NEW AIR DEFENSE STRUCTURE, DIRECTION VIEWED

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: UFO SPECIAL COLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005516636
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2011
• Case Number: F-2010-00651
• Publication Date: May 1, 1993

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Status: [STAT]
Document Date: 01 May 93 Category: [CAT]
Report Type: JPRS report Report Date:
Report Number: JPRS-EER-93-078-S UDC Number:
Author(s): Col. Marian Kopczewski, Ph.D., of the Higher Officers
School of Antiaircraft Defense, on the political
conditionings of a military threat to the Republic of
Poland: "Directions of Change in the Air Defense of
Central European Countries Following the Transformation
of Their Systems of Society"]
Headline: * New Air Defense Structure, Direction Viewed
Source Line: 93EP0305A Poznan PRZEGLAD WOJSK LOTNICZYCH I WOJSK
OBRONY POWIETRZNEJ KRAJU in Polish No 5, May 93 pp
39-44
Subslug: [Article by Col. Marian Kopczewski, Ph.D., of the Higher
Officers School of Antiaircraft Defense, on the political
conditionings of a military threat to the Republic of
Poland: "Directions of Change in the Air Defense of
Central European Countries Following the Transformation of
Their Systems of Society"]
FULL TEXT OF ARTICLE:
1. [Article by Col. Marian Kopczewski, Ph.D., of the Higher Officers
School of Antiaircraft Defense, on the political conditionings of a
military threat to the Republic of Poland: "Directions of Change in
the Air Defense of Central European Countries Following the
Transformation of Their Systems of Society"]
2. [Text] Any form of combat activity, including air defense, is
continually in a flux owing to the ongoing development of operational
art and tactics, the means of air attack by a potential enemy, and
the views on their use. The role and importance of air defense in any
European country hinge on its geographical location and strategic
factors. Poland's position in the center of Europe at a boundary
between the zones of political and economic interests of various
countries impels us to be on the alert to military threats ensuing
from particular political conditions. The current isolation of the
countries of Central Europe following the change in their systems of
society and the relatively unpredictable unfolding of events in the
eastern countries necessitate watching out for a variety of military
threats linked to evaluating possible occurrences in Europe.
3. A detailed analysis of the factors conditioning the existence of
a military threat to Poland requires considering the situation of all
Approved for Release
UNCLASSIFIED --La
Q.1
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of its neighbor countries and grouping them by the scale of eventual
threat as follows:
4. 1. Countries that at present are no threat to us at all or only
minimally: Denmark, Sweden, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and
Slovakia.
5. 2. Countries that are a greater threat to us and that emerged
from the former USSR. The situation in that region is still far from
stable.
6. 3. Germany-there the threat consists of our economic and
technological backwardness. As for the military threat, given the
current international situation, it is hardly likely, but, in view of
the huge military and economic potential of Germany, it has to be
taken into account.
7. Thus, the political, and hence also the.military, situation in
Central Europe is exceptionally complex, and it may grow worse in the
years to come. In extremal situations and the absence of successful
political actions (a collective security system), Poland and,
indirectly, other countries of Central Europe may find themselves in
a kind of political encirclement (or isolation), leading to military
consequences.
9. An assessment of the dangers to Poland and other countries of
Central Europe prompts the conclusion that the traditional concept of
massed air attacks against the territory of the former Warsaw Pact
that might be carried out by the NATO air force is no longer a viable
basis for planning air defense. Previously, the political and
military conditions in Europe had been the principal cause of a
widespread fear of a surprise air strike by the potential enemy. That
fear or psychosis persisted even during periods of declared detente.
Any unidentified flying object used to be interpreted by people as
the beginning of World War III. Air-defense systems were often placed
on alert status not by the potential enemy but by an accident, and
such errors bore tragic consequences. For example, on 1 September
1983, Soviet air-defense fighters shot down a Boeing 747 over
Kamchatka. Several months afterward, an Iranian A-300 passenger plane
was brought down by a missile launched from a United States warship.
On 28 May 1987, Mathias Rust's flight in a sports plane triggered
Soviet air defense into a state of combat readiness. The event of
1989 was the overflight of a MiG-23 past half of Europe after its
pilot left it by parachute owing to a breakdown.
