Appeal Request

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005389188
• Release Decision: IPPUB U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: March 11, 2011
• Case Number: F-2010-01608
• Publication Date: May 1, 2009

NAT'L SECURITY ARCHIVE ? CIA R 006/024
(b)(6)
The National Security Archive
The George Washington University
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, O.C. 20037
Delores M. Nelson
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington DC 20505
Re: Appeal for F'-2007-00110 / Archive #20061949CIA310
Dear Ms. Nelson:
Phone: 202.994,7045
Fax; 202.994,7005
foladesk?gwu,edu
http;//www.nsarchive.org
l writing on behalf of Thomas Blanton, director of the National Security Archive, This letter
constitutes an administrative appeal in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),
5 USC Sec. 552, of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) response to a FOIA request submitted
October 16, 2006, asking for documents related in whole or in part to then CIA Director George
Tenet's meeting with then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice on July 10, 2001
(Attachment 1). The CIA's response letter of March 11, 2009, said that the Agency considers
responsive records properly classified in full under FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(5)
(Attachment 2).
First, I would like to call the Panel's attention to the fact that information regarding the July 10,
2001 meeting between George Tenet and Condoleezza Rice has been made publicly available. In
October 2006, both the Washington Post and the New York Times described the meeting,
including the general substance of that meeting (Attachments 3 and 4), which has also been
described in Bob Woodward's book, State qfDenial, Bush at War Part III.
Previously classified records about terrorist threats in 2001 have already been declassified and
made available to the public, and I have enclosed one such document-a January 2001 National
Security Council memorandum to Condoleezza Rice (Attachment 5), This document provides
significant factual detail, and the release of this document in 2004 did not cause harm to national
security, It follows, therefore, that releasing materials about this July 2001 meeting will not
cause harm to national security now, almost 8 years after September 11, 2001-the threat that
was most likely the subject of the meeting.
An independent non-governmental research institute and library located at the George Washington University, the Archive collects
and publishes declassified documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. Publication royalties and tax deductible
contributions through The Nannnai Qe ,,ate
 I also question the application of Exemption (b)(5) to documents related to this meeting,
for several reasons. First, according to reports, there was no attorney present at the
meeting, and therefore, the information cannot fall under any kind of attorney or work
product privilege. Second, the meeting did not result in a policy decision. In fact, one
complaint has been levied against Rice that she did not respond to the wings by Tenet
from this meeting or other meetings. Therefore, records related to this meeting should not
be withheld on the basis of being "predecisional" as there was no decision made, no
policy pursued. Finally, the meeting involved factual information (the imminent terrorist
threat) in addition to recommendations about policy, and I urge the Agency Release Panel
to make this distinction.
At this time, I would like to take this opportunity to remind the Agency Release Panel
that the Freedom of Information Act mandates that an agency must release portions of a
record that are not exempt if those nonexempt portions are "reasonably segregable." This
particularly applies to the factual information that was relayed in the meeting between
Tenet and Rice. I urge the Panel to fully execute this requirement, as mandated by law,
and reconsider the withholding of this document,
As you review my appeal, please consider the recent Memorandum on the Freedom of
Information Act issued by President Barack Obama on January 21, 2009, which directs
all agencies to "adopt a presumption in favor of disclosure" and apply this presumption
"to all decisions involving FOIA_" President Obama also makes clear that "[t]he
Government should not keep information confidential merely because public officials
might be embarrassed by disclosure, because errors and failures might be revealed, or
because of speculative or abstract fears." Pursuant to this directive, I ask that you
consider whether the information withheld in response to my FOIA request should be
released in light of the new presumption of disclosure.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
 Attachment 1
 0420/2009 14:56 FAX [phone] NAT'L SECURITY ARCHIVE d CIA J009/024
to-lh e Ag=y
Mr. Thomas Blanton
The National Security Archive
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Sweet
Washington, D.C. 20037
Reference: F-2007-001 I S / Archive ##20061949CL,310
Dear Mr. Blanton:
This is a final response to your 16 October 2006 Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) request for all documents relating in whole or in part to then CIA Director George
Tenet's meeting with then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice on 10 July 2001,
We Processed your request in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. ? 552, as amended, and
the CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C, ? 431, as amended, our processing included a search
for records as described in our 25 July 2007 acceptance letter existing through the date of
that letter.
