WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: COMBAT ACTIONS BY NAVAL FORCES IN THE PROCESS OF ACHIEVING SUPREMACY AT SEA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: CIA Analysis of the Soviet Navy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005508939
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: June 19, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2017
• Case Number: SC-2007-00006
• Publication Date: February 15, 1979

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
15 February 197
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FRCP, : John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: Combat Actions by
Naval Forces in the Process of Achieving
Supremacy at Sea
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on articles from a SECRET Soviet
publication called Information Collection of the Head9uarters and the
Technical Committee of the COMbined Armed Forces. This article is an
overview oT the basic factors invoivenn attainin s ?remac at sea in an
enc ose naval theater with t e en _purpose 0 supporting the coastal
Tlanks of ground forces in the capture of straits zones. The various
asi---7e7ar7fcc--51-321--------digactivelyan passively with the mine threat are
presented. Mention is made of the need for air supremacy, support for
amphibious operatims, and blockade actions. This journal is published by
Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw
Pact officers. This article appeared in Issue No. 12, which was published
in 1976.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For ease of reference, nnrts from this publication have been
assigned the Codeword
6
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Weapons Intelligence
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COUNTRY USSR/WARSAW PACT
DATE OF
INFO. 1976
SOURCE
THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT DE REPRODUCED
Intelligence Information Special Report
Page 3 of 9 Pages
SUBJECT
DATE
15 February 1979
WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: Combat Actions by Naval Forces in the Process
of Achieving Supremacy at Sea
Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article from
a SECRET Soviet publication called Information Collection of the
Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces.
'this journal is published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, anTit
consists of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article Was written by
Commander T. Mandat. This article is an overview of the basic factors
involved in attaining supremacy at sea in an enclosed naval theater with
the end purpose of supporting the coastal flanks of ground forces in the
capture of straits zones. The various aspects of coping actively and
passively with the mine threat are presented. Mention is made of the need
for air supremacy, support for amphibious operations, and blockade actions.
Discussing the combat for supremacy at sea, it touches upon the
organization for combat, combat methods, reconnaissance requirements and
tasks, coordination, and control. This article appeared in Issue NO. 12,
which was published in 1976.
Comment:
End of Summary
Commander Tadeusz Mandat is Deputy Chief of Staff of the Polish Navy.
The names of authors are given in Russian transliteration.
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Combat Actions by Naval Forces in the Process
of Achieving Supremacy at Sea
by
Commander T. MANDAT
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Navy
of the Polish People's Republic
Under modern conditions combat actions at sea may be characterized by
extensive scope and the massive employment of multiple-arm forces, an
increase in the depth of mutual actions, the massed employment of nuclear
weapons, and also a significant growth in the number of support forces and
means.
The achievement and retention of supremacy at sea has acquired special
significance. The accomplishment of this task will be predetermined
largely by the effectiveness of the combat activities of the naval forces.
The basic factors determining the attainment of superiority over the
enemy and the achievement of supremacy at sea, in our view, are associated
with: the ability to forestall enemy actions, exploiting the element of
surprise; the establishment of qualitative and quantitative superiority; ?
the achievement of air supremacy; the attainment of a higher degree of
combat readiness by [our] forces, and of a superior morale and political
level by [our] personnel; and also the better preparation [by us] of the
theater of military operations.
Success in combat actions within an enclosed naval theater can be
ensured through the active and systematic utilization of multiple-arm
forces for the purpose of destroying the enemy in specific regions and of
preventing (or impeding) him from
from without. It is impossible to attain the ultimate goal -- the
achievem-? 1. :411. a -- b a sin e. To achieve this
requires combat activities of the navy within the framework of one or
several operations.
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It should be noted that the achievement of supremacy in an enclosed
naval th no - ? r. ose-lIFITIMI---=1:17IS an essential stage in
a ieving the purpose of the operation. The accomplishment of this task
enables naval forces to establish favorable conditions for the effective
support of the coastal flank of the ground forces.
Of great importance (in addition to the problem of air supremacy) are
blockade actions, which include not only the isolation of specific
groupings of enemy forces, but primarily aggressive combat against them so
as to simultaneously rule out the possibility of having them penetrate
deeply into our operational zone and also prevent the shifting of enemy
forces from adjacent sea areas.
The course of blockade actions in a straits zone will depend on the
general situation in the theater of military operations, foremost on the
balance of forces of the sides, and likewise on the nature of the
operations being conducted by the front troops.
Attention should be focused on the important matter of mine threat..
Bearing in mind the technical sophistication of modern mines and their high
combat resistance to minesweeping, one can draw the conclusion that the
most effective method of combatina_mines will be to prevent their_laving.
Thus, while still at peace, those enemy ships capable of transporting and
laying mines of various types as well as the depots for mine armaments must
be the object of constant interest for reconnaissance forces, and from the
instant war breaks out -- one of the chief targets for the actions of 0,g3:
strike forces. No lets important is the creation of-a reliable system for
antimine surveillance and for the constant monitoring and adjustment of the
physical fields of ships and vessels, and likewise the correct choice of
their courses and speeds on sea crossings.
Our navy must use mine weaponry in a manner that will not limit the
maneuvering capability of our forces. Bearing in mind that the blockading
of straits is, as a rule, terminated by actions to capture them, mines must
be laid with self-destruction devices.
It should be emphasized that the accomplishment of the tasks related
to the achievement of supremacy at sea demands the closest cooperation
between the forres of thenavy and thq_ground forces. During this
operation, the allied fleets will be charged with ?ffe embarkation, sea
lift, and debarkation of landing force troops while fully providing
antimine and antisubmarine defenses, and also with covering the landing
force detachments against attacks by enemy naval forces; with participation
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in the air defense, the neutralization of the enemy's antilanding defense,
and the fire support for the landing force troops operating on shore.
