SOVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005363468
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 98
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2009
• Case Number: F-2009-00439
• Publication Date: October 26, 1972

 (b) (1)
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TOP
N I E 11-8-72
SOVIET FORCES FOR
INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK
 CONTENTS
Page
1
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ................... ............... 1
I. PRESENT STATUS OF SOVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTI-
NENTAL ATTACK .............................................. 1
General .......................................................... 1
The Principal Types of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles ............. 3
II. SOVIET POLICY AND FUTURE PROGRAMS 5
DISCUSSION ....................................................... 13
1. INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES .................. 14
Status of Operational Systems ..................................... 14
Characteristics and Capabilities of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
Force ......................................................... 14
Possible Deactivation of SS-7 Soft Sites ............................. 24
The New Deployment Programs ................................... 24
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Research and Development 25
Goals of New Missile Programs ................ . ................... 26
TO
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 Page
II. SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES ................ 30
Current Production Rates and Force Levels ......................... 30
Characteristics and Capabilities of the Ballistic Missile Submarine Force 32
Y- and D-Class Submarines ..................................... 32
H-Class Submarines ............................................ 37
G-Class Submarines ............................................ 37
New Programs ..................... ............................ 38
Current Forces ................... .............................. 39
Characteristics and Capabilities of the Force ........................ 39
The Backfire .................................. ... 40
Possible Follow-on Heavy Bomber ... ............................. 40
IV. SOVIET DECISION-MAKING ON MILITARY POLICY AND
PROGRAMS .................................................. 42
The Politburo ................................................... 43
The Defense Council ............................................. 44
The Military-Industrial Commission .......... ..................... 45
The Military as an Interest Group .................................. 46
The Scientific Establishment ...................................... 48
Other Influences ............................................... .. 48
The Decision-Making Process ..... ......... ..................... 48
V. ILLUSTRATIVE FUTURE FORCES ...... ....................... 49
Introduction ..................... 49
The Impact of the Limitation on Strategic Arms ..................... 50
The Soviet Perception of the United States Strategic Threat .......... 52
System Characteristics and Deployment Patterns ..... . ............. 55
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles .................................. 55
SS-7 and SS-8 ............ ....................................... 55
SS-9 .......................................................... 55
New Large Missile ............................................. 55
New Large Silos ............................................... 56
SS-11 ......................................................... 57
New Small Missile ............................................. 57
New Small Silos ................................................ 58
SS-13 ............................. 58
TOP -SECREY"
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 Page
Solid-Propellant Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles ................. 58
Mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles .......................... 59
Ballistic Missile Submarines and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles . 59
Status of Y- and D-Class Submarines ............................ 59
Size and Makeup of Forces ........................ .......:..... 59
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles .......................... 60
Production Rates ................................................ 61
G- and H-Class Submarines ..................................... 61
Bombers ....................................................... 61
Alternate Force Developments .................................... 62
Force 3 ....................................................... 64
Force 2 ........................................................ 66
Force 1 .... ................. .................. ............ ..... 67
Force 4 ....................................................... 69
Force 5 ....................................................... 71
Likely Soviet Courses of Action ............. 73
APPENDIX TO SECTION V ...................... ..... ........... :.. 77
APPENDIX: GLOSSARY OF MISSILE TERMS . ..................... 85
ANNEX A: ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE
OF SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL WEAPON SYSTEMS 91
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 SOVIET FORCES FOR
INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK
SCOPE NOTE
This NIE assesses the strengths and capabilities of Soviet forces for
intercontinental attack, discusses questions of policy with respect to
those forces, and estimates their size and composition over the next
several years.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
1. PRESENT STATUS OF SOVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL
ATTACK
General
A. An estimate on Soviet forces for intercontinental attack is sub-
ject to some special difficulties this year. For one thing, the strategic
arms limitation (SAL) agreements concluded in May have profound im-
plications both political and military. They create a new milieu, and
affect both the choices open to the Soviets and the way in which they
will be exercised. In addition, the Soviet forces for intercontinental
attack are in a kind of interim phase technically, and there is much un-
certainty about the characteristics of new systems being developed.
The issues involved are taken up in depth in the body of the paper,
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 but only some Q an be resolved on present evidence. This summary sets
forth (1) essential facts about present Soviet forces for intercontinental
attack (2) considerations bearing on Soviet policy choices and (3)
some likely changes in the characteristics of these forces. It concludes
with a brief description of the illustrative future forces contained in the
body of the paper and brief comments on the likely future shape of
Soviet forces.
B. In the course of the past decade, the Soviets have engaged in
a vigorous and costly buildup of the various elements of their forces
for intercontinental attack. As a result of this effort, the Soviets had
operational on 1 October 1972 an estimated 1,527 ICBM launchers,
including .120 SS-11 launchers at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk which,
though possibly intended for use against European targets, are never-
theless capable of reaching the US, 516 submarine-launched ballistic
missile (SLBM) launchers, and 195 heavy bombers and tankers.
C. The large-scale deployment programs for ICBMs which began
in the 1960s have now run their course, but the construction of new
types of silos and certain activity at the test ranges indicate that Soviet
ICBM programs are entering a new phase characterized by emphasis
on qualitative improvements. The new silos are found at the Tyuratam
missile test center and at several missile complexes. Two basic sizes
are involved-one large and one small. The new silos probably will
be harder to disable than existing silos. There is evidence which sug-
gests that silos at operational ICBM complexes will be converted
to the new configurations.
D. It appears that two new liquid-propellant missile systems are
under development at Tyuratam which are to be used both in new
silos and in reconstructed silos.
he smaller missile is in the
SS-11 class, and we think it will be deployed in reconstructed SS-11
silos. It may also be deployed in 60 new small silos at Derazhnya
and Pervomaysk, but there is evidence that these silos will house
the SS-11 Mod 3, at least initially. The larger missile is in the SS-9
class; the available evidence suggests that it could be either the size
of the SS-9 or somewhat larger. We expect this missile to be de-
 TO
ployed in the 25 new large silos located at SS-9 complexes and in
reconstructed SS-9 silos. In addition, flight tests have begun at the
Plesetsk missile test center on a solid-propellant missile which could
be entirely new or a highly modified SS-13.
E. Twenty-seven Y-class submarines, each equipped with 16 launch
tubes, are currently operational, and an additional 4 are fitting out
or conducting sea trials prior to entering service. The Soviets have
launched a modified Y-class submarine which differs from all previous
units of that class. This submarine; which has been designated the
D-class, is longer than the Y-class and has 12 launch tubes rather than
16. We believe that it will carry the SS-NX-8 missile, which has a
much greater range than the SS-N-6 missile carried by Y-class
submarines.
F. The Soviet force of intercontinental bombers and tankers
consists of 110 Bears, 70 of which carry air-to-surface missiles,
and 85 Bisons, including 50 tankers. The first units of a new strategic
bomber-the Backfire-could become operational by late 1973. All
but the Air Force continue to believe that it is best suited for use
against Europe and Asia. The Air Force believes that it is suitable
for a variety of missions including intercontinental attack.
The Principal Types of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
G. The SS-11 Mod 1, by far the most numerous of Soviet ICBMs,
is estimated to have a circular error probable (CEP) at intercontinental
range of0 There is disagreement about its yield,' but which-
ever view is correct, the missile is still suitable only for attacking soft
targets. In 1969, testing began on two new versions of the SS-11, both
apparently developed to help penetrate antiballistic missile de-
fenses. Testing on one version ceased in December 1970 and the pro-
gram has almost certainly been terminated. The other version, now
called the Mod 3, has three re-entry vehicles (RVs) which are not
independently targetable. There is disagreement about the yield of this
weapon as well,' but again it is clearly suitable only for attacking soft
'See paragraph 24.
' See paragraph 27.
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 targets. Testing of the Mod 3 continues, and deployment is likely to
begin later this year.
H. The SS-9 exists in four variants: Mod 1, which carries an RV
weighing about 9,500 pounds; Mod 2, whose RV weighs about 13,500
pounds; Mod 3, which has been tested both as a depressed trajectory
ICBM (DICBM) and as a fractional orbit bombardment system
(FOBS) ; and Mod 4, which carries 3 RVs.
1. There is general agreement that the SS-9 was developed to pro-
vide better accuracy and a larger payload than the older SS-7, pre-
sumably for use against hard targets-e.g., the US Minuteman system.
The Mod 1, carrying a warhead estimated to have a yield
appears reasonably well adapted for this purpose. In
1965, however, the Soviets began to test the Mod 2, which, with its
heavier payload, is estimated to have a yield of
The Mod 2 actually reached operational status before the Mod 1, and
we estimate that three quarters or more of all operationally deployed
SS-9s are Mod 2s. But the Mod 2 has never actually demonstrated
enough range to reach any Minuteman complex. We believe that its
demonstrated range could be increased sufficiently to cover all of them
by using up more of the available propellant, removing telemetry pack-
ages, etc. It remains curious, however, that the Mod 2, alone among
the ICBMs except the SS-13, has never been tested to what we would
presume to be its intended operational range.
J. The accuracy of the SS-9 must be deduced
In the Intelligence Community, opinions as tote CEF o t e
SS-9 Mod 1 and Mod 2 under flight test conditions range from a low
of 0.4 nm to a high of 0.7 nm; all are agreed that under operational
conditions the CEP would be degrated somewhat. The significance
of these differences is considerable, but the Soviets would in any
event have to deploy several times the present number of SS-9 Mod is
and Mod 2s, with their present capabilities, before achieving a force
that would pose a serious threat to the Minuteman force as a whole.'
See paragraph 13 for a discussion of the differing views on accuracy and paragraph 14 for
a discussion of the effect of differences in accuracy and yield.
TOP
 K. As to the SS-9 Mod 3, it would not have sufficient accuracy in
either the DICBM or FOBS mode to attack hard targets effectively;
its apparent function is to attack soft strategic targets, negating or de-
laying detection by the US Ballistic Missile Early Warning System.
(New US warning systems give promise of reducing or eliminating
this advantage.) The Mod 3 appears to have limited capability as
a FOBS. It may be deployed in very small numbers; future deploy-
ment, if any, will probably also be limited.
L. The Soviets have also developed the SS-9_ Mod 4, which carries
three RVs.
For several years, there has been controversy
within the Intelligence Community about whether the three RVs could
be targeted independently and there is still some disagreement on this
point. Some agencies believe that the Mod 4 is and will remain a mul-
tiple re-entry vehicle (MRV) for use against soft targets; others believe
that the Mod 4 could have represented either an MRV or a multiple
independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) with limited target-
ing flexibility but that the development program has been terminated;
still others think it was intended to be a MIRV and also believe that
the development program has been terminated.; There is also disagree-
ment about the probability that the Mod 4 has been deployed, but all
agree that if now deployed, it is as an MRV and in small numbers.
II. SOVIET POLICY AND FUTURE PROGRAMS
M. The broader reasons for the USSR's energetic buildup of its
forces for intercontinental attack are neither complex nor obscure. In
the early 1960s the Soviet leaders, politically and ideologically hostile
to the US, and thinking and behaving as rulers of a great power, recog-
nized that in this particular respect their military forces were con-
spicuously inferior to those of their most dangerous rival, the US. Con-
sequently, they set themselves to rectify the imbalance-to achieve at
a minimum a relation of rough parity. Parity,in this sense cannot be
objectively measured; it is essentially a state of mind. The evidence
available, including Soviet statements at the SAL talks, indicates that
the Soviet leaders think that they have now generally achieved this
position.
See paragraph 19.
T
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 TO
N. Many aspects of the present force structure are also susceptible
to simple and probably correct explanation. The Soviets built a large
number of ICBMs in order to match-and then to surpass-the num-
ber of US ICBMs, and also to increase the probability that many would
survive an initial US attack. They built missile-launching submarines
which are highly survivable when deployed, and they retained a
manned bomber force as yet another option. The intercontinental at-
tack force is obviously capable of being used in war, but there is no
reason to believe that the Soviet leaders intend deliberately to make
nuclear war. The force is an attribute of power, an instrument to sup-
port policy, and a deterrent to the US.
0. Decisions about military policy and programs are probably
centered on two key elements-the military and military-industrial
authorities who formulate new programs, and the top political leaders.
The latter have the final say, but they must operate in a context of
other forces and take them into account. Decision-making appears to
involve clusters of advisory and executive bodies which are likely, at
times, to be in competition with one another. Bureaucratic pressures,
conflicts, and constraints may be heavy on occasion. We think it un-
likely that observed Soviet programs are the product of a carefully
thought out strategic plan or rationale which is undeviatingly exe-
cuted. It is probably fair to say that the Soviet system gives consider-
able weight to military claims and interests, and that it is characterized
by an inertia which favors large established bureaucratic interests in
general and tends to work against sharp changes in direction.
P. Looking to the future, we have little basis in evidence for esti-
mating the content of specific decisions on strategic policy or on par-
ticular weapon programs. Soviet strategic policy will of course be af-
fected by the specific provisions of the SAL agreements, and by the
manner in which these agreements alter or appear to alter the strategic,
political, and economic conditions and opportunities confronting the
USSR. Decisions about future forces will also be influenced by Soviet
perceptions of the US strategic threat, and by what weapons they are
able to develop and the feasibility of procuring and deploying them.
Q. It seems clear that the Soviet leaders intend to maintain at a
minimum such forces as will continue to give them a sense of equal
security with the US. The general attitudes and policies of the USSR
 being what they are, it might seem obvious to infer that they will
strive to exceed that minimum and to achieve marked superiority over
the US in strategic weaponry. We do not doubt that they would like
to attain such a position, but the question is whether they consider it
a feasible objective, particularly in the light of the arms limitation
agreements. They might think it feasible to seek a strategic posture that,
while falling short of marked superiority, makes clear that the Soviets
have advantages over the US in certain specific areas. Whether or not
such advantages are significant militarily, they would help to dramatize
the strategic power of the Soviet Union.
R. But even if the Soviet intention is to go no further than mainte-
nance of "equal security", their arms programs are bound to be vigor-
ous and demanding. This is in part because Soviet leaders must have
an eye not only to what forces the US has at present, but also to what
it can have, or may have, in future years even within the framework
of arms control agreements. In this respect, they are likely to be cau-
tious-to overestimate rather than underestimate the US threat. More-
over, the weapons competition nowadays is largely a technological race;
the USSR is impelled to press forward its research and development
(R&D) lest it be left behind. Soviet weapon programs also tend to
attain a momentum of their own; the immense apparatus of organiza-
tions, installations, personnel, vested interests, and so on, tends to
proceed in its endeavors unless checked by some decisive political
authority.
S. In some respects, these tendencies will be reinforced now that
the SAL agreements have been concluded. For military and political
reasons, the Soviet leaders will wish at least to keep pace with the
US. Also the leadership has a personal and political stake in insuring
that the USSR suffers no real or apparent erosion of its relative position.
It will want to maintain a strong bargaining position for the follow-on
negotiations, and to develop new options in the event that future talks
break down.
T. On the other hand, there are constraints upon Soviet arms pro-
grams beyond those imposed by the terms of the SAL agreements. The
most obvious is economic: resources are not unbounded; the civilian
economy demands its share; one weapon competes with another for
allocations; and intercontinental attack forces compete with strategic
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 defense and general purpose forces. The various bureaucracies with
interests in one or another area compete partly with rational argument
and partly in sheer political infighting. Soviet leaders must also consider
how far they may wish to press their own programs lest they provoke
countervailing programs in the US. And they must assess not only the
present and future US threat, but also that from China, and elsewhere.
U. In the context of arms control, other pressures for moderation
will be at work. The SAL agreements have been hailed in the USSR
as a successful manifestation of the current Soviet policy of detente;
consequently there will be incentives to avoid actions which, though
not actually violating the agreements, might jeopardize them. Many of
the top political leaders, and most notably Brezhnev, have identified
themselves personally with the accords, and would have much to lose
politically if they came unstuck. Similarly, various groups in the USSR
now have a stake in the agreements, as a consequence of a long and
difficult process of negotiation which undoubtedly required a delicate
balancing of individual interests. Any step which might constitute a
threat to the agreements would probably disturb this balance.
V. While the foregoing considerations probably govern the nature
of Soviet decisions as to future weapon programs, they provide us with
little or no basis on which to estimate what these programs will be
and, in particular, their features in detail. We have never had solid
evidence on these matters, and there is no reason to expect that we
shall have such evidence in the future. Moreover, as the past 10 years
have shown, technological advance can produce vigorous action and
reaction between military programs of the USSR and the US.
W. Yet the possibilities are not unlimited, certainly in the next five
years or so. For one thing, intercontinental weapon systems are of such
complexity that their development, testing, and deployment take a
long time. We can therefore estimate with much confidence that the
kinds of weapon systems deployed by the Soviets during the next two
years or so will be those already in operation or in the late stages of
development. Even in the period from two to five years from now the
force will be composed largely of existing kinds of delivery vehicles,
but it could change substantially by the end of the period of this
Estimate.
 TOP
X. As a result of the SAL accords, the main questions about the
future of Soviet forces for intercontinental attack center more than
ever on the pace and scope of technological change. Also as a conse-
quence of the accords, and of the opportunities and risks they present,
future strategic programming decisions will probably be even more
directly influenced than in the past by the Soviet leadership's sense of
stability or change in its strategic relationship with the US. To be sure,
as China moves closer to establishing a credible nuclear force, the need
to counter Chinese capabilities. will also affect Soviet plans. For many
years to come, however, Soviet planning of strategic offensive weap-
ons is likely to be concerned primarily with the US arsenal, in terms
both of the strategic threat it poses and the diplomatic and political
leverage it affords.
