THE SOVIET NAVAL CRUISE MISSILE FORCE: DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: CIA Analysis of the Soviet Navy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005512847
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: June 19, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2017
• Case Number: SC-2007-00006
• Publication Date: December 1, 1971

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AR 70-14
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
CIA HISTORICAL RELEASE
PROGRAM
JUNE 2017
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
The Soviet Naval Cruise Missile Force:
Development and Operational Employment
SR IR 71-79
December 1971
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
December 1971
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
The Soviet Naval Cruise Missile Force:
Development and Operational Employment
Introduction
In the mid-Fifties the growth of the strategic
threat posed by Western aircraft carriers called
for a response by Soviet naval defenses. Western
carriers could launch aircraft against the Soviet
Union from beyond the effective operating areas of
the Soviet Navy, which was then organized to protect
the coasts and to support the flanks of the army.
Soviet ships, aircraft, and submarines were designed
for short-range operations and lacked armament which
would permit an effective defense against the carrier.
A new weapon or weapon system was needed to cope
with the carrier.
The Soviets chose a weapon system--the cruise
missile--with the range necessary to counter the
carrier threat. Cruise missiles are rocket- or
jet-powered aerodynamic vehicles controlled remotely
and by self-contained guidance systems. They pro-
vide greater range and weight of explosive charge
than traditional naval weapons and can be launched
from surface ships, submarines, or aircraft. Their
homing systems make them more accurate than naval
guns.
Since the mid-Sixties the Soviets have accele-
rated the development of their cruise missile forces:
they have increased the size of the force, introduced
Th-1, Creport Was prepared by the Office of
C-1:rategle Research and coordinated within CIA.
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new models, and retained older models in the inven-
tory.
This report discusses Soviet cruise missiles
and their missions in the Soviet Navy, and describes
current and projected cruise missile force levels.
A summary begins on page 40.
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Contents
The Soviet Navy's Choice: Cruise
Missiles . . . .........
Soviet Cruise Missiles
Air-to-Surface Missiles
AS-1 Kennel 7
AS-2 Kipper 10
AS-5 Kelt 10
AS-6 11
AS-?, New Air-to-Surface Missile 11
Surface-to-Surface Missiles 11
SS-N-1 Scrubber 11
SS-N-2 StyN: 14
SS-N-3 Shaddock 15
SS-N-7 .... 17
SS-N-9 17
SS-N-10 18
SS-N-11 18
SS-NX-?, New Surface-to-Surface Missile 19
Cruise Missile Systems . 21
Major Surface Ship Systems 21
Submarine Systems 23
Patrol Craft Systems 25
Aircraft Systems ......... 26
Naval Role for the AS-3 Kangaroo 27
Current Force and Disposition ...... 28
Operational Employment of Cruise Missiles 33
Defense of the Sea Approaches . 33
Antiship Capabilities for Open-Ocean
Operations 33
Protection of Surface ASW Forces 35
Limitations ........... .
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Contents (continued)
Force of the Mid-Seventies
Summary . ...........
Table
Page
..... . 38
. 40
Soviet Naval Cruise Missile Force as of
1 July 1971 29
Illustrations
Estimated Characteristics of Operational Soviet
Air-to-Surface Cruise Missiles (diagrams and
performance data)
Estimated Characteristics of Operational Soviet
Naval Surface-to-Surface Cruise Missiles
(diagrams and performance data)
SS-N-2 Cruise Missile (photograph) 14
Major- Soviet Surface Ships With Cruise Missiles
(diagrams) ... .. . . . 00 ? p p ? ? a? . 20
Soviet Submarines With Cruise Missiles
(diagrams) 22
Soviet Patrol Craft With Cruise Missiles
(diagrams) . . . . ...... . . . 24
qU-16 Badger With AS-5 Kelt Missiles
(photograph) . ..... . ........ 26
SovieL Naval Cruise Missile Launcher Force,
USSR: Disposition of Naval Cruise Missile Plat-
forms and Launchers, Mid-1971 (map) 30
Cruise Missile Defense of Sea Approaches in
Soviet Exercise "Ocean," 15-28 April 1970 (map). 32
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The Soviet Navy's Choice: Cruise Missiles
In the early Fifties the Soviet Navy was tasked
to protect the coasts of the USSR and to support the
flanks of the army. The Navy seldom operated more
than a few hundred miles from the coastline. The
surface force lacked sufficient armament to operate
safely beyond land-based air cover in the face of
Western carrier-borne air power. The naval air arm
was composed mainly of land-based fighter aircraft
and light bombers with short range.
Only a few of the Soviets' 300 diesel-powered
submarines armed with torpedoes exercised beyond
home waters. These were available for the protection
of coastal areas and for interdiction of sea lanes
in wartime. Because these submarines were slow,
had limited submerged range, and had to penetrate
the aircraft carrier's large screening force before
they could launch torpedoes against it, their use-
fulness against the carrier was marginal.
In the mid-Fifties, the Soviet Navy, primarily
to counter the nuclear threat of the carrier, had
to extend its defense perimeters. The alternatives
were to construct aircraft carriers or to develop a
strike weapon of sufficient range. The Soviets chose
cruise missiles as their strike weapon.
Cruise missile technology had been acquired from
Germany after World War II, and the development and
production of cruise missiles did not require either
the research and development, the resource base, or
the lead time of six to eight years for aircraft
carriers. The Soviets had no experience in building
or operating carriers and were already committed to
a large and costly surface ship construction program
for coastal defense.
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The Soviets probably calculated that cruise
missiles offered several favorable characteristics
in addition to lower costs and shorter construction
lead times. Soviet training manuals claim that
missiles have an overall hit probability of from 60
to 90 percent, as compared with under 10 percent for
naval guns and 10 to 25 percent for torpedoes. One
direct hit with a high-explosive SS-N-2 Styx missile,
according to the manuals, can destroy a transport
or a destroyer-size warship. Three hits will destroy
a cruiser-size ship. If this textbook ratio is
continued, an estimated five to seven hits will destroy
an aircraft carrier, but one hit--in the hangar deck,
for instance--possibly could prevent the carrier
from launching its aircraft.