Subsequently, the naval forces will provide the shipment of military cargo/
to supply the ground forces engaged in actions on the islands and shores /
adjacent to these straits.
The navy's main tasks in the battles for the achievement of supremacy
at sea involve the following: the destruction or significant weakening of
the enemy strike groupings, the disruption of their rear and
disorganization of their system of bases and supply system, and also the
curtailment of the enemy's opportunities to receive support from adjacent
sea areas.
These tasks can be fulfilled under conditions of the employment of
both nuclear weapons as well as conventional weapons. It is unnecessary to
emphasize that nuclear weapons can have a radical effect in modifying the
situation and changing the balance of forces. This being the case, the
matter of delivering preemptive nuclear strikes on the enemy's most
vulnerable installations, in order to eliminate his nuclear potential,
assumes exceptional significance.
Combat actions by naval forces directed toward the achievement of
supremacy at sea require further study in the light of the experience of
combined exercises.
Let us state our viewpoint on this matter. It appears advisable to us
to establish three operational groupings whose function is to fight for the
achievement of supremacy at sea and the capture of straits zones:
-- first grouping -- for actions on adjoining open seas, made up
mainly of missile-delivery aircraft and submarines. Its tasks would be the
disruption of sea lanes, blockade. actions, and the destruction of the
enemy's naval forces in these water areas;
-- second grouping -- for combat actions within the enclosed
naval theater. This grouping could be made up of large and small missile
boats, submarines, bomber and ground attack aircraft, and also coastal
missile forces. In specific circumstances it could operate onteveral
axes;
-- third zrouping -- for supporting blockade actions, made up
primarily of missile, torpedoland mine forces, and also almisl
forces.
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Supremacy at sea can be achieved as a result of the first operation
alone. The preparation for it must be carried out quickly and secretly.
Depending on the situation the enemy's naval groupings can be
destroyed as they are being radar tracked (the instant war begins); by
strikes guided by reconnaissance forces; and by strikes preceded by
independent search or surprise rapid strikes (raids) on ports, bases, or
selected coastal areas. The last method can be successful only if we
possess detailed data on the targets planned to be struck, which makes it
necessary to study them comprehtnsively utile still at peace.
The organization of the system for obtaining full and reliable
information on the enemy affects greatly the result of combat actions.
Therefore reconnaissance, which includes organizational and technical
measures, and also the aggressive actions of specialized forces and means,
must be characterized by precisely channeled application (in keeping with
the specific tasks of the navy) and continuity and secrecy of actions.
The main tasks of reconnaissance during the struggle for supremacy at
sea should involve: the collection and collation of data on the situation
throughout the entire water area; the detection, classification, and
surveillance of the enemy's groupings, including those forces and means of
his considered to be the maig_tlEgets of action by our forces (ship strike
S minela ers landin craft the antilandin: defense s
c. ewise the
gro
de ensive mine ields the s ste
survei
?
channels e
an
ance o those enemy forces which constitute a threat to our fleet
(delivery means for nuclear weapons, missiles, and mines); the ascertaining
of the system used to prepare the theater; and also the acquisition of data
on the actions of those of our forces with whom communications have been
temporarily lost.
The successful fulfillment of these tasks can be achieved only by an
integrated system of reconnaissance. The organic units of this system will
be the specialized subsystems for antimine surveillance, reconnaissance of
the surface, air underwater, and shore situation; observation of nuclear
bursts, and the_like -- which will be equipped with the most modern and
highly automated means.
Meriting special attention is the organization of cooperation, that is
to say, the coordination of efforts as to place and time, and also
regarding specific enemy targets, since it enables us to more effectively
exploit the combat qualities of our fleets. This cooperation must ensure a
full synchronization of the actions of our forces on the main axis or
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against the main enemy targets with the undertakings on the secondary or
diversionary axes. The correct organization of cooperation is especially
important under conditions of the employment of nuclear weapons. Only
effectively organized communications, complete knowledge of the situation
in the theater of military operations, as well as firm and consistent
leadership (control) and skillful foreseeing of the changing situation can
provide the necessary continuity and reliablity of control, and the
capability of rapidly restoring the combat effectiveness of our forces even
under the most unfavorable conditions.
During the combat actions the situation in a theater of military
operations will undergo fast-moving changes. This will necessitate rapid
correction of previously adopted decisions, which is possible only when the
systems of control are functioning reliably. Moreover, the successful
employment of the forces and means of the allied fleets in the struggle for
supremacy in an enclosed naval theater is possible, in our view, only if we
have a centralized and reliably operating system of control. Within the
framework of such a centralized system, the individual fleets and the
operational-tactical large units (flotillas, bases) must have smoothly
functioning subsystems of control which allow the individual commanders
some freedom in choosing the method to accomplish the assigned tasks and
make it possible for them to react rapidly to sudden changes in the
situation.
In our view, the overall system of control for the forces of a planned
operation must include a primary system composed of fixed command posts for
the fleets and operational-tactical large units (flotillas, bases), an
alternate system consisting of alternate (mobile) command posts for the
fleets and operational-tactical large units, and also a zonal system, which
would function in the operational zones of the individual fleets.
It is not necessary to emphasize that the matter of the functioning of
such a system will to a significant degree depend on its advance
preparation and peacetime development. Therefore, during all exercises in
which multiple-arm coalition forces participate and while they fulfil other
tasks, it is essential to constantly improve the control system's
organizational structure and the methods of command under the different
situational conditions.
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