Y. The next few years should see significant qualitative improve-
ments in Soviet forces for intercontinental attack, as the USSR pushes
ahead with its R&D and exercises options open to it under the SAL
accords. The most important of these improvements are likely to be in
accuracy of missiles, in MIRVs for them, and in survivability.
1. Accuracy.5 We have for some time thought that the Soviets
would incorporate greater accuracy in follow-on missile systems, and
we now have some positive indications of this intent. The Soviets
appear to be moving toward less blunt RVs for their missiles. Such
RVs pass through the atmosphere more quickly, and are thus less
subject to deflection while in the atmosphere. Improvements in the
components of present Soviet guidance systems and a continuation
of the recent trend to less blunt RVs could result in CEPs as low
as about 0.25 nm for ICBMs. The Soviets could achieve significantly
smaller CEPs but this would require, in addition, wholly new tech-
niques of guidance. It is too early to tell what methods of guidance
are being emnloved in the new ICBMs described earlier
Lt. Gen. Samuel C. Phillips, the Director, National Security Agency, and Maj. Gen.
George J. Keegan, Jr., the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes this
Estimate overstates the improvements in ICBM accuracies the Soviets might achieve during
the period of this Estimate. For their views, see footnotes to paragraphs 54, 57, and 58 in
Section I.
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 10 TOP
2. MIRVs. We continue to believe that the Soviets will develop
MIRVs, including some with the yields and accuracies necessary to
attack hard targets. We estimate that it would take at least two years
of flight testing to develop a MIRV system, and at least an additional
year if wholly new techniques of guidance, designed to achieve very
high accuracies, were also involved.
3. Survivability. The USSR's concern about the survivability of its
forces will surely continue strong as the US deploys increasingly large
numbers of independently targetable RVs. In addition to the employ-
ment of active defenses, survivability can be achieved through hard-
ness and mobility. The new silos under construction promise to be
considerably harder than present types, and so do reconstructed SS-9
and SS-11 silos. The Soviets could also deploy mobile ICBMs, an option
not actually barred by the SAL accords; we continue to think this un-
likely, the more so because of the unilateral US statement opposing
this development.' We do expect the Soviets to replace their older
ICBMs with SLBMs as permitted by the agreements, in part to achieve
greater survivability.
Z. We have little evidence concerning the qualitative improve-
ments to be incorporated in the three new ICBMs. We are fairly
confident that the new large missile will carry a heavier payload than
the SS-9, and the new small liquid-propellant missile a heavier pay-
load than the SS-11. Although there is as yet no evidence on the point,
we believe that one or more of these missiles will carry MIRVs, in
due course if not at first, and that all will incorporate at least some
improvements in accuracy. More definitive judgments on these missiles
cannot be made until more data become available.
AA. As to ballistic missile submarines, in two years or so the Soviets
will have as many launchers on their Y- and D-class submarines as the
US has in the Polaris force, and these launchers will constitute a sub-
stantial portion of Soviet forces for intercontinental attack. We expect
the current SSBN production program to continue for some time, with
most if not all future units consisting of the 12-tube D-class carrying the
SS-NX-8. There is no direct evidence of another new class of ballistic
missile submarines, but we believe that one will appear in the next five
Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan, Jr., the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does
not agree with this judgment. For his views, see his footnote to paragraph 49 in Section I.
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 TOP II
years or so. A new construction hall is being built at the Severodvinsk
shipyard, which may be for a new class. A new submarine with more
launch tubes than the D-class would permit the Soviets to come closer
to the combination of 62 modern ballistic missile submarines and 950
launchers allowed by the SAL agreements.
BB. We have judged for the past several years that as their ICBM
and SLBM forces grew, the Soviets would come to rely less and less
on their intercontinental bombers. Those missile forces have now
reached significant proportions, but there has been no phase-out or
appreciable attrition of the heavy bombers and tankers in Long Range
Aviation for several years, or any significant reduction in their training
activity. Thus, it appears that current Soviet leaders believe that the
advantages afforded by an intercontinental bomber force, for the
present at least, are worth the cost of retaining one. If they persist in
this view, they must decide whether to put their rapidly aging aircraft
through more difficult and costly rehabilitation programs than in the
past, or, alternatively, to go for a new heavy bomber which would give
them greater capabilities for intercontinental attack than their present
force does.
CC. It is evident that there are many uncertainties regarding the
future makeup of Soviet forces for intercontinental attack. In order to
depict a range of possible developments, we present in Section V of
this Estimate five illustrative forces representing different levels of
effort by the Soviets and different degrees or rates of technological
advance within the constraints of the interim agreement on strategic
offensive weapons.' Three of them postulate that the Soviets do not
introduce new and highly accurate guidance systems for their missiles
within the period of this Estimate. Force 3 represents about the most
the Soviets could achieve under this postulate; it assumes that new mis-
sile systems reach initial operational capability in the minimum possible
time. Force 2 illustrates what could happen if some difficulties and de-
lays were encountered during development. Force 1 postulates, in addi-
tion, less ambitious technological goals than those of Forces 3 and 2.
Two other forces postulate that the Soviets do introduce new and highly
'Vice Adm. Vincent P. de Poix, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Maj.
Gen. William E. Potts, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army,
are in fundamental disagreement with several aspects of Section V. For their views see their
footnotes throughout that Section.
TZrft6Uz
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 accurate guidance systems for their missiles, providing accuracies of
the order of 0.15 nm CEP. Force 4 postulates the introduction of such
accuracies and other improvements later in the decade. Force 5 con-
stitutes a limiting case, and, in a sense, an artificial one, illustrating
what the Soviets could theoretically achieve under the interim agree-
ment if they have highly ambitious programs already well under way
and encounter no significant setbacks or delays.'
DD. On the whole, we think the Soviets will probably head into the
next round of SAL talks with something like the goals of Force 3. They
probably will be forced to settle for some slippages and delays of the
sort illustrated on an across-the-board basis in Force 2. The outcome
would then be something between Force 3 and Force 2. We wish to
emphasize, however, that these and the other models are strictly illus-
trative, and not to be regarded as-confident estimates. As one moves
beyond the next two years or so, all projections become increasingly
uncertain; beyond five years they are highly speculative.
'Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan, Jr., the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes
that Forces 2-5 overstate the missile accuracies the Soviets could achieve in the time periods
reflected in those models. For his reasons, see his footnote to paragraph 54 in Section I.
TOP
 DISCUSSION
1. With the signing of the strategic arms
limitation (SAL) agreements in Moscow on
26 May 1972, the Soviets achieved one of
the main objectives of their postwar foreign
policy: world-wide recognition of a position
of strategic parity with the US. This goal was
reached largely as the result of the massive
buildup of intercontinental and submarine-
launched ballistic missile forces which began
in 1963-1964 in the wake of the Cuban missile
crisis.
2. The interim offensive agreement is not
comprehensive, and it leaves various options
open to both sides. The way in which the
signatories will apply it is not known. Thus,
the effect it will have on specific Soviet pro-
grams or on the size and shape of Soviet
forces for intercontinental attack is far from
clear. The major effect of the agreement is
to place limits on the aggregate total of Soviet
strategic offensive missiles. New construction
of ICBM launchers is prohibited, and new
construction of SLBM launchers (beyond 740
launchers, and up to a total of 950) is
allowed only on the basis of one-for-one dis-
mantling of older ICBM or SLBM launchers.
The agreement leaves considerable latitude,
however, for changing the existing mix of
weapons, especially on the Soviet side where
the terms create an incentive for a partial
shift from land-based to sea-based missiles.
Qualitative improvements in missiles are al-
lowed, but silo enlargement in excess of 15
percent is prohibited. The agreement does not
cover mobile ICBMs, but the Soviets have
been informed in a unilateral statement that
the US would regard the deployment of land-
mobile ICBMs as inconsistent with the
objectives of that agreement. Moreover, the
agreement places no limits-quantitative or
qualitative-on bombers, the third major ele-
ment of forces for intercontinental attack.
3. Since the publication of NIE 11-8-71,
three new Soviet ICBM test programs have
been identified. Also now identified are the
missiles intended for initial deployment in the
new small silos and the platform for deploy-
ment of the SS-NX-8 naval missile. Many
TQFT
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 questions which were outstanding remain un-
answered, however. We still do not know the
characteristics of the new ICBMs, or whether
the Soviets plan to develop another class of
ballistic missile submarines, a new intercon-
tinental bomber, or a mobile ICBM. And all
but the Air Force remain uncertain about the
role of the new Backfire strategic bomber.
4. The next three sections review these
and related questions and provide what we
believe to be the most likely answers. The
fourth section discusses Soviet decision-making
in the military field. A final section discusses
the factors which might influence the future
course of Soviet forces for intercontinental
attack, and sets forth several different ways
in which these forces might develop over the
next several years.
1. INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC
MISSILES
Status of Operational Systems
5. As of 1 October 1972, the Soviets had
1,527 ICBM launchers in service at their de-
ployed missile complexes. (See Figure 1.)
These include 120 SS-11 launchers at the
Derazhnya and Pervomaysk complexes which,
although possibly intended for use against
European targets, are nevertheless capable
of reaching the US. There is still disagree-
ment within the Intelligence Community as
to which of these two missions is the primary
one.
6. In addition to their operational launchers
at deployed complexes, the Soviets have about
85 launchers which are used for research and
development (R&D) firings or for troop-
training firings. Another 20 or so launchers
are used for training at operational complexes.
At any given time, something over half of
these launchers would be available for use
against the US, but we do not believe that
they are on constant alert and we do not know
how long it would take to prepare them for
operational use.
7. The total number of ICBMs which could
be targeted against the US is summarized in
Table I. It should be noted that these totals
represent gross capabilities rather than an
estimate of the numbers which are in fact
likely to be targeted against the US at any
given time. As indicated above, there is a
difference of opinion about the primary mis-
sion of the SS-11s deployed at Derazhnya and
Pervomaysk. In any case, all of the missiles
nominally available almost certainly would
not be used in an initial salvo against the US.
8. No additional launchers of the types now
in service are under construction, and no
additional deployment of these types is ex-
pected. A total of 91 launchers of two new
types is under construction; 25 are at five of
the SS-9 complexes and 66 are at Derazhnya
and Pervomaysk. All 91 of these launchers
may be completed under the terms of the
interim agreement. There is no evidence of de-
ployment of these or other types of launchers
elsewhere. There is evidence, however, that
the Soviets plan to convert existing SS-9 and
SS-11 silos into launchers of the new type.
There is also some evidence that the Soviets
may be deactivating SS-7s deployed at soft
sites.
Characteristics and Capabilities of the
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Force s
9. There has been little evidence or analy-
sis over the past year which would lead us to
change our basic judgments about the SS-9,
the SS-11, and the SS-13, although we have
refined some of our judgments. Recent evi-
See Figure 2 for a comparison of Soviet ICBMs.
TOP SEZRET-
TS 190620
 Figure 1
Soviet Operational ICBM Launchers
1,000
60
120
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
'There is evidence that deactivation of some SS-7 soft sites has begun.
See paragraph 33.
ec
s
hart re
This
Assuming that all the 209 SS-7 and SS-8 launchers are still in the active force and in-
cluding the 120 SS-11 launchers at Pervomaysk and Derazhnya, the Soviets have 1,527
operational ICBM launchers deployed in the field. The chart does not include 6 SS-9
Mod 3's which may be operationally deployed at the Tyuratam Missile Test Center.
TOP SECRET
estimates of operational ICBM launchers as of 1 October 1972.
fl
t
c
deuce has not helped much to resolve con-
tinuing uncertainties about the characteristics
and. performance of these systems, and the
payload weight and yield of the SS-11 have
become matters of disagreement. The discus-
sion which follows is limited to the high points
of past material on the SS-9, SS-11, and SS-13,
and to new evidence or analysis.
10. The SS-9. The SS-9 has been discussed
extensively in the Estimates in this series for
the past three years. It is the only ICBM now
in the Soviet inventory which could have the
necessary combination of yield and accuracy
to threaten US land-based ICBMs and other
critical hard targets. Consequently, estimates
of its characteristics and capabilities have as-
TS 190620
 16 TO T
STATUS OF SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS
AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1972
DEPLOYED FORCES
PROJECTED
OPERA- TOTAL WHEN ALL
TIONAL GROUPS COMPLETE
ICBM Soft
SS-7' ` 124 124 Training Launchers at
SS-8' ................ 10 10 Complexes
SS-11 ................ 0 0 About ............ 20
Subtotal ............ 134 134
ICBM Hard Test Range R&D and
SS-7 ................. 66 66 Training Launchers
SS-8 ................. 9 9 About ............ 85
SS-9 ................. 288 288 TOTAL ABOUT ....... 100
SS-11 850 850
SS-13 60 60
Subtotal .. 1,273 1,273
New Large . ............. 0 31
New Small .............. 0 60
SS-11s at Derazhnya and
Pervomaysk 120 ' 120 `
` Most of these launchers probably could be readied to fire at the US, but we are unable to
make any reliable estimate of the time required to do so or of the availability of missiles for
them.
' Each of the soft SS-7 and SS-8 launchers has a capability to launch a second missile,
probably in 2 to 4 hours after initial launch.
Deactivation may have begun at some SS-7 soft sites.
This figure includes six silos at Tyuratam where the SS-9 Mod 3 may be operationally
deployed.
There are differing views concerning the primary mission of these SS-11s. All are agreed,
however, that they could be used against the US.
TS 190620
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 sumed a unique importance in our overall
assessment of the Soviet ICBM force. Deploy-
ment of the SS-9 ceased in 1970, however, at
a level well below that required to threaten
the survival of the Minuteman force.
11. With the 9,500 pound re-entry vehicle
(RV) of the Mod 1 variant, the SS-9 has been
flown to a non-rotating earth (NRE), range
of 6,600 nautical miles (nm), enough to reach
targets anywhere in the US from any of the
SS-9 complexes.1O With the 13,500 pound pay-
load of the more widely deployed Mod 2,
however, the SS-9 has never been flown more
than 4,400 run NRE. This is only enough to
reach the extreme northwestern part of the
US from the closest SS-9 complex. We have,
therefore, searched for ways to explain this ap-
parent limitation in the capability of the Mod
2. Considerable analysis has been done with
the result that, by making certain logical as-
sumptions and extrapolating from the avail-
able evidence, we have concluded that the
SS-9 Mod 2, using a minimum energy trajec-
tory, has a maximum operational range of
5,300 nm. This would permit coverage of all
six Minuteman complexes, one Titan complex,
and NORAD and Strategic Air Command
(SAC) Headquarters from at least one SS-9
complex. DIA believes, further, that a maxi-
mum operational range of 5,500 nm, providing
full coverage of Minuteman fields from most
SS-9 complexes, should not be ruled out.
"The actual range of these firings was 7,100 'em,
but this figure included effects of the earth's rota-
tion, which in this case added about 500 nm. Missile
ranges quoted in this Estimate are expressed in terms
of NRE distances. Ranges achievable in operational
firings northward to the US from the USSR are less
affected by the earth's rotation than are Soviet test
firings to Kamchatka or to the Pacific. As a result of
the earth's rotation, the ranges in some operational
firings would be increased, and in some decreased,
depending on launch point and target direction.
12. Estimates of the yield of the various
SS-9 warheads are based
13. The most important element in deter-
mining the capability of a missile system
against hard targets is the accuracy, or cir-
cular error probable (CEP),t' of the system.
System CEP has been calculated by measur-
ing or estimating various factors that reduce
accuracy, and subsequently combining these
error contributions statistically. The primary
factors involved are inaccuracies in missile
guidance and control, deflections of the RV
due to atmospheric conditions, and geodetic
and gravimetric (G&G) errors. Taking into
consideration these and other factors, CIA,
NSA, State, and Air Force believe that the
CEP of the Mods 1 and 2 at a range of
5,300 run and under flight test conditions is
0.6?0.1 nm; DIA, Army, and Navy believe
that the CEP of these two variants lies be-
tween 0.4 and 0.6 nm but they favor the lower
value. All the Agencies believe that handling
and maintenance of deployed missiles by op-
erational personnel would degrade accuracy
somewhat.
14. The significance of these differences
can be seen from the fact that, with a 0.4 nm
CEP, a single SS-9
would have a chance of disabling
a single Minuteman silo. With a CEP of 0.6
nm, the same weapon would have
TO~ TS 190620
 20 Tp
chance of disablin
a Minuteman silo,
Allowing for an esti-
mated force reliability factor of 75 percent
(that portion of the force which is expected
to reach the target area and detonate), it
could be expected that some 70 percent of
the SS-9 Mod 2s that the Soviets were able
to target against Minuteman silos would dis-
able their targets in the first case, and that
less than 60 percent would do so in the second
case. For Minuteman launch control centers
(LCCs) two SS-9 Mod 2 missiles would be
required to achieve similar probabilities, and
the probabilities fall off more sharply as esti-
mated accuracy declines.12
15. Turning to the Mod 3, this variant of
the SS-9 has been flight tested in two modes-
"Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan, Jr., the Assistant
Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes this para-
graph could be misleading. With respect to the prob-
abilities of disabling Minuteman, he would note that
the calculations do not represent the disablement prob-
abilities of the entire SS-9 Mod 2 force against the
entire Minuteman force. By
calculations would show that the probability of dis-
abling all Minuteman silos would be only 13-16 per-
cent even if all SS-9 Mod 2s were targeted against
them. He would further note that these probabilities
have no bearing on Minuteman missiles already
launched.