10. Protection against the effects of various errors necessitates
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exploring in peacetime ever better means, methods, and forms of
military monitoring of the airspace in the context of its
demilitarization. What, then, is the threat from the air nowadays?
11. Polish airspace (by the will of the government) is being
utilized by quite a few users for a variety of purposes, on employing
aircraft of varying design and possibilities. In general, both
civilian and military objects, Polish and foreign, may be present in
that airspace. Their number varies greatly, depending on the time of
day and the season of the year. At present, some 200 aircraft overfly
Polish territory daily (and about 2,000 overfly German territory).
All airspace users are obliged to strictly heed the air traffic
rules, and their compliance is monitored by an appropriate control
system. It is a fact that, in Poland, that system displays certain
defects so that users of our airspace may cause accidental or
purposeful (terrorist) threats.
12. Those airspace characteristics are the basis for evaluating
possible dangers from the air over Polish territory in peacetime and,
hence, also serve to reach conclusions concerning the nature of our
air defense:
13. -It must be continually ready to monitor the entire Polish
__ ___ a rspace. __
14. -It should act as a deterrent to any potential airspace
violator.
15. -It should operate with weapons of considerable firepower and
veil-trained crews capable of responding to the danger of terrorist
attacks.
16. A requirement for the solidity of the country's defense system
is its ability to deter threats in times of eventual conflict. Until
such time that we gain new allies linked to us by treaties of mutual
military assistance, threats to Poland from the air should be viewed
as a combination of factors, any of which may be likely.
17. The Eastern Direction. The air forces of the former USSR may be
a major danger to us in view of their considerable numerical
superiority and the availability to them of thorough information
about the infrastructure and basing of our units. The aircraft units
based in the western military districts adjoining our eastern
boundaries and the Baltic Fleet together total about 1,500 aircraft.
They may be flown in from various directions, and the principal air
strike targets in our country would be: elements of the Polish
air-defense system, the main groupings of troops, administrative and
economic centers, and the transportation infrastructure east of the
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18. The Western Direction. The German Air Force consists of 630
aircraft. Their current basing 50-100 km in the interior (plus
monitoring and guidance elements 10-20 km in the interior) makes
possible the execution of surprise attacks from two directions: the
sea and Berlin.
19. An assessment of the dangers in the event of a conflict prompts
the following conclusions:
20. -In peacetime, financial and organizational actions should be
focused on building strong air-defense systems in regions of special
danger (the Pomeranian Military District an the coastal air-defense
zone).
21. -The military districts that include regions directly threatened
in the event of a conflict should operate with strong and
maneuverable air-defense units.
22. -Troop air defense should be chiefly in the nature of direct air
defense.
23. Directions of Change in Air Defense; Aspects of the Polish Air
Defense MOdCT -
24. Until recently, the air-defense systems of the countries of
Central Europe were an integral component of the air-defense system
of the Warsaw Pact. That meant that priority was given to the aims
and tasks of the Warsaw Pact over the tasks of protecting the
national territory. Such a hierarchy of the aims and tasks of air
defense was not conducive to the formulation of a sovereign military
policy by the individual member countries. The air-defense system of
the Warsaw Pact countries represented clearly defined elements of the
overall aims and organizational structure of the coalition system.
Poland, by virtue of its geographical position, served to protect the
northern wing of the coalition and focused the efforts of its own
air-defense system on the Baltic seacoast, upon committing
considerable investment outlays for that purpose. Similar tasks and
priorities obliged the other member countries of the coalition. But,
however objectionable that situation may have been, it would be a
mistake to overlook the fact that the division of effort within the
coalition rationalized the outlays on air defense of Poland, the
former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria and was conducive to
mutual security.
25. That situation changed radically with the dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact. What used to be good as part of the coalition whole
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proved to be weak and ill-organized for every former member country
now on its own. The maladjustment of the air-defense systems of the
countries of Central Europe to the new conditions is also due to
their loss of their big-power protector, the USSR, especially as
regards antimissile and antispace defense.
