INTEL REPORT ROLE OF INTERDICTION AT SEA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: CIA Analysis of the Soviet Navy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005390331
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 125
• Document Creation Date: June 19, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2017
• Case Number: SC-2007-00006
• Publication Date: February 17, 1978

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Intelligence Report
The Role of Interdiction at Sea
in Soviet Naval Strategy and Operations
TC)1S.QET7
February_ 1978_ _
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al February 1978
The Role of Interdiction at Sea
in Soviet Naval Strategy and Operations
Key Judgments
This report assesses the level of resources the
Soviets are likely to assign to attacks on merchant
shipping in a war with NATO. It also assesses the
Soviets' capabilities for such interdiction irre-
spective of their iiiifiaitifiT:---WaTOI---fin-dings of this
?study are:
--The Soviet Navy has three principal missions--
strategic strike, antisubmarine warfare, and
anticarrier warfare--to which it would
allocate the majority of its forces in wartime.
--The Soviet Navy would, in addition, conduct
selected attacks on merchant shipping over a
wide area of. ocean, partly as a means of dis-
persing Western naval resources. The Soviets
would probably allocate a small portion--
perhaps 10 percent--of their attack submarine
force toward this task.
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--The Soviets consider disruption of Western
shipping an important objective in a pro-
tracted general war. They hope to achieve
this by launching strategic attacks on ports
and harbors, sinking merchant ships at sea,
and mining heavily traveled waters. It
seems unlikely, however, that the submarine
force would carry out extensive interdiction
_operations until Western carrier strike
groups and ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs) had been neutralized.
--The Soviets probably would attempt a total
interdiction of NATO's close-in maritime ship-
ping in areas such as the North Sea if such
a move were directly relevant to the land
battle. This would support Warsaw Pact
ground forces operating on a coastal axis and
would involve a wider variety of forces concen-
trated in a specific area for a limited period.
Although Soviet naval writers list interdiction
as one of the Navy's many wartime missions, they argue
against assigning large forces to attack merchant ship-
ping in the open ocean. Soviet naval forces--
OP
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especially their large fleet of attack submarines--
have the capability to pose such a threat, however,
and intentions can change rapidly, whereas capabili-
ties are modified only gradually. Accordingly, we
have assessed the capability of Soviet naval forces
assigned to the Northern Fleet to interdict the flow
of merchant shipping between the United States and
Western Europe. We used three scenarios, in which,
respectively, about 10 percent, 33 percent, and 100
percent of all of the long-range attack submarines
operationally available in the Northern Fleet were
given interdiction, as their primary mission.
We found that the number of merchant ships likely
to be sunk over an extended period--four months--
indicates that the Soviets have only a limited capa-
bility to impair the flow of shipping across the
Atlantic, even if they were to reorder their priori-
ties and allocate large forces to interdiction. Our
findings are summarized
_
the table below_and_are
dis-
cussed in detail in Annex F of this report.
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TOISURET
Western Merchant Ship Losses to Soviet Submarines in a
120-Day Interdiction Campaign in the North Atlantic
Participating Ships Sunk Percentage of
Scenarios Submarines or Disabled Avai,lable Ships
7
27
_I
1
2
21
106
,
3
64
273
We believe that the level of effort represented
by Scenario 1 would be the more likely in the opening
phases of war with NATO. The Soviets could not make
the larger allocations envisioned in Scenarios 2 and 3
without significantly reducing their capabilities
against Western SSBNs and aircraft carriers--forces
capable of striking vital targets in the USSR with
nuclear weapons or altering the course of war in
Europe.
The primary factors limiting the capabilities
of Soviet naval forces to carry out an interdiction
campaign at sea are:
--Soviet attack submarines carry ,few torpedoes,
have low operational availability, and in
wartime would receive little logistic support.
Their crews lack the necessary training in
attacking maneuvering targets screened by
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escorts. In addition, the location of
most Soviet bases and the submarines'
long transit routes through geographic-
ally constricted waters make the_sub-
marines vulnerable to counteraction
during deployment and return to base.
--Soviet Naval Aviation is not well suited
to operate at the ranges necessary to
interdict ships in the major sea lanes.
--The West has such an extensive inventory
of merchant ships that a large number
would have to be sunk before losses became
militarily significant. Moreover, the'magnitude
and diversity of the commerce they handle
would make it difficult for the Soviets to
distinguish between ships carrying routine
commercial cargoes and those loaded with
war materiel..
Present trends in Soviet naval strategy prob-
ably will continue for at least the next'decade-
-As long as Western SSBNs and aircraf_t_camriers
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remain a credible threat to the USSR, the Soviets
are unlikely to reorder their priorities for force
allocations to upgrade the role of interdiction in
the open ocean. As more nuclear-powered units enter
the force, additional older units may be assigned
an interdiction mission. The numbers involved in
such a reassignment, however, are expected to be
small and would not significantly change Soviet capa-
bilities against Western shipping.
vi
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The Role of Interdiction at Sea
in Soviet Naval Strategy and Operations
CONTENTS
Page
Key Judgments
Table of Contents vii
Preface 1
Part I: Assessment of Intentions 6
Current Soviet Naval Mission Priorities 6
Principal Wartime Missions 6
Importance of the Anti-SSBN
Mission 7
Tactical Support for Soviet
SSBNs 9
Continued Emphasis on Anticarrier
Warfare 9
Protection of Soviet Peripheral
Waters 11
Interdiction at Sea 13
Exercises 17
Trends in Force Procurement 19
Part II: Assessment of Capabilities 24
Soviet Interdiction Operations Against
Western Merchant Ships in the Open Ocean
in a General War
vii
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24
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CONTENTS (con-tic].)
Capability of Soviet Attack Submarines
Page
in the Atlantic and Contiguous Seas .
24
Competing Mission Requirements ?
?
29
Operational Availability .... ..
.
30
Torpedo Reloads
31
Weapons Effectiveness
32
Submarines Committed to Interdiction
34
Torpedo Launch Capacity in the Sea
Lanes
36
Capability of ASM-Equipped Aircraft .
39
Naval Aviation
39
Long Range Aviation
43
Capability of Surface. Ships
44
NATO Sealift Resources
45
US Plans for the Resupply of NATO
46
Part III: Outlook
48
'ANNEX A: The Role of Interdiction in
Nuclear War: Soviet Military
Viewpoint
A-1.
ANNEX B: Interpretations of Soviet Naval
Exercise Activity B-1
viii
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ILLUSTRATIONS (cont 'd)
Soviet Order of Battle of Naval ASM-
Equipped Aircraft, January 1978 (table) . . 43
Illustrative Ship Losses to Soviet Sub-
marines in a 120-Day Open Ocean
Interdiction Campaign in the North
Atlantic (detail) F-4
Cumulative Ship Losses (graph)
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The Role of Interdiction at Sea
in Soviet Naval Strategy and Operations?
Preface
A number of national security issues have recently
focused attention on Soviet capabilities and inten-
tions to interdict Western sea lines of communication
in a general war. The USSR has the world's largest
fleet of gene'ral purpose submarines, giving it the
capability to threaten the shipping lanes on which the
United States and its allies are economically and
militarily dependent. There are, however, markedly
different interpretations of how many forces the Soviets
would allocate to this mission.
The Soviets note that interdiction of sea lines
of communication can be accomplished in a variety of
ways using a variety of forces including disruption or
'destruction of ports of embarkation and destination,
attacking ships at sea, and mining sea lanes and
approaches to ports and harbors.* Units of the Navy,
*This paper does not examine Soviet capabilities to disrupt
shipping by attacking ports and mining heavily traveled
waters, but focuses on Soviet ability to mount an open ocean
interdiction campaign.
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Strategic Rocket Forces, Long Range Aviation,
and, in some cases, of the Ground and Tactical Air
Forces could be used to accomplish these objectives.
The Soviets clearly believe that the most
effective means to interdict shipping is through
attacks on ports and harbors. In a general nuclear
war, such attacks require the least forces, offer
the highest probability of success, are difficult to
defend against, and permit other forces capable of
interdiction to be given higher priority tasks.
In a conventional war in Europe or localized
conflicts outside the European theater, on the other
hand, the capabilities of the forces as well as
political factors limit the efficacy of attacks on
ports and harbors as the principal means of inter-
diction. If interdiction remained a goal under such
circumstances, the importance of attacking ships on
the open ocean probably would increase as the scale
of conflict decreased.
Thus, Soviet capability to conduct an at-sea
interdiction campaign is a key element in an assess-
ment of Soviet options in a variety of potential con-
flict scenarios.
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This paper studies the evidence bearing on the
role of interdiction in Soviet naval policy. It
examines Soviet mission priorities and estimates
the composition and capabilities of the forces the
Soviets would likely use for interdiction. It also
considers the possibility that they might adopt a
strategy of interdiction in situations short of
total war.
In this paper, interdiction is defined as the
disruption of merchant shipping in the open ocean.
Such ships could be carrying economic goods, mili-
tary cargo, or troops from one NATO country to
another. Warships, military logistic ships and
amphibious landing forces are excluded from our
definition.
Classified Soviet and Warsaw Pact writings,
documents, and manuals have provided insight into
Soviet war planning. These materials, however, have
certain limitations:
---Much of the documentation dealing specifi-
cally with the USSR was published before
1971. Nonetheless, it seems to remain valid
because it is. largely consistent with the limited
documentary materia]. and other forms of intelli-
gence_whica_continue to be available.:
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--Much of the material often is argumentative
in nature, prepared by advocates of one
course or another, and may not necessarily
represent official doctrine and policy.
--Contrary to most Western usage, the Soviets
sometimes use terms such as "interdiction,"
"transports," and "convoy" in reference to
naval support ships, auxiliaries, and even
amphibious landing craft, as well as merchant
ships and troop transports. The term "naval
blockade" for the Soviets can comprise
geographically diffused interdiction opera-
tions of the kind employed by Germany during
World Wars I and II. Lack of a clear defini-
tion of certain expressions and differences
from common Western usage thus introduces
ambiguity into Soviet writings and occasion-
ally appears to inflate the importance of at-
sea interdiction for them. Where appropriate,
these conceptual and semantic difficulties are
noted in this report.
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Analysis of Soviet plans for interdiction is
complicated by the paucity of information dealing
directly with the subject. Detailed discussion of
interdiction in Soviet military writings is compara-
tively rare (except in a historical context), and
the Soviets seldom practice anticonvoy tactics
except in amphibious landing exercises.
A model was used to examine Soviet capabilities
to interdict Western shipping in several possible
scenarios. The assumptions used in the model and the
results obtained are described in Annex F of this
report.
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Part I - Assessment of Intentions
Current Soviet Naval Mission Priorities
Soviet attack submarines, the main strike forces
for use against merchant ships, are also needed to per-
form a variety of other important naval missions. These
missions reflect Soviet plans on how they would use
their forces in wartime. Understanding Soviet mission
priorities, then, is essential to estimating the level
of effort that the USSR would expend against Western
shipping.*
Principal Wartime Missions
Clear statements of the relative standings of the
missions of Soviet naval forces date back to the 1960s.
They list main tasks**--antisubmarine warfare, anticarrier
warfare and deployment of Soviet SSBNs to launch areas--
that the Navy would -attempt to carry out even in a conven-
tional war. Missions which the Soviets list as less
critical include:
-- support of the seaward flanks of the ground forces;
-- interdiction of Western sea lines of
communication;
*See Annex A for a discussion of Soviet military writings regarding
naval mission priorities.
**While Soviet military literature often distinguishes between "main"
and "secondary" missions, the Russian language Lacks the articles
an and the. Thus, Soviet statements frequently contain no explicit
differentation between missions within each category, and ranking of
missions must be inferred by the order in which tasks are consistently
listed and from rare instances when explicit references are made by
authoritative writers..
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-- coastal defense; and
-- protection of Soviet shipping,
The priority of the secondary missions would^be the same
in the early stages of both conventional and nuclear war.
The Soviets believe interdiction, however, could assume
greater importance late in war after Western strike
forces had exhausted most of their strategic weapons.
Soviet military writings indicate that regardless
of how a war begins, they would attempt to direct their
general purpose naval forces first of all toward the
destruction of enemy aircraft carriers and ballistic
missile submarines. A critique of a Warsaw Pact
planning exercise held in 1970 stated:
We must keep in mind that the basic purpose of
[Warsaw Pact] naval actions is to destroy the
enemy's naval nuclear forces, first and fore-
most his nuclear missile submarines and strike
carriers, and also his naval surface forces.