As to the probabilities of disabling LCCs, he would
note that assessing the impact of disabling one is more
complicated than assessing that of launch silos because
of the redundancy among the five LCCs within each
Minuteman squadron and because of the existence of
the airborne launch control system (ALCS ). Any one
of the LCCs in a squadron can launch any one of
the 50 Minuteman missiles in the squadron. More-
over, the ALCS, which is continuously airborne, can
launch any of the Minuteman missiles. Thus, to pre-
vent the launching of Minuteman by attacking the
Minuteman command and control system, the LCCs
and the ALCS would all have to be neutralized simul-
taneously. He believes the probability of this occur-
ring is essentially zero.
as a fractional orbit bombardment system
(FOBS) and as a depressed trajectory ICBM
(DICBM). A large amount of data is avail-
able on this system from the firin s conducted
to date. we esti-
mate that the Mod 3 warhead has a yield
We also estimate that
the system has a CEP of about 1.0 to 2.0 nm
when fired as a DICBM in a northerly direc-
tion to the US; when launched in a southerly
direction in the FOBS mode, the CEP would
increase to 1.5 to 3.0 nm. These levels of
accuracy make the Mod 3 incapable of at-
tacking hard targets with any reasonable
probability of success. The shape of the tra-
jectory connotes a desire to deliver an attack
with less time for the enemy to react. These
factors suggest that the Mod 3 was designed
to attack strategic, time-urgent soft targets,
such as SAC bomber bases and soft command
and control facilities.
16. The Mod 3 has been flown to a range
of 6,300 nm in the DICBM mode, and can
unquestionably provide full coverage of the
US on northerly trajectories from any SS-9
site. The vehicle as tested in the FOBS mode
is not capable of inserting the payload into
an orbit that would permit an attack against
any target in the US on the initial orbit, on
either northerly or southerly launches.
provide coverage of the eastern one-
third of the US if the Mod 3 is fired south
from the most favorably located complex
(Dombarovskiy). It appears questionable,
however, that the Soviets would have devel-
oped a FOBS system with such a limited
capability. Considerable attention has been
devoted to insuring that our assessment of the
Mod 3's capabilities as a FOBS is not caused
by incorrectly interpreted data or faulty
methodology. Consequently, we are left with
the following possible explanations of why
Tnp _
TS 190620
 the Soviets have tested the Mod 3 in the FOBS
mode:
(a) The Mod 3 may be intended only for
use as a DICBM and might have been
tested in the FOBS mode merely be-
cause it was desirable to test fully the
capability of the launch vehicle while
at the same time monitoring the re-entry
phase at fully-instrumented land impact
areas in the USSR.
(b) Alternatively, the Soviets may have
taken advantage of the limited FOBS
capability of the Mod 3 and deployed
it as both a DICBM and a FOBS.
17. Last year we noted a third possibility-
that the Mod 3 might eventually be modified to
provide the additional range required to attack
targets throughout the US in the FOBS mode.
virtually elimi-
nates this possibility.
18. The SS-9 Mod 4 has three RVs. Each
RV is estimated to carry a warhead with a
yield The Mod 4 has been
flight tested to a range of 4,700 nm, but
it is believed to have a maximum operational
range of 5,500 to 6,000 nm-sufficient to cover
most of the likely targets in the US. The single
shot kill probability against hardened targets
would be much less than that of the Mod 1
or 2, because the individual warheads have a
much lower yield and the Mod 4 is less ac-
curate than either the Mod 1 or the Mod 2.
19. There has been considerable controversy
within the Intelligence Community about
whether the Mod 4 is or was intended to be
a multiple independently-targetable re-entry
vehicle (MIRV). After analyzing the evi-
dence, CIA and State conclude that the Mod 4
is a multiple re-entry vehicle (MRV) for use
against soft targets and that it probably will
not be developed into a MIRV capable of
attacking hard targets. DIA and the Air Force
conclude that the Mod 4 could have rep-
resented either a MRV or a MIRV system with
limited targeting flexibility and that the de-
velopment program has been terminated.
NSA, Army, and Navy believe that the char-
acteristics of the system are more applicable
to the intended development of a MIRV with
limited tarizetinL flexibility than to a MRV
opment program has been terminated.
20. There is some uncertainty about how
many of the various Mods of the SS-9 are
operationally deployed. The SS-9 force is
Firings of the Mod 3 fractional orbit or de-
pressed trajectory version of the SS-9 indicate
that this variant is operationally deployed at
one group of six silos at Tyuratam. This group
may not be ready for operational use at
mains possible, however, tha
J It re-
groups
in the field are equipped with this Mod
rather than with the Mod 1 or Mod 2.
21. There are also questions about how the
Soviets intend to target their force of SS-9s.
Although the high yield and relatively high
TS 190620
 accuracy of the SS-9 Mods 1 and 2 make
them the most effective missiles in the Soviet
inventory for attacking hard targets, the ex-
tent to which the SS-9 force is, in fact, in-
tended for use against such targets remains
unclear, for the available evidence is scanty
and inconclusive.
22. Such evidence as we do have suggests
that, at least initially, most SS-9s had US
ICBM complexes as their primary targets.
There is some evidence that a shift in target-
ing concept may have taken place after 1966.
On balance, we believe that at least some,
and perhaps the bulk, of the SS-9 Mods 1
and 2 are aimed at US ICBM installations,
even though the Soviets have not deployed
SS-9s in sufficient numbers to provide as-
surance of putting more than a small portion
of US launch facilities out of action.
23. The SS-11. The SS-11 currently makes
up some 60 percent of the ICBM force. All
SS-11s currently deployed are believed to con-
sist of the initial version, the Mod 1. While
the maximum demonstrated range of the
Mod 1 is about 5,200 nm, all Agencies agree
that it can be flown at least 5,700 rim, suf-
ficient to reach targets in almost all the US
from SS-11 complexes.
24. Determining the size and payload capa-
bility of the SS-11 has always been more
difficult than for any other Soviet ICBM.
Until recently, all Agencies agreed that the
Mod 1 payload weight was
All except CIA be-
lieve that this Estimate is still valid. CIA
now believes that the SS-11 Mod 1 is bigger
than previously estimated and that its payload
is While the increase in
weight over previous estimates is significant
in absolute terms
~--it
is not sufficient to change the judgment that
the SS-11 Mod 1 is suitable only for attacking
soft targets. To attain a hard target capability
at intercontinental ranges, its accuracy,=
would have
to be improved considerably.
25. In the summer of 1969, the Soviets
began testing two new versions of the SS-11,
both of which were apparently intended to
enhance the capability of the SS-11 to pene-
trate antiballistic missile (ABM) defenses.
One version,
walled the Mod 2, carries what prob-
ably are exoatmospheric penetration aids along
with a new RV. The other version,
called the
Mod 3, carries three RVs which are separated
in flight so that they will land either in
sequence on or near the same target or about
5 miles apart laterally. The three RVs =
are not independently target-
able. If sufficiently hardened, however, these
RVs would present three separate aiming
points to a defending ABM system. Testing.
Testing of the Mod 3 is con-
tinuing. Development of this system probably
is nearing completion and deployment is
likely to begin later this year, or early next,
at the new silos at the Derazhnya and Pervo-
maysk complexes. Additional deployment of
the Mod 3 is possible in standard SS-11 silos.
26. The range of the SS-11 Mod 3 is about
5,500 nm.13 Like the Mod 1, it has also been
fired to a reduced range of about 550 nm,
possibly to test its capability to perform in
" This is a change from the 6,000 nm estimated
last year.
 TOP 23
a peripheral attack role.
This improvement in accuracy as compare
with the Mod 1 is due to the higher ballistic
coefficient (beta) of the three RVs, which
reduces their susceptibility to atmospheric
effects, i.e., wind and density. Like the Mod 1,
the Mod 3 would be effective only against soft
targets.
27. There is disagreement about the weight
of the three RVs for the Mod 3. CIA, using
the same type of analysis as it applied to the
Mod 1, believes that each RV weighs about
900 pounds. DIA, Army, Navy, Air Force,
and NSA believe that each RV weighs about
600 pounds.
28. The SS-11 Mod 3 is not a MIRV as
tested to date and apparently is not intended
to be one.
29. The SS-13. To date, the Soviets have
deployed only one solid-propellant ICBM,
the three-stage SS-13. It is found at only a
single complex, in a total of 60 silos. One
version of the system, the Mod 1, is deployed
and a second version, the Mod 2, has been
tested and may also be deployed. Less is
known about the SS-13 than about any other
operational Soviet ICBM. Detailed analysis
of performance data now indicates that the
RVs used on both versions weigh about 1,200
pounds, some 200 pounds more than previ-
ously estimated.14
is suitable for use only against soft targets.
30. The SS-13 has been tested to a range
of 4,500 nm, sufficient to reach only the ex-
treme northeastern portion of the US from
the one complex where the system is deployed.
In August 1971, a Mod 1 was flown to the
4,500 nm Pacific impact area. It appears that
this test demonstrated the maximum energy
potential of the Mod 1.
would permit a maximum range
The payload of the Mod 3 was evidently
designed to facilitate the penetration of ABM
defenses by multiplying the number of war-
heads to be dealt with by a defender. Under
certain circumstances the Mod 3 also has a
greater capability to destroy targets than the
single warhead variants of the SS-11. In the
case of area targets such as cities or industry,
spacing between the RVs on the order of 4
to 5 nm or more provides up to a 30 percent
increase in the size of the area destroyed.
Impact patterns of this kind have been tested
on several occasions, including one to the
Pacific.
of about 5,100 nm. This is sufficient to cover
the northern half of the US from the com-
plex where the SS-13 is deployed.
31. Flight testing of the Mod 2 began in
early 1970, and development may have been
completed in late 1971, in time for deploy-
ment in early 1972
"The RVs are not identical, however. The one for
the Mod 2 has a different shape than the one for the
Mod 1.
 TO
The
change in the shape of the gives the Mod 2
slightly better accuracy than the Mod 1, but
the improvement is not significant in terms of
the overall capability of the system.
32. There is uncertainty about the maxi-
mum range of the Mod 2, which, like the
Mod 1, has been flown to a range of only
4,500 nm.
would give the
Mod a m;
If, however,
the range would remain
about 5,100 nm, the same as for the Mod 1.
Possible Deactivation of SS-7 Soft Sites
33. There is evidence which suggests that
some of the SS-7 soft sites are at least in it
reduced state of readiness and are possibly
being deactivated. All Agencies but the Air
Force believe that the start of deactivation is
the most likely explanation, but they cannot
rule out two other possibilities: modernization
or overhaul of the ground support system or
changes in missile handling procedures. The
Air Force acknowledges that some SS-7 soft
sites are at a state of reduced readiness but
believes that the evidence is insufficient at
this time to indicate that deactivation has
begun.
The New Deployment Programs
34. Last year we judged that construction
of two, possibly three new types of silos was
underway at the test center at Tyuratam and
at some complexes in the field. We said that
the purpose of these new silos was not clear
and that they might be intended to house
wholly new missiles, variants of present mis-
siles, or existing types in a program aimed at
increased survivability. We said that some
might not be intended for missiles at all.
35. We now believe that only two types
of silos are involved, one for a system in the
SS-9 class and one for a small ICBM in the
SS-11 class. Most of the large silos are at
SS-9 complexes while the small ones are at the
Derazhnya and Pervomaysk complexes. We
are confident that the new silos will be harder
to destroy than earlier types of Soviet silos,
but we do not know what degree of hardness
will be achieved.
36. In the recently concluded talks on the
limitation of strategic arms, one of the main
Soviet concerns was to maintain the right
to "modernize and replace" existing ICBM
launchers. This concern, along with conver-
sion of both SS-9 and SS-11 launchers at
Tyuratam to the new silo configurations, in-
dicates that the Soviets plan. to modernize
existing SS-9 and SS-11 launchers in the field.
We do not know how extensive the conversion
program will be, or how rapidly it will be
accomplished.
37. We believe that the SS-11 Mod 3 is to
be deployed in the 60 new small silos now
under construction at Derazhnya and Pervo-
maysk, at least initially. If so, then the first
of these silos probably will be operational
late this year or early next. If the 25 new
large silos presently under construction at the
SS-9 complexes must await completion of test-
ing on the new large missiles, as also seems
likely, then they will not be operational be-
fore late 1974 at the earliest, even though
the silos themselves may be completed well
before that.
TS 190620
 T
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Research
and Development
38. The number of R&D flight tests of
ICBMs declined sharply in 1971 and so far
this year as compared with 1970. This de-
cline in the pace of testing reflects the
completion, or near completion, of the major
ICBM development programs for the SS-9
Mod 4, the SS-11 Mods 2 and 3, and the
SS-13 Mod 2 which have been under way
in the USSR for the past three and a half
years. But the Soviets are already embarked
on other development programs-one involv-
ing a large missile for the new large silos;
one involving a smaller missile for the new
small silos; and one involving a new solid-
propellant ICBM, or a highly modified SS-13.
39. A New Missile for the Large Silos.
There is evidence that the Soviets are devel-
oping a new large ICBM in the SS-9 class
which can be deployed in the new large
40. Based on what little data are available,
we believe that the new large missile is about
the size of the SS-9 or somewhat larger.
we judge that a new launch technique
olved, possibly a pop-up technique
wherein the missile is ejected from the silo
prior to ignition of the first stage.
42. A New Missile for the Small Silos. It
was noted in the previous section that the
SS-11 Mod 3 would probably be deployed in
the new small silos at Derazhnya and Per-
vomaysk at least initially. There is also evi-
dence, however, that the Soviets are develop-
ing yet another new small ICBM which can
be deployed in modified SS-11 silos.
43. During the recently concluded SAL ses-
sion in Helsinki, one of the Soviet officials
asserted that the USSR had one, perhaps two,
missiles of different dimensions under de-
velopment as replacements for the SS-11. He
intimated that at least one of these missiles
is somewhat larger than the SS-11. His com-
ments were made in the context of a conver-
sation in which he expressed concern about
US proposals to limit increases in missile and
silo size. The Soviets subsequently agreed to
limit increases in silo launcher dimensions to
10 to 15 percent, but beyond the general limi-
tation in Article II of the interim agreement-
which prohibits the substitution of "heavy"
missiles for "light" ones-the Soviets have
made no commitment to limit the size of the
missiles themselves.
44. There has recently been one full scale
test of a new ICBM. Preliminary analysis in-
dicates that it is in the SS-11 class, that it uses
liquid propellants
he payload involved is only
a single RV. Detailed analysis of the charac-
teristics and capabilities of the new missile
cannot be made until more data become
available.
45. A New Solid-Propellant ICBM? Thus
far, the Soviets have developed only two solid-
propellant ballistic missiles-the SS-13 ICBM
and the SS-14 medium-range ballistic missile,
which is made up of the upper two stages of
TO
TS 190620
 26 TOP
the SS-13. The USSR has a large and varied
solid-propellant production capability, how-
ever-ample to support a new generation of
solid-propellant ballistic missiles. The magni-
tude of its solid-propellant R&D facilities,
moreover, suggests that it is pursuing an active
development program.
46. There were firings of a missile this year
at Plesetsk which could have been of a new
missile or of a highly modified SS-13. There
were some similarities between it and the
SS-13, including the use of solid propellants,
but there were' differences as well; the missile
flew to a higher apogee than the SS-13, and
its RV apparently had a considerably higher
ballistic coefficient.
47. A Mobile ICBM? For some years, the
Soviets have boasted of a mobile ICBM capa-
bility, but the now abandoned SS-X-15 was
the only mobile missile system we detected
which appeared to have a potential ICBM
application. The Soviet refusal to ban mobile
ICBM launchers in the interim agreement
with the US limiting strategic offensive
weapons indicates that the USSR remains
interested in that mode of deployment, in
which it may feel it has an edge on the US.
48. All in all, ultimate Soviet intentions with
respect to both solid-propellant ICBMs and
the mobile mode of deployment are unclear.
The sum of the evidence suggests that the
Soviets are committed to continue R&D on
larger solid-propellant motors, and we be-
lieve that they will gradually bring new
models to the flight test stage. The Soviets
could have the solid-propellant missile now
being tested ready for deployment by late
1974 or 1975. But they already have follow-on
liquid-propellant programs for their two prin-
cipal silo based ICBM systems. Although we
believe that the Soviets will deploy additional
solid-propellant missiles, we doubt that they
will be quick to abandon some 25 years of
proven liquid-propellant technology in favor
of solid-propellant systems.
49. With respect to mobile ICBMs, the
Soviets may see both military and bargaining
advantage in developing one. But they cannot
proceed too far in this direction unless they
are willing to risk some sort of showdown
with the US, which has asserted that deploy
ment of land-mobile ICBMs would be incon-
sistent with the objectives of the interim agree-
ment. In addition, there are practical diffi-
culties in deploying and maintaining the large
and complicated pieces of equipment which
would be required, and increased survivabil-
ity, which mobile systems could provide, is
already being provided by the silo hardening
program and the growth of the SLBM force.1'
Goals of New Missile Programs
50. We will not have a clear-cut picture
of what the Soviets are trying to accomplish
with their new ICBM systems until further
data are available. Nevertheless, we do have
some indications of their probable goals.