26. The countries of Central Europe are facing the problem of
radically changing the organizational structure of their own national
air-defense systems. Hence, what kind of changes, and what should
their nature be? And can those countries at present afford to
introduce them? I believe that the nature of the changes in the
air-defense systems of those countries can be grasped by means of a
long-range view of the role and place of their airspaces, which will
develop as part of the new relations between the Commonwealth of
Independent States, especially Russia, and a united Western Europe.
To both of those parties, the airspaces of Poland, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary constitute a genuine buffer zone that
can equally well promote mutual security and threats.
27. It appears that Western Europe and Russia will, in that respect,
make decisions advantageous to themselves first of all. Therefore,
even now it is highly important to the countries of Central Europe
whether the European countries accept a strong air defense of the
-above-mentioned buffer zone-strong enough to oppose the utilization
of its airspace as a transit zone for an air strike or to respoird
that strike-or whether it would be better for them for the air
defense of that region to be weak, weak enough to permit the
arbitrary utilization of airspace by anyone at will. Consider that by,
assumption that airspace seems ideally designed as a locale for an
eventual gigantic air battle outside the territory of the countries
engaging in that battle. Only time will answer that and other similar
questions.
28. The experience at the end of this century shows that a strong
and well-organized air defense is needed in the present-day world.
Only such a defense can assure the proper existence of countries and
serve to engage in offensive and defensive operations on land, on
sea, and in the air. The role of the Polish air-defense system ensues
from.its geographic location and strategic conditions of military
alignment. It can be thus stated that the role of air defense in the
nation's defense system is determined by: the extent of danger from
the air, the possibility of eliminating or reducing that danger, and
the views on the means of eliminating or reducing that danger.
Allowing for those determining factors, modern air defense should be
characterized by:
29. -Combating enemy air strength from all threatened directions
throughout the altitude range.
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30. -Concentrating the air-defense effort in the principal regions
and directions of the threat.
31. -Continuously responding to enemy attacks over the entire
national territory and far beyond its boundaries.
32. -Highly effectively destroying the enemy's air strength at
various altitudes and air speeds.
33. -Combating the enemy's air strength in the presence of
considerable radio-electronic noise.
34. -Flexibly operating the forces and resources of the air-defense
system.
35. Considering the political and military situation in Europe and
the role and requirements of the air-defense system, its
restructuring in the countries of Central Europe is a necessity that
brooks no delay. In view of its geopolitical position in Europe,
Poland should show initiative in developing a model air-defense
system of its own. That initiative in abandoning whatever is outworn
and unsuited to the formation of a European security system could
-protidean_example_._to other countries. Its announcement could be yet
another stage in making credie the goats of the mlitary policy of----
Poland, which wants to build its own armed forces, with the object of
maintaining a state of armed neutrality.
36. A broad analysis of European political-military, operational,
and economic conditions warrants considering a gradual "civilian
conversion" of that part of the air-defense system that accomplishes
its objectives in peacetime. Taking that initiative requires
organizing and maintaining two institutionally separate air-defense
systems: the peacetime and the wartime ones.
37. Such an organizationally dual air-defense system should cope
with the following requirements:
38. -It should assure in peacetime effective monitoring and control
of Polish airspace and act as a deterrent to eventual airspace
violators (oppose acts of air terror).
39. -It should retain combat readiness to oppose an air threat in
the event of armed aggression against Poland.
40. The peacetime air-defense system should be prepared to
accomplish the following objectives:
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41. -Alerting and keeping posted the government and the military
about air activity in neighboring countries and any eventual actions
taken in the vicinity of our borders.
42. -Assuring air security (with the object of protecting the
integrity of the airspace) by responding to any overflight that
constitutes a threat-that is, to any unidentified overflight or one
not following the accepted rules.
43. -Controlling air traffic, chiefly to ensure adherence to rules
and standards, and coordinating military air traffic with civilian
air traffic and experimental flights.
44. -Conducting search-and-rescue operations, inclusive of the
organization of operational cooperation among teams searching for
lost aircraft and rescue teams.
45. The postulated scope of the peacetime objectives of air defense
requires radical organizational changes. In that context, the Border
Guards should be responsible for the air protection of borders, in
partnership with civilian monitoring and control of air traffic and
civilian communications and supply systems. That would be the first
measure to break with the practice of "standing on guard of national
__ ___so_vereignty_wih fully, ready armed forces," ' a practice that should
be regarded as a cold war relic.