Also, cruise missiles are difficult to counter
because of their flight characteristics. Their
speed, ranging from slightly under Mach 1 for some
to as high as Mach 3 for other missiles, allows
defensive weapons little reaction time. Some missiles
in their final approach to a target fly at low altitudes
and present only a small radar return that may be
lost in surface clutter.
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Soviet Cruise Missiles
The Soviet Navy has deployed four major classes
of air-to-surface cruise missiles and seven main
classes of surface-to-surface cruise missiles. At
least two other missiles--one air-to-surface and one
surface-to-surface--are believed to be in the develop-
mental stage. This section includes brief descrip-
tions of these various classes of missiles.
On pages 8 and 9 are diagrams of the air-to-
surface missiles with their dimensions, performance
characteristics, and years they entered service.
These pages also include information on two other
ASMs which are operational only in Long Range Avia-
tion but which are believed capable of antiship
operations.
Similar data and illustrations for the surface-
to-surface missiles appear on pages 12 and 13.
Air-to-Surface Missiles
AS-1 Kennel
The AS-1 was the first antiship cruise missile
operational in the Soviet Navy, entering service in
1957. The missile design is based on the Soviet
MIG-15 Fagot jet fighter and has the same engine as
the YAK-23 Flora fighter. It has a range of about
55 nautical miles and a speed of about Mach 0.85.
The AS-1 is guided to its target by a beam-riding
method following a radar beam from the launching
aircraft. After launch, the missile is controlled
initially by an autopilot until it flies into and
begins to follow the radar beam from the launching
aircraft. The aircraft and missile are aligned with
the target until the missile is about ten miles from
the target. There the missile's nose-mounted radar
receiver picks up the launch aircraft's radar -ignals
reflected from the target, and uses these reflected
signals to home on the target.
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7717-H4c42.111
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Estimated Characteristics of Operational
Soviet Air-to-Surface Cruise Missiles
50'
AS-1 Kennel AS-2 Kipper
Year entered service
Carriers (number
of launchers)
Warhead type
and weight (lbs)
Guidance
1957 1960-1951
TU-16 Badger (2) TU-16 Badger (1)
HE 2200, HE or nuclear
2,200
gaucitnece radar
r ill)ormobianbgly
Beam rider with Autopilot with command
semiactive radar homing
Maximum speed Mach 0.85
Maximum range (nm) 55
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AS-3 Kangaroo*
1960-1961
TU-95 Bear (1)
Nuclear 5,000
Autopilot with command override,
possibly with active radar homing
in antiship role.
Mach 1.8
1968
TU-22 Blinder (1)
Nuclear 2200,
Autopilot with command
guidance and possible
active radar homing in
antiship role,
Mach 3.5
AS-5 Kelt
1965
TU-16 Badger (2)
HE or nuclear
1,100-2,200
Probably autopilot
with active radar
homing.
Mach 1.2
1970
TU-16 Badger (2)
HE or nuclear
1,100-2,200
Probably autopilot
with command guidance
and radar homing.
The AS-3 Kangaroo and AS-4 Kitchen are operational only in Long Range Aviation. Both
are believed capable of antiship operations and LRA Bears have simulated AS-3 launches
against ships in naval exercises.
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The AS-1 has been retired from operational ser-
vice probably because of limitations of the missile
which increased the vulnerability of the launching
aircraft to air defenses. Not only did the missile's
guidance system iequire the launching aircraft to
fly toward the ,arget during most of the missile's
flight time, but the TU-16 Badger aircraft had to
slow to about half its normal cruise speed and
descend to about 15,000 feet to launch the missile.
AS-2 Klpper
The Soviets first displayed the AS-2 air-to-sur-
face missile in 1961 at an air show in Moscow. The
AS-2 was an improvement over the AS-1 in that it did
not impose a vulnerable flight pattern on the launch
aircraft. The missile was controlled after launch
by a preprogramed autopilot. In addition, the missile's
own active homing radar did not require the launch
aircraft's radar to illuminate the target. The AS-2's
speed of Mach 1.6 and the range of 110 nm also
exceeded those of the AS-1 (the AS-2 has basically
the same engine as the Soviet MIG-19 Farmer fighter).
The principal drawback of the AS-2 design was that,
while the Badger aircraft could carry two AS-is, it
could carry only one AS-2.
The Soviets apparently are pleased with the AS-2/
Badger combination as there are no signs of either
being phased out even though the system now is ten
years old and newer air-to-surface missiles have
come into the force.
AS-5 Kelt
The AS-5 air-to-surface missile became operational
about 1965 and replaced the AS-1 in Soviet naval
aviation. The missile is probably guided in flight
by autopilot and active radar homing. The aircraft
probably can send flight path corrections to the
missile in flight.
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N
The AS-5 cruise speed is Mach 1.2 and its
maximum range is about 120 nm. Two AS-5 missiles
can be carried on the Badger.
AS-6
Soviet naval aviation's fourth air-to-surface
missile, the AS-6, became operational in 1970. The
speed of the AS-6 is estimated at Mach 3, which is
faster than all other Soviet naval air-to-surface
cruise missiles. Its maximum range is estimated to
be 300 nm, which is also better than its predecessors.
photography has shown that the missile is
rocket propelled,
Two AS-6 missiles can be
Badger.
carried on
the
AS-?, New Air-to-Surface Missile
Recent photography of the Ivankovskiy guided
missile plant shows that the Soviets are continuing
research on new air-to-surface missiles. It is
possible that a new missile\
will be for the new Back-
fire swing-wing aircraft after it becomes operational
(see page 27). On the other hand, it may be that
the AS-6, a modified AS-4, or a variant of these
supersonic missiles is planned for the Backfire.