51. Survivability. The survivability of their
ICBM force against a first strike or pre-
emptive attack has been a major concern of
the Soviets and will unquestionably continue
to be. The new silos are being constructed so
as to make them considerably harder than
previous Soviet types. Conversion of existing
SS-9 and SS-11 silos to the new configuration,
which the Soviets apparently contemplate,
will represent a considerable financial invest-
'? Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan, Jr., the Assistant
Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that the
Soviets would deploy mobile ICBMs if they con-
sidered it to their advantage. Noting the Soviet's
refusal to include mobile ICBMs in the SAL Agree-
ment, he believes it unlikely that the unilateral US
statement on mobile ICBMs will deter the Soviets
from deploying them.
TS 190620
 TO
ment in increased survivability as well as in
improved missiles.
52. Soviet concern for survivability is also
reflected in the provision of the interim
agreement on strategic offensive weapons
which permits the USSR to construct addi-
tional SLBM launchers if equal numbers of
older ICBMs or SLBMs are retired. Recogni-
tion of the vulnerability of SS-7s and SS-8s,
which are deployed on soft pads or in clus-
tered silos almost certainly contributed to
Soviet interest in this provision.
53. Accuracy. We have long believed that
the Soviets would incorporate greater accuracy
in follow-on missile systems, if only through
normal improvements in existing types of
guidance components. We 'now have indica-
tions of an interest in improved accuracy in
connection with two of the new missile sys-
tems under development. The use of RVs
with higher betas, as in some of the more
recent ICBM modification programs, could
also facilitate development of higher accu-
racies. As noted in past Estimates, Soviet
RVs have normally had considerably lower
betas than US RVs, thus making them slower-
moving once they reach the atmosphere and
more subject to atmospheric disturbances.
54. How much improvement will actually
be achieved in the new missile programs is
hard to predict. Even detailed future analysis
is not expected to provide a confident assess-
ment. The improvement might be only mar-
ginal. Improvements in the components of
present Soviet guidance systems and the use
of higher betas (i.e., 950-1,250 PSF) could,
however, result in CEPs as low as about
0.25 nm. This would require at least two
years of testing. If the Soviets were willing to
accept the necessary risks and commitments,
they should be able to achieve CEPs ap-
proaching 0.15 rim.
In addition, they
would have to accept the necessity for at
least three years of testing-more if the pro-
gram developed difficulties-before the sys-
tem could be confidently deployed.''
" Dr. Ray S. Cline, the Director, Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Research, Department of State; Lt. Gen.
Samuel C. Phillips, the Director, National Security
Agency; and Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan, Jr., the
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believe.
that significantly longer flight test programs would be
required by the Soviets to achieve very high accuracies
on their new missiles, If the Soviets have decided to
strive for such accuracies in their new ICBMs and
are only now beginning initial testing of guidance
systems capable of providing such accuracy, they
face many problems and like the US will require a
substantial number of flight tests and an extended
learning period to solve those problems.
Dr. Cline and Gen. Phillips believe that a flight
test program of at least 5 years would be required to
achieve a CEP significantly better than 0.25 nm.
Gen. Keegan believes that a longer period of flight
Based on US experience, Gen. Keegan believes that
the Soviets would probably require five to seven years
of flight testing and analysis to understand, quantify,
and translate these problems and their theoretical
solutions into an operational system with a CEP of
0.25 nm. Since the Soviets may now be entering the
initial flight test phase of a new generation of guidance
systems and techniques like those the US has been
refining in flight testing for some 17 years (i.e., all
inertial incorporating a digital computer and inertial
platform ), an additional learning period would be
expected. Thus, he believes that under these circum-
stances the Soviets would require a total of seven to
10 years of flight testing and concurrent analysis to
obtain CEPs better than 0.25 nm.
 TOP
56. It is too early to tell whether the
Soviets are now seeking to achieve very
high accuracies for their land-based ICBM
force and have done the lengthy design
and development work required before ac-
tual testing could begin. We do have evi-
dence that they are experimenting with
new and more sophisticated guidance tech-
niques in other applications,
 TO
59. Multiple Independently-Targetable Re-
entry Vehicles. We continue to believe, as we
have for some years, that the Soviets will
develop MIRVs for their ICBMs, including
some with accuracies providing a capability
to attack hard targets. Increasing the num-
ber of available RVs by means of MIRVs
would also be useful for enhancing the retal-
iatory capabilities of ICBMs surviving a pre-
emptive attack and for penetrating ABM de-
fenses. There have been various indications,
some quite explicit, that the Soviets regard
this as an important area of strategic weap-
onry in which they have need, for political
as well as military reasons, to catch up with
the US.
60. The first indication of present Soviet
intentions with respect to MIRY development
may emerge once the Soviets begin down-
range tests of their new large missile from
Tyuratam to Kamchatka. Our best present
judgment is that this program will involve
MIRVs with improved accuracy. The new
small ICBM which the USSR is developing
is less likely to have a hard target capability,
but we would expect it to incorporate ad-
vances in guidance system technology, and it
may be equipped with MIRVs as well. We
would expect to determine the broad ob-
jectives of new ICBM development programs
soon after the Soviets begin flight testing.
61. Penetrating Antiballistic Missile De-
fenses. The Soviets have also been concerned
by the problem of penetrating ABM defenses,
although this concern has presumably abated
now that an ABM Treaty has been concluded.
In the past few years they have developed
three missile systems which would complicate
the problems of an ABM defense-the SS-9
Mod 4, the SS-11 Mod 2, and the SS-11
Mod 3. As indicated earlier, the SS-11 Mod 2
program appears to have been terminated.
62. The three RVs of the SS-11 Mod 3 and
the SS-9 Mod 4 would have to be hardened
to withstand the nuclear effects of defensive
weapons (and possibly also to avoid "fratri-
cide" 20) if they were to be effective.
I'lie Soviets are presumably we aware
these systems
of the problem and have done research in
the area. Hence we believe that at least some
degree of hardening has been provided for
testing these systems long before any US ABM
63. We do not know why the Soviets began
"Fratricide takes place when an incoming warhead
is put out of action as the result of the detonation
of an earlier incoming warhead.
 30 TOP
system could be operational. A possible ex-
planation is that they may initially have ex-
pected US ABM deployment to begin well
before it actually did. They may later have
decided it would be desirable to complete
development of appropriate hardware in ad-
vance of any strategic arms limitation agree-
ment. As it has turned out, however, signature
of the ABM Treaty lessens the pressure for
developing penetration systems except pos-
sibly as a hedge.
II. SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC
MISSILES
64. In the mid-1950s, the Soviets acquired
a limited ballistic missile submarine capability
by converting six diesel-powered Z-class attack
submarines to carry two missiles each. Soon
thereafter, production began on two new
classes of submarines-the diesel-powered G-
and the nuclear-powered H-class-each of
which carried three 300 nm ballistic missiles.
Production of these two classes ended in
1962 with the completion of 23 G-class and 9
H-class units. The decision to halt construc-
tion probably was made in the late 1950s in
connection with a decision, evident in classi-
fied Soviet writings, to divest the Soviet Navy
of responsibility for carrying out strikes deep
in enemy territory.
65. Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis,
however-and probably in part as a reaction
to that crisis-another reversal of course took
place. Authorization was given to develop a
strategic counterpart to the US Polaris force,
based on the Y-class nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarine. Construction on the first of
these 16-tube units began at Severodvinsk in
1964. This lead unit was launched in 1966 but
did not enter service until nearly two years
later. In 1969, the first Y-class submarine was
launched at a second yard-Komsomol'sk in
the Soviet Far East.
66. The Soviets have launched a modi-
fication of the Y-class submarine which
differs significantly from all previous units
of that class. Up until recently this submarine
has been referred to as the modified Y-class.
It has now been designated the D-class. (See
Figure 3.) It is about 25 feet longer than the
Y-class, has 12 rather than 16 launch tubes,
and carries a larger missile, the SS-NX-8, with
much greater range than the SS-N-6 carried
by the Y-class. Because the extra length is aft
of the missile bay, the Soviets could have
utilized the extra space for such improvements
as increased habitability and an improved
and/or quieter power plant.21 Subsequent to
the launch of this unit, the Soviets launched
five more Y-class submarines, three at Severod-
vinsk and two at Komsomol'sk, but it is be-
lieved that the Soviets are now concentrating
on the D-class and that few if any more
Y-class units will be produced.22
Current Production Rates and
Force Levels
67. The present combined rate of D- and
Y-class production from Severodvinsk and
Komsomol'sk is 6 to 7 a year, down from the
previous high of eight units in one year estab-
lished in 1970. The switchover to production
of D-class units is now complete at Severod-
vinsk, however, and the overall production
rate probably will begin to increase somewhat.
68. Table II shows the estimated num-
ber and status of Soviet ballistic missile sub-
marines as of 1 October 1972. The number
of missile launch tubes is shown in paren-
theses. Of the 27 Y-class units operational,
20 are in the Northern Fleet and 7 in the
" There have been other modifications of the Y-
class, but the earlier "variants" differed from the
original in only minor ways, such as an improved
sonar system.
'= It is not known whether Komsomol'sk is produc-
ing the D-class.
7TAFiFf.QET
 TO 31
D-Class Submarine
OPERA-
TIONAL
IN CONSTRUCTION
OR CONVERSION *
OUTFITTING
OR ON
SEA TRIALS
G-I (3 Launchers) .............. 7(21) 1(3)"
8(24)
G-II (3 Launchers) ............. 11(33)
1(3)
12(36)
G-III (4 Launchers)` ............
...
1(4)
1(4)
G-IV (6 Launchers)
...
1(6)
...
1(6)
H-II (3 Launchers) .............
8(24)
...
...
8(24)
H-III (6 Launchers) ............
1(6)'
...
...
1(6)
Y (16 Launchers) ...............
27(432)
0-4(0.64)?
4(64)
31-35(496-560)`
D (12 Launchers) ..............
...
12-8(144-96)`
1(12)
13-9(156-108)?
54(516)
14(153-169)?
7(83)
75(752-768)e
" All units currently in construction or conversion will be operational by late 1974 or early
1975.
This unit probably is being converted to a G-II type.
The missile intended for the G-III submarine has not yet been determined.
? The H-III is not, strictly speaking, operational because it is being used for R&D firings of
the SS-NX-8. See paragraph 85. ,
The range of figures reflects our uncertainty as to whether the Komsomol'sk shipyard is
producing the D-class.
TO
TS 190620
 32 TOP
Pacific Fleet.23 Of 12 units on the ways,
8 are in the main yard at Severodvinsk, and
4 are at Komsomol'sk. All 12 of these units
and 5 more now fitting out or on sea trials
probably will be operational by late 1974 or
early 1975, bringing the operational force to a
total of 44 units.
Characteristics and Capabilities of the
Ballistic Missile Submarine Force
Y- and D-Class Submarines
69. The Soviets' most widely deployed
SLBM-the SS-N-6-is a single-stage, liquid-
propellant missile with a maximum range of
about 1,300 nm. It is carried on Y-class sub-
marines. With this missile, Y-class submarines
could take station as much as 500 miles off the
east and west coasts of the US and strike most
major targets in the country; moving the sub-
marines closer in or placing some in the Gulf
of Mexico would permit virtually complete
coverage of the US. Y-class submarines C
71. We believe that the D-class will be
equipped with 12 SS-NX-8 missiles. There
is some doubt about the maximum range of
result in a maximum range of about 3,500
maximum
3,100 nm.
operational range would be
72. The first D-class submarine is now
on sea trials and will probably not join the
operational fleet until 1973, assuming that the
normally
stay about 1,000 nm out. (See Figure 4.)
navigation inaccuracies probably would in-
crease the overall system CEP
" Two of the Pacific Fleet units were built at
Severodvinsk and transferred from the Northern
Fleet-one in 1971, another in 1972; the rest were
built at Komsomol'sk.
SS-NX-8 is also ready by then. The missile
development program was in its final stages
earlier this year
After a standdown in test-
ing for nearly three months, launchings re-
sumed from the White Sea area in August,
73. Deployment of the SS-NX-8 will sig-
nificantly improve the flexibility and surviva-
bility of the Soviet SLBM force. With this
missile, submarines could take station some
1,500 miles off the coasts of the US and strike
any target in the country. This would greatly
increase the ocean area from which D-class
submarines could strike the US, compared
with the amount of ocean area associated with
the 800 nm standoff range of the closest pres-
ent Y-class patrols. (See Figure 5.)
TOP
 Figure 4
Ballistic Missile Submarine Patrol Areas
from present patrol areas
with the SS-N-6 missile
TOP , t'E
561124 9-72 CIA
TS 190620
 Potential Coverage of US by D-Class
with SS-NX-8 Missile
t.
---
Area in which D-class `~
submarines withSS-NX-8
missiles could cover the
entire US
Distance from US from which
D-class submarines with
SS-NX-8 missiles could cover
the same targets now covered,
by Y-class submarines from
---tkeir present patrol areas rp
TO
:r
 TO
If the Soviets were to target
only the same installations that are now within
range of the SS-N-6 missile from 800 nm off-
shore, the D-class submarines with the SS-
NX-8 could stay out as far as 2,800 nm and
further complicate the US antisubmarine
problem.
74. Each D-class unit equipped with the
SS-NX-8 will have fewer missiles than Y-class
units. But such units would have shorter travel
time to and from patrol stations, and could
thus stay on station longer. Assuming that the
same target areas were to be covered in both
cases, the Soviets could then maintain as.many
launchers on station with units fitted with
SS-NX-8 missiles as they could with a force
of the same size consisting of units equipped
with the SS-N-6. With all else equal, for every
three Y-class units equipped with the SS-N-6
that the Soviets could maintain on station
within range of the US, they could maintain
four D-class units on station equipped with
the SS-NX-8, because of the shorter transit
times. The number of missiles on station would
be the same in either case, but US antisub-
marine forces would have to cope with the
presence of more submarines at greater dis-
tances from the US coasts in the case of units
equipped with the SS-NX-8.
75. In addition to its greater range, the
SS-NX-8 is believed to be more accurate than
the SS-N-6.
 TOP
80. During the past year, the number of
submarines continuously on station within
missile range of the US has remained the
same-one in the Pacific and three in .the
Atlantic. Thus, the percentage of the force
continuously on station has been declining-
from nearly 20 percent last year to about 15
percent now. This compares with about 50
percent continuously on station for the US
Polaris-Poseidon fleet.
81. We do not know the reasons for this
continuing low level of patrol activity. It is
consistent, however, with the long-standing
Soviet belief that hostilities with the US and
its allies would occur only in the course of a
major political crisis which would provide an
opportunity for bringing Soviet forces to peak
readiness. In such a situation, some 80 per-
cent of the force probably could put to sea
and remain there for 60 to 90 days.
82. In time, the Soviets might increase the
percentage of the force normally on station,
particularly as units equipped with the
SS-NX-8 become available beginning late this
year or early next. Even with a sizable SS-
NX-8 force, however, operational factors, such
as the lack of forward bases and crew avail-
ability (the Soviets probably have only one
crew for each missile submarine), probably
will prevent the Soviets from maintaining
more than 40 percent of the force continu-
ously on station within range of the US.24
" This figure also takes into consideration the re-
quirements for overhaul of SSBNs. In the years to
come, about 20 percent of the force normally will
be in the overhaul process at any one time, and thus
not available for patrol duty.
TS 190620
 83. The Y- and D-class force appears in-
tended for use against urban-industrial or
soft military targets in the US, because its
missiles lack the yield and accuracy to be
effective against hard targets. Beyond this,
we do not know how the Soviets intend to
use the force. They may regard it as primarily
useful for retaliatory or follow-up strikes.
Some 70 percent of the force is always in port
and vulnerable to a surprise attack from a
potential enemy, however. This suggests that
the Soviet plan would be to send more Y- and
D-class units to sea in the' event of a major
political crisis in which a serious threat of
nuclear war developed.
84. The use of depressed trajectories with
SLBMs would make them potentially more.
effective against time-urgent targets because
warning times would be reduced. At a range
of 1,000 nm, for example, the SS-N-6 fired on
a trajectory with an apogee of about 100 nm
would have an estimated flight time of less
than 11 minutes, as opposed to about 14 min-
utes with the trajectory normally used in flight
tests. There has been no evidence to date that
any Soviet SLBMs have been tested on de-
pressed trajectories. Depressed trajectories
produce higher temperatures and greater dy-
namic pressure on the missile which could
cause structural failure. In addition, the shal-
lower angle of the flight path degrades ac-
curacy. Thus, some tests probably would be
required to determine the effects of depressed
trajectories on the missile involved. We would
probably detect such a test program before
its completion.
H-Class Submarines
85. Of the nine H-class nuclear-powered
submarines built between 1958 and 1962,
eight have been converted to carry three 700
nm SS-N-5 missiles. These submarines have
been designated the H-II-class. The SS-N-5 can
be launched while the submarine is submerged
and has more than twice the range of the
surface-launched SS-N-4 which it replaced.
The ninth unit, designated the H-III, has been
extensively remodeled to provide it with six
launch tubes instead of the original three, It
has completed sea trials and now is being used
for the initial firings at sea of the SS-NX-8.
There is no evidence that any other H-class
units are being similarly* converted, and, in
view of the length of time since completion
of the H-III unit in 1970, it appears unlikely
that any additional units will be.