We completed a thorough search for records responsive to your request and located
material which we determined is properly classified and must be denied in its entirety on
the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(5).
CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator Delores M. Nelson made this decision,
which you may appeal to the Agency Release Panel, in my care, within 45 days from the
date of this letter. Please include the basis of your appeal,
Delores M. Nelson
Information and Privacy Coordinator
20061949CIA310
RECN0:34851
CIA
SEQC0R:146065
as,'meentau, Tftaynsty
 04!28(2009 1457 FAX [phone] HAT'L SECURITY ARCHIVE i CIA
Attachment 2
 The National Security Archive
The George Washington University
Gelman Library, suite 701 Phone; 202/994-7000
2130 H Street, H,W, Fax: [phone]
Washington, D.C. 20037 [e-mail]
Scott A, Koch
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Was on, DC 20505
Re: Request under the FOIA, in reply refer to Archiv 200619490 10
pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (POIA), I hereby request the ing,
A/1 docaanseaee, including but not limited to cables, le rs an oranda, briefangpapers, transcripts, summaries, notes,
"his, reports, dr , and intelligence documents relating in whole or In part to then CIA Director George Tenet's
meeting avitla then National Secaray Advisor Condoleewa Rice on ..tally 10, 2001.
This meeting is cited in Bob Woo d's book State of Denial, wash at War Part M. It is also cited in an October 2,
.2 006, New York pies Article, "Records Show Tenet Briefed Rice on Al redo Threat, ' by Philip Shenon ands ark
M eedi as well as an October 3, 2006, Washington Post article, "Tenet Recalled Warning Rice." by Dan Eggen and
Robin Wright I've attached copies of both articles for your reference.
If
you regard any of these documents as poten y exempt from the FOLA,'s disclosure reo ergo a Ana e
nonethelaq,
t ^
s
at
L
As the
.
, O
k requires, please release all reasonably seg?egable non
exempt portions of documents. To permit me to reach an intelligent and informed decision whether or not to Me an
administrative appeal of any denied material, please describe any withheld records (or portions thereof) and 1
basis for your exemption claims,
p
As a representative of the news media, the National Security
status 5 U.S.C. See. 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(11) End, therefore, may rayanooc be qualities charged search for
s rein review fees. (See nr "
. National
Security Archive v. U.S. Department ?fDefense, 880 F.2d 1381 ().C. Cir. 1989), cart denied, 110 0 S fee S 0t. 1478 7$ (1990)).
This request is made as part of a scholarly and news research project that is intended for publication and is not for
commercial use. For details on the Archive's research and
irsaral ve.org, extensive publication activities please see our website at
www.li
To expedite the release of the requested documents, please disclose them on an interim basis as they become available to
you, without waiting until all the documents have been processed. Please notify me before incurring
costs over S 100. If you have any questions rear
ding any photocopying
0 the identity of the records, their location, the scope of the request or
any other matters, please call me at [phone] or cmQ response within the twenty day statutory time period, me at fo" ait~o edu, I look forward to receiving Your
Sincerely yo
Thomas S. Blanton
Executive Director
 Attachment 3
 U4/ Ut2009 1457 FAX [phone] NAT'L SECURITY ARCHIVE
Records Show Tenet Briefed Rice on Al Qaeda Threat ? New York Times
c Xetu Dark Cho r
f?,,: : .et[ iri
October 2, 2006
Records Show Tenet Briefed Rice on Al Qaeda ? Threat
By 2 T SHE d
JIDDA, Saudi Arabia, Oct, 2 - A review of White House records has determined that
lmd, then the director of central intelligence, did brief Condol e2aa 12'a and other top
officials on July lo, 2001, about the looming threat from ALQaeda, a State Department
spokesman said Monday.
The account by Sean McCormack came hours after Ms. Rice, the secretary of state, told
reporters aboard her airplane that she did not recall the specific meeting on July 10, 20d1,
noting that she had met repeatedly with Mr. Tenet that summer about terrorist threats.
