GEORGIA: INDEPENDENCE DRIVE ACCELERATING

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005424739
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2010
• Case Number: F-2009-00834
• Publication Date: April 24, 1990

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
24 Apri11990
GEORGL~: INDEPENDENCE DRIVE ACCELERATING
Summary
Last April's brutal dispersal of Georgia demonstrators by Soviet military and
security forces prompted Georgian nation rst leaders to step up the pursuit of the
republic's independence, lost in 1921. Differences, though, exist between those who
favor a tough approach to Moscow and demand indeperulence quickly, and others who
favor a more moderate, gradualist approach While the Lithuanian events will
underscore each group's detemtination that its approach is correct, independence
pressures at the moment seem to be bolstering a more radical approach. Meanwhile, a
number of republic minorities, feeling oppressed by the Georgians, oppose Georgian
independence, and conriderab a violence rs likely to enapt periodically. Moscow wd[
attempt to avoid military intervention in the republic's civil con~licts, but will like! take
an increasingly tough line in response to republic steps toward tndependence.
Comments ana uesuons azc welCOme ana may ce auectea to
APPROVED FOR RELEASEDDATE:
29-Mar-2010
 Growth QElJationalism -
For Georgians, the killing of 20 Georgian demonstrators in Tbilisi by Soviet troops
on 9 April 1989 was a turning point in the recent history of their nation and the spark forma
meteoric growth of modern Georgian nationalism and the drive for independence.
Georgion political opinion became more radical throughout 1989, but Western
travelers and Soviet domestic press reports both indicate that since about January of this
year, a qualitative shift toward greater anti-Soviet feeling among Georgians has occurred.
Demonstrators have destroyed and defaced statues of I.emn and vandalized other symbols
of Soviet power such as hammer and sickle reliefs on buildings and monuments marking
Soviet-Georgian friendship. Demonstrations of varying size take place in Tbilisi each
Friday evening at 6:00 with leaders from various nationalist groups advocating everything
from secession to stronger environmental laws. During the 9 April anniversary about
10,000 demonstrators marched on a military head4uarters outside of "Tbilisi, hurlin nti~
Soviet and anti-military slogans and burning a Soviet military commander in effigy.
The nationalists have had a significant impact on the cultural and educational
policies in the reppublic. Georgian nationalist and orthodox church flags now fly from
nearly all the buildings in the republic's capital. Anew language law makes Georgian the
republic's primary language; and whereas previously Georgians and minority groups in the
republic used Russian as the lingua franca, all schools now are moving toward using
Georgian as the language of instmction. Press reports indicate that all republic schools are
also now teaching Cieorgtan history, and some are seeking to replace the history of the
CPSU with Georgian courses. There have also been proposals to replace Communist
ideology classes with Georgion Orthodox religious ins sch ols are currently
offering religious training, but it is not yet mandatory.
T'he Georgian orthodox religion is an important source of inspiration for Georgian
nationalism; during [he April demonstrations last year the Geor ion atriarch was one of
the s Bakers. Since then, religion has grows in sigmficance.
young people are very involved in the church an reporting to [cafes t tat even
ommumst Party officials attend services. Georgians appear to be returning to the church
for two reasons--it is now possible to openly parncipate m religious activities without fear
of repercussion and it is a uniquely powerful way for Georgians to express their ethnic
identity.
Independence Drive
Over the past year the Georgian Supreme Soviet has passed several resolutions
which pttt Geor~a In the forefront of the fight for sovereignty by a number of union
republics. In March the republic Supreme Soviet declared the Soviet annexation of the
republic in 1921 illegal and asked Moscow to begin negotiations with them on
independence. Other recently assed resolutions illustrate the determined nature of
Georgia's independence drive.~~
 ~yereie~ Law. At the time of its passage, the Georgian sovereignty law went
beyond those of anycof the other republics which had passed such laws--tire three Baltic
republics and Azerbaijan. Not only does it state that the power of republic laws supersedes
the power of USSR laws, it also states that a Supreme Soviet action to declare a republic
a~unconsiittrtior{al will result in an im.~rtediate declaration of independence by Georgia.
Economic Autonomy. The Georgion Supreme Soviet has passed an economic
autonomy law which gives the republic the sole right to determine which goods are
exported from Georgta. This would allow the republic to take care of its own people first
and then send excess food products and consumer goods to other places in the SU
Union, or, if republic officrals choose, to export those goods outside the country.
Secession Referendum. The Georgian Supreme Soviet was one of the first to pass a
resolution providing in principle for anon-binding public referend e soon of
secession. No date has been set, however, for such a referendum.