86. Although patrols by H-class subma-
rines in the western Atlantic continue,
gesting that the two units in the Pacific Ocean
Fleet now are assigned to a peripheral attack
role.
in the Northern Fleet, w are now conduct-
ing about three patrols per year, probably are
still intended for use against targets in the
US. These submarines may be relegated to a
peripheral attack role when more Y- and
D-class submarines are available.
G-Class Submarines
87. Of the 23 G-class diesel-powered sub-
marines built between 1958 and 1962, 11 have
been converted to carry three SS-N-5 missiles
instead of the original SS-N-4s. Two more units
are being similarly converted. The converted
units have been designated G-IIs. Seven
G-class units still carry three SS-N-4s.
88. The two remaining -class units have
been converted in two uniquely different
ways. In one instance a G-class has had a
raised superstructure added aft of the sail.
Four missile tubes of a size suitable to house
SS-N-6 missiles are fitted in the superstruc-
Tna
 38 TO T
ture. There are no tubes in the sail. Work on
this conversion appears complete but sea trials
and missile firings have not yet begun.
89. The other conversion program involves
modifying a G-class submarine to carry the
SS-NX-8 in six missile tubes in an enlarged
sail-along the lines of the H-III. This con-
version should be finished about the end of
this year.
90. We do not know why the Soviets would
undertake to convert G-class submarines to
carry either the SS-N-6 or the SS-NX-8, be-
cause both types of missiles are already being
installed on Y-class and D-class units, respec-
tively. The first conversion may carry the KY-9
missile now being tested at Kapustin Yar,
which is about the size of the SS-N-6. As to
the second, involving the SS-NX-8, whatever
the Soviets had in mind may have been over-
taken by events at the SAL talks and in the
SS-NX-8 program itself.
91. We continue to believe that some
G-class submarines are assigned to a peripheral
and some to an intercontinental attack role,
but we do not know how many, or which
ones, are assigned to which mission.
At present, it would appear that the six
G-II class submarines in the Northern Fleet
may still be assigned to an intercontinental
attack role but that the nine G-class units
in the Pacific, and probably the five G-I class
units in the Northern Fleet, are intended pri-
marily for use against peripheral targets.
New Programs
92. There is no direct evidence of any
new Soviet ballistic missile submarine pro-
gram. But the SAL agreement allows the
USSR to build up to 62 modern ballistic mis-
sile submarines and 950 SLBM launchers, not
counting the launchers for older types of mis-
siles now installed. The only way these totals
.can be approached or reached in combination
from the current base of 12-tube D-class and
16-tube Y-class submarines operational and
under construction is for the Soviets to revert
to construction of the 16-tube Y-class units or
to include units of a new class with more than
16 launchers each.225 If the Soviets convert
existing Y-class submarines to the new, 12-
tube D-class configuration, this would further
increase the requirement for a new class with
more launchers per unit.
93. The Soviets are building a large new
construction hall adjacent to the main sub-
marine construction hall at Severodvinsk. This
building was begun in late 1970 and probably
Will be ready for use in 1974, but we do not
know how the Soviets plan to use it. One pos-
sibility is that a new ballistic missile submarine
will be produced there. In this case, the So-
viets could complete the present program in
the existing construction hall in 1974, at about
the time the new hall would be ready for the
start of a new program. The old hall could
then be turned over to the conversion or over-
haul of Y-class and other types of submarines.
A new missile or an improved version of the
If the Soviets stop building 16-tube units soon, as
it appears they will, and continue building 12-tube
units until they reach a total of 62 modern ballistic
missile submarines, they will have far less than the
950 SLBM launchers permitted under the agreement.
 SS-NX-8 could be developed and ready for
deployment by 1976 or 1977, by which time
the first submarine from the new construction
hall could be reaching operational status.
94. Because the interim agreement permits
the Soviets 950 SLBMs and 62 modern
submarines and because of the existence
of the new construction hall at Severodvinsk,
we believe that the USSR will develop and
deploy a new class of ballistic missile sub-
marine by 1977. Similarly, because the interim
agreement permits the Soviets to replace old
launchers on G- and H-class submarines
with new launchers on modern SSBNs, we
believe it unlikely that any additional G-
or H-class units will undergo further mod-
ernization or conversion for strategic attack
purposes.
III. HEAVY BOMBERS AND TANKERS
Current Forces 26
95. The heavy bombers and tankers of So-
viet Long Range Aviation (LRA) comprise
the third major component of Soviet forces for
intercontinental attack. Currently this element
is made up of 110 Bears-70 are air-to-surface
missile (ASM) carriers and 5 are fitted for
reconnaissance-and 85 Bisons, including 50
LRA also has some 700 TU-16 Badger and TU-22
Blinder medium bombers based throughout' the Soviet
Union. These aircraft have a limited capability for
intercontinental attack although some could be used
on one-way missions if the Soviets felt a need to
maximize an all-out nuclear assault against North
America. However, evidence continues to support our
judgment that Badger and Blinder forces are equipped
and trained primarily for peripheral operations. The
deployment of large numbers of medium bombers
through Arctic bases would raise serious problems
in airfield capacity and logistics. The use of medium
bombers in the peripheral role is discussed in NIE
11-14-71, "Warsaw Pact Forces for Operations in
Eurasia."
tankers. Delivery of these aircraft to LRA
ceased in the early 1960s; they are the only
ones in the Soviet inventory whose primary
mission is intercontinental attack. In naval
exercises of recent years it has become ap-
parent that Bears equipped with ASM also
have a mission, probably a secondary one,
of carrying out strikes against naval forces,
particularly aircraft carriers.
Characteristics and Capabilities of the
Force
96. Bears pose the most serious bomber
threat to the US because of their numbers and
range; they can cover virtually any US target
on two way missions. The 70 ASM carriers,
45 of which are equipped for aerial refueling,
are fitted with the 350 nm AS-3 and can
launch their weapons while well out from
the target, thereby avoiding terminal defenses.
The Bears equipped for aerial refueling can
operate directly from their home bases, but
the non-refuelable types-25 ASM carriers
and 35 free-fall bombers-would have to stage
through bases in the Arctic to obtain exten-
sive coverage of the US. Whether refueled
or staged, the range of the Bear aircraft gives
it greater flexibility in routing and in choice
of flight profile than other Soviet bombers.
97. The 35 Bison bombers in the force are
all capable of aerial refueling but even so they
would have to resort to Arctic staging for
extensive coverage of the US on two-way mis-
sions. None of them carries ASMs. The 50
Bison tankers are used to refuel the Bison
bombers, the refuelable Bears, and, in some
instances, Bears assigned to Naval Aviation.27
' Bear aircraft assigned to Naval Aviations units are
not considered a threat to the continental US since
they are used exclusively in naval reconnaissance or
antisubmarine warfare activities.
 40 TO
The Backfire 28
98. The Soviets have a new twin-engine
bomber under development which is fitted
with a variable-geometry wing; we refer to
it as the Backfire. The Backfire was first seen
in July 1970, and its test program is probably
well advanced. A decision to produce the air-
craft serially has probably been made.
99. An analysis undertaken during the past
year suggests that the radius of action of the
aircraft when flying a high altitude, subsonic
mission, with wings fully extended through-
out the flight, would be near the 3,000 nm
figure estimated in NIE 11-8-70. Other analy-
sis, mentioned in 11-8-71 still suggests that the
radius of action is less, perhaps much less
for this profile. Unfortunately we are in no
better position to make a confident estimate
of the aircraft's performance than we were
last year. We may have to wait until the air-
craft is assigned to operational units before
this becomes possible,29
100. In the view of all but the Air Force,
the Backfire is best suited for a peripheral
"See Figure 6 for a silhouette of the Backfire and,
for purposes of comparison, silhouettes of the Bear,
Bison, and Badger.
" Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan, Jr., the Assistant
Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that we
are in a better position to make a confident estimate
of Backfire's performance. than we were last year.
He believes that additional correlation and analysis
of available evidence during the past year permits
a more confident assessment of the capabilities of
Backfire to be made.
He would also note that the results of detailed
engineering design anal ses
indicate the
performance and characteristics of Backfire are within
about 10 percent of those estimated in NIE 11-8-70.
These analyses show that Backfire has nearly twice
the radius of the Badger medium bomber and about
the same radius as the Bison heavy bomber.
attack role. The Air Force believes that the
basic design of the aircraft indicates that the
Soviets developed the Backfire to perform a
variety of missions, including intercontinental
attack. All believe that the Backfire will reach
IOC late next year as an ASM carrier; a free-
fall bomber version may reach IOC about the
same time.
101. The suitability of the Backfire for an
intercontinental role will be heavily dependent
on the existence of a suitable force of tankers.
Several aircraft other than the Bison, such
as the 11-62 (Classic) or the 11-76 (Candid),
could be adapted to the tanker role, or a new
one could be developed.
102. The Backfire may have considerable
growth potential. If, for example, the Soviets
were to develop high efficiency turbofan
engines for it, the range of the Backfire could
be somewhat increased. Such improvements
in performance are not likely to appear in
deployed aircraft before the late 1970s.
Possible Follow-on Heavy Bomber
103. For the past several years we have
considered Soviet development of a new heavy
bomber unlikely. This judgment was based in
part on our belief that as their ICBM and
SLBM forces grew, the Soviets would come
to rely less and less on bomber aircraft. Those
missile forces have now reached significant
proportions, but there has been no phase-out
or appreciable attrition of the heavy bombers
in LRA for several years, or any significant
reduction in their training activity. Thus, it
appears that contrary to Khrushchev, who be-
lieved the day of the manned bomber had
passed, present Soviet leaders recognize the
advantages of flexibility, recall, and follow-on
,attack afforded by a manned bomber force.
For the present, at least, they apparently be-
lieve that these advantages are worth the cost
of retaining an intercontinental bomber capa-
TS 190620
 Bomber Silhouettes
Engines
4 jet
Gross weight
400,000 lbs
Combat radius
3,050 nm
Cruise speed
445 kts
Assumed bomb load
10,000 lbs
Engines
Gross weight
Combat radius
Cruise speed
Assumed bomb load
-152 ft f
4 turboprop
365.000lbs
4,500 nm
435 kts
10.000 lbs
2 jet
167,000 lbs
1.650 nm
445 kts
6,600 lbs o
_119 ft
T T
 42 TOP
bility for some years to come. Other factors
that may encourage them to do this are the
exclusion of bombers from the recently signed
US-USSR interim agreement on strategic at-
tack systems, and the reduced state of US
air defense.
104. If this is their view, and they persist
in it, the Soviet leadership must sooner or later
come to grips with the problem of the com-
position of their future forces. Their present
bomber aircraft are aging rapidly and attrition
will soon take its toll unless the Soviets are
willing to engage in rehabilitation programs
more difficult and costly than those in the
past. Such programs would serve merely to
extend the life of the aircraft rather than to
improve the capabilities of the force to any
significant degree. Alternatively, the Soviets
may opt for a new heavy bomber. Although
its development would be more expensive than
the rehabilitation of their present aircraft, it
would give them greater capabilities for inter-
continental attack than their present force.
105. We have no evidence that a new heavy
bomber program is underway, but develop-
ment of such a bomber would not present
any particularly difficult technical problems
to the Soviets. They now have the capability
to develop long-range, fixed-wing aircraft
fitted with advanced turboprop or turbofan
engines, and, based on their experience with
the Backfire, variable-geometry wing aircraft
with greater ranges than Backfire. If they do
decide to develop a heavy bomber, we would
expect to become aware of its existence four
to five years prior to its reaching operational
status.
IV. SOVIET DECISION-MAKING ON
MILITARY POLICY AND PROGRAMS
106. Certain distinctive and enduring fea-
tures of the Soviet political system affect the
way in which decisions are made on military
policies and programs. One of them is the
primacy of the Party, particularly its central
apparatus. The -principle of close and rela-
tively detailed party supervision of military
affairs, in peace and in war, has from the
beginning been an important element of So-
viet political doctrine, partly as a consequence
of the Party's persistent fear of Bonapartism.
The military has also been drawn into the
party system in a number of ways. The role
of the Party is enhanced by the tendency of
the Soviet bureaucracy to push decisions to-
ward the top. This means that the top political
leadership is more often involved with the
details of military decision-making than is
normally the case in Western countries.
107. The process through which decisions
on Soviet military policy and programs emerge
is veiled in secrecy. Enough is known, how-
ever, to show that the process is a complex
one in which many groups and individuals
play a part. A variety of advisory and execu-
tive bodies-drawn from the military, the sci-
entific establishment, and defense industry-
forward their views to the top political and
military leadership, at times in competition
with one another. This interplay of competing
policy positions and special interest groups
serves in effect to impose checks and balances
on the power of the top leadership. As in
other countries, final decisions are the result
of organizational and personal politics as well
as of an objective consideration of strategic
needs.
108. Soviet decision-making on military
affairs has generally followed the trend evi-
dent in other areas of national policy over
the past two decades. That is, there has been
an increase in the number of people who
participate in the decision-making or who
furnish advice, a gradual diffusion of respon-
sibility, and a movement toward what might
be termed "participatory bureaucracy". The
TOP SECK-T-
 TOP
movement has been roughly from a one-man
command system under Stalin, to a system
under Khrushchev using a mixture of personal
and oligarchic procedures, to the present sys-
tem of rule by committee, which makes wide
use of councils, commissions, and second-level
advisors.
109. The top leadership's dependence on var-
ious subordinate organizations for information,
technical judgment, and . recommendations
is in large part necessitated by the detail and
complexity of the issues with which the lead-
ership deals. Limitations on the time and in-
formation available to top officials virtually
compel the inclusion of subordinate echelons
in the decision-making process. At a minimum,
subordinate organizations play a role in fram-
ing the policy issues which come before the
top leadership, and hence in circumscribing
policy options. In addition, within a complex
bureaucratic system, component organizations
have their own institutional interests to protect
and promote, and often have differing views
on military requirements and goals.
110. At several key points in the system,
the varying views and pressures generated by
the groups discussed above come together and
in one way or another are resolved, accom-
modated, rejected, or forwarded to another
organizational level. There are presently four
key institutions in the Soviet military decision-
making structure. These are the Politburo, the
Defense Council, the Military-Industrial Com-
mission, and the General Staff of the Ministry
of Defense.
The Politburo
111. The ultimate decision-making authority
in the USSR on defense issues, as on other
issues of national policy, is the Politburo of
the Communist Party's Central Committee
with its 15 voting and 8 non-voting members.
There is no detailed information available
on the exact responsibilities of the Politburo
in the military sphere, but it is believed to
set broad requirements for the armed forces
and to make final decisions on military strategy
and doctrine, the allocation of resources to
defense, and the structure and employment of
the armed forces. It normally meets once
each week.
112. The Politburo's operations have evolved
as political conditions have changed. Under
Stalin the Politburo was not a genuine policy-
making body. It made significant contribu-
tions to decision-making under Khrushchev
(1957-1964), although it suffered from Khru-
shchev's heavy-handed dominance. Under the
present regime, operating procedures have be-
come more systematized, and the Politburo
has adhered to orderly decision-making proc-
esses. The regime has sought to maintain a
collectivity of leadership, as reflected by its
separation of the top party and government
posts, and the effort made at Politburo meet-
ings to get full coordination of views and
unanimity on important issues. Nonetheless,
three officials, by virtue of their position, ex-
perience, and knowledge, play leading roles
in discussions on defense and military indus-
trial policy: Party General Secretary L. I.
Brezhnev, Premier A. N. Kosygin, and D. F.
Ustinov, a Party Secretary and a candidate
member of the Politburo who is the party's
overseer for military-industrial affairs.
113. Brezhnev is the de facto chairman of
the Politburo and its most influential member.
His prerogatives include the right to convene
and chair Politburo meetings, to compose the
agenda, to sum up the issues under considera-
tion, to circulate or withhold various docu-
ments and proposals, and to enlarge or restrict
attendance at meetings, including the right
to exclude candidate members. As party
leader, Brezhnev holds a post which tradi-
TOP
TS 190620
 tionally entails leadership over military affairs,
and he is known to be chairman of the De-
fense Council (see below), the USSR's closest
counterpart to the US National Security
Council. His authority in the defense field is
also reflected in his overall supervision of the
Central Committee's Administrative Organs
Department (which oversees the military, se-
curity, and judicial establishments on behalf
of the Central Committee) and the Chief Po-
litical Directorate of the Ministry of Defense,
which functions as a Central Committee de-
partment responsible for ensuring the political
reliability of the armed forces.
114. Kosygin also has certain responsibili-
ties in the defense and. military-industrial
field. As chairman of the Council of Ministers,
he has constitutional authority over the Min-
istry of Defense and the eight ministries con-
cerned with defense industry. In addition, the
Military-Industrial Commission or VPK (see
below), which oversees the various ministries
and agencies involved in defense produc-
tion, is formally attached to the Council of
Ministers.
115. Ustinov apparently has direct super-
visory authority over the VPK and over the
production of advanced weapons generally.
The VPK chairman, L. V. Smirnov, is known
to report to Ustinov, who thus serves as a
personal link between the VPK and the De-
fense Council and the Politburo. It is through
Ustinov that the Politburo monitors the de-
fense industrial sector. In addition, Ustinov
has contacts with at least two departments of
the Central Committee that deal with defense-
related materiel and personnel matters.
116. Major questions relating to military
matters are discussed and decided by the Polit-
buro, often in considerable detail. This small
elite group is occupied with a wide range of
interests and issues, however, and devotes
only a limited amount of attention to military
affairs, To facilitate its decision-making tasks,
the Politburo delegates some of its authority
to other bodies and relies upon various coun-
cils and commissions, either permanent or ad
hoc, to examine particular policy areas.