Rice, the national security adviser at the time, said it was "incomprehensible" she ignored AT&
dire
terrorist threats two months before the Sept. ii attacks,
Mr. McCormack also said records show that the Sept, ii commission was informed about the
meeting, a fact that former intelligence officials and members of the commission confirmed on
Monday.
When details of the meeting emerged last week in a new book by Bob Woodward of The
Washington post, Bush administration officials questioned Mr. Wood rd's reporting,
Now, after several days, both current and former Bush administration officials have confirmed
parts of Mr. Wood ward's account.
Officials now agree that on July 10, 2001, Mr. Tenet and his counterterrorism deputy, J. Cofer
Black, were so alarmed about an impending Al Qaeda attack that they demanded emergency
meeting at the White House with Ms, ice and her National See, o ,n 9 staff.
According to two former intelligence officials, Mr. Tenet told those assembled at the White
House about the growing body of intelligence the Central Tntehl_iaenee en had collected
pointing to an impending Al Qaeda attack. But both current and former officials took issue
with Mr, Wood rd's account that Mr. Tenet and his aides left the meeting in tration,
feeling as if Ms. Rice had ignored them.
 Records Show Tenet Briefed Rice on Al Qaeda Threat - New York Times Page 2 of 3
Mr. Tenet told members of the Sept. sx commission about the July to meeting when they
interviewed him in early 2004, but committee members said the former C.I_A, director never
indicated he had left the White House with the impression that he had been ignored.
"Tenet never told us that he was brushed off," said Richard Ben$Teniste, a Democratic member
of the commission, "We certainly would have followed that up,"
Mr. McCormack said the records showed that, far from ignoring Mr. Tenet's warnings, Ms.
Rice acted on the intelligence and requested that Mr. Tenet make the same presentation to
Defense Secretary Donald 1T I~cl and Atttorney General J_ghn AsI ro4 .
But Mr. Ashcroft said by telephone on Monday evening that he never received a briefing that
summer from Mr. Tenet,
" Frankly, I'm disappointed that I didn't get that kind of briefing," he said. "I'm surprised he
didn't think it was important enough to come by and tell me,"
The dispute that has played out in recent days gives further evidence of escalating battle
between the White House and Mr. Tenet over who should take the blame for such mistakes
the failure to stop the Sept, a attacks and assertions by Bush administration officials that
stockpiling chemical and biological weapons and cultivating ties to Al
Mr. Tenet resigned as director of central intelligence in the s mer of 2004 and was honored
that December with a Presidential Medal of Freedom during a White House ceremony. Since
leaving the C.I.A., Mr. Tenet has stayed out of the public eye, largely declining to defend his
record at the C.I.A. even after several government investigations have assailed the faulty
intelligence that helped build the case for the Iraq war.
Mr. Tenet is now completing work on a memoir that is scheduled to be published early next
year.
It is unclear how muchMr, Tenet will use the book to settle old scores, although recent books
have portrayed Mr. Tenet both as dubious about the need for the Iraq war and angry that the
White House has made the C.I.A. the primary scapegoat for the wax.
In his book "The One Percent Doctrine," the journalist and author Ron Sus ' d quotes Mr.
Tenet's former deputy at the C?I?A., John McLaughlin, saying that Mr. Tenet "wishes he could
give that damn medal back."
 Records Show Tenet Briefed Rice on Al Qaeda Tbreat m New York Times Page 3 of 3
In his own book Mr. Woodward wrote that over time Mr. Tenet developed a particular dislike
for Ms. Rice, and that the former C.I.A. director was furious when she publicly blamed the
agency for allowing President Bush to make the false claim in the 2003 State of the Union
dress that Saddam Hussein was pursuing nuclear materials in Niger.
"If the C.LA., the Director of National Intelligence, had said ` e this out of the speech,' it
would have been gone, without question," Ms. Rice told reporters in July 2003.
In fact, the C.I.A. had told the White House months before that the Niger intelligence was
bogus and had managed to keep the claim out of an October 2002 speech that President Bush
gave in Cincinnati.