Surface-to-Surface Missiles
SS-N-1 Scrubber
SS-N-1 Scrubber, the first surface-to-surface
cruise missile to be deployed by the Soviet Navy,
was first seen on a Kildin
class destroyer in 1958. The missile has a cruising
speed of Mach 0.7 and a maximum range of 130 nm.
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Estimated Characteristics of Oporatinnal Soviet Naval
Surface-to-Surface Cruise Missiles*
as,
20'
10'
Year entered
service
Carriers (number
of launchers)
Warhead type
and weight Obs)
SS-N-1 Scrubber
1958
Krupnyy (2),
Kildin (1)
HE or nuclear
500-2,000
Guidance Autopilot with active
SS-N-2a Styx SS-N-26 Styx SS-N-3a
SS-N-311 SS-N-3c
(folded-wing variant) Shaddock Shaddock Shaddock
1959 1964 1961 1962
Osa I (4),
Komar (2)
1960
Osa 1(4), Osa 11(4), 6-Il (8), J (4) Kynda (8) E-1 (6), E-Il (8),
Komar (2) submarines Kresta 1(4) W (1,2, or 4), J(4)
HE 1,100 HE 1,100
Autopilot with active
radar homing, radar homing.
Autopilot with active
radar horning, May
have infrared homing
backup.
Maximum speed Mach 0.7 Mach 0.9 Mach 0.9
Maximum
range (nm) 130 25 25 220
HE or nuclear
1,100-2,200
Autopilot with command
guidance and active radar
horning.
Mach 1.2 Mach 1.2
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Nuclear 2.200
Inertial with no
terminal homing ?
Mach 1.2
150 250
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SS-N-11
1969
Osa 1 (4)
Osa 11(4)
,
1
?
SS-N-7
1968
C (8) submarine
SS-N-9
1961
J(4) submarine,
Nanuchka (6)
SS-N-1U
1970
Kresta 11 (8),
Krivak (4)
Mach 1.0
30
Mach 1.4
150
Mach 1.2
45
Mach 1.2
25
n're tentative.
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The SS-N-1 is guided by a preset autopilot until
the missile's terminal homing radar controls the
missile in its final approach to the target.
The ships armed with the SS-N-1 carry an estimated
eight reloads per launcher, but the system has a slow
reload time which probably does not allow it to fire
more than four rounds each hour. The system also
is bulky, consisting of a large quonset-hut-like
launch housing, a deckhouse ready hangar, and an
underdeck magazine. This imposes a limit on the
other weapons and electronics the ships with SS-N-ls
can carry. Because of these inherent shortcomings,
the Soviets are slowly retiring the SS-N-1 missile
and converting its associated ships to other purposes.
SS-N-2 Styx
The Soviet Navy followed the SS-N-1 with the
SS-N-2, deployed on fast, relatively small patrol
craft (see photograph below). The SS-N-2 is a
comparatively short-range missile--25 nm maximum--
with a speed of about Mach 0.9.
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The missile patrol craft locates its target
visually or with surface search radar. The observed
data are fed into a computer for a fire control
solution, and the patrol craft heads directly toward
the target for about two minutes to stabilize the
free reference gyros in the missile before the missile
is launched. The SS-N-2 flies according to instruc-
tions preset in its autopilot until its radar begins
to direct the missile's flight.
The SS-N-2 is difficult to maneuver and must
have its launcher pointed at the target for launch
These limitations do not significantly degrade the
overall capabilities of the missile and its patrol
craft launcher. The SS-N-2 system is still widely
deployed in the Soviet Navy and has been exported
to several countries. The Soviets are slowly re-
placing their own SS--N-2s with a rocket-propelled
missile--the SS-N-11 (see page 18).
SS-N-3 Shaddock
The SS-N-3 Shaddock is the longest range surface-
launched cruise missile in the Soviet Navy. It has
a maximum range of 250 nm at a speed of Mach 1.2.
It is fired from a variety of ships and submarines
and is built in at least three major variants. The
SS-N-3 probably has the same turbojet engine as the
MIG-19 Farmer fighter.
When fired, the missile follows a flight path
determined by its preset autopilot.
guidance
The SS-N-3 has a homing radar for terminal
One
variant of the SS-N-3 may have inertial homing and
be designed for use against coastal targets.
The Shaddock is designed to hit targets at long
range beyond the horizon of the launcher.
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?
The SS-N-3 system may be limited by an inability
to fire effectively at close ranges. The missile's
trajectry and guidance system design are such that
the missile may have to travel at least 10 nm before
its homing radar can acquire a target.
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The SS-N-3 missile in midcourse flight is not
a difficult target for air defense. It flies at
an altitude and speed comparable to that of early
jet fighters and it lacks evasive maneuverability.
few
the
On a
snips SS-N-3s are possibly being replaced by
SS-N-9 (see below) or another missile.
SS-N-7
The SS-N-7 is the first operational submarine
cruise missile capable of being launched underwater
and perhaps requiring no external guidance.1
Less than 25 feet long, it has solid booster and
sustainer engines with possibly supersonic flight
speeds. It probably can be fired at targets at ranges
as short as 5 or as long as 30 nm. Target acquisition
and fire control data apparently ran be obtained
independently using the launching submarine's own
sonar in passive and active modes. A capability
may also exist to receive target data via underwater
communications from a surface ship or submarine
acting as a forward observer. A Soviet military
press article published in the summer of 1970
indicated that the cruise missile could be fired
in salvo.
Little is known about the guidance of the SS-N-7
missile. It probably is guided by a preprogramed
autopilot without the command override capability
common to many other Soviet cruise missiles. The
missile probably has a terminal homing radar or
it may be able to home on infrared radiation from
the target.