Abolition of ti le VI. Most recently the republic Supreme Soviet, under pressure
from nationalist groups, has abolished Article VI of the Georgion republic constitution
which, like the same article in the U5SR constitution, ensured the supremacy of the
Communist Parry, and postponed republic Supreme Soviet elections until October or
Novemb r 'n rd r t rve the republtc's nascent parties time to organize for amulti-party
election.
Several other measures before the republic Supreme Soviet, if passed, would put
still more distance between Georgia and Moscow--for example, the formation of a republic
Ministry of Defense and strengthened trade ties to the West. The Georgian Communist
Party moreover is like) to vote to break away from Moscow at its congress beginning 15
May.
In addition, several Georgian institutions have already voted to secede from All-
ilnion groups. For example, the Georgian Union of Writers is no longer a member of the
USSR Writer's Union. Even the republic soccer team has decided it will compete
internationally as a Georgian team rather than as a part of the Soviet Union's soccer
association, though the international soccer association has rejected Georgia's proposal for
this. Most recently, party and Komsomol cells in local universities have disbanded.
Nationalist Grouns
Georgtan nationalist groups have become increasingly influential since last April,
despite infighting and differing opinions on the speed with whtch Georgia should seek
independence and what type of government should succeed the present one. The death
last fall of the father of the Georgtan Nationalist Independence Movement, Merab
Kostava, has left a leadership void, however; Kostava was able to navigate somewhat
successfully the minefield of nationalist political opinion and even brought differing groups
together in an umbrella organization. Today, however, one needs a score card to keep
track of the over 120 groups that coinpetc for public support. Three groups predominate.
Two, the Georgian Popular Front and the Rustaveli Society, are moderate, willing to work
within the existing system. The third, the National Democratic Party. is radical in outlook,
 A[ present, the ~oreian Popular Front is the most well-organized non-official
group to run candidates for this fall's Supreme Soviet elections. Its leaders, many of whom
are mrddle aged Communist Party members, advocate working within the system for more
autonomy, while seeking independence within the next five years. The grou advocates
strong ties to the United States in order to help the republic's economy. Its leaders claim
that it is the most powerful informal group in [he republic, and its seetmngly close
relationship with the republic Supreme Sovtet supports this view. We are not cer
great its popular support is, but the group's leaders claim over 100,000 members.
The Rustaveli Socierv is similar to the Front but considers itself a political group
rather than a party. It seeks independence within the next two to three years. Rustaveli
leaders claim their group is the largest in the republic with over 350,000 members, Most of
its members are Georgians, but the group is tryrng to encourage other ethnic groups to join.
Rustav li'sl~ad much of its membership are made up of literary and cultural
figures.
The National Democratic Par has refused to work within the existing Soviet
system, advocates immediate secession from the Soviet Union, and successfully pressed to
postpone elections originally scheduled for the end of March. This group recently
parnctpated in a republic conference of radical groups which declared the republic
government illegal, advocated the election of a shadow government, and branded as
traitors all candidates in the elections scheduled for March. The group's tactics include
hunger sir ainst republic and Soviet leaders. Its leaders are prominent
and vocal.
The NDP is currently spearheading a drive to collect signatures of those who are
willing to give up their Soviet citizenship. NDP leaders state that they currently have over
30,000 signatures, and claim that if half of the republic population of 5.2 million were to
sign, Georgia would automatically be independent. Again, we cannot gauge the amount of
popular support that the NDP and other radical groups enjoy (their claim of 30,000
signatures, for instance, may not be accurate), but their main support seems to be among
the youth and at the recent 9 A ril demonstrations in Tbilisi radical nationalists appeared
to have the spotlight.~~
Factors Com licating the Path to Independence
Georgia's mishandling of its own restive sub-republic minorities has sparked
interethnic violence in the republic and may prove to be an important stumbling block to a
smoother transition to independence, While Georgian culture is being increasingly ,
emphasized, the culture of Georgia's many minority ethnic groups is being suppressed,
prompting concern among the republic's minorities that they are being systematically
"georg~amzed." Republic officials, showing no patience with minorities' demands, have
steadfastly refused all requests for increased levels of autonomy and have been
unresponsive to minority concerns on linguistic and other cultural issues.0
The two groups whose response to Georgian chauvinism has been strongest are the
Abkhaz and the Osseuans; clashes between these groups and Georgians resulted in deaths
on both sides. Abkhazian5 wish to see their autonomous republic raised to the status of
union republic, or at-the very least be separated from Georgia and 1'oined to the Russian
Republic. Georgians, however, declare that Abkhazia belongs to the Georgions, not the
Abkhaz (who constitute only 17 percent of the region's population), and refuse to even
 consider its separation. Bloody clashes broke out between the two sides in April 1989 and
again in July. The Ossetians have demanded that the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast
be united with the North Ossetian Autonomous Republic, where two-thirds of Ossetians
live and which is a part of the Russian Republic. Violence entpted there in November
1989 and several times since; Georgians and Ossetians are currently being kept apart by
MVD troops. Recently, a Georgian nationalist leader declared to a US audience that if he
Ossetians persist in their calls for secession, there will be more bloodshed.