More recently, Mr. Tenet has told friends that he was particularly angry when, appearing
recently on Sunday talk shows, both Ms. Rice and Vice President Dick her, gv cited Mr. Tenet
by name as the reason that Bush administration officials asserted that Mr. Hussein had
stockpiles of banned weapons in Iraq and ties to Al Qaeda.
Mr. Cheney recalled during appearance on "Meet the Press" on Sept. io of this year: "George
Tenet sat in the Oval Office and the president of the United States asked him directly, he said,
`George, how good is the case against Saddarn on weapons of mass de ction?' the director of
the C.I.A. said, `It's a slam dunk, Mr. President, it's a slam dunk.' "
Philip Shenon reported from Jidda, SaudiArabia, and lWark M zetti from Washington,
Pelv~ew Palkv J
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httP:// .n i es.comJ2006/101021was ? gtonl03ricecnd h ?ei-5088 aa=5b272a2b.:.
 Attachment 4
 Tenet Recalled Warning Rice - w gtonpost.corn
5i n
Tenet Recalled Warning ice
Former CIA Chief Told 9/11 Commission of Disputed
Meeting
By Dan Eggen and Robin Wright
wasbington Post Staff Writers
Tuesday, October 3, 2006; A03
Former CIA director George Tenet told the 9/11
Commission that he had warned of imminent threat
from al-Qaeda in a July 2001 meeting with
Condoleezza Rice, adding that he believed Rice took
the warning seriously, according to a transcript of the
interview and the recollection of a commissioner who
was there.
Tenet's statements to the commission in January 2004 corrinot the outlines of event in a new book by
Washington Post Assistant Managing Editor Bob Woodward that has been disputed by some Bush
administration officials, But the testimony also is at odds with Woodward's depiction of Tenet and
former CIA counterterrorism chief J. Cofer Black as being frustrated that "they were not getting through
to Rice" after the July 10, 2001, meeting.
Rice angrily rejected those assertions yesterday, saying that it was "incomprehensible" that she would
have ignored such explicit intelligence from senior CIA officials and that she received no warning at the
meeting of an attack within the United States.
Rice acknowledged that the White House was receiving a "steady stream of quite alarmist reports of
potential attacks" during that period, but said the targets were assumed to bean the Middle East,
including Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Israel and Jordan,
"What I quite certain of, however, is that I would remember if I was told -- as this account
apparently says -- that there was about to be attack in the United States," Rice said. "The idea that I
would somehow have ignored that I find incomprehensible."
The meeting has become the focus of a fierce and often confusing round of finger.poiuting involving
Rice, the White House and the 9/11 Commission, all of whom dispatched staffers to the National
Archives and other locations yesterday in attempts to sort out what had occurred,
Members of the co ssion -- independent, bipartisan panel created by Congress to investigate the
Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks -- have said for days that they were not told about the July 10 meeting
and
were at being left out. As recently as yesterday afternoon, both commission
chairman
omas H.
Kean and vice chairman Lee Hamilton said they believed the panel had not been told abot the July 10
meeting,
But it turns out that the panel was, in fact, told about the meeting, according to the interview
and Democratic commission member Richard Ben-Veniste, who sat in on the int transcript
erview
ort. with Tenet, The
meeting was not identified by the July 10 date in the commission's best-selling rep
http:// .eras . gtoupo$t,conV _dy,n/cont t/ 'cle/2006/10/02/AR20n
 Tenet Recalled Warning Rice - washingtonpost,com
Rice added to the confusion yesterday by strongly suggesting that the meeting may never have occurred
at all -- even though administration officials had conceded for several days Department spokesman said later that while the meeting de 'tely happened, at
Rice and Tenet disputed
Woodward's characterization of her response.
"The briefing was a summary of the threat reporting from the previous weeks," State Department
spokesman Sean McCormack told reporters navel' with nice in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia. "There. was
nothing new."
w s or perhaps month '?"r? anew were signs that there could be an al- da attack in
s, that there would be multiple, simultaneous attacks caus' jor h an
casualties, and that the focus would be US, targets, f a c i l i t i e s o r interests, But the intelligence sapoda
focused almost entirely on the attacks occ overseas, Tenet told the co ission, S
It was at this session that Tenet said "the system was blinking red," which became a chapter title in the
co ssion report, according to the official who saw the transcript.