.[In addition] an important task of navies is to
support the fronts,...wage combat against enemy
[sea] communication routes, and deliver strikes
against naval bases, ports, airfields, and air-
craft bases.
Importance of the Anti-SSBN Mission. Peacetime
Soviet naval operations reflect the high priority
assigned to the anti-SSBN mission. The Soviets have
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stationed intelligence collection ships (AGIs) near
Western SSBN bases since 1964--and have in more recent
years operated their newer nuclear-powered attack sub-
marines in an attempt--apparently fruitless so far--to
detect and trail Western SSBNs.
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The Soviets consistently acknowledge the difficulty
of defeating Western SSBNs. Although they stipulate
that the struggle with SSBNs would require large and
diversified general purpose forces, they also acknowledge
that they may not be able to prevent many submarine-
launched ballistic missiles from being fired at the
Soviet Union. They believe that even after firing its
missiles, the SSBN should still be a priority target in
order to prevent 'tt from 11.2 i na_r_e_us_ed _aft e _r e arming _
The threat this force poses is evidently regarded so
seriously that Soviet planners feel even partial success
fully justifies the concentration of resources against
it.
In addition to the unsolved problem of initially
detecting the SSBN, Soviet strategy could be further
complicated by the poor capability to classify submarines
that might be detected--a critical deficiency if the
Soviets wished deliberately to delay or avoid operations
against SSBNs in a conventional war to avoid the escala-
tory potential of such a strategy. Because of these
difficulties and the continuing threat posed by Western
SSBNs, strategic ASW will probably continue to occupy_
important Soviet naval resources for the foreseeable
future.
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Tactical Support for Soviet SSBNs? Consistent
with the high priority assigned to destroying Western
SSBNs, the Soviets place a high value on securing the
operating areas of their own. Some torpedo attack
submarines probably would be assigned to that task in
wartime. When Y-class SSBNs began to enter the fleet
in large numbers in the late 1960s, some Soviet naval
officers argued that protection of Soviet strategic
submarines would be particularly important during the
conventional and limited nuclear phases of a general
war--when these submarines would have to remain passively
on station awaiting the launch order. Naval operations,
writings, and exercises since that time continue to
reflect a concern for the security of the Soviet SSBN
force. The Soviets frequently practice for and use their
attack submarines to conduct delousing* of their tran-
siting SSBNs. Recently, they also have assigned attack
submarines to accompany SSBNs on patrol on several
occasions.
Continued Emphasis on Anticarrier Warfare. The
Soviets regard the carrier as the key element of Western
*In ;such delousing operations, a passing submarine is checked
for covert trailers by another submarine.
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general purpose naval forces, as a reserve strategic
nuclear force, and apparently as an integral part of
amphibious landing forces. Most of the Navy's cruise
missile submarines and ASM aircraft were procured
primarily to counter Western aircraft carriers,although
these forces could be employed against any ships at sea.
As the US deployed large numbers of intercontinental
and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, however,
the strategic strike role of carriers declined, and in
about 1964 the Soviets began to focus on the Polaris
submarine as the primary strategic naval threat to the
USSR.
Their respect for the carrier's importance in NATO
military strategy has not diminished, however. Soviet
writings and exercises still indicate that the Soviets
would attempt to attack carriers with large forces as
soon as possible after a war begins, before carrier-
based strike aircraft could be launched against land
targets in the USSR or against Warsaw Pact forces.
In view of the emphasis on anticarrier warfare
and the multiple hits with conventional weapons which
the Soviets deem necessary to sink a carrier, it seems
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unlikely that many submarines and aircraft armed with
cruise missiles would be diverted from this task.
Moreover, there is mounting evidence that Soviet cruise
missile submarines do not carry many, if any, torpedo
reloads. This would limit their immediate utility__
aftercarrying out their anticarrier mission.
Protection of Soviet Peripheral Waters. In addi-
tion to defending Soviet territory from sea-based
missile and air attack, the maritime defense of the USSR
includes securing Soviet coastal waters from naval
attack. Soviet naval writers devote comparatively little
space in their doctrinal literature to discussing this
traditional mission, which clearly has been supplanted
in Soviet debate by the more difficult problem of
fighting naval strike forces farther away.*
*Many of the forces devoted to countering SSBNs and carriers would
be deployed in such a fashion as to fulfill both the strategic
defensive mission as well as defense of peripheral waters. Naval
forces deployed to the Ureenrand--Iceland=United Kingdom gap and
Norwegian Sea are examples.
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Generally, these exercises include simulated, hostile
amphibious and carrier task forces, seeking to land
troops on the USSR. Typically, the
force
is subjected to attack by Soviet surface, submarine,
?and air forces, with missile-equipped aircraft delivering
the decisive attack. These exercises suggest that in
war large forces, including diesel-powered submarines
armed with cruise missiles, probably would be held in
or near the Barents Sea--far from major shipping lanes
--as part of these defensive forces.
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Interdiction at Sea
Compared to antifleet operations, Soviet military
literature and exercises devote little attention to
interdiction of sea lines of communication. What infor-
mation is available, however, suggests that the Soviets,
from the outset of hostilities, would conduct some
attacks on shipping to tie down substantial Western
naval forces.
Nonetheless, interdiction at sea probably does not
figure prominently in Soviet war plans, except as a
means of occupying and dispersing enemy naval assets
and forcing NATO to take defensive measures which would
reduce the efficiency of shipping. The Soviets, however,
do accord somewhat more importance in a general war to
interdicting the NATO-US lines of communication by
operations against port areas. Reaffirming this view,
Adm. Gorshkov in his 1976 book, Sea Power of the State,
stated that the character of interdiction operations
has changed and that interdiction is now subsumed in
the "overall system of naval operations against the
shore." These judgments rest on evidence from a
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variety of Soviet sources--writings, exercises, sub-
marine operations, the structure and capabilities of
their attack submarine and naval air forces, and the
continuing emphasis on the likelihood of nuclear war.
Soviet naval opinion, however, is far from unani-
mous on the subject of interdiction.* Classified
Soviet writings indicate that as early as 1963 there
were "various points of view about combat on the ocean
lanes" in the Soviet Navy. The authoritative view
seems to strike a balance between the opinions of those
who believed that interdiction had no significance and
of those who believe that attacks on shipping would
play an important role in the "initial period" of war
"by undermining the enemy's military-economic potential."
One authoritative writer stated that a "part" of Soviet
naval forces, particularly diesel-powered submarines,
would operate on the major sea lanes to prevent NATO
military forces from being reinforced or evacuated, but
noted that this allocation of forces must not "divert
the main elements from combat against the enemy's
strike groupings at sea."
*See Annex A for discussion of internal debate within the Soviet
naval Command on what the role of interdiction should be.
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In the late 1960s, interdiction gained in importance
for some authors because of the shift in military doctrine
to include the possibility of protracted war. Nonethe-
less, as late as 1970 one Soviet officer?a proponent
of increasing the attention paid to interdiction--believed
that the USSR had not done the preparatory work necessary
to conduct interdiction operations effectively.
Taken as a whole, Soviet writings suggest that the
USSR is hedging its bets on interdiction. Most Soviets
do not expect to have to fight the kind of war in which
attacks against shipping would be significant. They
believe that the opening phases of the war probably
would be brief and decisive, culminating in a nuclear
exchange which, in any case, would destroy the ports
upon which shipping depended. This belief relegates
an attrition-based strategy, such as interdiction at
sea, to a position of secondary importance. Yet they
recognize that under certain circumstances--particularly
a prolonged war--cutting the sea lanes could play an
important role. As the war progresses, the Soviets
probably believe that forces may become available as
other missions are accomplished. We, however, believe
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it unlikely that many ASW forces could be reassigned
during a conflict. Moreover, Soviet forces probably
would suffer heavy losses in attacks against Western
aircraft carriers and SSBNs. Western attack submarines,
_
ASW _aircraft, and mines probablv also would subiect
Soviet -submarines to heavy losses as they funneled through
geographic chokepoints.to reach the open ocean.
. . .
Information from Soviet writings on mission
priorities has declined after 1970, but evidence from
recent Warsaw Pact and occasional Soviet documents and
other sources suggests that no fundamental change has
occurred. The weapons carried by Soviet attack sub-
marines reflect their continued belief in the escalatory
potential of conflicts at sea.*
The Soviets would not lightly discard the basic
precepts which have guided their operational planning
for the last two decades. To do so would require a
major break with past doctrine, a body of military
thought characterized by slow, evolutionary change.
*See Annex D.
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Even more important, they could not allocate more
forces to interdiction at sea without reducing their
capabilities against Western SSBNs and aircraft carriers
--forces capable of striking vital targets in the Soviet
Union with nuclear weapons.
Exercises
The Soviets rarely practice attacks against convoyed
merchant ships except as part of amphibious landing
exercises. Soviet writings emphasize the importance of
carrying out coordinated air and submarine operations
in any campaign to interdict shipping
There is no
evidence of a Soviet torpedo attack submarine conducting
joint search and attack operations with a TU-95 Bear D
reconnaissance airplane--the only Soviet reconnaissance
aircraft with sufficient range to operate over the North
Atlantic sea routes and locate targets for submarines.
If interdiction were a priority mission, such joint
operations would seem to be desirable because submarines
on their own have limited ability to find merchant ships.
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Soviet naval exercises and routine
training, instead, have focused on ASW and anticarrier
warfare.*
In exercises, which do not involve actual forces
of either side, the relative effort expended against
naval and non-naval targets is clear.
Beginning conven-
tionally (for "training" purposes), the
exercise varianied-a theater conflict with NATO in the
eastern Mediterranean Sea and contiguous areas.
According to the scenario, the Pact could have achieved
its objectives without use of nuclear weapons. After
three days of fighting, however, NATO--faced with defeat
--escalated the conflict.
*By contrast, Adm. Doenitz, architect of the German U-boat campaign
during World War II, believed that interdiction required thorough
and specialized training. Doenitz insisted that U-boat crews
undergo rigid training before being released to prey on Allied
shipping. On 1 September 1940, for example, Germany had only 27
U-boats available for Atlantic duty, partly because a large number
of additional submarines had been detailed for training (Doenitz,
Memoirs pp. 107-9). Soviet naval officers appear to agree with
this assessment: their writings stress that open-ocean inter-
diction operations would be complex and difficult, and criticize
the Germans for the decline in U-boat training that occurred late
in World War II.
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From the onset of hostilities, the Pact's "main"
naval forces were directed against Western aircraft
carriers and SSBNs operating in the Mediterranean.
The scenario assumed a highly optimistic view of Pact
capabilities: Pact forces were credited with sinking
five of the six NATO SSBNs located in the Mediterranean
and "routing" Western carrier and other surface forces.
In addition, the Soviet and Bulgarian Navies also
provided fire support for Pact ground forces, destroyed
enemy naval forces (presumably Turkish) in the Black
Sea, and helped secure the Turkish Straits.
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Trends in Force Procurement
The Soviets have not structured their military
forces to interdict merchant ships in the open ocean.
Most of their naval aircraft armed with ASMs
lack the range to operate effectively over
the major sea lanes (see map-on 13: ).
Their submarine force lacks the afloat
logistic support necessary to resupply out
of area in wartime. Soviet authors write that
logistic support, dispersed over a wide area,
is necessary to sustain distant submarine
operations. The lack of such support has
been noted repeatedly and is consistent with
the findings of Warsaw
The size of the attack
has declined by nearly
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Pact exercises.
submarine force also
30 percent since 1965
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(see graph on p.
However, the loss in
numbers is offset somewhat for inter-
diction by the greater speed and range of
new submarines entering the fleet.
Finally, if sinking merchant ships were a key
objective, one would have expected the Soviets to have
produced large numbers of submarines optimized for that
role. The Soviets would have been able, for example,
to mass produce submarines which combined simplicity
of design, relatively inexpensive diesel propulsion,
high endurance, and large torpedo capacity.* They
have instead concentrated resources on fewer, more
expensive submarines with relatively small torpedo
loads that are optimized for ASW and anticarrier
operations.
*The Soviets had unused construction capacity during the production
run for the diesel-powered F-class submarine--the second Largest
class in the Soviet submarine force?which spanned more than a
decade and averaged Less than five new units a year. By compari-
son, production of the medium-range W-class submarine reached more
than 60 units a year before the program was canceled in the
mid-1950s.
