SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE JAMAICA INTERNATIONAL YOUTH CONFERENCE: A CASE STUDY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005393117
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: July 23, 2009
• Case Number: F-2009-00553
• Publication Date: July 10, 1985

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ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 09-09-2003 BY UC 60322 LP/STP/SZ
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
10 July 1985
Soviet Active Measures Campaign Against the Jamaica
International Youth Conference: A Case Study (U)
Summary
The Soviet Union conducted an intense, systematic, worldwide
active measures campaign against the Western-sponsored Interna-
tional Youth Conference held in Kingston, Jamaica, 6-9 April 1985.
Begun in mid-19B4, the Soviet campaign involved a variety of overt
and clandestine tactics to disrupt and discredit the Conference,
including propaganda, media placements, rumors, interference with
organizers' efforts, and pressure and incentives to discourage
potential attendees. The Soviet campaign created suspicion among
a number of youth groups and directly or indirectly discouraged
the participation of such governments as Egypt, Indonesia, and
Senegal. Nonetheless, the Soviets did not achieve their maximum
objective of limiting conference attendance to a small number of
conservative and pro-US groups: the 1,100 attendees from almost
The intensity of the Soviet campaign against the Jamaica
International Youth Conference demonstrates Moscow's strong
concern for maintaining control of international youth
organizations. We believe that the Soviet Union will use similar
tactics to counter any future Western actions to create a viable
non-Communist international youth movement. Moscow's ability to
conduct a systematic, sophisticated, global campaign against this
single event also provides some indication of the level of
resources the Soviets will commit to long-term issues having
greater priority, such as arms control he Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI).
APPROVED FOR RELEASED
DATE: 10-Jul-2009
 Soviet Active Measures Campaign Against the Jamaica
International Youth Conference: _A ..Case Study
Background
The International Youth Conference, held in Kingston,
Jamaica, 6-9 April 1985, was the largest youth conference
organized by non-Communist countries--attracting 1,100 attendees
from almost 100 countries. The Conference plan was initiated in
1981 by Jamaica with support from the United States, FRG, Canada,
and other Western governments for the stated purpose of creating
a non-Communist youth forum to recognize the UN's International
Youth Year; it also served to challenge Moscow's longstanding
control of international youth organizations. The Soviet Union
had gained control of two international youth groups--World
Federation of Democratic Youth and International Union of
Students--shortly after their establishment at the end of World
War II and has used their members as conduits for Soviet policy.
The public announcement of the Conference by the host, Prime
Minister Seaga of Jamaica, in November 1983, coincided with the
Soviet announcement of their twelfth world youth festival to be
held in Moscow 27 July to 3 August 1985. The appearance of
Conference organizers in world capitals in early 1984, and the
establishment of an international Conference secretariat in July,
signalled to the Soviets the seriousness of the Western
Active Measures Campaign
By midsummer 1984 the Soviets began a systematic, worldwide
campaign to disrupt and discredit the Jamaica Conference through
media reporting, the use of international Communist front youth
groups, and contact with pro-Communist officials. Over the next
nine months, the Soviets and their supporters used a variety of
active measures to disrupt the Conference, including a three-
month worldwide media barrage, rumors and allegations,
interference with organizers' efforts, and pressure tactics and
incentives to discourage would-be attendees.. They encouraged a
major boycott begun by socialist youth groups and provided
guidance and funds to a Jamaican youth group which conducted a
demonstration in Kingston during the Conference.
The targets of the campaign included the Conference
coordinators, the Conference agenda, and almost all potential
attendees. The most persistent themes the Soviets used to encour-
age suspicion and discourage participation were allegations of:
 o the conservative and undemocratic nature of the
Conference organization.
