IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005479946
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2011
• Case Number: F-2009-01706
• Publication Date: September 1, 2002

APPROVED FOR
RELEASEL DATE:
25-Jan-2011
Iraq's Weapons of Mass
Destruction Programs
September 2002
 Summary
Iraq-which has the expertise, facilities, and equipment to expand its WMD
arsenal-is working to reconstitute prohibited WMD programs.
? Since December 1998, Baghdad has refused to allow UN inspectors into Iraq as
required by UN Security Council resolutions; in the absence of such inspections,
Iraq's ability to work on prohibited programs without risk of discovery has increased.
? Iraq has stockpiles of CW and BW agents and munitions and is rebuilding its dual-use
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agents quickly. Additionally, Iraq is aggressively pursuing delivery platforms-
including UAVs-for chemical and biological agents.
? Iraq is developing a ballistic missile capability that exceeds the UN imposed 150-km
range limitation and probably retains a small force of prohibited Scud-variant missiles
and launchers and is developing two short-range ballistic missile systems that could
violate UN-imposed range restrictions. Currently, all of these Iraqi weapons could
have warheads that deliver chemical or biological agents. Iraq admitted filling some
of its Scud warheads with either chemical or biological agents in 1991.
? Iraq still has much of the. infrastructure needed to pursue its goal of building a nuclear
weapon, although it is unlikely to produce indigenously enough weapons-grade
material for a deliverable nuclear weapon until the last half this decade. Baghdad
could shorten the acquisition timeline significantly if it were able to procure fissile
material abroad. Baghdad could have procured nuclear weapons related materials and
equipment without detection.
? Iraq has been able to import dual-use, WMD-related equipment and material through
procurements both within and outside the UN sanctions regime. Baghdad diverts
some of the $10 billion worth of goods now entering Iraq every year for humanitarian
needs to support the military and WMD programs.
 Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs
In April 1991, the UN Security Council enacted Resolution 687 requiring Iraq to declare,
destroy, or render harmless its weapons- of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal and
production infrastructure, under UN or International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
supervision. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 also demanded that Iraq
forgo the future development or acquisition of WMD.
Baghdad's determination to hold onto a sizeable remnant of its arsenal, agents,
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inspections. Elite Iraqi security services orchestrated an extensive concealment and
deception campaign to hide incriminating documents and material that precluded
resolution of key issues in each WMD category: Iraq's missile, chemical warfare (CW),
biological warfare (BW), and nuclear programs.
? Iraqi obstructions prompted the Security Council to pass several subsequent
resolutions demanding that Baghdad comply with its obligations to cooperate with the
inspection process and to provide United Nations Special Commission -(tJNSCOM)
and IAEA officials immediate and unrestricted access to any site they wished to
inspect.
? While outwardly maintaining the facade of cooperation, Iraqi officials frequently
denied or substantially delayed access to facilities, personnel, and documents in an
effort to conceal critical information about their WMD programs.
Successive Iraqi declarations on Baghdad's pre-Gulf war WMD programs gradually
became more accurate between 1991 and 1998 but only because of sustained pressure
from UN sanctions, coalition military force, and vigorous and robust inspections
facilitated by information from cooperative countries. Nevertheless, Iraq never has
fully accounted for major gaps and inconsistencies in its declarations and has
provided no credible proof that it has completely destroyed its weapons stockpiles
and production infrastructure.
? Despite the destruction of most of its prohibited ballistic missiles and some Gulf war-
era chemical and biological munitions, Iraq probably still has a small force of Scud-
variant missiles, chemical precursors, biological seed stock, and thousands of
munitions suitable for chemical and biological agents.
? Iraq has managed to preserve and in some cases even enhance the infrastructure and
expertise necessary for WMD production and has used that capability to maintain a
stockpile and possibly to increase its size and sophistication.
Since December 1998, Baghdad has refused to allow United Nations inspectors into Iraq
as required by the Security Council resolutions. Technical monitoring systems installed
 UN Security Council Resolutions and Provisions for Inspections
and Monitoring: Theory and Practice
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