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In their classified writings, they have indicated
that the principal interdiction weapon system would
be diesel submarines. Interdiction-type submarines,
mostly F-class units, presently make up about a third
of the attack submarine force, a percentage that
has been fairly stable in recent years as obsolescent
submarines have been retired and new T-class units
have entered service.
Current submarine operations* and Soviet doctrinal
writings and exercises indicate that these submarines
also would be heavily committed in wartime to anti-
fleet operations. The slow underwater speed
The F-class is used more extensively than other classes of
Soviet attack submarines. Normally, these submarines are deployed
in the Mediterranean where they primarily conduct barrier opera-
tions directed against naval ships of the US Sixth Fleet. The
only other F-class unit routinely deployed out of area is in the
Indian Ocean, where it spends most of its time in the Gulf of
Aden. Operations in the major sea lanes by long-range diesel
submarines are rare.
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of the F- and T-class units dictates that they lie in
wait for targets or patrol in relatively restricted
areas; thus many submarines would be necessary for pre-
positioning along geographic chokepoints from which
they could intercept Western naval forces. This would
leave relatively .few available to interdict shipping in
the open ocean sea lanes.
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Part II - Assessment of Capabilities
Soviet Interdiction Operations Against Western
Merchant Ships in the Open Ocean in A General War
The Soviets would try to use a variety of techni-
ques to make shipping difficult. These include
disrupting port operations, sinking merchant and
troop transport ships in the open ocean and in
coastal waters, and mining harbor entrances. This
section, however, deals only with Soviet capabilities
to destroy shipping in the open ocean.
Capability of Soviet Attack Submarines in the Atlantic
and Contiguous Seas
The USSR currently maintains in its western
fleets an active inventory of 178 attack submarines,
most of which are based in the Northern Fleet (see
following table). Of these, 123 are long-range units
with the endurance to operate on the major shipping
lanes. Nuclear-powered submarines,
make
up nearly one-third of the force. Long-range diesel
submarines,/
constitute another third. The re-
maining third are medium-range R- and W-class submarines,
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Nuclear-Powered
Class Missiles
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Fleet Distribution of Soviet Attack Submarines,:Februarv_1918Ll
Estimated
Torpedo Loads2/
Northern Baltic Black Sea
Fleet Fleet Fleet
C-I 8 SS-N-7 12 9
C-IL 8 SS-N-7 12 3
J7I. 8 SS-N-3/12 8 15
P Unknown Unk _1_
TOTAL SSGN 28_
Diesel-Electric
J 4 SS-N-3
W Long
6
12
Bin 4 SS-N-91
10
2
1
W Twin
Cyl. 2 SS-N-3.1/
12
3
TOTAL SSG
12
2
4
TOTAL CRUISE MISSILE
SUBMARINES
40
2
4
Torpedo
Nuclear-Powered
Class
Unk
AY
8
184/
8
V-I
165/
13
V-II
165/
5
TOTAL SSN
26
TM) cCPT
Total Pacific
Atlantic & West Fleet
9 2
13:
15 14
16
12 4
3 3
3
18 (7
8
13
5
26
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Fleet Distribution of Soviet Attack Submarines,_Februark197811'
Torpedo (cont'd)
Estimated
Torpedo Load&
Northern
Fleet
Baltic
Fleet
Black Sea
Fleet
Total
Atlantic & West
Pacific
Fleet
Diesel-Electric
Class
87/
Unk
1
2
3
1
F
22
36
5
41
19
..2
G
6
--
2
Q7/
8
2
2
4
a/
14
10
2
12
T
22
3
5
8
W3/
12
5
15
10
30
15
Z
22
3
4
1
8
5
TOTAL SS
58
26
22
106
42
TOTAL TORPEDO ATTACK
SUBMARINES
84
26
22
132
54
Total Long-Range Attack Submarines
108
9
6
I ---1-237
58
Total Short- and Medium-Range
119
Attack Submarines
16
19
20
55
GRAND TOTAL
1-24
28
26
178_
1/ Numbers include submarines in repair, butnot auxiliary, radar picket, or reserve units.
2/ Torpedo estimates assume that Soviet submarines are loaded with standard 21-inch torpedoes. There is some
evidence that submarines which lack torpedo reloads, such as the J-class, could increase their loadings by
carrying two small weapons in place of a large one (see p. D-5).
3/ Medium-range submarines with a patrol radius of 1,800 nm and 10 days on station, or 1,200 nm and 20 days on
station--too little endurance to be effective against Western shipping.
4/ N-class submarines could carry 20 torpedoes if they have after torpedo tubes.
5/ V-class submarines also carry two SS-N-15 rocket-assisted nuclear depth bombs for use against other submarines.
6/ The Soviets have built f6UF A-class-SS4--Of-these, one has been dismantled, two are fitting out, and one is ?
_
undergoing sea trials.
7/ Submarines suited only for coastal or inland sea operations.
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with an endurance
they would
not be effective against the major shipping lanes to
Europe.* These shorter range submarines could be more
effectively used in barrier operations in areas closer
to the USSR. W-class submarines based in the Baltic
and Black Seas probably would be denied access to.
the North and Mediterranean Seas, Soviet plans ulti-
mately to control these areas notwithstanding.
The focal point for a Soviet campaign against
Western shipping most likely would be the North
Atlantic. The main threat to the North Atlantic sea
routes consists of the 110& long-range attack submarines
based in the Northern Fleet, supplemented perhaps by
a few long-range units predeployed from the Baltic and
Black Sea Fleets. Although this force is large, there
are several factors which limit its capability against
the flow of NATO merchant shipping.
Competing Mission Requirements. One of the most
important factors limiting the effectiveness of a Soviet
*See map on page
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1411..l.lALI
interdiction campaign would be the competing naval
missions that would have a prior claim on attack sub-
marines. Even without diverting forces to an interdiction
campaign, the Soviets do not have the submarines they
believe tiry would need to perform the critical naval
missions of strategic ASW and defense against carrier
strike forces.
Documentary evidence indicates that the Soviets anti-
cipate requirements of some 80-100 nuclear or 320-400
diesel submarines in order to have a 70 percent prob-
ability of destroying the NATO SSBNs in the Atlantic area
even after localizing the SSBNs to within 100-square-mile
areas.* Although our own analysis of Soviet ASW capa-
bilities indicates that even these numbers would not
suffice, their planning factors show the level of effort
the Soviets feel is necessary.
Similarly, the Soviets believe that mass forces would
be required to counter Western aircraft carriers. In
addition to ASM aircraft, they have estimated that three
*Because of the low noise levels of US and UK SSBNs compared to those
of Soviet submarines and the poor quality of Soviet sensors, it is
unlikely that the initial detection and localization would be
accomplished.
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to four nuclear-powered submarines or 12 to 15 diesels
would be required to detect an aircraft carrier task
group in time to prevent the launch of aircraft.
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They;haieerstimated that they would nee-d to salvo eignt
_
submarine-launched cruise missiles in order to pene-
trate the air defenses of a carrier task force, and
that 12 to 15 hits with conventional torpedoes would
be required to sink an aircraft carrier. In a nuclear
conflict, one writer noted' three SSNs--each armed
with three torpedoes with nuclear warheads -would be
needed to destroy a carrier group consisting of one
strike carrier, an antiaircraft guided missile cruiser,
and escorts. If submarines were unavailable against
this group, he noted, the equivalent number of air-
planes would be two regiments--more than 40 aircraft--
equipped with air-to-surface missiles, six of which
would have nuclear warheads.
Some submarines probably would be positioned where
they could attack a variety of targets, especially those
?in the Nomwegian Sea_and in the
Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (G-I-UK) gap. Others
could conduct attacks on shipping as targets of oppor-
tunity while waiting for NATO naval forces to cross their
path or after completing primary missions, such as
attacking carriers.
Operational Availability. The low operational
availability of their submarines also would impact on
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Soviet capabilities to carry out an interdiction
campaign. This low availability stems from poor quality
control and inefficiencies in the design, production
and maintenance of the submarines; from block obsolescence
of part of the force; and from the expansion of the
submarine fleet--with emphasis on SSBNs--at a faster rate
than facilities and trained personnel have been prepared
for their repair.
Based on empirical evidence, we estimate that in
an emergency some 60 percent of the submarine fleet
could conduct .operaticins?iiiiihing degrees of combat--
,
effectiveness. The Soviets_wouid.-find it diffiCillt t
ita1n the initial level of deployment, riCt onljr becaus
_
of combatfrition but also because the iiiCis-ed use
of the submarines could lead to?More of7the matefiel
_ .
-f4flures that have plagued their submarines in the past.
_
Torpedo Reloads. Another limiting factor would
be the small number of torpedoes carried by some classes
of Soviet submarines. Cruise missile-armed units, in
particular, would be limited in carrying out a
secondary, antishipping, role because of the few
torpedoes that they evidently carry.*. In addition,
all deployed Soviet
*See Annex D.
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submarines, regardless of class, apparently carry as
part of their load at least two nuclear torpedoes and
some ASW torpedoes.
In a long conventional conflict, the Soviets prob-
ably could not rearm their submarines without returning
them to home waters, which in the Atlantic would force
them to exit and return through chokepoints where they
probably would be subject to heavy attrition.
The Soviets have not stockpiled naval weapons near
the Atlantic sea lanes. They do have a fleet of sub-
marine tenders and missile support ships which could
transfer torpedoes at open anchorages and cruise missiles
at sheltered anchorages and in port. If operated out-
side Soviet-controlled waters in wartime, however,
these resupply ships would be vulnerable to attack, and
the Soviets probably would not count heavily on them
for replenishment,
Weapons Effectiveness. Soviet weapons reliability
apparently would not be a seriously limiting factor.
Tests performed on recovered Soviet torpedoes suggest
that they are technically reliable (about .85).
Weapons reliability, however, is only one of
several factors that figure in the "kill" rate for
torpedo attacks, and the others tend to degrade Soviet
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capabilities. Even though the Soviets appear to be
fairly proficient in their routine torpedo firing
exercises, their exercises usually lack realism, and
typically occur against unprotected, straight-running
ships. When target protection is expected, Soviet
submarines usually fire from outside the escort screen
at long ranges--often 10,000 yards Together wita
the few available writings on attacking surface ships
with torpedoes, this firing practice suggests that
they plan on firing outside a convoy's screen in war-
time--a practice which would seriously reduce .accuracy.
Primarily because of this practice, the Soviet hit
rate in wartime probably would be low. In Western navies there
eyidently_ would be about A _SFxribLa_h_i_Lit_y____01_a_t___-1
_
non-homing torpedo would hit a straight-running surface
ship at 2,000 yards. (Most Soviet antiship torpedoes
lack a homing capability.) This level of proficiency
would drop quickly against a fast-moving, maneuvering
target protected by escorts. An increase in distance
generally is the most important factor in reducing
accuracy. Accordingly, we estimate the Soviet hit rate
in wartime at no better than about 25 percent for each
torpedo fired (.85 technical reliability times an
optimistic .3 probability of hitting the target).
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The Soviets might be diverted into firing some
torpedoes against escorts--fast, highly maneuverable,
shallow draft ships that would make difficult targets.
They probably have high respect for Western ASW ships.
On occasion, their submarines have been matched against
such ships and have found it difficult to escape once
they were detected. Operational experience, such as
that gained by E-II-and F-class submarines recently
in the Mediterranean, probably reinforces the Soviet
preference for attacking surface ships from long
distances.
Difficulties in discriminating between merchant
ships carrying important military equipment and those
loaded with routine commercial cargoes would also reduce
effectiveness. Soviet writings stress the importance
of target selectivity, without indicating how it is to
be accomplished. Submarines are poor reconnaissance
platforms; the major sea lanes are crowded with ships;
and measures could be taken by NATO that would compli-
cate target discrimination further.
Submarines Committed to Interdiction. Despite the
high priority and heavy requirements of strategic
defense and the difficulties inherent in a large-scale
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interdiction campaign, the Soviets probably would assign
some submarines to attack shipping from the outset of
hostilities. They apparently believe that a relatively
small commitment of submarines against shipping could
draw off a disproportionate number of enemy naval forces
from combat with important Soviet fleet components,
particularly SSBNs. Moreover, by threatening merchant
shipping, they expect to force NATO to adopt convoying,
the inefficiencies of which by themselves could reduce
the effectiveness of shipping by some 20 percent in
Soviet estimates.*
The number of submarines earmarked for interdiction
is unknown. In the initial stages of a war, however,
we believe that the total would be not more than about
10 percent of those operationally available because of
other force commitments. Many cruise missile-equipped
submarines evidently would be positioned away from the
major sea lanes and in the principal avenues of approach
to the USSR to defend against raids by carrier strike
forces; those deployed near the sea lanes might be
prohibited from attacking targets other than carriers.