According to three people present at the session, including Ben-Veniste, Tenet believed that Rice
responded seriously to what she had been told. "We particularly questioned him about whether he had
the sense that Dr. Rice and the others on the White House side understood the gravity of what he was
telling th ," said Ben-Veniste, a former Watergate prosecutor. "He said that they believed that they
did.... We asked him farther whether Dr. Rice just
an impression." J shrugged this off, and he said he did not have such
Tenet gave testimony about the July 2001 meeting with Rice at his Langley 28, 2004, occasionally referring to charts and slides, Philip Zelikow, who at the time was the ce on Jan.
co scion's executive director and now works for Rice, was present along with other orand ssion staff
members, according to F3 -V 'ste and to a portion of the transcript, which was read to The
Washington Post by official with access to it.
At one point in the lengthy session, Tenet recalled a briefing he was given on July 10 by Black st , according to the transcript. He said the information ation was so important that he quickly called for as
car and telephoned Rice to arrange for a White House meeting g to share what he had just learned,
according to the transcript and Ben-V `ste.
e
A east rovide the same e al john D. Ashcroft. briefing to fence Se et
Donald H. Rumsfeld and then T3.5. Attorney Gen
17, he said. McCormack was unable to explain why Rice felt the briefing should repeate fit did not
include new material.
Ashcroft said in an interview yesterday that he was never briefed by Tenet or Black about an imminicat
domestic threat.
"I didn't get called on by Black or Tenet if they were going around doing such briefings," Ashcroft said.
"If in fact they were making visits to craphasize the severity of the domestic threat, I'm a little
disappointed they didn't bring that'' ation to my attention."
Neither Black nor Tenet has made any public comments about the assertions in Woodward's book.
Woodward declined yesterday to corm ,t in a--1
Despite this, McCormack said Rice
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oatenU 'cle/2006/10/02/ 0051002001$7_... 10/17/200
 Tenet Recalled Warning Rice - washingtonpoet,com Page 3 of 3
Ben.Veniste`s comments seem to contradict his own remarks over the weekend to the New York Times,
in which he said that "the meeting was never mentioned to us." -Veniste said yesterday that there
was confusion between two different meetings and that the meeting described by Tenet is different in
character from the one portrayed by Woodward.
Zelikow, who now works as one of Rice's closest aides as a State Department counselor, did not respond
to a request for comment yesterday. He told the New York Times that none of the co ission`s
witnesses had drawn attention to a July 10 meeting or had outlined the type of confrontation with Rice
described by Woodward,
In comments to reporters, Rice also denied that she had endorsed ousting R feld at the and of Bush's
fist t
lth
a
h
a
rm, oug
she said she did tell President Bush that he might want to consider ch
entire foreign policy team.
"I did tell the president at one point that I thought maybe all of us should go, because we had fought two
wars and had the largest terrorist attack in American history," Rice said. "When he asked me to be
secretary of state, I said I think maybe you need new people. I don't know if that was somehow
interpreted, but what I was actually ? i about was me."
Wright reported from Shannon, Ireland, and Jiddah, Saudi Arabia. Staff writer Walter Pincus
contributed to this report.
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0 2006 The Washington Post Company
Running an online store? Loam how to proms Ue1160000ns for bee
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http;//-~ .washmgtonpost cd e/
 Attachment 5
 :ATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WRSP9tNC7~M, D.c. 2?5?a
SNFDR TION
MEMO DIBM FOR CONDOLEEZZA RICE
+tJLr1AKp A. CLARKE
Presidential Policy nI ltiative/Review
Qida Network - The Al.
reviews or initiacivas,w~Npropose major
Presidential policy
level review we eswo[1yz need such a Principals
on the al Qida netwnrb
7vst .some Terrorist
Grow 7
s _eA?b wl organizations limits the scope of
Support friendly Arab regimes can give to a range of US
As we noted in our briefings for you, al Qida is 6oC some
narrow- little terrorist issue that needs Co be included in
broader
broad regional policy. Rather, several of our regional
need to address centrally
to the US and our interests the
the Cra,! Qidagnet challenge
proceeding with separate policy csed v reviews t al Qida Central Asia, the By
CCC, North Africa, etc. we ws would dealina
for a comprehensive multi-regional policydegttately with the need
on a1 Qida.