SS-N-9
The SS-N-9 missile was observed
in 1969. It apparently resembles the
SS-N-i Shaddock but is estimated to be superior to
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JnitallimilammrquirammTioir4
it. Its maximum range is not known but its size
and state-of-the-or-1- nnrr nn H h rhr oviet
antiship missiles I indicate
that the missile can fly beyond the radar horizon,
possibly to a distance of 150 nm at a maximum speed
of Mach 1.4. A forward target spotter is needed
if the missile is to be accurate beyond about 30 nm,
Little is known about the engines or guidance
of the SS-N-9. The missile may have a jet sustainer
engine and rocket boosters like those on the SS-N-3,
and it probably is guided by a preprogramed autopilot
that can be superseded by commands from the launch
ship.
SS-N-10
In 1970 a new cruise missile system, the SS-N-10,
appeared on a new cruiser, the Kresta II. The missile
itself has not been seen. Estimates of the size
and performance of the SS-N-10 are based on launcher
size, associated equipment, and Soviet practice.
Its size--about 25 feet long--suggests a similarity
to the SS-N-7 missile which in turn suggests that
the SS-N-10 is propelled by a two-stage solid-fueled
rocket engine.
the likely modes of target
acquisition and guidance for the missile may limit
the operational range to about 25 nm. It is most
likely guided by a preprogramed autopilot and a
missile-mounted radar for homing on the target. A
passive infrared seeking device may provide backup
homing guidance.
SS-N-11
The SS-N-11 is believed to be similar to the
SS-N-2 in size because both are launched from tubes
of about the same size. In place of the SS-N-2's
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liquid-fueled rocket sustainer engine, however, the
SS-N-11 is believed to have a solid-propellant
rocket sustainer engine. Little else is known of
the missile, but it is presumed to have improvements
in guidance and flight characteristics possibly
allowing the launching ship to launch while not head-
ing straight at the target. It may also have alter-
nate means of terminal homing--such as infrared--in
addition to active radar. The date of the missile's
initial operational capability is estimated to be
1969. More information will probably be forthcoming
if the Soviets begin deploying the missile outside
of the USSR and exporting it to other nations as they
have the SS-N-2.
SS-NX-?, New Surface-to-Surface Missile
Nothing is known about
the size, the warhead, the guidance speed, or maximum
distance capabilities of this missile. The similarity
of the missile tubes on the P class to those on the
C class submarine suggests that both may launch their
missile while submerged. The means used by the P
class to obtain target data for ranges of 100 nm or
more, however, are not known.
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.'!4 liirwar
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07-8.L.c,g,Ez
Cruise Missile Systems
Major Surface Ship Systems
The SS-N-1 was first deployed on the Kildin class
destroyers in 1958 and a year later it appeared on
the Krupnyy class. (Seepage 20 for diagrams of the
major surface combatants that carry cruise missiles.)
The Kildin class destroyers are modified Kotlin
class destroyers that have a single SS-N-1 launcher.
The Krupnyy class ships were designed to have two
SS-N-1 launchers. The large bulky missile installa-
tion on the Krupnyy and Kildin ships limited the
number of missions these ships could undertake. In
the past few years the SS-N-1 has begun to phase out
of service as several Krupnyys and Kildins have entered
a slow-paced reconversion program.
The long-range SS-N-3 Shaddock was placed on the
Kynda and Kresta I classes of cruisers as they entered
service in 1962 and 1967. The Kynda carries
eight launchers and the Kresta I has four.
Cruise missile systems for surface ships introduced
after the SS-N-3 have been comparatively small, allow-
ing even destroyer-type ships to carry a variety of
equipment for other than antiship tasks. For instance,
the relatively small Kresta II light cruiser--about
the size of a US destroyer at 6,800 tons full dis-
placement--is armed with eight SS-N-10 missiles, but
also carries two twin-rail surface-to-air missile
launchers, two twin-mounted 57mm guns, ten torpedo
tubes, two antisubmarine rocket launchers, a variety
of radar, sonar, and other electronic equipment, and
a helicopter.
The SS-N-10 may also be deployed on the new
Krivak destroyer, but the evidence is not conclusive.
Four missile tubes about the length of the SS-N-10's
launch tubes are located on the bow. The Krivak, in
contrast to the Kresta II, appears to rotate its
missile tubes and apparently has a different type of
surface-to-surface missile guidance radar. This may
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indicate that the cruise missile on the Krivak is not
the SS-N-10, but another cruise missile system.
A new Soviet warship now undergoing sea trials,
tentatively identified as the 44513 and resembling but
larger than the Krestas, may also be equipped with
eight SS-N-10 missiles. Its cruise missile launchers
resemble those of the KrestaII and are placed,on?the
main deck on each side of the bridge, as are the
Kresta's launchers.
The Soviets are attempting to increase the
operational capability of their cruise-missile-armed
surface combatants by using shipborne helicopters
equipped with Drambuie to provide information on tar-
gets beyond the line-of-sight horizon.
Submarine Systems
The first Soviet submarine cruise missile system
was a combination of the SS-N-3 and the W class sub-
marines. These submarines were modified to carry
one, two, or four launch tubes. In some cases, the
launch tubes were on the deck and in other cases
they were built in the sail. The first submarine
specifically constructed to carry cruise missiles was
the nuclear-powered E-I, with six missile tubes built
into the superstructure of the submarine. This pro-
gram was followed by the nuclear-powered 13-Il, with
eight missile tubes, and the diesel-powered J submarine,
with four missile tubes. All of these submarines
carried variants of the SS-N-3 missile. (See page 22
for diagrams of the submarines that carry cruise
missiles.)
Submarines carrying the SS-N-3 missiles must sur-
face before they can launch the missile. A surfaced
submarine is vulnerable to detection and attack, and
rough seas can prevent the missile launch. The Soviets
at times attempt to counter the submarine's vulnerability
while launching on the surface by keeping surface-to-
air missile ships in or near the submarine launch
areas.
The C class submarine, with eight SS-N-7 missiles,
is the first operational submarine that can launch
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Osa
(4 SS-N-2 or
SS-N-11 launcher)
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cruise missiles underwater. The submarine's sonar or
radio direction finder may provide sufficient target
location information for the missiles to eliminate
the need for a forward observer. The C class sub-
marine and its new missile system evidently are not
intended to replace the older SS-N-3 submarine systems.