The Defense Council
117. The highest level body in the USSR
dealing primarily with military affairs is the
Defense Council. It is a political-military body,
chaired by Brezhnev, which serves as a defense
advisory committee to the Politburo. The
Council's high-level membership-which in-
cludes at least the top three political leaders
(Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgornyy), the De-
fense Minister (Grechko), and probably the
Party authority on military-industrial affairs
( Ustinov )-suggests that a recommendation
by the Defense Council would seldom en-
counter opposition within the Politburo.
. 118. The Council's permanent membership
seems designed to ensure that meetings are
attended by at least one representative from
the Party, the government, defense industries,
and the military. A variety of other top civilian
and military officials-such as the chairman
of the KGB, the Chief of the General Staff,
the Commander in Chief of the Strategic
Rocket Forces (SRF), and the commander in
chief of the Warsaw Pact-are also invited
to participate on occasion. As a consultative
forum, the Defense Council provides the mili-
tary leadership and defense industry with
direct institutionalized access to at least the
top three political leaders, and hence with an
opportunity to present advice and take posi-
tions on the issues under consideration. Con-
versely, the Council provides the political
 TOP
leadership with a formal means of effecting
the controlled participation of senior military
leaders in the consideration of military policy.
119. The Defense Council is evidently con-
cerned with virtually all major military policy
questions. Issues reported to have 'been dis-
. cussed by the Council, or which clearly fall
within its area of responsibility, include ABM
development and deployment, revision of the
military conscription law, national mobiliza-
tion plans, military doctrine, civil defense mat-
ters, military intelligence activities, high-level
military appointments, military aid, the SAL
talks and various crisis situations throughout
the world. There is little evidence on how
the Council operates, and it is not known
what form the discussions take, how dif-
ferences are resolved, or whether the mem-
bers forward a list of options or formulate
a Council position as such. Brezhnev as its
chairman, plays a central role in the Coun-
cil's operation. He has authority to initiate
Council meetings at his own discretion, to
determine when and where the Council will
meet, to establish the purpose and agenda
for a given meeting, and to enlarge or restrict
attendance. He presumably exerts considerable
influence on the course of Council discussions
and on any decisions or positions arrived at.
To a large extent, Brezhnev probably deter-
mines the Defense Council's actual role within-
the Soviet policy-making system.
The Military-Industrial Commission
120. A second high-level body which pro-
vides defense policy support to the Politburo
is the secret VPK, a supraministerial coordinat-
ing staff formally attached to the Presidium
of the Council of Ministers. The VPK over-
sees the various ministries and agencies in-
volved in defense production, and provides a
high-level forum for the discussion of pro-
grams and problems relevant to the defense
industries. It plays a supervisory role in co-
ordinating activities in the defense industries
and serves to facilitate negotiations with the
defense industries' major customer, the Min-
istry of Defense.
121. As a governmental body, chaired by
Deputy Premier L. Smirnov, the VPK is nomi-
nally subordinate to Premier Kosygin. On the
most important matters of decision-making in
the sphere of defense-related research, devel-
opment, and production, Smirnov in practice
reports to the Party Secretariat-in particular
to Party Secretary Ustinov-and thus indi-
rectly to General Secretary Brezhnev. Ustinov
consequently provides the VPK and defense
industries with a personal link to the Defense
Council and the Politburo.
122. The VPK has a permanent staff of de-
fense production experts, headed by Smir-
nov and his three deputies (G. Titov, C. Pash-
kov, and L. Gorshkov). The staff works closely
with directors of defense plants, engineers,
and leading officials of the eight ministries
primarily responsible for defense production.
.The heads of these ministries are almost cer-
tainly members of the VPK. The deputy min-
isters and several other senior officials of the
defense-related ministries, together with lead-
ing officials of certain scientific research in-
stitutes and the USSR Academy of Sciences,
also attend VPK meetings on occasion and
may constitute a sort of associate member-
ship.
123. Defense Minister Grechko is also in-
volved with the VPK, and appears to have
some authority to request services and studies
from technical specialists attached to it. The
authority may derive from his membership on
the Defense Council.
TS 190620
 46 TO
124. The extent to which the VPK is ac-
tively involved in defense decision-making is
uncertain. It may have only limited authority
to initiate and approve decisions itself, serving
rather to recommend and coordinate on deci-
sions by other groups. Certain VPK recom-
mendations probably are forwarded through
the Council of Ministers, and receive pro
forma approval at that level. A second chan-
nel through which VPK views presumably
reach the Politburo is the Defense Council,
where Ustinov would be in a position to sum
up and present VPK views. At times, however,
VPK business is taken up directly by the
Politburo.
The Military as an Interest Group
125. No professional military officer has
served on the Politburo since the ouster of
former Defense Minister Zhukov in 1957. But
senior military leaders and top defense experts
do attend Politburo sessions upon invitation,
and presumably are able on those occasions
to present their views and recommendations.
In addition, the military is represented in
formal deliberative bodies such as the Defense
Council and the VPK.
126. All available evidence indicates that
the Soviet hierarchy leans heavily on the mil-
itary leadership for recommendations and ad-
vice on professional military matters, and that
the leadership has a high regard for Marshal
Grechko. Moreover, present political leaders,
unlike Khrushchev, have preferred to avoid
direct conflict with the military in the area of
their professional competence. Although the
exigencies of SAL talks may have led to some
relaxation, Soviet security practice effectively
prevents most civilian elements of the govern-
ment, even including the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, from having any influence over, or
even knowledge of, strategic military matters.
While the staff directly serving members of
the Politburo probably plays an important role
in screening and evaluating recommendations,
it is highly unlikely that it has or would claim
to have any expertise in military matters.
127. As successful products of the Soviet
system, the military almost certainly perceive
the nation's destiny in much the same terms
as the top civilian leaders. While they do not
constitute a disaffected element, they do con-
stitute a powerful pressure group with pri-
orities and bureaucratic interests of its own.
These interests may conflict with those of
other groups, including at times even the
top political leadership. Khrushchev said that
it took every bit of his power, and certain
sops as well, to push through the large cuts
in military personnel which took place in the
late 1950s.
128. The military leadership is not, of
course, always of one mind. There is ample
evidence of rivalries in the past. These be-
came acute, for example, when Khrushchev
was trying to build up the strategic forces
at the expense of the general purpose forces,
but they have been evident on other occasions
and over other issues as well. These conflicts
almost certainly continue, although they ap-
pear to have become muted. The combined
arms tradition is strong, and since the time of
Khrushchev, the services appear to have been
generally successful in composing their dif-
ferences and presenting a united front. Part
of the reason, perhaps, is that under the col-
lective leadership total military spending has
been increasing, which may have made the
competition within the military less keen than
if spending were constant or diminishing.
With one exception, the estimated shares spent
for the individual services appear, in recent
years, to have been remarkably steady. The
 exception is the SRF, whose share has de-
clined as major deployment programs were
brought to a conclusion.
129. The Ministry of Defense is an institu-
tion which reflects the interests of military
professionals almost exclusively. Unlike its
counterparts in Western countries, the Min-
istry is almost entirely a military organization.
Its top positions are held by professional mil-
itary officers, and it has few civilians in re-
sponsible jobs. It enjoys considerable auton-
omy in operational matters and seems to be
highly compartmentalized, both within itself
and vis-a-vis outside organizations.
130. Within the Ministry of Defense, by far
the most influential component is the General
Staff, which is directly responsible for the
day-to-day management of the armed forces,
for controlling them in operational situations,
and for planning their future. As such, it
frames and elaborates the Defense Ministry's
position on such issues as weapon programs,
force levels, employment concepts, and arms
control. In all of these matters the political
leadership has the final authority, but the
General Staff's recommendations are believed
to carry considerable weight since they repre-
sent the consensus of expert military opinion.
This is probably especially true when com-
plex technical questions are at issue. The Gen-
eral Staff's involvement in preparing the So-
viet position at the SAL talks is an illustration
of how the political leadership relies upon it
for discerning what is militarily necessary to
maintain the sort of strategic relationship
with the US which the leadership deems
desirable.
131. Recommendations on how the defense
budget should be apportioned among the
services and competing programs would prob-
ably emanate from the General Staff. Each of
the services undoubtedly has its own goals
with respect to resource allocations and future
programs. Presumably each submits proposals
justifying its requirements and setting forth
its interpretation of the threat posed by po-
tential adversaries of the Soviet Union. The
ex officio status of the chiefs of the individual
services as Deputy Ministers of Defense af-
fords further opportunity for them to press
their special claims. However, the top leader-
ship in the Ministry of Defense would prob-
ably look in the first instance to the General
Staff for studies and recommendations. The
General Staff would almost certainly play
an important role in the event of a major inter-
service conflict, say between the SRF and the
Navy about the . question of retiring older
ICBMs in favor of additional SLBMs.
132. In dealing with the conflicting institu-
tional interests of the military services, the
General Staff appears to have some degree of
immunity from the influence of individual
service rivalries. Its senior officers are men
with long experience in combined-arms plan-
ning and operations. Assignment to the Gen-
eral Staff is usually permanent, and some
officers spend much of their military careers
there. Presumably they progress within a sep-
arate General Staff career ladder rather than
through their parent services. In addition,
they are trained at the General Staff's own
academy. With that kind of career pattern,
General Staff officers probably tend to iden-
tify more with the larger concerns of the
military establishment than with the parochial
interests of a single service.
133. The General Staff has traditionally had
a strong hand in coordinating Soviet military
R&D. Although an organizational change
raises some question about its present role in
this area, the General Staff probably retains
some responsibility for recommending what
development programs should be pursued.
TO
TS 190620
 48 TO
The Scientific Establishment
134. The scientific and technical elements
in the defense establishment appear to have
less leeway for innovation than their Western
counterparts. Indications at the SAL talks and
elsewhere are that scientists and technicians
tend to be regarded more as skilled aides
rather than as partners of the military. By and
large, they are apparently told only enough
about the task at hand to handle the require-
ments explicitly levied upon them.
135. Still, the influence of scientists and
technicians is almost certainly felt in ways
which are important, if indirect. For one thing,
Soviet military and political leaders have their
options at least partially defined for them by
those responsible for R&D. To put it another
way, new technology, and thus the nature of
the weapon systems developed, is probably
influenced as much from below as from above.
To the extent that this is so, the result would
not be a response to some integrated design,
but a reflection of the interests of individual
services, particular design bureaus, and the
like.
Other Influences
136. Other individuals and groups also play
a role in decision-making on military mat-
ters, but we do not know in detail how they
operate, or their exact relationship to the top
political and military leadership. Departments
of the Central Committee deal with political
affairs, personnel, and materiel. There is evi-
dence of a small but growing body of military-
academic specialists who concern themselves
with questions of strategic doctrine and policy,
and who have prepared studies on foreign
military establishments. For example, studies
and testimony by such officials as Yuriy Ar-
batov, head of the Institute of the USA in the
Academy of Sciences, have apparently been
used by members of the Defense Council.
The top State economic planning organization,
Gosplan, coordinates and integrates the na-
tional R&D program, including the military
R&D program.
The Decision-Making Process
137. The preceding discussion provides an
incomplete picture of the way in which deci-
sions about military forces are made. None-
theless, it permits the following inferences and
generalizations:
a. It appears that the Soviet decision-
making process involves clusters of advisory
and executive bodies, which are likely at
times to be in competition with one an-
other. These clusters funnel their views to
the top leadership, political and military, in
a number of ways.
b. Brezhnev and his colleagues on the
Politburo and the Defense Council work in
a context of bureaucratic pressures, con-
flicts, and constraints, which may be heavy
at times, and which serve, in practice, to
limit the freedom of action of the top politi-
cal and military leadership. This tendency
is reinforced by the collective nature of the
leadership and the consequent need to ac-
commodate varying interests in order to
achieve a consensus.
c. In the case of military programs, the
decision-making process is probably cen-
tered on two key elements-the military and
military-industrial authorities who formu-
late and propose new programs, and the top
political leaders who make the final deci-
sions, particularly those who serve on both
the Politburo and the Defense Council.
Other individuals and interest groups play
a role, but almost certainly a lesser one.
d. The system of decision-making de-
scribed above tends to have certain built
in biases. For one thing, it gives consider-
TO
 TO
able weight to military claims and interests,
in part because of the nature and objectives
of the political system itself. Other reasons
are the lack of open discussion and the ex-
treme compartmentalization of informa-
tion, particularly of the kind of informa-
tion needed to make decisions on military
policy. There is also considerable inertia in
the system: it favors large, established
bureaucratic interests, and works against
sharp changes in direction, in spite- of the
concentration of political power at the top.
138. Thus, we can describe in a broad way
how the institutions of Soviet decision-making
work and what the characteristic biases of the
system may be. What we cannot do, given
our present state of knowledge, is to weigh
the forces that may bear on particular deci-
sions and, thus, be in a position to predict fu-
ture program choices. The capability of intelli-
gence in this matter is unlikely to improve
very much unless and until the Soviet system
becomes much more open than it is now.
V. ILLUSTRATIVE FUTURE FORCES 30
Introduction
139. Soviet decisions on military policy
spring from a complex of considerations, stra-
tegic, political, and economic, which change
' Vice Adm. Vincent P. de Poix, the Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency, and Maj. Gen. William
E. Potts, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army, are in fundamental dis-
agreement with several aspects of this Section. They
believe that the influence of US actions on the struc-
ture of future Soviet strategic forces is unduly em-
phasized. They believe that the Soviets will press their
strategic weapons R&D vigorously, regardless of the
US level of effort, and consider that the text fails
to put sufficient emphasis on this highly significant
point. They disagree with certain assumptions con-
cerning various weapon systems. For these reasons
they believe that the Defense Intelligence Projections
for Planning (DIPP) provide a more useful portrayal
of the options available to the Soviets for future
strategic weapons deployment than do the Illustrative
Force Models contained in this Section. For a more de-
tailed expression of their views see their footnotes
throughout this Section.
over time and are often in conflict with one
another. Programs and goals that once ap-
peared appropriate may subsequently be
viewed in a more jaundiced light.Procure-
ment is an incremental process, worked out
year by year as choices and requirements
change. Thus, many decisions about the
makeup of Soviet forces for intercontinental
attack will be altered, some more than once,
during the period of this Estimate. Under these
circumstances, and with our lack of direct and
reliable evidence on Soviet planning for the
future of their forces for intercontinental at-
tack, judgments about the future are subject
to great uncertainty.
140. Nevertheless, it is possible to circum-
scribe in a rough way the range of choices
available in the light of certain major factors
that Soviet planners and policy makers will
have to take into account. Soviet strategic
planning will obviously be affected both by
the specific provisions of the SAL agree-
ments and by the expectations and com-
mitments generated in Moscow in the course
of reaching them. Policy will also be greatly
influenced by Soviet perceptions of US in-
tentions and objectives in the new circum-
stances created by the agreements-and in
particular, by the US buildup of its own stra-
tegic forces and the stress the US appears to
be placing on it. Finally, Soviet military plan-
ners must work within the context of the prac-
tical choices available to them in terms of the
weapons that can be made available and the
feasibility of procuring and deploying them.31
" Vice Adm. Vincent P. de Poix, the Director, De-
fense Intelligence Agency, while agreeing with the
substance of this paragraph, believes that the sum
of the references in this and subsequent paragraphs
( 146, 147, 152, 153, 156, 159, 160, 210, 224, 232,
240, and 246) to the relationship between US actions
in the strategic attack field and Soviet strategic plan-
ning has the effect of overstating the influence of US
actions on the structure of future Soviet strategic
forces.
TS 190620
 50 TOP
141. This Section discusses these three fac-
tors. It then presents a series of force projec-
tions illustrating various ways in which Soviet
forces for intercontinental attack might de-
velop in the next five to eight years.
The Impact of the Limitation on Strategic
Arms
142. The accords signed in Moscow in May
1972 to limit strategic arms introduced a whole
new set of constraints and political factors
which will influence future Soviet decisions
about strategic forces. The provisions of the
agreements-what they prohibit and what they
allow-will foreclose some options and make
others more attractive. Perhaps of even greater
significance are the commitments, concessions,
and consensus that must have developed
within the Soviet leadership over the issues
arising from the talks.
143. Clearly, there were divergent views
within the leadership and its advisory bodies
about the positions to be taken, and even
over the questions of whether negotiations
were desirable. Some groups, such as those
concerned with economic development or in-
creasing the supply of consumer goods, had a
clear self-interest in successful negotiations.
Others, such as the military services, almost
certainly had misgivings, and may have re-
ceived concessions which made the agree-
ments palatable to them. We do not know
what specific bargains were struck during
the evolution of the Soviet position, but
the proponents of arms control were able to
hammer out compromises and achieve enough
of a consensus to make the initial agreements
possible. The consensus no doubt embodies
the views of many separate interest groups
with disparate motivations and attitudes.
144. However fierce the infighting may
have been, the top Soviet leaders now find
themselves committed to the success of the
accords. They will have personal and profes-
sional incentives to insure that the accords are
not abrogated, and to avoid the intensifica-
tion of the arms competition and the deteriora-
tion in US-Soviet relations that would result.
At the same time, they will need to show that
the agreements are beneficial to the Soviet
Union. These concerns will tend to color de-
cisions about future Soviet strategic weap-
onry. They will also cause the top leaders to
involve themselves more deeply than ever in
the details of strategic planning.
