EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT WITH ANGOLA'S INSURGENTS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0005515532
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
June 24, 2015
Document Release Date: 
August 19, 2010
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
F-2007-01213
Publication Date: 
November 15, 1978
File: 
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PDF icon DOC_0005515532.pdf110.33 KB
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE^ DATE: 21 -Jun-201 0 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER (b)(1) (b)(3) Jonas Savimbi's leadership of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has kept in the field a force that numbers approximately 18,000 guerrillas. UNITA, the only serious insurgent threat to Angolan President Neto, moves freely within and is supported by the inhabitants of an area of southern Angola that is roughly between a third and a half of the country's territory. UNITA has demonstrated the ability to survive Angolan/Cuban offensives against it.and the insurgents should be able to continue denying southern Angola to Luanda's control. UNITA will not be successful in expanding its territory, but will continue to harrass the central government by various means. Continued attacks on the Benguela Railroad is one example. External assistance to UNITA comes from a variety of sources and may be decreasing. Such aid is important but not critical to the insurgent's ability to sustain the pressure on the Luanda overnment. Zambian President Kaunda is an old supporter of Savimbi, as are the West African moderates Senghor and Houphouet-Boigny, but they probably do not provide material assistance to UNITA. Savimbi would look to these and other moderate African states for transit rights in'the event an alternate supply route were needed. FNLA and FLEC Neither the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FLNA) nor the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) poses a serious threat to the Neto government. Both groups suffer from ineffective leadership, a lack of arms and ammunition, and FLEC has had serious internal problems. While both groups continue to tie-down Cuban and Angolan forces, they are unable to engage in large- scale military confrontations. The FNLA has 2,000 to 4,000 combatants operating mainly within the area of the Bakongo tribe in northern Angola from which it draws its major followin Some FNLA leaders reside in Zaire but Zairian President Mobutu claims that his government is no longer assisting the rebels. Representatives of FLEC's estimated 1,000-man force maintain that they have received no foreign assistance over the past two years. While we have no evidence to disprove this, the insurgents could be receiving some limited assistance FLEC recently has attempted to reorganize into a more effective military force, but this has not yet been reflected in the insurgents' anti-government activity.