These other systems are still being deployed--although
some arc being modified. Some of the older submarines
are receiving upgraded weapons systems, but they are
still limited to firing on the surface. There are
a few indications in photography that the diesel-
powered 0- class submarine is being modified to fire
the new SS-N-9 missile in place of the SS-N-3.
The P class submarine, a large nuclear-powered
cruise missile submarine that entered operational
service in 1971, has at least ten launch tubes for
cruise missiles. The submarine's missile tubes appear
similar in design but larger than the tubes for the
SS-N-7 on the C class. The P class submarine's
missile may be a long-range submerged-launch cruise
missile.
Patrol Craft Systems
The Soviet patrol craft force is made up of Osas,
Komars, and Nanuchkas. (See diagrams on page 24).
Osa patrol craft, first built in the late Fifties,
carry four SS-N-2 missiles. They are still being
produced and some now carry the improved SS-N-11
missiles. The small Komar missile boats which entered
service in 1960 carry two SS-N-2 missiles. The Komars
arc being phased out of the Soviet inventory probably
because of the difficulty in maintaining their wooden
hulls. The Nanuchka complements rather than replaces
the smaller Osa missile patrol boat. The new Nanuchka
cruise missile patrol craft carrying six SS-N-9 missiles
may he intended to provide additional defense in depth
of Soviet coasts.
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The Nanuchka can patrol the sea approaches to the
USSR out to a distance of about 500 nm. Its speed,
size, and endurance indicate that it is capable of
performing in enclosed seas like the Baltic, the Sea
of Okhotsk, or the Mediterranean. Although the Nanuchka
is not suited for sustained open-ocean operations,
its use in enclosed waters might release Soviet cruisers
and destroyers for employment in the open ocean.
Aircraft and ships based in the USSR and Egypt
can provide target information for firing beyond
about 30 nm.
Aircraft Systems
The naval air force deployed antiship guided
missiles in the late Fifties when the AS-1 Kennel
was installed on Bull and Badger bombers. The AS-1
was followed by the AS-2 in 1960-1961 and was replaced
in operational units by the AS-5 in the mid-Sixties.
The Badger (see photograph below) was the carrier air-
craft for these missiles.
111-16 Badger With AS-5 Kelt Missiles
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The recent introduction into naval aviation of the
AS-6 missile for the Badger indicates that the Soviet
Navy intends to retain its Badger ASM strike force
until at least the late Seventies despite the age of
the Badger aircraft. The last Badger was produced in
early 1959.
The Backfire swing-wing aircraft currently being
flight-tested could be operational in the Soviet Navy
by mid-1974. Its dash speed of about Mach 2 and
range with an ASM exceed the performance of the Badger
medium bomber (which has a maximum speed of 540 knots
and a range of 2,100 nm with two ASMs). There is no
evidence as to what air-to-surface missile the Backfire
will carry. If the Backfire carries a new missile and
not the AS-6, it may not enter operational service
with the Navy until 1975.
Naval Role for the AS-3 Kangaroo
The cruise missile system normally employed as a
strategic attack weapon with Long Range Aviation air-
craft has a secondary antiship role. LRA Bear air-
craft armed with the AS-3 have increased their partici-
pation in naval exercises during the past few years.
The Bears have simulated missile attacks against ship
formations far at sea. There are approximately 75
Bears in the LRA equipped to carry the AS-3. Exercise
activity by the Bears indicates that they launch the
Kangaroo against ships at ranges of less than 200 nm,
whereas the missile's maximum range against land tar-
gets may be as great as 350 nm.
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Current Force and Disposition
Launchers for ship and airborne cruise missiles
in the Soviet Navy have increased from about 100 in
1958 to about 1,460 in mid-1971. (Launchers are used
in this report to measure the size of the missile
force because information on refire capability for
the various platforms is lacking. Only a few ships--
the Kynda, Krupnyy, and Kilden classes--are known to
have a refire capability.)
The chart below shows the force levels from
mid-1958 to mid-1971. Platforms for these launchers
include 20 major surface ships, 275 aircraft, 160
coastal craft, and 66 submarines. The table on page 29
shows the cruise missile force at mid-1971 by type of
carrier and number of launchers.
Soviet Naval Cruise Missile Launcher Force, Midyear 1958-1971
1,500 ? Number of launchers
"
1.200
II9 nIsIto !J 9 on sta awnat,sts
In lilt USSR
flu oceauln g hl ire$
0
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
1968 1969 1970
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Soviet Naval Cruise Missile Force
As of 1 July 1971
Total
Number Type of number of
of units missile launchers
Submarines 66 404
E-I 2 SS-N-3 12
E-II 28 SS-N-3 224
C 7 SS-N-7 56
J 16 SS-N-3 64
P 1 SS-NX--? 10*
W conversions 12 SS-N-3 38
Major surface ships 20 82
Kresta I 4 SS-N-3 16
Kresta II 2 S5-N-10 16
Kynda 4 SS-N-3 32
Krupnyy 5 SS-N-1 10
Kildin 4 SS-N-1 4
Krivak 1 SS-N-10 4
Coastal Ships 160 586
Nanuchka 3 SS-N-9 18
Osa 127 SS-N-2/ 508
SS-N-11
Komar 30 SS-N-2 60
Aircraft** 275 385
TU-16 Badger 165 AS-2 165
TU-16 Badger 100 AS-5 200
TU-16 Badger 10 AS-6 20
Total 521 1,457
The P class submarine may carry 12 cruise missiles
rather than the 10 indicated here.
** The TU-22 Blinder with the AS-4 Kitchen and the
TU-95 Bear with the AS-3 Kangaroo are not included here
because they are only in Long Range Aviation. Both
systems are believed capable of antiship operations,
however, and LRA Bears have simulated such attacks
with the AS-3 in naval exercises.