a1? Qida is the active- organized, major force that is using a
distorted version of Islam as its vehicle to achieve two goals;
to drive the US out of the Muslim world, forcing the
withdrawal of our military and economic presence in countries
from Morocco to Indonesia;
--to moderate, modern, west in
countries with theocracies modeled alongetherlii s of theltm
Taliban,
a.2 Qida affects centrally our policies on Pakistan, Afghanistan
Central Asia, North Africa and~the GCC. Leaders i,n
Saudi
Arabia see a r o,4.4? --
v
I
Reason. ss,, ?asu A. Clarke NSC DECIFI TIONlo5td) REVIEW (x6) [E ?,LZ>35Ep
ed From: Multiple sources
 sastates by State and CIA?
respo-Third, when and how does the Administration choose to
respond to the attack on the tTSS Cole. That decision is
obviously complex, We can make some decisions, such as the
those above, now without yet coming to grips with the harder
decision about the Cole, on the Cole, we should take advantage
of the policy that we ,will respond at a time, place, and manner
of Our Own choosing' and not be forced into knee jerk responses.
policies, including Iraq policy and the peace process- We would
make a major error if we underestimated the challenge al 4ida
poses, or over estimated the
regimes al Qida threatens. stability of the moderate, friendly pendin Time Sensitive Cetfsioaas
At the close of the Clinton Administration, two decisions about
al Qi da were deferred to the Bush Administration,
wuAa we tOvide the Af
snare han Northern All Iante
assistance to mainrmiw
11 "I rlg}ating resumes after thejwInter thawor action this Spraing when
. The al sse
Brigade, which has been a key fighting force for the Taliban,
would then ethreaten freed tosend its personnel elsewhere, where they
would likely g interests. For any assistance to get
there in time to effect the Spring fighting, a decision is
needed now.
allow them aaaUU6Q a increase assistance to Uzbekistan to
to deal with the al ids! IlNC] tkrP~o-a
Three Other issues awaiting addressal now area
"First; what the new Administration says to the Taliban
and Pakistan about the importance we attach to ending the al
Qida sanctuary in Afghanistan. we are separately proposing
early, strong messages to both.
"Second, do we propose significant'program growth in the
FyQ2 budget for anti-al Qida operations by czA and counter-
terrorism training and as
 Ucl et-- Should we continue
Into F u et-- Should we continue the funding State and CIA programs designed increases
al Qida strategy, to implement the
Q da propaganda,
3. FY02 a
Attached is the year-end 2000 strategy on al Qida dev
the last Administration to give to you. eloped by
Also attached is the
1990 strategy, Neither was a "covert action onlyN
Both incorporated diplomatic, economic , ry
diplomacy and intelligence tools. Usingmtheilit2a000; Public
r as
r?background, we could prepare a decision paper/guide for a PC
review.
recommend that you have a Principals discussion of al Qtda
soor~ and eddreass the following issues:
Threat Ma Tlitude: Do the Principals agree that the al
4ida network poses a first order threat to Us interests in a
number or regions, or is this analysis a 'chicken A over
reaching and can we proceed without little
major new initiatives and by
handling this issue in a more routine manner?
2. Strategy; If it is a
the existing strategy be isting stfit order issue,
rastrengthened? how should
Two elemental of the' existing strategy that have not been made to
publworkic effectively information are to a) going after al Qida?s money and b)
counter al t
L:7 currences by, Mary McCarthy,
Camp
to the Northern glliancecand?totheSthobek?sp initiate
funding
Please let us know if you would like such a decision/discusijon
paper or any modifications to the background paper.
an Pried, Bruce Reidel, Don C
9
Attachment
Tab A December 2000 Paper: strata
from the Jihadist Networks of a gY for slimiasat the Threat
1-Qida: Status and Pros rospects ?
Tab 2 September 1998 Paper: P01-Mu Plan for al-Aida
 -1-11110 +.Od rnx 202 984 7005
04/24/2009 17:07 FAX [phone]
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