145. More now than in the past, the main
questions about the future of Soviet forces for
intercontinental attack center on the pace and
scope of technological improvements. The in-
terim offensive agreement places certain nu-
merical limitations on ICBMs, SLBMs, and
modern missile-carrying submarines but per-
mits qualitative improvements and it places no
restrictions on strategic bombers. Thus, it al-
lows room for new programs in all major ele-
ments of the Soviet forces for intercontinental
attack.
146. In planning for their forthcoming stra-
tegic weaponry, Soviet leaders will have strong
incentives to exercise the options open to them
under the SAL accords. They will want to
avoid any deterioration of the Soviet Union's
relative position as the US pushes ahead with
the deployment of MIRVs and works on
follow-on systems such as the B-1 bomber
and ULMS. They will also wish to maintain
a strong bargaining position for the follow-on
SAL negotiations, and to develop new options
which could be exercised if the follow-on
talks break down. These incentives will be re-
inforced by pressures from individuals and
groups which have a parochial interest in pro-
moting specific weapon programs.
TS 190620
 147. Aside from the military considerations
involved, the top political leaders have a per-
sonal stake in insuring that the Soviet Union
suffers no real or apparent erosion of its posi-
tion. Their pronouncements about the SAL
talks have consistently emphasized the theme
of "equal security", and it is likely that the con-
sensus they forged to approve the accords is
based on assurances to skeptical elements that
the Soviet Union would not fall behind again.
Indications that the US was pulling ahead
would make Brezhnev and his supporters vul-
nerable to criticism and prompt them to con-
sider countermeasures.
148. At the same time, there will be other
pressures working to restrain the Soviet leader-
ship. One of them is economic. Soviet
spokesmen and Soviet literature continue to
emphasize the high cost of the strategic arms
race. This probably bespeaks a genuine de-
sire by political leaders to realize some savings
from the arms limitation accords-particu-
larly in the high-quality, specialized resources
that are needed to modernize the civilian
economy and boost productivity. A Pravda
editorial in May 1972, for example, noted that
the SAL accords will help curb the arms race,
which has diverted "huge funds from construc-
tive purposes". Another article in a journal in-
tended for the political indoctrination of Soviet
military personnel described military expendi-
tures in general as non-productive and as di-
rect deductions from national income, and
argued that "in peacetime the military organi-
zation must not be too burdensome to the
national economy". Judging from statements
of various high-ranking Soviet military leaders
in recent years, however, this viewpoint is con-
tentious within the military; a subsequent is-
sue of the very same journal placed military
needs first.
149. On the political side, there will also be
strong incentives for the leadership to resist
courses of action which might jeopardize the
agreements, even though not actually violat-
ing them. The agreements play an important
part in the current policy of detente with the
West, and they have been hailed as a success-
ful manifestation of that policy. The top politi-
cal leaders, and Brezhnev personally, have
identified themselves with the agreements and
would have much to lose politically if they
fail. If they in fact consider an unrestrained
arms competition neither necessary nor de-
sirable, they would also wish to stop short of
actions which threatened to undercut the
follow-on SAL negotiations.
150. Below the top leadership there will be
similar forces at work. The consensus that was
developed through compromise and conces-
sion during the period of negotiation and rati-
fication is likely to produce a bureaucratic
momentum of its own. That is, a wide variety
of important pressure groups in the Soviet
military and civilian bureaucracies now has
a commitment to, and a stake in, the SAL
agreements as a result of a long and difficult
process which required a delicate balancing
of individual interests. Any attempt to shift
policy in a direction that might endanger the
agreements would require another lengthy
and difficult set of negotiations and under-
standings among the interested bureaucratic
groups. Furthermore, the agreements have
received laudatory publicity in Soviet pe-
riodicals and broadcasts; they are portrayed
as a salutary result of Soviet policy and an
important step in reducing the dangers of
nuclear war. The Council of Ministers issued
a formal directive ordering compliance with
the agreements, and the necessity for strict
implementation has been stressed in public
media. The fact that compliance with the
agreements is being monitored by both sides
has been made known in the Soviet press.
TOP
 52 TO
151. This is not to say, however, that the
Soviets would be inhibited from pursuing any
permitted options they considered necessary
in order to maintain their relative status and
their bargaining position during the next phase
of negotiations or even that they would re-
frain from steps inviting or leading to termi-
nation of the agreements should their vital
interests appear to require them. Nor would
they, in so doing, be particularly sensitive to
charges that their programs represented an
escalation of the arms race or were destabiliz-
ing. The Soviet leaders almost certainly con-
tinue to regard the US as a crafty antagonist
which is still ahead of the USSR in some im-
portant aspects of strategic power and which
might well seek to achieve some further de-
gree of advantage under the agreements.
152. Soviet public media have already said
that increased US spending on strategic weap-
ons and any effort to attach conditions to the
SAL agreements would in effect constitute a
rejection of the principle of "equal security"
as the basis for the US-USSR strategic rela-
tionship and undermine the spirit of mutual
restraint evident in the agreements. The point
was most authoritatively put by Politburo
member M. A. Suslov, who stressed that the
USSR would closely follow the efforts of "cer-
tain US circles" to distort the "spirit and let-
ter" of the agreements. To some extent such
statements can probably be discounted as part
of the rhetorical jockeying for position which
has gone on intermittently since before the
SAL negotiations began. Nevertheless, they
almost certainly reflect an important point:
that decisions about Soviet forces will be
greatly influenced by Soviet perceptions of the
US attitudes towards the SAL agreements as
well as by specific US decisions on its strategic
forces.
153. As a result of the opportunities and
risks associated with the SAL agreements,
future programming decisions will probably
be even more directly influenced than in
the past by the Soviet leadership's sense
of stability or change in its strategic re-
lationship with the US. To be sure, as China
moves closer to establishing a credible nu-
clear force, the need to counter Chinese ca-
pabilities will also affect Soviet plans. For
many years to come, however, the Soviets are
likely to be concerned primarily with the US
arsenal, in terms both of the strategic threat
it poses and the diplomatic and political lever-
age it affords.
The Soviet Perception of the United States
Strategic Threat
154. The Soviets are both well informed and
sophisticated in their understanding of US
strategic weapon programs. We know, for
example, that the Soviet military conducts de-
tailed analyses of the relative capabilities of
US and Soviet strategic forces, using much
the same kinds of measures as US analysts.
It is also clear that the Soviets have accurate
information about US strategic forces, both
current and programmed, through a combina-
tion of open literature, satellite photography,
and other intelligence sources.
155. How this information and analysis are
used is not known. At a minimum, the military
services and the General Staff probably cite
it in buttressing their arguments for specific
programs and budgetary allocations. It might
also be used for high-level and relatively un-
biased evaluations, although the Soviets ap-
parently do not have any non-military organi-
zation to provide a thorough and independent
review of military programs and requirements.
TS 190620
 TOP SE
156. Attempts to correlate specific Soviet
strategic weapon programs with develop-
ments in US strategic forces have not pro-
duced conclusive results. It does appear, how-
ever, that Soviet strategic force planners have
sometimes reacted to US strategic programs
that were only in the planning stages when
the key Soviet decisions were made. As an
example, a likely explanation for the develop-
ment of the multiple warhead versions of the
SS-9 and SS-11 ICBMs is that they were in-
tended to penetrate the countrywide area de-
fense ABM system which was initially pro-
posed for the US prior to the decision to con-
centrate on defense of Minuteman fields.
157. We have no direct evidence on how
Soviet planners project US strategic forces for
the remainder of the decade. At a minimum,
however, they would certainly assume that
the improvements presently programmed-
and made public through congressional hear-
ings and press reports-would be carried out.
These improvements include the retrofit of
over half of the Minuteman silos and three-
quarters of the Polaris submarines with MIRV-
carrying missiles; hardening of missile silos;
deployment of a new class of missile subma-
rines (Trident) with long-range, MIRV-
carrying missiles (ULMS) ; replacement of
older B-52 bombers with B-1s; deployment
of new air-to-surface missiles (SRAM and
SCAD); deployment of Safeguard ABMs at
two sites; and improvements in the survivabil-
ity of command and control systems.
158. In addition, the Soviets would prob-
ably consider it prudent to allow for the possi-
bility that toward the end of the decade the
US will press beyond current force goals-
for example, by retrofitting all Minuteman
silos, replacing Poseidon missiles with ULMS,
and retaining most of its B-52s. Soviet planners
would also need to consider reported US pro-
grams and proposals for the development of
new strategic weaponry, such as hard-target
MIRVs and strategic cruise missiles, and the
effect these systems would have on the US-
Soviet strategic relationship if they were
deployed.
159. There will be those in the Soviet Un-
ion who will argue that the US has for some
time been striving for strategic superiority.
Their position is articulated in First Strike, a
book published last year. It seeks to docu-
ment the thesis that the US has historically
tried to acquire a decisive first-strike capabil-
ity against the USSR and has been frustrated
only by the growing capabilities of Soviet
forces. At a minimum, the element of the So-
viet military advocating development and de-
ployment of counterforce weapons such as
hard-target MIRVs will probably seize on re-
ports of US work in this field to press their
case in policy-making councils. On the other
hand, advocates of arms control might cite
such reports as demonstrating the need for
negotiating limitations on qualitative improve-
ments in strategic weaponry. In any case, the
prospect of improved counterforce capabilities
for the US strategic arsenal is likely to be re-
flected in Soviet planning.
160. The following table illustrates how So-
viet planners might view the future develop-
ment of US strategic forces. The first two
columns show the improvements currently
programmed for mid-1977 (when the interim
agreement on limiting strategic offensive
weapons expires) and for mid-1980. The third
column represents a possible Soviet projection
of a "worst case" threat at the end of the
decade, in which US deployment goals are
raised and the results of intensive R&D are
incorporated into US forces. The improve-
ments shown in all three cases assume that
the current SAL agreements continue in effect
through 1980. The Soviets may also plan for
the possibility that the interim agreement will
not be renewed or replaced when it expires,
 54 TO
but the impact of new programs initiated
in 1977 would not be felt appreciably until
after 1980.
161. In addition to the major threat posed
by the US, the Soviets must consider the capa-
bilities of Great Britain, France, and China
when structuring their forces. Great Britain
now has four Polaris submarines in opera-
tional service. France has operational 18
IRBMs and one Polaris-type submarine.
The French plan to build a total of five
ballistic missile submarines, and deploy a
total of 27 IRBMs in hardened silos. Both
Great Britain and France have bomber air-
craft capable of attacking the Soviet Union.
At the last round of the SAL negotiations the
Soviets attempted to gain compensation for
these units and made the unilateral statement
that any increase in NATO's "modern sub-
marine" force would entitle the Soviet Union
to equivalent increases. During the 1970s
China will probably build up a missile force
capable of attacking targets throughout the
USSR. These weapons could have warheads in
the megaton range. In the same period, China
may also increase its capabilities for air attack
along contiguous borders of the USSR and
into key areas of the Soviet heartland.
POSSIBLE SOVIET VIEW OF IMPROVEMENTS IN UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC FORCES
Minuteman III retrofitted to
550 silos.
Minuteman III retrofitted to
550 silos.
Most Minuteman silos
hardened.
Poseidon missiles retrofitted to
31 SSBNs.
Present B-52 and FB-111
bomber force maintained.
Safeguard ABM deployed at
1-2 sites.
Poseidon missiles retrofitted
to 31 SSBNs.
First, few Trident SSBNs
with ULMS entering force.
About 100 B-1 bombers in-
troduced in place of equiv-
alent number of older B-
52s.
Safeguard ABM deployed at
2 sites.
Hard-target MIRVs incorpo-
rated in ICBM and SLBM
forces.
Minuteman III or more ad-
vanced ICBM retrofitted to
all Minuteman silos.
First few Trident SSBNs with
ULMS entering force.
Poseidon missiles replaced with
ULMS.
Possibly some sea-launched
strategic cruise missiles be-
coming operational.
Most B-52s retained along with
100 or more B-is.
Grand Forks ABM complex
retrofitted with hard-site de-
fense.
TS 190620
 TOP
System Characteristics and Deployment
Patterns a2
162. This Section presents the judgments
and assumptions about Soviet strategic at-
tack systems which underlie the later pro-
jections of Soviet forces for intercontinental
attack. It briefly reiterates earlier estimates
of the structure of present forces and postu-
lates likely characteristics, readiness dates,
and deployment rates for possible new sys-
tems. Some of the assumptions differ for
various projected forces and those differences
are spelled out here and in the discussion of
each projected force.
SS-7 and SS-8
163. The interim agreement permits the re-
placement of the old and relatively vulnera-
ble SS-7s and SS-8s by modern SLBMs,
with deactivation to occur by the time the
submarines carrying these SLBMs begin
sea trials. We assume that SS-7 and SS-8
missiles will be deactivated on this basis, in
whole or in part.
SS-9
164. The present force of 288 SS-9 launch-
ers at deployed complexes is assumed to be
equipped with
Vice Adm. Vincent P. de Poix, the Director, De-
fense Intelligence Agency, differs with many of the
judgments and assumptions presented in this sub-
section. In addition to his major differences which
are footnoted below, he has lesser differences which
have not been footnoted. He would note, however,
that when taken together, small differences on such
issues as the construction rate of a projected new
SSBN, the number of re-entry vehicles on a specific
missile, and the kind of modernization a particular
kind of silo is to undergo can result in significantly
different projections even though there is general
agreement on more fundamental postulations.
]nissiles.33 We have assumed that at
least some standard SS-9 silos will be con-
verted to the new harder silo configuration
and that a new large missile will be deployed
in these silos.
New Large Missile
165. In some forces we postulate early initi-
ation of flight testing of the new large missile
under development at Tyuratam and a highly
successful flight test program, with deploy-
ment beginning two years after the start of
flight testing if present guidance technology
is utilized, or three years after if the missile
employs entirely new guidance techniques
The new missile thus appears initially in
the operational listings in mid-1975 or mid-
1976.34 Two other projections allow for the
possibility that testing might start later, take
longer to complete, or both. In these projec-
tions the initial appearance of the new large
missile in the operational listings is delayed a
year to mid-1976.
166. We postulate that the new large mis-
sile will be more accurate than the SS-9 and
will carry MIRVs.
"These figures do not include the six SS-9 Mod 3
missiles believed to be operationally deployed at
Tyuratam nor do they reflect the possibility that
:::::]Alod 3 missiles are deployed in the field. er
paragraph 20.
Y' Vice Adm. Vincent P. de Poix, the Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency, believes the likelihood
that the Soviets are now developing a new large mis-
sile with a CEP on the order of 0.15 mn to be so
remote that a projection of the deployment of such
a system in mid-1976 should not be made. For a fuller
explanation of his views on this subject, see his foot-
note to Force 5.
TS 190620
 TO
167. The throw weight for the new large
missile is assumed to be about 15,000 pounds.
We have postulated that such a missile would
appear, alternatively, with three different
MIRV systems, one with three RVs, another
with six RVs, and one. with 12 RVs.
The missile would be capable
of carrying more RVs, however, and a larger
number cannot be ruled out, particularly if
the Soviets are concerned about survivability.
168. The assumptions about MIRVs and ac-
curacy used in the illustrative forces, as well
as the combinations of these two variables
shown, are intended to be representative of
what the Soviets could achieve during the
1970s. Certainly, other combinations are pos-
New Large Silos
169. We postulate that the new large mis-
sile will initially be deployed in the 25 new
large silos under construction at SS-9 com-
plexes. In addition, we postulate that the
Soviets will retrofit the new large missile into
reconstructed SS-9 silos.
170. How long it would take the Soviets to
convert all or a major portion of their SS-9
silos to accommodate a new missile would de-
pend on the time required per silo and on how
many silos were under conversion at a time.
The latter, in turn, would depend largely on
how anxious the Soviets were to get the job
completed on the one hand and on what level
of operational missiles they desired to main-
tain during the conversion period on the other.
171. The Soviets might have as many as
10 launch groups-60 sites-under conversion
at a time if the program were given sufficient
priority. This would permit the entire force to
be converted to the new missile in about five
years, but reduce the number of operational
launchers for large missiles by over 20 percent
throughout this period. Alternatively, if the
Soviets considered that all of the 288 SS-9
launchers now operational were needed to
meet targeting requirements, they might de-
activate silos for conversion only as new silos
became operational-i.e., about 25 at a time.
At this rate it would take over 10 years to
retrofit the entire SS-9 force. In practice, how-
ever, Soviet targeting requirements are un-
likely to produce that much inflexibility. The
introduction of even a 3-MIRV missile in the
25 new silos now under construction, for ex-
ample, would enable the Soviets to cover as
many as 75 targets now assigned to SS-9
launchers (which could then be deactivated
for retrofit), the number depending on how
TS 190620
 TO
much redundancy of targeting was required
because of the smaller MIRV warheads. If the
Soviets were content to maintain only about
the present number of independently target-
able warheads, targeting requirements would
place no effective restrictions on the rate of
retrofit except at the outset.
172. Considering these factors, we have
postulated four rates of retrofit-30, 42, 54,
and 60 silos a year. We assume that the
retrofit of each silo would take 12 months
except in one illustrative force where we have
assumed that it would take 18 months.