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Baltic Sea Fleet
Platforms Launchers
18 Coaslal ships 174
45 Aircraft 65
2 Major surface ships 4
3 Suhmarines 12
Total 255
USSR: Disposition of Naval Cruise Missile
Platforms anti Launchers
Mid-1971
Northern Fleet
Platforms Launchers
22 Coastal ;hips 88
80 Aircraft 100
,4 Major shrine ships 20
35 Suhmarinee228
total 436
Black Se Sas Fleet
Platforms 'launchers
30 Coastal ships'', 104
65 Aircraft
7 Major surface ships 312.
5 Submarines 14
Totin 239
Pacific Fleet
Platforms launchers
60 Coastal ships 220
135'Aircrlt 130
Major; surf ace ship; 27
3 Submnrines 150
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:
Most of the cruise missile force has been oriented
primarily toward defense of sea approaches to the
eeasLs, but the ocean-going force is growing. Of the
approximately 1,460 cruise missile launchers, about
two-thirds are on coastal ships and medium-range air-
craft. The remaining one-third represents the force
of ocean-going launchers--about 400 on submarines and
80 on major surface ships.
The disposition of cruise missile platforms and
launchers by fleet as of mid-1971 is shown in the
illustration on page 30. Two-thirds of the cruise
missiles on naval platforms are based in the Northern
and Pacific fleets, where they have better access to
the open sea than in the Baltic and Black Sea fleets.
Only eight cruise missile submarines are based in the
Baltic and Black seas, where their exit could be
blocked.
The 160 missile-armed coastal patrol boats are
distributed unevenly among the fleets, the largest
concentration is in the Pacific Fleet apparently to
defend against possible naval air attack from the
seas of Japan and Okhotsk. Only 22 are in the Northern
Fleet, where open seas and harsh climatic conditions
restrict their use.
The 275 missile-armed aircraft are distributed
more evenly--ahout 30 percent are based in the Pacific
Fleet, 30 percent in the Northern Fleet, 25 percent
in the Black Sea Fleet, and the remaining 15 percent
in the Baltic Fleet. The dispatching of ten air-to-
surface missile configured Badger medium bombers to
Egypt in November 1971 provided the Soviets with a
new element of forward basing, enhancing their anti-
ship capabilities in the Mediterranean area.
About half of the missile-armed ocean-going war-
ships are home-based in the Baltic and Black seas
where repair and building yards and test ranges are
located. Ships home-based in these areas, however,
spend much of their time in the Mediterranean or in
operational areas where they are in a position, if
required, to counter Western fleets.
T : ,
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S
Cruise Missile Defense
of Sea Approaches in
Soviet Exercise "Ocean"
15-28 April 1970
1. 15th: Helicopter cruiser Leningrad, Sverdlov cruis.
er and three destroyers
leave Mediterranean to simulate aircraft carrier
task force.
2 Ten naval Bear I) aircraft reconnoiter North
Atlantic as far south as Gibraltar area.
3 17th: Two Bear Ds overfly northbound Leningrad
group.
4 18th: Intelligence trawler- takes rip shadowing po.
Si tion. Rear D over flights continue.
5 20th: Three Long Range Aviation) Bear bombers
overfly Leningrad gr oup, possibly acting as targets for
the ships' air defenses or simulating ASM launches.
6 21st Submarines shadow Leningrad ciFOUP.
8 24th: Some 115 aircraft leave Kola Peninsula ;n
waves to take part in missile strikes against approach-
ing naval forces.
9 25th: Leningrad and one destroyer join two Alli-
gator LSTs and destroyer from the Baltic. This group
continues north, simulating amphibious assault force.
10 26th: Another day marked by reconnaissance and
missile strikes,
7 23rd: Two Krestas arid three submarines simulate
cruise missile strikes against the group. Bear Ds sup-
port strikes. Missile strikes by Rodger aircraft follow.
11. 27th: Large group of destroyers and escorts with
three Polnocny LSMs joins northbound assault force, ,
12 Osa coastal patrol ships join missile-launching
defense. C class submarine possibly launches cruise
missiles from underwater.
13 28th: Amphibious assault force establishes beach-
head on Kola Peninsula
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Operational Empluyment of Cruise Missiles
Soviet cruise missiles play an important role in
defending the sea approaches to the USSR, countering
Western aircraft carriers and other surface ships,
and assisting Soviet antisubmarine warfare efforts.
Defense of the Sea Approaches
A naval surface force approaching the Soviet coast
to launch a strike would have to bypass or defeat
several echelons of Soviet naval forces armed with
cruise missiles. Bear aircraft and diesel and nuclear
cruise missile submarines form the first line of
defense, which extends south of the Azores in the
North Atlantic and into the Philippine Sea in the
Pacific. Large surface combatants and Badger air-
craft are employed closer to the USSR, but still far
outside Soviet coastal waters; they form the second
line of defense. Coastal patrol craft and diesel
submarines form the last line of defense in front of
shore-based installations. Cruise missiles are the
main armament for all of the defending forces.
Exercise "Ocean," the largest multifleet exercise
ever held by the Soviets, demonstrated how they intend
to use their naval cruise missile force to defend the
sea approaches to the USSR. The sequence of operations
in Exercise "Ocean" is portrayed in the illustration
on page 32. simulated cruise
were directed against one task group
simulating a carrier force attacking the Soviet Union.
Soviet strength in the defense of sea approaches lies
in the number and variety of cruise missiles that can
be brought to hear on an attacking naval force.
missile launches
Antiship Capabilities for Open-Ocean Operations
Cruise missiles provide the Soviets with an anti-
ship capability which they probably consider essential
to support their expanding naval presence in the open
seas. Most long-term deployments and large-scale
exercises include cruise missile ships or submarines.
Operational days at sea for submarines and major
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surface ships increased from 3,370 days in 1965 to
19,100 days in 1970. Concomitant with this increase
in open-ocean operations has been the 80-percent in-
crease in the number of cruise missile launchers on
Soviet ocean-going submarines and ships.