The more capable ASW submarines (the V-class) probably
*Both Adm. Doenitz and Winston Churchill estimated that 33 percent
of British tonnage was wasted during World War II because of
defensive measures made necessary by the U-boat threat.
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would be seeking Western SSBNs and protecting Soviet
ones; and some of the! remainder would be colidu&-iinj
barrier operations. If so, relatively few submarines
--mostly N-class SSNs and long-range diesels--would
be in the major sea lanes, assigned to engage merchant
ships.
Torpedo Launch Capacity in the Sea Lanes. Assuming
that the Soviets gave at-sea interdiction the same
priority as that accorded ASW and anticarrier warfare,
they could assign 21 long-range torpedo attack sub-
marines (33 percent of the inventory of general purpose
submarines in the Northern Fleet at 60 percent avail-
ability) to interdict shipping in the Northern Atlantic.
Over a 120-day period, these submarines under favorable
operating conditions could sink or disable some Ea_
merchant ships, or about one percent of NATO-flag shipping.
Additioaal_lie_r_chant_ahips flying. Panamanian and Liberian
11a23 of conyanience Jarnhahlm also wauld_he_availahl:e
far_ae_aaift if necessar_y_.*
After the first interdiction patrol Soviet capa-
bilities could be expected to decline, unless more
*These numbers were derived from a set of assumptions which included:
.2 attrition of force per submarine patrol evolution; each submarine
withholds two torpedoes for self-protection; all others are expended
against merchant ships; necessary on-station time is 15 days; .85'
technical reliability for Soviet torpedoes; .3 probability of a hit
per single firing; one hit is sufficient to disable a target. See
Annex F for additional discussion.
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submarines subsequently were given, merchant ships as
their principal targets. To replenish their torpedo
loads, the submarines would have to pass through the
Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap where they prob-
ably would be especially vulnerable to attrition from
NATO ASW forces. Once rearmed, they would have to
return through the gap. In addition, the increased
demands placed on the older submarines likely to be
used in an interdiction campaign--combined with mini-
mal time in port for replenishment and maintenance--
probably would result in significant materiel failures,
which would seriously reduce the submarines' combat
effectiveness and/or lengthen time between patrols.
How much time Soviet submariners plan to spend in
the sea lanes per patrol is unknown, but a rule of thumb
that the Soviets seem to accept implicitly comes from
the German experience during World War II when the
Germans--operating new submarines from forward bases in
France and Norway--were
third of their force
USSR's distant bases
at
in
unable to keep more than one-
a time on station; from the
the Northern Fleet less time
could be spent on station.
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Deploying out of Northern Fleet bases at the high
average speed of 12 knots, Soviet nuclear-powered
submarines would spend nearly 15 days in transit to and
from the sea lanes, while diesels averaging five knots
would spend 35 days in transit.* If no actions were
taken to inhibit the operation of Soviet ocean reconnais-
sance systems, the Soviets probably would be more limited
by the number of torpedoes
ance of their submarines.
they carried than by the
Without help in finding
endur-
targets, however, particularly if they intend to be as
selective as their writings imply, patrols by diesel
submarines might be limited by the endurance of platform
and crew.
The estimate of turnaround time is also based on
the German experience. The Germans averaged more than
three weeks between patrols. If the Soviets spent a
like amount of time between patrols, their nuclear sub-
marines could operate on the sea lanes about 40 percent
of the time, and their diesel submarines about 30 percent.
In a long campaign, additional time would also be fequited
foir?eatended-maiiiteria-fice--an area characterized 12y poor
Soviet performance in peacetime. (The Germans--
_ _ _
using newer, simpler submarines--found it necessary to
make extensive repairs after seven or eight patrols.)
This calculation assumes that the submarines travel to an areain the
North Atlantic, some 2,100 nm from their Kola Gulf bases.
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To ensure that our estimates of Soviet capabilities
, were not unrealistically low, our calculations credit
fhe Soviets with the same level of efficiency in turning
their submarines around as that obtained in World War II by
' the Germans and_g_tnerally, by the US in the ?Pacifi-C.?
Annex F, with the help of a model, discusses alter-
native interdiction scenarios in more detail.
Capability of ASM-Equipped Aircraft
Naval Aviation. Soviet Naval Aviation
(SNA)--the
_pri-
mary Soviet air force that would be involved in antiship
attacks--is not well suited for interdicting most of
the Western sea lines of communication. Soviet naval
ASM-equipped aircraft have relatively short combat radii,
which rule out their use in antiship attacks over most
of the major sea lanes in the North Atlantic.* They
do have some capability near the United Kingdom but
ground-based air defenses make strikes there particularly
hazardous.
SNA has some 310 ASM-equipped aircraft
_ .
assigned to the four Soviet fleets.** Most of these
aircraft are aging medium-range TU-16 Badgers, which
*See map on page
**See table on page
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Maximum Combat Radii of Naval
ASM-Equipped Aircraft Under Optimum Conditions*
Badger C
Modified
Badger C
Badger G
Backfire
Weapon Unrefueled
Load Radius
1 AS-2 1,450 nm
2 AS-6
2 AS-5
1 AS-4**
1,050 nm
1,150 nm
1,750-
2,075 nm***
Radius with One
Pre-Strike Refueling
2,050 nm
1,600 nm
1,850 nm
2,700-
3,100 nm
*These radii apply only to flight profiles optimized for maximum range,
and they should be considered upper bounds. Such flight profiles allow
only for a minimum fuel reserve, and they do not allow for loitering,
low-altitude flight, high speed, or combat maneuvering.
**The Backfire can carry two, possibly three, ASMs but only with significant
****Naval Aviation currently has no tan er orce o suppor ac sre
tions. However, there is some evidence that the Soviets are developing
a tanker aircraft which could support the Backfire. With one pre-strike
refueling under optimum conditions the Backfire radius could be improved
_ _ _ _
by as much as 50 percent for some missions.
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are especially vulernable to modern air defenses. About
67 Badger tanker aircraft are assigned to Badger strike
regiments for refueling support. The supersonic Backfire
bomber was first introduced into SNA in late 1974, and
about 35 of these aircraft are now operational in the
Baltic and Black Sea Fleets.
Some 200 ASM-equipped Backfires probably will be
in naval service in the mid- to late 1980s. The
Backfire can fly to greater distances than the Badger,
and it is better able to penetrate air defenses because
of its high speed and low-altitude flight capabilities.
The map on page shows the practical limits
for at least initial antiship attacks by naval aircraft
in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. Antiship attacks to the
maximum combat radius shown in the table on page
would be virtually impossible because of the require-
ment to penetrate Western land-based and fleet air
defenses. Unless Western air defenses had been elimi-
nated early in the war, Soviet mission planners would
have to allow adequate fuel for combat maneuvering,
high speeds, and indirect routing and low-altitude
flight to avoid detection and improve the survivability
of the aircraft. These factors would reduce consi-
derably the range at which antiship attacks could be
conducted.
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20' 0 '
o? 1o?
35*
iiFBAR.E.N
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MAUL
42-
Practical Limits for Initial
s%
.4t Antiship Attacks_ by Naval
gi Aircraft in a NATO-Warsaw
?st-Pact War
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Practical Limits for Initial Antiship Attacks
by Naval Aircraft in a NATO-Warsaw Pact War
Rationale
1. Limits are based on the performance of the Backfire
bomber--the most capable naval strike aircraft--
armed with a single AS-4 ASM.*
2. Flights originate from forward naval airfields in
the USSR or from airfields in other Warsaw Pact
countries.
3. Flight routes are selected to avoid or minimize
overflying Western land-based air defenses.
4. Strike missions are based on the following Hi-Lo-
Hi-Lo-Hi flight profile, except for areas in which
the aircraft encounters extensive land-based air
defenses for most of the flight:
-- The aircraft initially flies at its most
efficient cruise altitude and speeds.
-- As the aircraft approaches the intended
target, it descends to low altitude for
' 200 nm to avoid detection.
The performance characteristics used here are based on CIA's
appraisal of the Backfire
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-- The aircraft then climbs to high altitude
to launch its AS-4 missile
-- After missile launch the aircraft reverses
course and descends to low altitude to
escape.
After 200 nm at low altitude, the aircraft
climbs to its most efficient cruise altitude
and returns to its base.
S. For areas where the aircraft confronts extensive
land-based air defenses--such as the Baltic and
Eastern Mediterranean regions--the aircraft is
assumed to fly_at low altitude for most or all of
its mission.
6; Backfires do not fly at supersonic speeds. Use
of this tactic would reduce combat radius.
7. Backfires do not refuel in flight. Naval Aviation
currently has no tanker force to support Backfire
operations. However, there is some evidence that
the Soviets are developing a tanker aircraft whith
could support the Backfire. With refueling in
the Norwegian Sea, the Backfire range limits for
antiship attacks could be extended several hundred
miles into the North Atlantic, depending on where
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the aircraft was refueled. Refueling in the Baltic
and Mediterranean regions is not considered feasible
--except over friendly territory--because of the
hostile air defense environment.
8. The Backfire aerodynamic design is assumed to be
optimized for subsonic flight. A less efficient
design would reduce the combat radius by some 15
percent.
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Soviet Order of Battle of Naval
ASM-Equip ed Aircraft Januar 1973
Northern Baltic Black Sea Pacific
Fleet Fleet Fleet Fleet Total
Backfire
14
20
-
_
Badger C*
33
21
- 22
23
Modified Badger C*
33
21
23
23
100
Badger G
22
-1_0
15__
77
Total
66
75
310_
78
9_1_
*The size of the Badger C modification program is unknown. It is assumed
arbitrarily that one half of the Badger Cs have been modified thus far.
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The areas shown on the map are keyed to the capa-
bilities of the Backfire, but some attacks by Badgers
--with aerial refueling--also would be possible at the
outer reaches. Badger strikes at long ranges would be
limited by the dearth of tanker aircraft and their small
fuel transfer capacity. .Only about six tanker aircraft
are attached to each strike regiment to support some 25
strike and ECM aircraft. The Soviets thus far have not
pooled naval tankers from several regiments to support
large strike formations LJ
Long-Range Aviation. Antiship attack is a secondary
mission of the LRA. Some LRA aircraft usually partici-
pate in major naval exercises, and they practice
reconnaissance and antiship strikes. The intermediate
range bombers, similar in type to those of Soviet Naval
Aviation, could perform antiship strikes in the nearer
reaches of those areas shown on the map on page
Only about 10 tankers are available in LRA for refueling
the intermediate range bombers. Of some 190 heavy
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bombers in the LRA, 70 TU-95 Bear bombers are equipped
with ASMs. Attacks by these aircraft would be limited
to nuclear strikes since the AS-3 missiles they carry
were designed for use against large-area targets rather
than for direct hits on ships
Capability of Surface Ships
The capability of Soviet surface combatants to
interdict sea lines of communication is restricted,
not only by the primacy accorded to such other missions
as ASW, but also by the risks inherent in any attempt
to operate in open ocean areas. Of particular import-
ance is the vulnerability of such vessels to NATO air
power, both carrier- and land-based, when operating in
areas beyond the range of Soviet air support. The
Soviets are well aware of the vulnerability of their
surface ships. In his critique of a 1970 exercise,
Marshal Yakubovskiy, then Commander in Chief of Warsaw
Pact Forces, cautioned naval planners that they could
not count on using their surface ships against Western
carriers in the Mediterranean after the second day of
hostilities.
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Another drawback for the Soviets in using surface
combatants for interdiction would be their inability
to provide adequate logistic support. In the Atlantic,
Soviet combatants would either have to return to Northern
Fleet bases for replenishment, or rely on logistic support
ships deploying from such bases. In either case, they
would have to transit from the Norwegian Sea during which
they would be highly vulnerable to attack from Western
aircraft and attack submarines. Soviet support ships
would be subject to very heavy attrition. They are poorly
armed and too slow to keep up with Soviet warships. More-
over, they have little capability for providing warships
with underway replenishment of munitions
In addition,
most Soviet surface combatants are equipped with missiles
-which are designed primarily for ASW and air defense
rather than for use against other surface vessels.