Georgia's other minority nationalities have also been active, though not as violent.
Azeris, who form majorities in three districts of southeastern Georgia, staged violent
demonstrations last summer calling for more autonomy. Russians, concerned by the falling
status of the Russian language and an increase in anti-Russian sentiment, have formed an
"interfront" in Georgia similar to those organized by the Russian minorities in Moldavia
and the Baltic. Meskhetian Turks, deported from Georgia in 1944, have increased efforts
to return after recent violence against them in Central Asia; Georgians have refused to
accept them. There also have been scattered calls for separation from Georgia by
Armenians and Adzhars.
The Abkhaz, Azeris, and Adzhars are Muslim, and claim that Georgian chauvinism
is aimed especially at them for religious reasons and that some Georgians are attempting to
force Muslims to convert. Georgians, however, appear to be equally Intent on
"georgianizing" all their minorities, irrespective of religious affiliation, although there are
some indications that Georgians Fear apan-Islamic coalition. At this time there is no
indication that Georgia's Moslems are planning any such coalition.0
Even the most extreme Georgian nationalists have not et advocated ousting
minorities from the republic. Rather, Georgians were
taken aback by the extent to which non- eorgtan mmonttes stt c mg to their ethnic
idemities. They also resent minority resistance to Georgtan linguistic and cultural policies,
and term nnr rr rmm~rehend hnw inrimidarinQ these policies appear to non-G00rgtan5
usstans m Tbdtst m tcates t at many
ongttme non- eorgtan rest ents o t e city are leaving because they fear the undercurrent
of violence and sense that local authorities ma have lost control of the republic to warring
nationalist groups. on-Georggtans often feel coerced into
doing things because o t e prepon erance o eorgians (70% of the republic population)
in most social situations.
Moscow's Perspective
Moscow, probably correctly, fears that anti-Russian elements of Georgian
nationalism will become more pronounced if Georgians are not allowed more
independence, and therefore is not discouraging moderate nationalists. Accordingly, over
the past year, Moscow has practiced a policy of restraint from involvement in interethnic
disputes throughout the country. However, tf Russians were to become the targets of
violence or if radical nationalists were to attempt the violent overthrow of the republic
government, Moscow would feel compelled to intervene, probably through airlifting non-
Georgians out of the republic or economic sanctions. Moscow would still be reluctant to
 use Eorce or military coercion, however: such a move, including the dropping of leaflets,
arrests of draft dodders, and replacement of the republic procurator probably would lead to
terrorist acts against Moscow-appointed republic authorities and even against authorities in
Moscow. In effect, Moscow may have to choose between stopping at economic sanctions
and political rhetoric, which would not stop the inde endence drive in Georgia, or escalate
the conflict to include significant military coercion,
The Events in Lithuania: Repercussioos in Georeia
Both moderate groups have said that they are using the Lithuanian drive far
independence as a model, and Georgians have been watching carefully the events in
Lithuania. A large demonstration was held in Tbilisi on 24 March in support of Lithuania.
Demonstrators condemned Moscow's behavior and demanded that the Geor
government officially declare Georgia has uo economic claims on Lithuania.
Gorbachev's reaction to the Lithuanian situation will have different implications to
different groups of Georgian nationalists. The moderates are likely to see his hard line as
further ev[dence that independence should be achieved gradually through negotiations, and
that recipitate steps should not be taken. They would therefore not change their basic
platform. Radicals, however, may perceive these events as proof that Moscow will never
willingly allow a republic to secede and that Lithuania's peaceful approach was inherently
faulty. They may therefore step up efforts to put teeth in Georgia's tndependence moves,
by spearhead[ng a drive to block m[I[tary conscnption in Georgia, pressing for dissolution
of the republic Soviet as illegitimate and aeitatine--possibly violently--for wnthdrawal of the