Media Campaign
The Soviet media campaign was intense, reflecting the
priority they placed on this issue. Following Soviet propaganda
techniques, the Soviets would originate a radio or press report
and pass it to foreign media for local use; the local reports
would then be used by pro-Communist media in other countries as
"reliable" sources. For example:
o In order to exploit cultural and political fears, West
African and Moroccan newspapers carried an inaccurate
Moscow report that the Conference coordinator for Israel
was also responsible for all Middle Eastern countries.
o over a several-month period, news articles appearing in a
number of countries progressively exaggerated the amount
of US financial support to the Conference--from US$1
million to US$60 million--the figure growing as the
Soviet media treatment indicates concern almost a year in
advance of the Conference; their efforts, however, became par-
ticularly intense in the last three months before the Conference
in order to produce the maximum disruptive effort. The earliest
anti-Conference radio attacks began in the summer of 1984, but
the global campaign started in mid-January 1985 with two or three
reports broadcast weekly through the end of February. From the
beginning of March through the end of the Conference on 9 April,
Moscow transmitted attacks daily to regional and global audiences.
In the course of the radio campaign, the Soviet message was
carried in 28 languages worldwide. Havana elaborated on major
themes regionally in Spanish and English, and Luanda made several
broadcasts, based on Moscow reports, in Portuguese.
Concurrent with the accelerated radio campaign, the Soviet,
youth organization, Komsomol, took the lead in the press
campaign, on 6 March, with a long, highly critical feature
article in Komsomolskaya Pravda. Inflammatory remarks, tailored
for local readers, appeared almost immediately afterwards in the
Accra, Ghana, Echo (a conduit for Soviet-supplied material), and
subsequently in Moroccan and Finnish newspapers. Reuters News
Service transmitted the article to the Caribbean News Agency for
regional publication. The article was also broadcast by Moscow
 As a reflection of their thoroughness in attempting to
discredit the Conference, the Soviet media campaign continues as
a prelude to the Moscow Youth Festival that will begin 27 July.
Articles describing the Conference as a "complete flop" appeared
in Pravda and in most East European newspapers immediately after
the Conference, and subsequently in Latin American, Indian, and
Moroccan periodicals. In late May, President Forbes Burnham
described the Conference as a "fiasco" during a speech to a youth
Rumors and Allegations
Because of their frequency, widespread appearance, and
common themes, we believe the anti-Conference rumors and
allegations that began in late 1984 were probably the work of the
Soviets. Few rumors could be traced t urce. However, in
late March he Soviets expressed
their concern to the Jamaican charge in Moscow that Jamaica was
not a safe place for visitors (i.e., crime-ridden). This
allegation was subsequently repeated by a number of sources
worldwide. A Conference coordinator traveling through Africa
learned that Soviet representatives for the Moscow Festival had
informed a number of African officials that the Jamaicans did not
intend to invite their governments or youth groups to the Jamaica
Conference. Other rumors circulated that:
o the Conference would be cancelled or postponed (Austria);
o Reverend moon's church was financing the Conference
(Uruguay);
The most imaginative rumor was circulated by means of a
flyer of unknown origin handed out in France to French delegates
en route to the Conference. The flyer, from a non-existent
"Moral Majority, German Section," warned of an AIDS (Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome) epidemic in Jamaica, Haiti, and the
the spread of rumors played on
the suspicions of would-be participants in, for example, Norway,
Barbados, and the Netherlands, and created some uncertainty among
youth groups. We believe their effect on actual participation,
We believe the Soviets were responsible for a variety of
"dirty tricks" that interfered with the Conference coordination
 r
and organization. The most significant efforts were accomplished
by Communists or Communist sympathizers Finland, and
Italy who, , blocked
correspondence an interfered with attempts by Conference
organizers o
groups.