In any case, Soviet writers do not regard surface
ships as important strike platforms against merchant
ships, except in coastal waters. Rather, they regard
surface ships as important for defending the sea approaches
to the USSR, their own shipping, and safeguarding the
passage of their submarines to and from operational
waters. Other writers also have said that surface
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ships could be one means of keeping slow-moving con-
voys "continuously under observation." We believe it
unlikely that they effectively could use surface ships
for surveillance after the outbreak of hostilities,
however, unless such operations took place in areas
where the Soviets had air superiority.
NATO Sealift Resources. A major Soviet inter-
diction campaign at sea probably would founder on one
of the same problems that plagued the U-boats: the
large number of merchant ships available to the West.
Western commerce rides on the keels of thousands of
ships.* Moreover, construction of merchant ships--
and the consequent potential replenishment of the mer-
chant ship inventory--is high: Lloyd's Register of
Shipping reported that over 1,000 merchant ships,
totalling nearly 30 million tons, were constructed in
*According to Lloyd's, in 1976 there were over 9,600 NATO-flag
merchant ships displacing over 1,000 tons. A recent study by
Headquarters, US Command in Europe, concluded that, of these,
over 5,900 would be suitable for sealift of supplies and mater-
iel to Europe. Additional Western-owned merchant ships flying
Panamanian and Liberian flags of convenience d be
available for sealift if necessary. An older study
estimated that about 11,500 merchant ships cou s se u ed for the
resupply of NATO Europe.
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the Free World in 1976. Down four million tons from
the peak 1975 level, the 1976 output of merchant ships
is expected to be followed by further reductions as a
result of overbuilding in the early 1970s, economic
recession, and a lessening of demand for new tankers.*
These figures, nonetheless, indicate a formidable capa-
city to replace losses for shipping.
The Soviets emphasize the importance of target
selectivity--probably reflecting an awareness that it
would be difficult otherwise to achieve much impact on
thousands of ships. In practice, however, distinguishing
ships carrying military cargoes bound for NATO forces
in Western Europe from the large number of ships loaded
commercially would be difficult--some 3,,200 Free World
merchant ships are estimated to ply the sea lanes of
the North Atlantic on a typical day. Time consumed in
the target selection process itself also could reduce
the effectiveness of Soviet at-sea interdiction operations
US Plans for the Resupply of NATO
The size of a likely US resupply effort, while
providing numerous targets for Soviet submarines, would
*See ER 77-1068, November 1.977 (Unclassified), for details.
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work against a Soviet interdiction campaign. US plans
for resupplying NATO in a conventional war assume a
large scale of support shipping that increases steadily
during the war.
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Convoys totaling approximately 350 ships could
be enroute to Europe during the first 30 days of
hostilities. During the next 30 days, more than 500
additional ships would probably depart for Europe.
US projections for later phases of the war assume that
over 1,100 additional ships sail for Europe, for a
total of 2,000 ships with military cargoes in the first
120 days of war.
By the early 1980s, the pool of shipping committed
to the resupply of Europe is expected to be increased
substantially by additional allocations of West European
ships. To reduce this pool appreciably (by say 25 per-
cent) the Soviets first would have to identify the
ships carrying military cargoes among the thousands of
those loaded commercially, and then maintain large,
continuously deployed strike forces in the sea lanes.
We believe that present Soviet forces clearly are
inadequate to accomplish these tasks.
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Part III - Outlook
Contemporary documentation, exercises, and
naval force trends do not indicate that there is
likely to be a militarily significant increase
either in Soviet willingness to allocate forces to
the interdiction mission, or in the interdiction
capabilities of the forces themselves for at least
the next five to 10 years. This judgment is predi-
cated on:
--The continuing threat of strong Western
SSBN and carrier strike forces capable
of attacking targets in the USSR with
nuclear weapons which requires the Soviets
to commit strong forces in counteraction.
--Maintenance of strong NATO air defenses that
could and probably would deny Soviet air-
craft free access to the sea lanes in
wartime.
A key element in deterring the Soviets from
fully exploiting Western dependence on long sea
lines of communication is the credibility of the
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carrier and SSBN threats to the USSR. The specter of
US carrier task groups in areas such as the Norwegian
Sea and the eastern Mediterranean would almost certainly
continue to cause the Soviets to assign large forces in
those areas--well away from the major sea lanes. On the
other hand, should the West in wartime position high-
value targets like carriers on the major shipping routes,
Soviet naval strike forces would tend to be attracted to
these targets and could threaten Western convoys with
heavy attacks.
Soviet ASW forces have little capability against US
SSBNs. To improve their antisubmarine defenses, the
Soviets first would have to enlarge their ASW forces and
solve the difficult problems of detecting and classifying
contacts. This raises the possibility that the Soviets,
confronted with persistent failure, might reorder their
submarine force allocations to take advantage of easier
targets, including merchant ships. All of the avail-
able evidence, however, suggests that, while the Soviets
recognize their deficiencies in ASW, they have chosen
to intensify their efforts in this area. Further, they
-
could not easily change course because of the design and
construction lead times required and because of their
considerable investment in present forces.
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A reallocation of Soviet naval forces to increase
the effort against Western sea lines of communication
probably would depend on the outcome of the initial
battles at sea--and on land. If NATO successfully
checks the Pact advance in Central Europe and if the
war is prolonged, Soviet interest in interdiction prob-
ably would increase because cutting the sea lanes--
particularly in waters adjacent to a theater of mili-
tary operations--could then affect the outcome of the
war. This would be particularly true if attrition or
Western strategy reduced the threat from aircraft
carriers, thereby freeing more forces to attack merchant
ships. If the war in Europe were stalemated and
Western task forces remained largely intact, however,
the Soviets would face a hard choice: whether to try
to interrupt the US resupply of Europe, or to continue
to concentrate their remaining naval forces against
SSBNs and carriers. The Soviet propensity to assign
higher priority to military targets leads us to con-
clude that under these circumstances the Soviets would
continue to concentrate most of their efforts against
NATO's offensive naval forces. Should they elect to
send most of their surviving attack submarines and
ASM aircraft against merchant ships, however, they
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would leave highly mobile Western attack carrier
forces free to strike important Pact ground and
naval targets.
Faced with a choice between attacking carriers
and merchant ships, the Soviets evidently would
solve the dilemma by directing other forces against
what they regard as shipping's most vulnerable point--
ports of embarkation and destination--by mining
harbor entrances and systematically attacking the
ports with bombs and missiles. Soviet capabilities
against US ports, however, probably would be limited
in the conventional and limited nuclear phases of war.
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ANNEX A
The Role of Interdiction in Nuclear War:
Soviet Military Viewpoint*
In classified articles written in the late 1960s,
the then chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal
Zakharov, and his deputy for operations, Colonel
General Povaliy--the two men who would be most closely
involved in planning, coordinating, and executing
Soviet military operations in wartime--laid down the
basic principles of how the Soviets then expected to
fight a modern war.**
Both men regarded interdiction as secondary to
the performance of strategic missions, except possibly
in the final stage of a nuclear war. They believed
that some attacks on merchant shipping, however, should
be performed concurrently with strategic missions from
the outset of hostilities.
*This annex is based on a much larger volume of material
than that directly cited. The Povaliy and Zakharov
articles are highlighted because, although dated, they
are the most authoritative and detailed articles avail-
able which discuss interdiction within the phased develop-
ment of a general war, beginning with conventional
hostilities and progressing through a limited nuclear
period to full nuclear war. The limited, relevant writ-
ings presently available which postdate these articles
have remained consistent with the principles expressed
by Povaliy and Zakharov.
**The General Staff, referred to in the USSR as the "military brain"
of the Soviet State, would be the executive agency for the Stavka
in war. Within the General Staff, the Main Operations Directorate
is an elite group responsible for operations planning and control,
the performance of strategic targeting, and--with others--the
formulation of military strategy. Povaliy served as head of the
operations directorate from 1963 to 1970.
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A key objective of their articles apparently was
to promulgate changes in Soviet strategy relating to
a broader range of conflict possibilities than were
incorporated in Soviet strategy when Khrushchev was
in power.
Povaliy wrote that by the mid-1960s .the US and
USSR each had the means to apply military force "in
various sequences and in any desired combination,
depending on the military-political situation." This
statement acknowledged Soviet awareness of the need for
a "flexible response" doctrine. The Soviet view of that
doctrine, however, differed from the US interpretation
in several important ways: the conventional phase of a
war was held to be brief, lasting from hours to a few
days if war began in Europe, and not much longer if it
had its origins in a secondary theater. The possible
limited nuclear period--as well as the decisive nuclear
period--also were expected to be brief. Both Povaliy
and Zakharov indicated that wars fought with only
conventional or tactical nuclear weapons were
possible,
regarding
but neither man "nourished any
the feasibility of limiting
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a war with NATO because, according to Zakharov, "the
losing side will begin ceaselessly building up its
strike to restore the situation."
Zakharov wrote that in the conventional and limited
nuclear phases of war the "main effort... [would] be...
to inflict maximum destruction on the enemy, especially
on his nuclear groupings...." The Navy, with help from
the Long Range Aviation, would concentrate its efforts
against enemy submarines and aircraft carriers. These
brief, opening phases of war were important because they
helped "set the stage" for the subsequent use of strategic
nuclear weapons.
Zakharov and Povaliy believed that the period
of warfare following a nuclear exchange could be
protracted, unlike the earlier, decisive stages;
that military operations at this time would be con-
ducted mainly by surviving general purpose forces;
and that naval forces, because they could be
dispersed, would survive in significant numbers to
play an important role in this period.
According to Warsaw Pact lecture notes on
strategy for war in Europe, residual naval forces
in the final stage of war would:
-- deliver strikes against coastal and
theater targets;
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-- complete the destruction of fleet
strike forces;
- interdict enemy sea communications; and
-- render aid to fronts by conducting amphi-
bious landings, seizing straits, and
supporting their own shipping.
Other classified Warsaw Pact and Soviet writings
have provided varying views on how a NATO-Pact war might
develop. They have differed mainly over whether there
would be a limited nuclear phase, and--less frequently
--over whether a lengthy conventional phase is possible.
The authors assume that war could begin either with a
surprise attack, using nuclear or conventional weapons,
or after a period of rising tension.
All of the writings emphasize that the major objective
of the conventional phase would be to destroy the enemy's
nuclear-capable forces--SSBNs, carriers, forward-deployed
tactical nuclear weapons and storage areas, and shore-
based facilities which support enemy SSBN and ASW
operations.
Should a "limited" nuclear phase occur, naval
their tactical
writers argue that/forces should launchmediately all .
of their nuclear weapons--including SLBMs with yields
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of less than one megaton--against high-priority enemy
naval targets and some land targets. Land targets dis-
cussed include airfields, tactical nuclear weapons
sites, storage facilities, naval bases, and harbors.
Population centers and "strategic shore installations"
(undefined) would be excluded from these attacks.
The Soviets, clearly believing_ that the first_s_tra-
tegic nuclear strike would be the decisive act of the
war, indicate that they would conduct oRellations
nuclear
during any conventional or limited/phases as if the
transition to nuclear war could occur at any time.
They acknowledge that the requirement to prepare for
both kinds of war entails demands which reduce the
_
effectiveness of general purpose naval forces for either
kind of war.
Evidence of Internal Debate
Since the early 1960s, some Soviet writers have
argued that the naval command was either paying too
little or too much attention to interdiction. Briefly,
writers who believed open-ocean interdiction operations
were not important stressed:
-- Disruption of shipping by attacking land
targets. Reaffirming this view, Admiral
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Gorshkov in his 1976 book, Sea Power of
the State, stated that the character of
interdiction operations has changed and
that interdiction is now subsumed in the
"overall system of naval operations
against the shore."
Concentration on strategic missions. Most
Soviet writers appear to believe that in a
general war oceans should no longer be
viewed as an arena of action against ship-
ping, but rather as a vast operating area
for sea-based nuclear strike forces.
The power of nuclear strikes and fast pace
of modern war. These factors render large
scale shipments across the sea largely
unnecessary.
Effect of stockpiling. NATO dependence on
the sea lanes, some argue, has been reduced
by stockpiling supplies and equipment in
Europe and by the development of capability
to airlift "minimum consumables."