The increased deployment of cruise missiles in
distant operations has occurred primarily in the
Mediterranean Squadron, where the Soviets kept an
average of about 50 naval units deployed during the
first half of 1971. Ten to 12 were submarines?two
of these were cruise missile submarines--usually
J, or the newer C class. Some 15 to 20 were
surface combatants, usually including a missile cruiser
and six to eight destroyers, several of which were
missile destroyers. The cruiser and destroyer force
sometimes doubled in size during exercises, periods
of tension in the Middle East, or while forces were
being rotated in and out of the Mediterranean. The
remaining units were auxiliaries.
The Mediterranean Squadron ships frequently con-
duct exercises against each other and against NATO
ships, Occasionally, exercise targets are US carriers
of file Sixth Fleet which are trailed by Soviet ships
nearly all the time that they are in the eastern
Mediterranean. In February 1971, for example, an
exercise force consisting of a SAM-equipped Sverdlov
cruiser, a Kynda class cruiser, two Kashin destroyers,
a Kotlin destroyer, an unknown number of submarines
including a C class, and a few small combatants and
auxiliaries operated against the US aircraft carrier
Forrestal. The Forrestal cut short the exercise by
making a port call at Malta
similar Mediterranean
exercises have also reflected simulated air-to-surface
cruise missile attacks/
Missile-equipped TU-16 Badger
aircraft were deployed in early November 1971 to Aswan,
Egypt, where air-to-surface missile crates have been
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seen since the spring of 1970. The Soviet Navy prob-
ably will keep at least a squadron of about ten
missile-carrying TU-16 aircraft in Egypt.
Naval operations elsewhere, although they have
involved smaller forces than those in the Mediterranean,
frequently involve cruise missile forces. For example,
the Soviet naval visit to Cuba in May 1970 consisted
of a Kresta armed with cruise missiles, a surface-to-
air missile destroyer, a cruise missile nuclear sub-
marine, two torpedo attack submarines, a submarine
tender, and a naval supply ship. This naval force
could hit surface ships up to 220 nm away with cruise
missiles. The submarines or long-range Bear aircraft
from either the USSR or a deployment base in Cuba
could provide target information beyond the horizon
for the surface-to-surface missile firings. The
cruise missile submarines, patrolling at a distance
from the main formation, would extend the strike
range of the force. Some measure of protection from
air attack would be provided by the surface-to-air
missiles of the cruiser and destroyer.
Protection of: Surface ASW Forces
The Soviets are arming some antisubmarine ships
with cruise missiles to protect ASW task groups from
surface threats that could disrupt their operations
on the oven sea. This use of cruise-missile-equipped
forces will increase as the Soviets put more effort
into antisubmarine warfare against ballistic missile
submarines, one of their most pressing naval problems.
Exercise "Ocean" showed how the Soviets use ships
armed with cruise missiles to protect an ASW task
group. A major ASW portion of "Ocean" in the North
Atlantic took place in the Norwegian Sea and involved
an ASW task group of four Petya destroyer escorts
and two Riga destroyers led by a Kresta cruiser.
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Limitations
In addition to the disadvantages of the individual
cruise missile systems previously discussed, there
are other limitations in Soviet antiship capabilities.
For example, the in-depth defense of Soviet coasts
is complicated by the number of ships and aircraft
that the Soviets use to do the job. Under combat
conditions, the Soviets probably would experience
command and control difficulties in coordinating
the complex operations involved in the multiple-
echelon defense of coastal areas.
The Soviet chief of naval communications, Vice
Admiral G. G. Tolstolutskiy, in critiquing Exercise
"Ocean" (Novel Digest, November 1970), stated that the
reliability of operations was hindered by saturation
and disruption of communications. He noted "ineffi-
ciencies in the control of the forces" even in exer-
cise play where communications were not subject to
combat interference. The Soviets are working to
solve these problems mostly through improved means of
communications, additional exercises at sea, and im-
proved training for communications personnel.
A limitation applicable Lu all antiship capabilities
is the heavy reliance the Soviets place on the inter-
cept of electronic signals for ocean surveillance.
The Soviets are attempting to overcome this problem
by exercising against Soviet ships which simulate
enemy forces and use strict control of electronic
emissions.
Some Soviet cruise missile ships and submarines
of the ocean-going force lose effectiveness when
operating beyond the range of Soviet aircraft which
provide over-the-horizon support in targeting cruise
missiles. External targeting data are needed for the
normal operation of most of the ocean-going cruise
missile launchers.
Newer systems such as the 55-N-10 on the Kresta
II and the SS-N-7 on the C class submarine may be
capable of operating without outside assistance, but
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T
they represent only one-fifth of the ocean-going
force and their missile ranges are less than those
of the systems they are superseding and complementing.
The variety of cruise missile weapons deployed
complicates logistic support. At least seven different
surface-to-surface cruise missiles are operational
now. New weapons continue to be developed and intro-
duced, yet the Soviet Navy seems reluctant to phase
out the older systems. Soviet ships, because of their
size and the numerous weapons and electronics on board,
are believed to carry few spare parts and few weapons
for refire. The underway replenishment capability for
arms and equipment in the Soviet Navy is probably in-
adequate to compensate for the limited on-board
logistics capabilities of Soviet ships.
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Force of the Mid-Seventies
The number of cruise missile launchers on Soviet
ships, submarines, and aircraft is expected to increase
from the present level of about 1,460 to over 1,800 by
mid-1975.
Important changes in the composition of the force
will occur by mid-1975. Improved cruise missile
systems?those introduced since the mid-Sixties--such
as the SS-N-.7 for the C class submarine are being
deployed. These new systems comprised only about 5
percent of the total cruise missile launcher force in
mid-1971 but will probably make up about 50 percent
of the force by mid-1975.
At least two new cruise missile systems are expected
to come into service by the mid-Seventies. The P class
submarine has been in the Northern Fleet since the
spring of 1971, although its missile may not be
operational. Almost nothing is known about the missile
for the P class, but it may be capable of hitting
targets beyond the horizon, possibly after underwater
launch.