Pressure Tactics
Although it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of
Soviet pressure tactics, we believe that direct Soviet contact
with government officials and youth groups was a major factor in
discouraging participation at the Jamaica Conference. I
o Syria, Libya, and Algeria attempted unsuccessfully to
convince Morocco not to send delegates.
o Indonesia
wit rew from Conference participation at the last
minute, possibly because the government feared that its
nonaligned status would be jeopardized in a pro-US forum.
o Senegal, an early supporter, abruptly withdrew its
delegation for unknown reasons shortly before the
Conference. Senegal is sending a large delegation to
the Moscow Festival.
o The UNESCO Director of Youth Affairs reported that he
attended despite considerable pressure from the Soviet
delegation to UNESCO.
 The Soviet campaign put pressure on the Jamaica Conference
organizers to work harder and spend more money to attract
attendees. As a consequence of the intensified response of the
Jamaica Conference organizers, the Soviets were in turn forced to
make the Moscow Festival a more attractive alternative to Jamaica
by providing more transportation and expanding their subsidies to
pick up the bill for most, if not all, of the costs for thousands
of attendees. Q media reports on the progress of the
Moscow Youth Festival suggest that the Soviets have also recently
During their campaign the Soviets were able to take
advantage of local and international non-Communist opposition to
the Jamaica Conference. The opposition Jamaican People's
National Party Youth Organization (PNPYO) enlisted the support of
the International Union of Socialist Youth (IUSY), the youth arm
of the Socialist International, in their efforts to stop the
Conference.
leadership of the IUSY began a critical inquiry into the
operation of the Conference, its source of funding, and
the extent of US involvement.
o In October 1984 the IUSY Latin American regional members
agreed to participate in the Moscow Festival and avoid
the Jamaica Conference. By March 1985 all IUSY member
groups agreed to boycott the Conference.
o The IUSY provided funds for PNPYO representatives to
travel to Europe and Africa to rally support for an
international boycott.
The Soviets,) also
provided funds to the PNPYO. Although there is no evidence of a
cooperative effort between the Soviets and the IUSY, we suspect
that there may have been collusion, beginning in mid-1984,
because of parallel activities to discredit the Conference,
similarities in the derogatory language used to attack the
Conference, and the funding of PNPYO activities by both the
Despite its planning and the vocal backing of Jamaican
leftist parties, the PNPYO was unable to muster enough support
locally to disrupt the Conference: it did little more than make
media protests, circulate anti-Conference and anti-government
flyers, and cause a small disturbance on opening day. The
Soviets did, however, use the PNPYO's small clash with security
 Implications
We believe the Soviets had hoped to discourage participation
of all youth groups except the most conservative and pro-US in
order to demonstrate the "reactionary" nature and US domination
of the forum, restrict the attendance of dissidents from
Communist-dominated countries, and demonstrate solidarity with
the Soviet Union through a worldwide boycott. Conference organ-
izers originally anticipated 700-800 delegates from 80 countries,
an expectation that was surpassed by the final tally of 1,100
attendees from 85 countries, including a number of attendees from
Communist-dominated countries. In view of the greater than
anticipated attendance of delegates representing the spectrum of
The Soviets, however, conducted a well-orchestrated
worldwide operation that:
o fostered suspicion and influenced a number of governments
and youth groups;
o coalesced a large body of socialist, pro-Communist and
anti-US groups in opposition to the Conference;
o provided a positive background for Moscow's own youth
conference;
o created a number of annoying distractions for the
Conference organizers; and
o employed a wide range of resources to attack
systematically the United States. F
The level of activity directed against the Jamaica
Conference clearly demonstrates the importance Moscow places on
its control of the international youth movement. Although the
public Soviet campaign to discredit the International Youth
Conference temporarily subsided, it is intensifying again as the
Moscow Festival approaches. Among the issues to be presented to
the estimated 20,000 delegates at the Moscow Youth Festival--such
as US intervention in Central America and the arms race--we
believe the Soviets will stress the "failure" of the United
States and the Conference to create a division within the
international youth movement. In our view, the Soviet ability to
mount such a systematic worldwide campaign against a single event
such as the Jamaica Youth Conference provides some indication of
the level of resources they are able to commit to long-term
issues having even greater priority, such as arms control and the