Irrelevance of interdiction in a nuclear
conflict. The sheer devastation of nuclear
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war, in this view, would make interdiction
irrelevant. Not only military forces, but
also millions of people and thousands of
industrial enterprises--all consumers of
supplies, finished products, and raw
materials--would disappear.
Enhanced submarine capabilities for other
missions. In the past, their then limited
endurance and slow speed made submarines
comparatively ineffective against warships,
according to some writers, who argue that
today submarines are "totally adequate" for
attacking the main battle forces of enemy
navies.
The indecisive character of interdiction.
Almost all naval officers, including
Gorshkov, who have written about inter-
diction, consider that it alone could not
determine the outcome of a war.
On the other hand, arguments stressing the import-
ance of interdiction* emphasize:
*These statements are not confined to our definition of interdiction
as being limited to at-sea operations but are from the more general
Soviet expression which would include blockade by mining, and destruc-
tion of ports. They also could include damage to land transportation,
storage facilities and defense industries.
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The enormous logistic requirements of
fighting a modern war with conventional
arms.
The utility of interdiction operations in
facilitating the attainment of other war
objectives. Although not "decisive" in
itself, several authors write that inter-
diction contributes to victory by
"undermining a country's military-economic
potential...[by] depriving the enemy of
freedom of operation" in specific areas of
the ocean," and by forcing a diversion of
enemy naval resources.
-- Improvements in capabilities to conduct
interdiction operations. Technical improve-
ments to submarines, submarine armament and
would make a_modern
interdiction campaign more effective than
heretofore. Convoying would no longer
suffice to protect merchant ships, according
to some naval officers, because modern
submarine-launched torpedoes and cruise
missiles have sufficient range to be fired
from outside a convoy's defense perimenter.
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-- Nuclear war could be protracted.
Were nuclear war protracted) it would
require additional merchant shipping to
offset large-scale losses in Europe.
Moreover, one writer observed that a
NATO-Warsaw Pact war need not be nuclear
inasmuch as chemical and biological
weapons were available to belligerents
in World War II, but were not employed
on a mass scale in that war.
We believe that the authoritative Soviet view is
that contained in writings, such as the Povaliy and
Zakharov articles, and General Staff planning documents.
These indicate that interdiction is a mission of the
Soviet Navy, but that it is less critical than defeat
of enemy nuclear strike forces, particularly in the
opening phases of war.
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ANNEX B
Interpretations of Soviet
Naval Exercise Activity
Soviet naval exercises involving merchant ships
and convoy-type activity have been rare but some
recent occurrences have evoked considerable interest
and debate among intelligence analysts. Interest
focused especially on the activity in Okean-75 (a
major exercise which took place in April 1975 involv-
ing, air, submarine, surface, and reconnaissance forces
of all four Soviet fleets) and, to a lesser extent,
on annual exercises involving amphibious forces.
Okean-75
The first major Soviet naval exercise that in-
volved merchant ships, Okean-75 has been cited by
analysts
as a demonstration of Soviet intent to interdict
Western maritime communications in wartime. This
annex summarizes the arguments of those who hold that
Okean-75 provides evidence which supports or refutes
that interpretation.
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Some 200 surface ships, divided into 11 task
forces, participated in the exercise, which took
place in April 1975. The activity of four of the
task forces was sufficiently ambiguous to raise
concern that some or all of them represented targets
for other forces practicing attacks against merchant
shipping. Contributing to this supposition, two of
the task forces--one in the North Pacific and one in
the Barents Sea--included merchant ships.
Merchant Ship Participation. The task force in
the North Pacific consisted of four naval ships and
four cargo ships. An intelligence ship, the Izmeritel',
trailed the group as it moved from an area east of
Japan northward toward Kamchatka. This formation has
been assessed variously as a simulated Western carrier
task force and as a merchant ship convoy. The forma-
tion was supported by ASW aircraft and was stalked
either by a C-class nuclear-powered cruise missile
submarine--which would tend to support the carrier
task force hypothesis--or by a V-class submarine, a
modern torpedo attack unit which is thought to be
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primarily assigned ASW missions but which could be
used also against carriers or merchant convoys.
Another task force operated primarily in the
Barents Sea and was composed of seven merchant ships
and four naval ships. The presence of a tank land-
ing ship in this group suggests that it represented
a hostile amphibious task force, consistent with past
exercise activity in this area. The steaming forma-
tion for this group--with the combatants traveling
in a forward screen, and the LST singled out for
special protection--supports this conclusion. More-
over, the ships in this group were attacked repeatedly
by waves of aircraft equipped with air-to-surface
missiles, but apparently attracted little attention
from submarines.
The actual role played by the merchant ships is unclear.
The following page lists the arsumelir??Mat cati?be
_
made both for andagainst the thesis that the involve-
ment of merchant ships in Okean-75 demonstrated that
Moscow gives high priority to interdiction of Western
shipping.
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Merchant Ship Participation
in Okean-75: Two Views
Interdiction Was Given High Priority
Merchant ships participated in
convoy exercises.
The intelligence collection
ship Izmeritel' may have been
a member of the convoy in the
Northern Pacific for at least
part of the exercise.*
Convoys moved at slow speeds
more typical of merchant ships
than of naval task forces.
Convoy maneuvers were more
typical of merchant ships seek-
ing to evade attack by sub-
marines than of a naval task
force.
Since only a small percentage
(e.g., 12 percent in the
Northern Fleet) of available
naval surface ships partici-
pated in Okean-75, it seems
unlikely that the Soviets
would have had to divert cargo
ships, as they did, simply to
provide additional targets for
surveillance systems and
aircraft.
Interdiction Was Given Little Priority
Merchant ships may have repre-
sented warships or troop ships.
The Izmeritel', in trailing the
Northern Pacific group, probably
was acting as a "tattletale," a
common Soviet tactic whereby a
ship shadows a carrier task force
in order to provide targeting
information for strike. aircraft
and cruise missile submarines and
surface ships.*
The Barents Sea group apparently
simulated passage through a mine-
field, which would have slowed
its progress.
The exercises both in the Barents
Sea and in the North Pacific took
place relatively close to the
USSR rather than in major sea
lanes between the US and its NATO
allies and Japan.
Both groups were subjected to
repeated simulated attacks by ASM-
equipped aircraft, primarily TU-16
Badgers which, with one refueling,
would barely have the range to
reach the sea lanes between the US
and Europe. The intensity of the
ASM attacks exceeded what probably
would be necessary to interdict
merchant ships. The ASM strikes
against the North Pacific group
took place at the same time as
those against more obvious simu-
lated carrier task forces.
No attempt was made to protect the
merchant ships by placing them in
the center of the convoys, as would
have been expected if the ships
were simulating wartime convoys to
provide realistic targets for
interdiction.
*Alternatively, the Ismerttel' may have functioned as an exercise
referee.
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Operations Off Africa. During Okean-75 the
Soviets also operated in the merchant shipping lanes
between the Indian Ocean and Western Europe. At
least two submarines were deployed from the Mediter-
ranean to an area west of Africa near the Canary
Islands, where they may have established a barrier
patrol. About the same time, a destroyer and an
oceanographic ship, which had been located west of
Africa, began moving northward. The roles played by
these ships are unclear. One interpretation is that
they were simulating oil tankers enroute to Western
Europe. Another is that they joined a tank landing
ship operating in the same area and simulated an
amphibious task force. The ships eventually reached
the area where the submarines were located, but we do
not know whether the submarines simulated attacks
against them. Soviet reconnaissance aircraft using
Guinean airfields frequently flew over the ships and
could have updated their position for the submarines,
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Also unclear was the role of a group of surface
ships consisting of about four major combatants and
seven hydrographic ships that operated together north-
east of the Azores. The suspected presence of Soviet
submarines nearby and the group's steaming formation--
in four rows with the hydrographic ships in the center
two--suggest that the group may have portrayed a US
convoy or
group was
aircraft
amphibious task group enroute to Europe. This
subjected to regular reconnaissance by Soviet
and to simulated air and sub-
marine attacks. The lack of positive movement toward
Western Europe could argue against this group's simulat-
ing a convoy. However,
in fact they were simulating
a "convoy," a term that in the Soviet usage can include
naval auxiliaries and amphibious ships as well as merchant
ships.
ship was "torpedoed" and
that two F-class submarines were in the general area.
This case represents the least ambiguous example
and its purpose may indeed have been to practice anti-
convoy tactics. Even so,
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it also could have represented a troop transfer move-
ment--a class of targets which the Soviets have clearly
indicated has high priority for interdiction and which
probably falls within the "some attacks on shipping"
category that Marshal Zakharov noted should be conducted
(see page A-.2).
On balance, we believe that the two formations in-
volving merchant ships probably simulated naval task
forces. In the early stages of the exercise, the merchant
ships in the Barents group most likely were intended
initially to give the Soviet Navy practice in protecting
coastal shipping or their own amphibious task groups.
Subsequently, this group probably represented a Western
amphibious landing force attacking the homeland. The
group in the North Pacific probably simulated an attack-
ing Western force of naval combatant's.
The activity west of Africa and north of the Azores
is more difficult to interpret. Either or both of these
could have served as merchant convoys as well as targets
for ocean surveillance. If they were convoy-associated,
the submarines apparently targeted against these groups--
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at least four diesels--would represent about 10 percent
of all attack submarines deployed for Okean.
Most of the events in Okean-75 could simply repre-
sent an exercise of fundamental naval skills: reconnais-
sance, intercept and attack by the offensive forces, and
escort and evasion tactics by the defending forces. We
would expect to see some antishipping activity in a multi-
fleet exercise the scale of Okean-75. Because inter-
diction of the sea lanes is a mission of the Soviet Navy,
there would be a requirement to practice tactics.
On the defensive side, the Soviets have an increas-
ing need to defend their merchant ships as their merchant
fleet expands its operations. The Soviets conduct exten-
sive shipping between Soviet ports--which in 1975 accounted
for 78 million tons of cargo--and also with East European
ports. In wartime, this and other Soviet shipping would
require navalescort. The Soviets also routinely co-opt
merchant ships-for naval operations. Together with am-
phibious ships, merchant ships also often are used to carry
equipment for the ground forces. They regard protection
of their own sea lines of communication as important,
particularly in the northern and far eastern areas of the
USSR where roads are bad or nonexistent. In the Far East,
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where Soviet military operations would depend heavily
on easily interdicted rail lines, they could believe
that moving military supplies by ship would be important
for supporting sustained combat against the Chinese.
Thus, the participation of merchant ships in Okean-75
need not indicate a change in the priority of Soviet
naval missions.
Amphibious Landing Exercises
Since 1965, the Soviets annually have conducted
amphibious landing opera-
tions in the Northern
Fleet area, which meet
some of the US criteria
fora convoy (see
definition). .These
operations have provided
the Soviets with ancillary
opportunities to
convoy tactics.
main body of the
Definition of a Convoy
A number of merchant ships
or naval auxiliaries, or both,
usually escorted by warships
and/or aircraft or a single
merchant ship or naval auxili-
ary under surface escort,
assembled and organized for
purpose of passage together.
--JCS Dictionary of
US Military Terms
for Joint Usage,
1974
exercise convoy techniques and anti-
Defended by a screen of warships, the
task forces in the exercises usually
has consisted of relatively defenseless -?hities?(o?ften
including merchantmen) and (about half of the time)_ a maiar
surface combatant probably simulating an aircraft carrier.
These ships are subjected to simulated
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missile and torpedo attack by Soviet military forces.
Because the primary purpose of the exercises is to pro-
vide training in conducting and countering amphibious
landings, they usually take place in local Soviet
waters, which would limit the utility of the exercises
as training for interdiction in the open ocean. The
composition of the screening forces--mostly coastal
patrol and destroyer escorts, minesweepers, old destroyers,
and small frigates--would further reduce the realism of
the exercises as training for interdiction. These ships
would have virtually no ASW capability until after enemy
submarines disclosed their locations by attacking the
ships protected by the screen.
With the allowances made for short distances in-
volved, the tactics employed in these exercises may be
relevant to how the Soviets would attack convoys. As
the amphibious groups move toward shore in order to land
naval infantry--and sometimes troops from the ground
forces--they typically are subjected to pre-strike sur-
veillance and then to simulated ASM, torpedo, and
occasionally submarine-launched cruise missile attacks.
The attacking strike aircraft sometimes are opposed by
air defense interceptors. Surface ships rarely parti-
cipate in the attacks except in coastal areas.