46. Periods of intensive change are always characterized by
considerable uncertainty about the future. That is so now, too; we
can consider many probable scenarios of the future geopolitical
situation in Europe, but we cannot predict which one will prove true.
On the one-to be sure, realistic-extreme, there is the possibility of
the formation of a European security system in the short run, while,
on the other, there may arise the danger of Poland's becoming
isolated from the European Community and facing a growing military
threat.
47. In view of that, our fundamental strategic objectives should be,
first, the creation of sufficient defensive strength to discourage
potential aggressors from attempting to use armed force in order to
exert pressure or perpetrate aggression, and, second, in the event of
aggression, to repulse the enemy's strikes and, in the event of its
invasion of our national territory, to destroy its forces or push
them back beyond our borders.
48. Thus, the need to start work on adapting the Polish air-defense
system to the new political, economic, and defense conditions arising
in our country and in the neighboring countries is justified. Those
conditions require an innovative definition of the role and place of
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air defense in the Polish system of national defense and, partially,
also in the European military system. As a consequence, the
organizational and operating requirements for a Polish air-defense
system have to be adapted to future needs by developing and testing
different models of that system.
49. The present-day Polish air-defense system includes a broad
variety of specialized means of counteracting potential air strikes.
The jurisdiction over those means varies. Generally speaking, the
objectives of broadly interpreted air defense are being accomplished:
by the Air Force and the Air Defense Troops, which have been merged
into a single branch of armed forces; the antiaircraft troops, as a
branch of operational service; radio-electronic warfare units and
subunits, and the antiaircraft units of the Navy. That
organizational fragmentation is counterproductive. Too many
decisionmakers, using the same kind of resources, want to do the same
thing in Polish airspace. The current Polish air-defense system is
adapted to accomplishing Warsaw Pact objectives rather than those of
a conceptual model of Polish national air defense.
51. To sum up the reflections on a conceptual model of the Polish
air__defense syst m,__it_can be stated that: - --- -
52. -The nature of that system is determined by the magnitude of its
combat potential, the manner in which it is used, and the nature of
the threat.
53. -The magnitude of combat potential should ensue from the needs
(requirements) for counteracting the air threat.
54. -The operating procedures and organizational structure
(including division of labor) should be optimized in the interest of
the Polish air-defense system as a whole rather than of its selected
elements (such as the Antiaircraft Defense Troops, the Air Force and
Air Defense Troops, and others).
55. -Air defense should be extended to the entire Polish territory,
along with all objects present thereon, on varying the pattern of
deployment of the combat resources, depending on the degree of threat
and the importance of objects.
56. -Given the proposed model of the Polish air-defense system,
allowance should be made for two basic categories: zonal air defense
and direct air defense. That differentiation is required by the
differences in the threat posed to air defense by different kinds of
airborne means of attack. In accordance with that division, the
UNCLASSIFIED
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Polish air-defense system should be divided into two separate but
mutually complementary parts: a national air-defense system in charge
of zonal air defense and a military air-defense system in charge of
operational direct air defense for the purposes of troop support.
57. -The organizational structures of air defense themselves should
be simplified, especially as regards the chain of command, which
should be reduced to a minimum (while at the same time assuring a
sufficient variety of equipment for each structure).
58. -The basic elements of direct air defense should be the
reconnaissance-command-fire team (artillery battalion, battery). That
kind of defense should be, like antitank defense, propagated
throughout the military.
59. -Air defense in all of its aspects should be subordinated to the
overall national defense system, which in practical terms will mean
that the territorial division of zonal air defense would correspond
to the design of organizational structures and the scopes of
competence.
60. -In peacetime, a part of the resources of Polish air defense
should be used to monitor the airspace and as a deterrent. Allowing
-for-the-requirementsAt_modern_air defense and the directions of its
development, it can be argued that the rode o a3 r ~eferise will
steadily grow, and its effectiveness will be a fundamental criterion
for evaluating the defensive capability of a country or a coalition
of countries.