Another new missile expected in the mid-Seventies
is an air-to-surface missile for the Backfire swing-
wing aircraft. The missile for the Backfire could be
the AS-6, a modified AS-4, or the new missile which
has been identified under development
If the trends of the past decade are continued,
new missiles are likely to have enhanced target
acquisition capabilities and increased speed, and
to be smaller. The trend toward smaller missiles
is significant, as more missiles can be provided per
missile carrier, thereby lessening logistic problems.
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}
The cruise missile force in 1975 almost certainly
will engage in an increasing number of long-range
ocean-going operations, giving slightly less emphasis
to defense of the sea approaches to the USSR. The
ocean-going submarines and major surface ships will
account for nearly all the numerical increase in
the launcher force while coastal ships and aircraft
are not expected to change significantly in number.
The total number of submarine cruise missile launchers
will probably increase from about 400 to about 550,
and the :lumber of launchers on major surface ships
will Lriple--from about 80 to some 240.
In mid-1975, a little over half of the Navy's
cruise missiles will be on coastal ships or medium-
range aircraft, about one-third on submarines,
and the remainder on major surface ships. The
proportional distribution of missiles and carriers
by fleet will probably not change significantly be-
cause their allocation appears to be based on fleet
missions, which show no signs of changing before 1975.
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Summary
The cruise missile has played a primary role in the
expansion of the missions and operations of the Soviet
Navy. In the early Fifties, the Soviet Navy was
organized to protect the coasts of the USSR and to
support the flanks of the Soviet army. By using the
cruise missile the Navy has extended its defense
perimeters to counter the Western carrier threat. In
contrast to the early Sixties, Soviet warships now
operate regularly far from the USSR's coasts.
Soviet naval cruise missiles have proved to be an
accurate means of delivering large warheads at greater
ranges than traditional naval guns. Only a few hits
by conventionally armed cruise missiles would be need-
ed to sink or put a large warship out of action. In
recent years, the Soviets have traded pff long range
in some cruise missile designs for improved tactical
characteristics such as submerged-launch capability
for missiles on submarines, high-speed flight for
air-to-surface missiles, and improvements in missile
maneuverability or guidance.
Cruise missiles are integrally related to many of
the missions and tactics of the Soviet Navy. Exercises
for defense of the homeland illustrate annually the
Soviet Navy's dependence on cruise missiles. These
exercises show that a naval force approaching the
USSR's coasts to launch a strike would have to bypass
or defeat several echelons of Soviet naval forces
armed with cruise missiles. Included in this echeloned
defense are long-range aircraft, nuclear submarines,
cruisers, destroyers, diesel submarines, and patrol
craft.
The Soviets probably consider their cruise missiles
Lo be an essential part of their expanding naval
presence in the open seas. For example, they usually
have in the Mediterranean a fleet of about 50 ships
with about 10 to 12 submarines and 15 to 20 surface
warships--including 1 to 3 cruise missile submarines,
1 missile cruiser, and 2 or 3 missile destroyers--
which exercise against each other and at times simulate
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attacks on NATO forces. These operations generally
involve mock cruise missile strikes.
Cruise missiles will also protect ASW forces at
sea as indicated by the Soviet Navy's construction
programs and exercises. Ships armed with cruise
missiles have been taking part in Soviet naval
operations to develop tactics and strategy to be
employed against submarines. The role of the missile-
armed ships has been to act as command posts and to
protect the ASW forces from the interference of
other surface naval forces.
As the principal means of naval attack, Soviet
cruise missiles have their shortcomings, however.
For instance, most cruise missile submarines have
to surface before they can fire their missiles.
Command and control processes would present difficulties
in coordinating the complex operations involved in
multiechelon defense of the coast. Also, Soviet
dependence on electronic intercept and direction find-
ings for reconnaissance is a disadvantage in the face
of opposing forces observing strict control of
elecLronic emissions.
To date, the Soviet Navy has deployed at least
seven classes--excluding variants--of surface-to-
surface cruise missiles for submarines, patrol craft,
and large surface ships. Those missiles which appeared
in the late Fifties and early Sixties were designed
around two basic concepts. They were either for long-
range strike, so that the seagoing launch ship could
launch a strike from outside the target's defenses;
or for short-range strike from fast, maneuverable
patrol craft. The new missiles deployed in the past
few years have improved on these concepts by adding
an over-the-horizon range to missiles on patrol craft
and by giving greater tactical flexibility to the sea-
going ships equipped with such missiles.
The four types of air-to-surface cruise missiles
that have been deployed in Soviet naval aviation are
all carried by the TU-16 Badger aircraft. An important
increase in strike capability is being realized by
the deployment of the new AS-6 missile. The AS-6 has
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a top speed of Mach 3, which is about twice as fast
as earlier naval air-to-surface missiles, and has a
maximum range of 300 nm, which is more than double
that of its hest predecessor. Further increases in
strike capabilities may be forthcoming in the mid-
Seventies with the possible introduction of the swing-
wing Backfire.
The Soviet ilaval cruise missile force has been
oriented predominantly toward the defense of the sea
approaches to coasts, but the ocean-going force is
growing. Cruise missiles are distributed among the
fleets in accordance with the main tasks of the in-
dividual fleets. Most of the cruise missile force is
located in the Northern and Pacific fleets to assure
better access to the open seas. Coastal patrol
missile boats are deployed in accord with possible
enemy attack routes. The Black Sea Fleet provides
most of the surface ships used for Mediterranean
deployments.
In addition, construction programs under way
indicate that the use of cruise missiles on anti-
submarine warfare ships to protect ASW task groups
will increase.
The composition of the cruise missile force by
mid-1975 probably will change significantly. By mid-
1975, missiles introduced since 1965 will probably
make up about 50 percent of the force compared with
about 5 percent in mid-1971. Missile launchers on
the ocean-going force of major surface ships and sub-
marines probably will increase from about 500 in mid-
1971 to about 800 by mid-1975.
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