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Large numbers of TU-16 Badgers armed with ASMs
typically participate in simulated strikes against the
amphibious groups. The TU-16s usually are accompanied
for part of the flight by tanker aircraft for aerial
refueling and are preceded by other aircraft which drop
chaff and conduct electronic jamming to confuse the
groups' defenses.
The number and composition of the submarines par-
ticipating
they often
there were
preference
bious task
in these exercises have varied widely, but
have included nearly as many submarines as
surface ships under attack, indicating a
for group submarine operations against amphi-
forces. An exercise
for
example, may have been opposed by as many as 18 sub-
marines. Although 11 of these carried cruise missiles
as their primary armament, most attacked only with
torpedoes during this exercise. A Y-class SSBN also
participated in this exercise, probably to update its
crew's torpedo training. Information on the submarine-
related activity in these exercises is sparse, but again
it appears that the classes most likely to be given
interdiction assignments--such as the F-class--do not
participate more than other classes in practicing torpedo
attacks against surface ships. In landing exercises
held during 1967-76, missile-armed submarines--primarily
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the_J_.- and .7._classes=conducted more antishiD
attacks in the landing exercises than did submarines
for which torpedoes were the primary armament.
Another interesting feature of these exercises is
that attack submarines
of the amphibious task
this represents Soviet
decrease the number of
have operated in direct support
forces. It is
policy (if so,
uncertain whether
it could further
submarines available for inter-
diction), or whether the Soviets occasionally assign
submarines to groupings simulating US task forces for
realism because they know that the US Navy sometimes
uses attack submarines in a direct support role.
Other Convoy-Type Operations
Viewed against the totality of Soviet naval exer-
cises, the amount of effort devoted to anticonvoy train-
ing is small. Much of what does occur either involves
amphibious training or the Soviets' practicing of their
own convoy tactics. Occasionally, convoy-type exercises
do occur, however, which do not appear to be associated
with landing operations or simulation of anticarrier
warfare.
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In April 1977, for example, as part of the
spring exercise held annually by the Northern Fleet,
a convoy consisting of three merchant ships, an oiler,
and two warships operated off North Cap.e% Other
than possibly serving as targets for ASM aircraft,
the convoy's purpose is unknown.
More is known about "Val-74," a Warsaw Pact
command staff exercise enacted with "skeleton" naval
forces from East Germany, Poland, and the USSR. This
exercise reflected Soviet Baltic Fleet preoccupation
with close-in sea lanes, and indicated that the Pact
probably would try to control the Baltic and North
Seas in wartime. According to the exercise scenario,
the Pact first "seized" the Danish Straits and then
conducted a variety of navial operations, including
convoying merchant ships and interdicting Western
support shipping in the Baltic and North Seas. They
also operated in the North Sea against Western amphi-
bious forces and performed tactical ASW. These actions
were considered necessary to control the approaches to
the Baltic, to assist Pact ground forces advancing
along the coast of the Baltic and North Seas, and to
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protect the Pact's coastal shipping. Some of the
strikes in the North Sea were made against "troop
convoys."
Together with other evidence?includinia recent -
class ifie_si_Soviet discussian_af_conducting
operations in a continental theater--Val-74 indicates
that
--The Soviets regard interdiction in selected
off-shore waters as fairly important
when-it is tied to other objec-
tives, such as supporting ground troops
operating on a coastal front.
--Some of the convoy-type activity seen in
Soviet exercises probably is training to
protect Soviet shipping.
--Some-of the references to attacking convoys
in Soviet military literature and the appear-
ance of convoys in exercises probably are
related to countering landing ships screened
by naval escorts and supported by carriers.
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Coincident with attacks on enemy shipping, Soviet
writings indicate that they would attempt to secure
their own shipping--particularly in coastal waters--
through a combination of selective sea control measures
and convoying. According to a classified article pub-
lished in 1974i a centralized board would be established
to coordinate convoy operations for the Pact. The same
article and others indicate that they apparently expect
to have to assign 25 to 30 percent more escorts than
noncombatants in forming convoys. The screening forces
observed in Soviet peacetime exercises, however, usually
have included a smaller number of ships, on the order of
75 percent as-many as were in the main body.*
In addition to convoying merchant ships, the Pact
would seek to control its local waters and especially
important sectors of sea lanes. The Pact also would
conduct "special operations"--which include preemptive
strikes against enemy airfields and naval bases--as a
means of protecting its own shipping.
Thus, what appears to be a growing involvement of
commercial ships in Soviet naval operations may be a
reflection of Soviet concern to improve naval protection
*In about half of these exercises, the main body has included a major
surface combatant, probably to simulate a Western aircraft carrier.
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for these assets rather than an indication of increased
attention to interdiction of Western sea lines of
communications.
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ANNEX C
Interdiction in Local Wars
Soviet writings on interdiction focus on a NATO-
Warsaw Pact war. This orientation toward -
Europe probably reflects the importance that area has
for Soviet planners and also the belief that any con-
flict involving vital Western interests would elicit a
strong response that could lead to general nuclear war.
The key factor in Soviet assessments of the risks
of military involvement probably would be the degree
to which the Soviets believe they could keep such
conflicts from escalating. Thus, future Soviet involve-
ment in local wars or use of interdiction as a form of.
naval blackmail is dependent upon the scenario.
Unless they felt confident that they could gain
their ends by intimidation rather than by use of force,
the Soviets probably would employ naval blackmail
cautiously, if at all. Admiral Gorshkov has written,
however, in a historical context that the "threat" of
interrupting sea communications is a peacetime use of
naval power. The Soviets probably would like to be
able to use the same leverage, under favorable circum-
stances,-to influence the foreign policy of small
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countries. That they would move cautiously is indicated
by their past behavior and by a later Gorshkov article
in which he warned that limited wars in distant areas
carry with them the danger of escalation.
Conducting local wars, according to Gorshkov, is
general policy for "Imperialism," A key vulnerability
for the West in fighting such wars is its dependence on
sea communications. Gorshkov doubtlessly would like to
acquire the means to deter the West from involvement in
local wars that impinge on Soviet interests. He probably
_
believes that the presence of Soviet naval forces--and
the attendant publicity that.ther would. receive in the
Western press?could inhibit Western involvement in local
wars except where vital interests were threatened.
On balance, there is little evidence that the
Soviets contemplate limited use of their naval forces
in peacetime to disrupt shipments of vital commodities,
such as oil. Not only could such action endanger world
peace, but it also could imperil the heavy investment
that the Soviets have made in their own merchant and
.fishing fleets.
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ANNEX D
Weapons Carried by Soviet Attack Submarines
The evidence
generally is consistent with recommendations for weapons
loads contained in the classified Soviet writings of the
mid- to late 1960s, when the Soviets began to grapple
with problems raised by modifying their strategic doctrine
to include the possibility that war with the West might be
fought in all or in part without use of nuclear weapons.
In their military literature the Soviets note the diffi-
culty of being prepared for both nuclear and non-nuclear
contingencies and emphasize the importance of
_
*See table on page .
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maintaining their operational submarines in sea-ready
-
condition and loaded with authorized levels of both
nuclear and conventional armaments.
Soviet Doctrine
Recognition of the need to prepare simultaneously
for both conventional and nuclear war raised several
problems for the Soviet Navy. This need, which was
not officially acknowledged in the Soviet Union until
the mid-1960s, prompted several articles in classified
Soviet journals on how to adapt naval forces to the
new doctrine. These articles contained the following
recommendations on submarine armament:
-- At least half of all the cruise missiles
carried by Soviet submarines should be
nuclear.
If a cruise missile submarine has a
limited number of launchers and if group
operations are impossible, all missiles
should be nuclear.
ASW submarines should carry rocket-
boosted antisubmarine weapons and two
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to four nuclear torpedoes. These should
be launched against Western SSBNs as soon
as nuclear war begins.
Submarines need only conventional
torpedoes for self-defense.
Torpedo attack submarines dedicated to
anticarrier-operations should carry up
to 30 percent nuclear torpedoes. This
would permit two "salvos" with conven-
tional torpedoes and one with nuclear
torpedoes against an.aircraft carrier.
Implications of the Cruise Missile Loads
The high ratio of nuclear to conventional warheads
on cruise missiles carried by the submarines suggests
that the Soviets believe that war at sea may not
remain conventional for long. In a conventional con-
flict, Soviet cruise missile submarines could be
forced to wait on the sidelines as a contingency force
in case of escalation, or be forced to brave Western
antisubmarine barriers to replenish their few non-
nuclear missiles.
To compensate for the small number of conventional
weapons carried, the Soviets probably would try to
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concentrate their forces against major targets. Group
operations would offset weapons limitations, but would
require large forces, decreasing the number of units
available for other tasks.
The weapons loadings reflected in
doctrinal writings indicate a strong Soviet
commitment to fighting naval engagements with tactical
nuclear weapons. In a nuclear environment the small
number of weapons carried would not be critical. A
single hit with a nuclear weapon probably would be
sufficient to sink any target at sea.
Speculations on. the Torpedo Loads
There seems to be a requirement to arm front-line
Soviet submarines, regardless of class, with at least
two nuclear torpedoes--a small fraction of nuclear to
conventional weapons compared to the cruise missile
loads. One reason for this dissimilarity may be that
some of the torpedoes are earmarked for self,defense,
while all of the cruise missiles are offensive weapons
intended for striking high-value surface ships. The
Soviets also could use conventional weapons against
targets in close engagements to avoid damaging the
firing submarine.
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ANNEX E
How the Soviets Would
Carry Out Interdiction Operations
The Soviets write that in wartime they would
attempt to interdict Western sea lines of communi-
cation by conducting missile and air strikes against
ports; by sinking merchant and troop transport ships
on the high seas; and by sowing mines in heavily
traveled waters.
Soviet emphasis on all three of these basic
methods is a departure from the conduct of past inter-
diction campaigns. Soviet authors, for example, have
stressed that a major flaw in German planning during
World War II was their failure to mount "massed and
systematic" attacks on cargo ports. The tone of
Soviet discussion of German mistakes suggests that
on European ports
such attacks/with conventional weapons could be
launched if a war did not escalate into a nuclear
conflict. Soviet theorists note that once the nuclear
threshold is .crossed, nuclear strikes against land
targets are the most efficient means of interdicting
shipping.
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Similarly, the Soviets have stated that in the
past mining has been underestimated as a means of
disrupting shipping. Mine warfare in their view also
is useful because it strains enemy naval resources
and extends the amount of time that merchant ships
must remain at sea, thus enhancing their vulnerability
to other forms of attack.
Focusing on the military aspects of interdiction,
Warsaw Pact authors distinguish between "ocean" communi-
cations and "close sea lines of communication."
Disruption of the latter can become an "urgent task,"
the outcome of which could impact directly on the land
campaign. This emphasis is consistent with Soviet
planning guidance for use of submarines, aircraft, and
surface ships in interdiction operations. "Experience
indicates," according to a classified Pact document,
that the best means of conducting interdiction
operations in off-shore waters is through a combination
of aircraft and surface ships.
In open ocean interdiction, submarines would be
the primary strike force. Aviation would have a dual
role--to participate in antishipping strikes and to
locate targets. Surface ships, in the Soviet view,
would be needed to support and protect submarines
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transiting to and from the sea lanes. The Soviets
probably would only deploy their surface ships within
effective range of their land-based aircraft. The
emphasis on coordinated operations, coupled with the
lack of air cover, might dictate concentration of
Soviet forces within -a few hundred miles from Europe,
with only a few Soviet submarines operating alone in
distant waters.
If sufficient forces were available, the Soviets
_
probably would seek to create a submarine threat within
an entire naval theater because theyJalso view inter-
diction as a useful diversionary tactic. They know
that it is much easier to attack than defend merchant
ships, and, .consequently, that a few submarines can tie
up a disproportionate amount of enemy resources. In
his writings of 1972 and again in 1976, Adm. Gorshkov
noted that, for each German U-boat in World War II, the
Allies were obliged to deploy 25 ASW ships and 100
aircraft.
in a long war
Moreover,_/ attacks against sea communications
are useful because they impose "great stress" on
defending naval forces. One officer argued that
scattered worldwide attacks could force the enemy to
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monitor the entire ocean. If these views were imple-
mented, the Soviets might try to conduct strikes in
unexpected areas--as well as against the main North
Atlantic shipping lanes--to force as large a dispersion
of Western naval resources as possible.
