: "I will not end the
ideological 'drama.'" Those who write with pain at the sound of the
word "peace" liked the pose. They liked the words, too. They
decided to give it a try and brought the actor in for a test. They
hauled him off the theatrical and onto the political stage. On the
small stage, to start with. The familiar tune sounded louder, the
words more threatening. The test was successful. On to the big
stage.
258. This is how the second plenipotentiary of imperialism to lay a
claim to world domination appeared on earth in our days. He picked a
team worthy of himself and settled into the White House.
259. Today the Second Pretender holds in his hands not a bomb but a
nuclear missile. He is waving it about on land, on the water, under
the water, and in the sky, and is carrying it into space. . Take
the plugs out of your ears, Reagan. Time to think about God. That
is what religious people would say. But we are realists: Think about
Nuremberg.
260. Aleksandr Yakovlev, director of the World Economics and
International Relations Institute (IZVESTIYA, 7 Oct 83)
261. There can be no doubt that the current U.S. President is
exerting an extremely destructive influence on the international
situation. His personal contribution to bringing the danger of war
closer is great, and he bears the responsibility for the very rapid
demolition of the structure of international cooperation built by the
efforts of many countries on the platform of deepening and
strengthening peace. But at the same time R. Reagan is also carrying
out a social instruction. Reflecting the U.S. ruling oligarchy's
present tasks, he has-been outstandingly assiduous in his post, as
the whole world can see for itself. . . .
262. As THE LOS ANGELES TIMES notes, Reagan does not have an
inquiring mind. Eyewitnesses invariably stress that he has more
horses in his stables than books in his library. He believes in
flying saucers, assiduously reads horoscopes, and believes in the
actions of secret evil spirits.
263. A. Leontyev (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 15 Oct 83)
264. In an attempt to somehow justify their adopted course of war
preparations, the new aspirants to world domination--in that sense
too the heirs of the raving fuehrer--excel in slander against the
Soviet Union and resort virtually to foul-mouthed abuse alternating
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with hypocritical homilies about morality and human rights, with the
White House incumbent himself setting the tone.
265. If we are to believe Reagan, America is ruled by "the most
noble," "the most magnanimous," and "the most philanthropic"
gentlemen. But there is no mention of the fact that each of these
gentlemen possesses heaps of dollars in his bank account, acquired
from the drudgery of modern-day slaves, taken from widows and
orphans, and collected from the corpses of soldiers who have perished
in the dirty wars and criminal adventures of the United States.
266. Commentator Oleg Kolesnikov (TASS report in English, 26 Oct 83)
267. The crude act of international terrorism elevated by Washington
to the status of government policy is the assessment given by the
world public of the occupation of Grenada by the U.S. Marines. The
statements by President Reagan about the "peace-making" mission of
the U.S. Marines sent by him to that tiny island in the Caribbean
strike one as monstrous cynicism. . . .
268. Reagan's statements are mendacious from beginning to end, and
even officials of the American Administration are forced to admit it.
269. Bovin (OTECHESTVEN FRONT, 1 Dec 84)
270. When the Americans agreed to detente and when they held
constructive talks with us, this was an attempt to adapt their policy
to the changes in life and in the world that had emerged. Now the
reverse process is occurring--Reagan is trying to adapt the whole
world to the interests of the United States as he understands them.
Such an approach, however, again undermines the realistic basis for
any constructive agreements. Evidence of this is the failure of the
Geneva talks.
271. The dominance of a conservative, reactionary, and archaic
ideology in the United States, an ideology which is being transformed
to politics, is the main obstacle for regulating disputed problems.
I think that Reagan cannot change himself. Romain Rolland has
actually said that one can begin to understand something of life only
when one comes upon its sharp corners. Reagan has already come upon
such sharp corners but having in mind the way he understands life, I
have not noticed that he has changed himself. Since Reagan will
probably stay in the White House for another four years, it is my
belief that for that period of time we will not succeed in reaching
an agreement on anything meaningful. We will, of course, conduct
negotiations, we will try to sign agreements and we will probably
even succeed somewhere on the political fringes. However, I think
that concerning the main and basic issues we will have to face a game
of nerves, confrontation, and conflicts for another four years. This
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is not a very optimistic prospect. I would very much like to be
wrong but I can draw no other conclusion at present.
272. Fedor Burlatskiy, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA political observer and
CPSU Central Committee official (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 4 Jan 84)
273. It is impossible to deny that a serious turnabout occurred in
U.S. geopolitics on the threshold of the eighties, or that the
United States has completely rejected the very idea of detente and
has embarked on the path of global confrontation with the Soviet
Union. . . .
274. It is well known that this shift is basically linked with the
arrival of President Reagan in the White House, a man with extremely
reactionary views representing the interests of the "iron
triangle"--the military business, the Pentagon, and the militarist
wing in the U.S. Congress. . . .
275. [Whether the present militarist course in the United States is
irreversible] is a very complicated question. Much depends on
whether R. Reagan manages to win the forthcoming U.S. election in the
fall of 1984. Much also depends on the correlation of forces within
the framework of the U.S. economic and political elite and on public
opinion in that country.
276. R. Reagan is hastening to consolidate the basic foundations of
militarism for the future. He is inflating the military budget and
planning programs for new types of weapons. Nonetheless, political
forces in the United States and the U.S. people still have not had
their final say. I am convinced that ordinary people in the United
States fear thermonuclear war no less than other people in the world.
277. TASS report on President Reagan's State of the Union Address
(TASS, 26 Jan 84)
278. President Ronald Reagan made a traditional "State of the Union"
address to a joint meeting of the two houses of Congress. His
statement, made in a spirit of electioneering, was an attempt to
picture in a favorable light the results of his three-year rule and
justify his policy, marked by extreme aggressiveness in the
international field and total disregard for the needs of the common
people in the home policy field.
279. The foreign policy section of the President's State of the
Union address was notable for demagogy and hypocrisy. The President
was trying to justify his militaristic policy by claiming that "the
United States is safer . . . and more secure in 1984 than before",
albeit, in real fact, the threat to general security, including to
the security of the United States itself, has increased. And the
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leaders of the United States bear all responsibility for such a turn
of events.
280. Commentator Yuriy Kornilov (TASS, 30 Jan 84)
281. The U.S. Administration speaks a great deal about "the need of
a dialogue." Yet, it deadlocks, disrupts and blocks all the talks on
the problems of curbing the arms race. . . .
282. Our hands are clean, and we have never been aggressors, U.S.
President R. Reagan pointed out recently at the Congress in the State
of the Union message. This is an obvious lie. In the past 6 years
alone the U.S. Administration resorted to armed actions or the threat
of force against other states 38 times, . . .
283. The thing is that from whatever point of view we assess the
situation, it is more than obvious: The allegedly "peace-making"
tricks of Reagan and his team, brought about by the purely
time-serving considerations, have nothing to do with the real foreign
policy pursued by Washington, which is based today, the same as
before, on the desire to make history reverse its course, to reshape
the political map of the world.
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