Other Soviets argue, however, that antishipping
forces should be concentrated on "decisive axes"--probably
close to shore--
/where they could produce quick results. There is no
evidential basis for divining which course the Soviets
might take but it seems most likely that they would
hedge their bets and use both diversionary and con-
centration operations.
General Staff Planning
A classified Soviet manual, written in 1963 but
apparently sill inTiIsebfhe General Staff-fin= prannifig
all types of naval operations, describes in some detail
Soviet planning factors for interdiction. The manual
does not indicate how the Soviets would apportion their
forces in wartime. The planning information in this
15-year-old document also is consistent with the more
general treatment of interdiction in a recent Warsaw
Pact report.
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The Soviets believe they would need:
-- To collect advance intelligence on the nature
and importance of enemy shipments, as well as
their defenses.
To reconnoiter "the entire depth of the
enemy's [sea] communications."
To relieve submarines which have expended their
weapons or to resupply them at sea.
To resolve the problem of hydrometeorological
forecasting in distant areas.
To deploy interdiction forces covertly
in advance along the expected routes of
enemy convoys; and
-- To conduct timely shifts of forces to new
areas if the enemy engages in evasive
convoy
routi^ ng.
The manual states that interdiction forces should
be divided into three groups, consisting of:
-- Strike forces, primarily submarines,
allocated to sink convoys and disrupt
port operations.
Surface ships to safeguard submarines
engaged in interdiction operations as
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they deploy to and from their patrol
areas.
?
-- A "reserve" of naval aircraft.*
The Soviets expect to begin an interdiction cam-
paign by striking ports while convoys Are?b-e-i-n-g--fbiti-e-d -
and ships loaded.** Then submarines and aircraft would.
strike convoys en route. If a diesel submarine detected
a convoy, the submarine would surveil it, and report
to the "fleet command post," which would order faster
nuclear-powered submarines to join and then remain in
contact with the convoy, presumably until sufficient
forces were available to conduct '--i-C-66idina1ed ?ack
Merchant ships would then be subjected to successive
mine fields, which would be systematically replenished.
As they neared their destination, the merchant ships would
be attacked by aircraft and missile troops of the coastal
front.
*In a more recent Warsaw Pact discussion of the three groups
necessary to conduct interdiction operations, an air group
dedicated to "reconnaissance" was substituted for the "reserve"
of naval aircraft.
"The Soviets elsewhere have indicated that they believe it would
take the United States between two and three weeks to organize
convoys and that they would attempt to deliver strikes (presumab4--
with nuclear weapons) against the ports toward the end of this
period when the concentration of ships was highest.
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Weapons Employed
The Soviets have the option of employing a variety
of weapons against merchant ships at sea--air- and
submarine-launched cruise missiles, torpedoes, and
mines laid by aircraft and submarines. Because of
range constraints on Soviet naval aircraft and their
heavy commitment early in war against carrier task
forces, we believe it unlikely that they would be used
much against merchant shipping. The Soviets also could
have difficulty laying and replenishing mines in areas
of Western air superiority.
With regard to submarine-launched cruise missiles,
the Soviets probably continue to believe as one admiral
did in 1961 when he wrote that "there is no need to
expend [cruise] missiles against transports since one
or two torpedoes, are sufficient to sink a merchant
vessel." If, however, the convoys are well protected
and are of high value, or if success agaihst aircraft
carriers permits the reassignment of cruise missile sub-
marines, the Soviets probably would allocate some of these
submarines against convoys.
Whether the Soviets would use submarine-launched
cruise missiles or torpedoes with nuclear warheads
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against merchant-convoys is also unclear and probably
would depend partly on how well the convoys were
escorted. A long list of targets considered suitable
for naval weapons with nuclear warheads contained in
the General Staff manual does not include convoys.
Elsewhere, in a discussion of tactics to be used in an
interdiction campaign, however, the manual indicates that
nuclear weapons could be used against merchant ships.
Another classified documentary source stated that at the
outbreak of war Soviet submarines should put to sea with
"their complement" of nuclear weapons, which would be
used only against "capital ships." A recent lecture
on strategy, classified Top Secret by the Soviets,
estimated that a shortage of nuclear weapons would
develop as the war progresses and, consequently, that
they would have to be used only against the most
important targets.
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ANNEX F
Alternative Interdiction Scenarios
The analysis described in this Annex was performed
to examine Soviet submarine capabilities against Western
shipping in the North Atlantic. A model employing several
sets of assumptions provided a range of outcomes.* The
analysis considers the capabilities of Soviet submarines
under different force levels to deliver torpedoes against
US convoys to Europe. It assumes that most merchant ships
are concentrated in the southern shipping lanes of the
North Atlantic in order to route them beyond range of
Soviet ASM aircraft for most of the distance. This would
also extend transit times for Soviet submarines.
The analysis focuses on three scenarios which repre-
sent varying levels of commitment of attack submarines to
interdiction of Western shipping in the North Atlantic
over a 120-day period. The assumptions built into the
model deliberately tend to "worst case" the situation for
NATO and result in optimistic exchange ratios for the USSR.
*Called Firearm, the model, which is unclassified, was developed '
by Science Applications Incorporated of Englewood, Colorad..
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Key assumptions used in the model were:
-- Each submarine withholds two torpedoes
for self-defense; otherwise all of its
torpedoes are expended against merchant
.ships in a target-rich environment.
-- Submarines suffer 20 percent attrition--
during transitatt-or: NO Additional
submarine attrition was included.
Torpedqes with nuclear warheads and
cruise missiles are not expended against
imerchant ships.
-- Nuclear submarines transit at 12 knots;
diesels at five.
-- Turnaround time between patrols is 25
days.
-- Submarines average 15 days on station.
-- The Soviets maintain a continuous sub-
marine presence in the shipping lanes.
-- Northern Fleet bases are undamaged and
continue to support submarine operations.
-- Submarines must return to the Northern
Fleet area for replenishment. NATO air
superiority prevents the Soviets from
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replenishing submarines from captured
territory.
-- The Soviets achieve a hit rate of about
.25 for each torpedo fired (.85 technical
reliability times a deliberately optimistic
probability of .3 for accuracy).
-- One hit is sufficient to disable a merchant
ship.
The results of this analysis indicate that because
of limitations such as long transits, low availability,
small average torpedo loadings, and because of the
large number of NATO-flag-ships available-for sealift
in the North Atlantic, Soviet submarines in all three
cases fail to sink ships at a level that would
seriously affect the resupply of Europe. The results
of the model are summarized in the following table.
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?
Illustrative Ship Losses to Soviet Submarines in a 120-Day Open Ocean Interdiction Campaign in the North Atlantic
Percentage of
Available Long-Range Percentage of
:
Level Attack Submarines Composition of Ships Sunk INATO-Flag
_
Scenarios of Effort in Northern Fleet Soviet Interdiction Forces or Disabled*** _Ships
1 Anticipated 11 5 F-class SS* 27
2 N-class SSN
2 All available 33 12 F-class SS*
long-range 2 1-class SS.
torpedo 5 N-class SSN
attack sub- 2 Z-class SS
marines
except V-
class
3
Maximum: All
available sub-
marines except
ballistic
missile
106
100 6 C-class SSGN 273 f2.8
8 E-II-class SSGN
7 J-class SSG
5 N-class SSN
12 V-class SSN
22 F-class SS**
2 1-class SS
2 Z-class SS
*F-class submarines deployed to the Mediterranean are excluded from the strike forces in Scenarios 1 and 2.
**The Northern Fleet normally supplies about 10 attack submarines for the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron.
Although unlikely, it is assumed for purposes of Scenario S that these forces would be available for
operations in the North Atlantic.
***These numbers assume a Soviet hit probability of about 25 percent and that a single hit is sufficient
to disable a target.
_
****These numbers include only NATO-gag ships, which displace_over 1,000 tons. They exclude over 4,000 Liberian
and Fdnamahian flag ships, some of which probably alto woutd-te-used for sea lift if
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Scenario 1 (Anticipated Level of Effort)
This scenario assumes that the Soviets are interested
mainly in attacking merchant ships in the open ocean in
order to create a diversion and cause NATO to disperse
its forces over the sea lanes. It represents the level
of effort we believe likely in the early phases of war
while Western aircraft carriers and SSBNs still posed a
threat to the Soviet Union. Collectively, these submarines
would commence their patrols with 132 torpedoes that could
be expended against merchant ships.
The table on p. shows that over a 120-day period
this group could under favorable operating conditions.,
sink or disable some 27 ships, or about .3 percent of
the sealift resources available to NATO.
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lw.0 0.1.,...1.1...1,
Scenaric? 2 (all available long-range torpedo attack
submarines except V-class)
This scenario assumes that NATO armies_have_fought Pact
forces to a standstill on the Rhine; that the Soviets
preempted at sea, destroying some Western SSBNs at their
bases and carriers with conventional weapons; and that
this partial success plus an indefinite continuation of
the conventional phase, persuaded Soviet leaders to risk
sending one-third of the available long-range general
purpose submarines in the Northern Fleet inventory
against merchant ships. This level of effort by Northern
Fleet submarines would be approximately the same as that
expended against Western SSBNs and carriers.
Under favorable operating circumstances these
submarines could destroy or disable 106 merchant
ships, constituting about one percent of NATO-flag
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Scenario 3 (Maximum Effort)
All available long-range general purpose submarines
in the Northern Fleet and Mediterranean Squadron are
sent against merchant ships. This force could sink some
273 merchant ships, a level of attrition that would repre-
sent about three percent of the inventory NATO-flag ships.
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If in the maximum effort portrayed by Scenario 3 all
submarines were predeployed to the sea lanes and began
sinking merchant ships at the outset of hostilities,
losses would rise by about 30 percent. This additional
attrition, however, would include relatively few ships
carrying military cargo because of the time required
for convoy formation. Moreover, Soviet capabilities
would drop rapidly and prevent them from maintaining
a steady presence in the sea lanes.
Additional attrition could be inflicted on shipping
in Scenario 3 by use of conventionally armed submarine-
_
_
launched cruise missiles as well as torpedoes. Assuming
that 50 percent of the missiles carried by C-,
and J-class submarines were conventional, this would be
approximately the equivalent of 100 additional torpedoes
that could be expended against merchant shipping in
_
Scenario 3.
Failure to include cruise missiles in calculating
losses in Scenario _3, however, is compensated for by assuming-
more effective antiship torpedo loadings than the evi-
dence would indicate.
"alert" submarines in peacetime carry mixed weapons
loads, including ASW and nuclear torpedoes. If, as seems
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likely, this practice were carried over into wartime,
the number of torpedoes that could be expended against
merchant ships would be reduced and would result in
fewer ships lost than postulated in Scenarios
Other more realistic operating conditions likely
to prevail in wartime for Soviet at-sea interdiction
probably would contribute to lower ship losses than
those attained in this analysis. Given the Soviet -
peacetime practice of firing at long range from outside
escort screens, Soviet accuracy probably would be less
than that postulated. Moreover, all hits would not dis--
able or sink a target as we assumed.
Target acquisition, depending on the scenario,
could also reduce Soviet capabilitie5 and force their
submarines to spend more time on station searching for
targets. This would increase the vulnerability of the
submarines, while reducing their effectiveness.
In any event, submarines would be subject to
attrition during their entire patrols, not merely during
transits. If submarine attrition were .3 to .5 per
patrol, instead of .2 as assumed in_this analysis, the_
Soviets, after 120 days of war, could sink only about
200-250 merchant ships in Scenario 3, and their capabiliti&s
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to continue an at-sea interdiction campaign would be
sharply reduced.
If the higher attrition rates were used in Scenario
_ _
submarine losses would rise to about 35 to 50 percent
of all long-range general purpose submarines main-
tained in the Northern Fleet as opposed to 25 percent
at .2.
In any event, given the basic assumptions of this
model, we can find no reasonable scenario that would
appreciably increase the number of merchant ships
sunk in any of the three cases examined. All three scen-
arios were constructed to the Soviets' advantage. Even
if we were to further increase that advantage by assum-
ing that the convoys were undefended--thus allowing
about a .43 hit rate (.5 accuracy times .85 technical
reliability)--in Scenario 3 the Soviets could stil1 sink
only about -five percent of NATO-flag shipping in a
favorable 120-day interdiction campaign.
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.101---TSerrieL
(Security Classification)
--Ur?Se) Grret
(Security Classification) ///f/
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