173. The SS-11 force now consists of 850
Mod 1 missiles at regular ICBM complexes
and 120 Mod 1 missiles at Derazhnya and
Pervomaysk. We postulate that the 60 new
small silos at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk will
become operational in early 1973 and will be
equipped with the SS-11 Mod 3.36 We further
postulate that the six new large silos at
Derazhnya and Pervomaysk will not house a
missile equipped with a nuclear payload.
174. Although there are differences of opin-
ion as to whether the SS-11s at Derazhnya and
Pervomaysk have a primary role in peripheral
or intercontinental attack, we have included
fense Intelligence Agency, believes
that deployment will likely be broader than in just
60 such silos at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk. More-
over, as stated in the text, under certain circumstances
the SS-11 Mod 3 is capable of greater coverage of
urban areas than is the SS-11 Mod 1. In his view, the
DIPP projection of the deployment of 200-400 SS-11
Mod 3s, better represents probable Soviet plans for
deployment of the system.
them in the illustrative forces because they are
subject to the restrictions of the interim agree-
ment.
New Small Missile
175. The Soviets apparently are developing
a new small liquid-propellant missile but the
evidence available does not yet permit a con-
fident assessment of its characteristics. We
assume that the new missile will have better
payload characteristics than the SS-11 Mod 3
and postulate a system with three MIRVs in
all the illustrative forces. In one case, how-
ever, the new small missile is initially equipped
with a single RV and only later fitted with a
3-MIRV payload. The new small missile is
postulated to incorporate either guidance sys-
tem improvements
~~or a new guidance system
176. A new small missile with a guidance
system designed to achieve accuracies of
would require a minimum of two years of
flight testing before it could be deployed.
Thus, if flight testing has now started, devel-
opment of such a missile could be completed
by late 1974 at the earliest. Accordingly, the
first year a new small missile appears in the
illustrative forces is mid-1975. At least three
years of testing would be required for a new
guidance system with an accuracy
Thus, the first year such a
missile appears in the illustrative forces is
1976.3, In either case the test program could
a' Vice Adm. Vincent P. de Poix, the Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency, believes the likelihood
that the Soviets are now developing a new small mis-
sile with a CEP to be so
remote that a projection of the deployment of such a
system in mid-1976 should not be made. For a fuller
explanation of his views on this subject, see his foot-
note to Force 5.
TS 190620
 58 TOP S
take a year or more longer than the minimum
times given here, and two projections take
this into account.
New Small Silos
177. In all the illustrative forces we postu-
late that the Soviets will retrofit the new small
missile into reconstructed SS-11 silos. Recon-
struction of an existing SS-11 silo to the con-
figuration of the new small silos would be
much more difficult than in the case of the
SS-9 silos, but it could be accomplished in
about one year. Accordingly, we assume that
it would require 12 months per silo for this
conversion in all but one illustrative force,
where we postulate it would take an average
of 18 months. We have not illustrated the
possibility that the SS-11 silos might be only
partially reconstructed to accommodate the
new small missile.
178. The factors that affect the rates of
reconstruction of SS-9 silos and the deploy-
ment of a new large missile are also applicable
to the deployment program for a new small
missile. If the Soviets wish to maintain the
present level of 970 SS-11 type operational
launchers, then only some 60 launchers would
be in conversion at any one time. If, however,
the Soviets were content to maintain the num-
ber of independently targetable warheads,
then deployment of a 3-MIRV system would
permit retrofit of up to 180 silos in the year
after the 60 new small silos at Pervomaysk and
Derazhnya become operational, and, there-
after, there would be no restrictions on the
rate of retrofit.
179. We have assumed a maximum con-
struction start rate of 200 silos a year for one
force and rates of 60, 100, and 150 a year for
the other illustrative forces.
SS-13
Solid-Propellant Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles 38
181. The Soviets appear to have begun
testing a new solid-propellant ICBM from
Plesetsk this year.39 We postulate in all but
one force that a new solid-propellant ICBM
will be developed and deployed and that it
will have an accuracy
and carry a single RV. We further postulate
that a minimum of about two years of flight
testing will be required. Thus, the new solid-
'Vice Adm. Vincent P. de Poix, the Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency, agrees with the pro-
jected deployment of solid-propellant ICBMs in only
the 60 SS-13 silos already operational for low and
medium level of effort force projections. He believes,
however, that there is sufficient evidence to suggest
that high level of effort force projections should reflect
the possibility of greater solid-propellant ICBM de-
ployment
He believes an appropriate way to portray this
judgment would be to project the development of two
solid-propellant ICBMs, one for deployment in the
60 SS-13 silos beginning in about 1975 and another
larger one for deployment in some SS-11 silos begin-
ning in 1977. The DIPP projects deployment of over
500 of the larger one.
' It remains possible that this vehicle is a highly
modified SS-13. See paragraphs 45-49.
_ZeP_,~T~
TS 190620
 TOP
propellant ICBM first appears in the illustra-
tive forces in 1974. Because the Soviets have
relatively little experience with solid-propel-
lant missiles and because of the extended
period it took to develop the SS-13, in two il-
lustrative forces we have allowed one and two
additional years for the flight test program.
The new missile initially appears in these
forces in 1975 and 1976.
182. For purposes of these projections, we
have postulated deployment of the new solid-
propellant missile only in a silo-launched con-
figuration, as replacement for the 60 SS-13s.
Such a limited deployment program might be
justified simply by dissatisfaction with the
SS-13 and a desire to advance solid-propellant
technology and make use of some of the
USSR's extensive solid-propellant production
facilities. Alternatively, the Soviets might be
developing a new solid-propellant missile as
a backup to or in competition with a new
small liquid-propellant missile-in which case
the limited deployment we have postulated
would represent victory for the other system.
Mobile Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles
183. Another possible aim of a new solid-
propellant program is the development of a
mobile ICBM, either as a SAL bargaining chip
or for actual deployment. Because of the uni-
lateral US statement during SAL negotiations
that deployment of mobile ICBMs would be
considered inconsistent with the objectives of
the interim agreement, we have not projected
deployment in any of the forces, postulating
that the Soviets would not want to risk a show-
down with the US on this matter 40 In addi-
'0 Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan, Jr., the Assistant
Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that there
is sufficient probability that the Soviets would deploy
mobile ICBMs that he would include them in the
force tables.
tion, the Soviets would probably hesitate be-
cause of the practical difficulties of deploy-
ing and maintaining mobile ICBMs. Assum-
ing that testing has started, however, a solid-
propellant mobile ICBM could be ready for
deployment as early as 1975.
Ballistic Missile Submarines and Sub-
marine-Launched Ballistic Missiles
Status of Y- and D-Class Submarines
184. The projections reflect the estimate in
Section II above that as of 1 October 1972
there were 44 Y- and D-class submarines either
operational or under construction-of which
31 were 16-tube Y-class units and 9 were of the
12-tube D-class, with the configuration of 4
units under construction at Komsomol'sk still
undetermined. The Severodvinsk yard has
now shifted over entirely to the D-class. The
projections assume that the four units under
construction at Komsomol'sk and all units sub-
sequently produced there will also be of the
D-class.
Size and Makeup of Forces
185. We postulate that the Soviets will move
to achieve the force of 62 modern ballistic mis-
sile submarines permitted them under the
interim agreement Al and in all but one illus-
trative force, that they will seek to get
as close as possible to the total of 950
SLBM launchers the agreement also allows.
It is apparent that if they wish to achieve the
latter goal they will sooner or later have to
halt construction of the D-class submarine in
favor of one with more launch tubes and that
the longer production of the D-class is con-
"Vice Adm. Vincent P. de Poix, the Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency, agrees with this assump-
tion in medium and high level of effort projections.
He believes, however, that the possibility of a Soviet
goal to deploy fewer than 62 modern SSBNs should
be illustrated in a low level of effort projection.
TS 190620
 60 TO
tinued, the more launchers the new submarine
would have to carry in order for the USSR to
approach the 950 limit. If only D-class sub-
marines were built from now on the Soviets
would have only 868 SLBM launchers-on
31 Y-class and 31 D-class units-when they
reached the level of 62 modern ballistic mis-
sile submarines in the mid-1970s.
186. To illustrate how the Soviets might
seek to build up the number of SLBM
launchers to the maximum number allowed,
we have projected for all but. one of the forces
introduction of a new nuclear-powered bal-
listic missile submarine-either a further modi-
fication of the Y-class or an entirely new de-
sign-with either 18 or 20 tubes. A new
submarine with fewer than 18 or more than
20 tubes is also possible and other combina-
tions of submarine types could result, par-
ticularly if the Soviets convert older Y-class
units to the new 12-tube SS-NX-8 D-class
configuration.
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles 92
187. We postulate that the SS-N-6 will be
deployed only in the Y-class submarine and
' Vice Adm. Vincent P. de Poix, the Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency, notes that in each of the
illustrative force models it is postulated that the de-
velopment of SLBMs in general lags behind The de.-
velopment of ICBMs. He believes
his postulation may
be in error. Moreover, he believes it is possible that
the Soviets will have greater incentive to develop
MIRVs for SLBMs than for ICBMs, particularly if
they continue to maintain only a few ballistic missile
submarines on station at any given time. The deploy-
ment of MIRVs on the SLBMs carried on these sub-
marines might be a desirable way to increase the
weight of a retaliatory strike. He therefore believes
that a postulation of at least equal priority for SLBM
development should underlie projections that are
judged to be more likely or of a higher level of effort.
that the D-class will utilize the SS-NX-8. We
postulate the introduction in due course of
one or more of the following missiles for
retrofit into Y- or D-class submarines or in-
stallation in a new SSBN:
-A new small missile with a range of at
least 2,000 nm which would replace the
SS-N-6. It would incorporate improvements
in accuracy and in some cases would have
MIRVs as well. With a 2,000 nm range this
missile would nearly quadruple the po-
tential. on-station operating area of the
Y-class submarine with its present 1,300
nm missile. This missile appears in all illus-
trative forces.
-An improved version of the SS-NX-8
for use in a new submarine and eventual
retrofit into the D-class is included in all
but one illustrative force. We postulate a
range of about 3,000 nm, a 3-MIRV pay-
load, and improved accuracy for this mis-
sile.
-In one illustrative force we postulate
a new large SLBM in the SS-NX-8 class
with very high accuracy, a 3-MIRV pay-
load, and a range of 4,500 nm. The missile
would be available both for a new sub-
marine and for retrofitting into the D-class.
188. In all projections we assume that
MIRVs will be deployed on ICBMs before
they are on SLBMs and that there will be a
similar lag in any achievement of high ac-
curacies-in part because of our sense of
probable Soviet priorities
As with ICBMs, the achieve-
ment of very high accuracies would require
improved guidance systems and RVs either
with higher betas or terminal guidance.
TS 190620
 TO T
Production Rates
189. We postulate that the production rate
for D-class submarines will average about
seven units a year-four-five from the exist-
ing assembly hall at Severodvinsk and two-
three from the facility at Komsomol'sk. We
further postulate that the introduction of a
new submarine would cause a falling off in
total production, because it would probably
take longer to produce the new submarine than
the D-class.
190. Construction of a new submarine
might begin in the existing main assembly
hall at Severodvinsk, conceivably by early
1973. If so, the lead units would be available
for deployment by mid-1976; production could
later take place at the new assembly hall now
under construction as well. But it appears
more likely-and we so postulate-that con-
struction of a new submarine will take place
only in the new hall, which we postulate to
be completed in early 1974, with the first
units of the new class showing up in the
operational tables in mid-1977. We postulate
construction rates of three or four units of the
new submarine a year.
191. Waiting for the new construction hall
to become available would in most cases force
a halt in starts of D-class units six to nine
months before assembly of the new submarine
could begin, if the Soviets desire to maximize
the number of SLBM launchers on the au-
thorized 62 modem submarines. As space be-
came available in existing construction facili-
ties at Severodvinsk, the ways concerned could
be used for overhaul or retrofit of existing
submarines or for other purposes. We make
no specific assumptions on this point, beyond
assuming that the ways would not be used
for the construction of ballistic missile sub-
marines.
G- and H-Class Submarines
192. Older submarines which are counted
against the ceiling in the SAL agreement are
carried in the illustrative forces. This includes
8 H-II, 1 H-III, and 1 G-class submarine.43
In all but two illustrative forces, all of the H-II
class units and the one G-class submarine that
carries the SS-NX-8 missile are decommis-
sioned as new SSBNs enter the force.
Bombers 44 40
193. We assume that the Soviets will main-
tain the small Bear and Bison heavy bomber
force in service for the 1970s, although some
slight attrition is indicated in the projections.
tinental use
included only in the high forces.
194. The Backfire is not included in the
projections. However, it almost certainly will
be produced in substantial numbers and, if
it proves to have adequate range and if an
appropriate tanker is developed, might be
" The other modified G-class submarine is assumed
to be a test bed and is not in-
cluded in the projections.
" Vice Adm. Vincent P. de Poix, the Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency, believes the possibility
of the Soviet's deploying the Backfire with a suitable
tanker force to augment or eventually replace the
Bear/Bison force is sufficiently high to warrant its
inclusion in future projections as an alternative to the
deployment of a new heavy bomber.
'' Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan, Jr., the Assistant
Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, noting that bomber
inventories are not affected by the SAL agreement,
would include a new bomber in all of the force tables.
Moreover, he believes that the basic design of the
Backfire indicates that the Soviets developed that
aircraft to perform a variety of missions, including
intercontinental attack. He would, therefore, include
Backfire in the projections.
TS 190620
 used for intercontinental missions. We esti-
mate that Backfire will begin to enter op-
erational units in late 1973. The table below il-
lustrates the growth of the operational Back-
fire force assuming two different production
rates for the 1970s-one likely and the other
high.,
Alternate Force Developments
195. With the signing of the interim of-
fensive agreement, the Soviets are faced
with important decisions involving trade-offs
among different systems, rates of deployment
or retrofit, and the degree of risk to be taken
in development programs. The more ambitious
the development programs for new ICBMs,
the higher the risk of delays or possible failure.
Moreover, a technologically ambitious pro-
gram takes longer to complete and delays the
introduction of new systems. The more rapid
the rate of retrofit of a new missile, the sooner
the program is completed. But during the
period of rapid retrofit, more delivery vehicles
are offline and for a time total capability may
be reduced. The continued production of the
D-class would provide 62 modern SSBNs in
the shortest possible time. To approach the
limit of 950 SLBMs, on the other hand,
would require going back to production of the
Y-class or a new SSBN with more than 12
tubes. The freedom to substitute new SLBMs
for older SLBMs or ICBMs adds another
variable to the force planner's problem.
196. The alternative force developments
presented in this section represent possible
directions that Soviet strategic policy could
take. Many other models could he postulated
Mid-
Year
and for any one model illustrating a particular
force planning philosophy and level of weap-
ons technology, many other force levels could
be projected in general or in detail. Never-
theless, we believe the models chosen repre-
sent possible directions Soviet intercontinental
attack forces could take. It should be empha-
sized that we consider no one of them an esti-
mate that Soviet intercontinental attack forces
will be composed of the particular weapon sys-
tems in the precise numbers listed. They are
intended only to. be illustrative models of pos-
sible trends and differing emphases, and are
developed primarily for broad policy use at
the national level. They are not intended for
defense planning purposes; projections devel-
oped for planning in the Department of De-
fense are included in the Defense Intelligence
Projections for Planning (DIPP).
197. We present five illustrative forces
representing different levels of effort by the
Soviets and different degrees or rates of tech-
nological advance. All assume that the Soviets
adhere to the SAL agreements and, so as to
illustrate more fully what the Soviets might
do under the interim agreement on strategic
offensive weapons, further assume that it is
extended through 1980. Additional possibil-
ities that would be open to the Soviets if
the interim agreements were not extended
beyond mid-1977 are discussed in paragraphs
248-250. No attempt is made to indicate
the possible impact of a permanent treaty
which replaces the interim agreement, since
we lack any good basis for prejudging the
content or timing of such a treaty.
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
Likely Production Effort .............. 15
45
80
115
150
185
220
High Production Effort .............. 15
50
100
150
200.
250
300
 198. In constructing the illustrative force
models, we have assumed in all but Force 1
that the Soviets push ahead with qualitative
improvements as rapidly as their technology
permits, subject to the limitations of the
interim agreement on offensive forces. It is
possible, however, that they will not, for fear
of jeopardizing the follow-on negotiations or
of provoking a US response. Also, they may
wish, in the, follow-on negotiations, to con-
strain technological possibilities, in an effort
to further stabilize the US-Soviet strategic
relationship. If so, they may resist the tempta-
tion to take immediate advantage of all that
technology may offer. Thus, they may choose,
for example, not to develop MIRVs for any of
their missile systems.
199. All five of the illustrative forces assume
that MIRVs will be used in one or more of the
new missile systems now under development.
Three of them postulate that the Soviets do
not introduce new and highly accurate sys-
tems of guidance for their missiles within the
period of this Estimate. Force 3 represents
about the most the Soviets could be expected
to achieve under this postulate; it assumes
that testing of new missile systems begins soon
and proceeds without significant difficulty or
delay, permitting IOCs to be achieved in
minimum times. Force 2 illustrates what could
happen if, for one reason or another, new
weapon programs were not carried out as
promptly as postulated for Force 3. Force 1
postulates, in addition, less ambitious tech-
nological goals than those of Forces 3 and 2.
200. Two other forces postulate that within
the period of this Estimate the Soviets do in-
troduce new and improved guidance systems
for their strategic missiles which produce ac-
curacies of the order of 0.15 nm CEP. Force
4 postulates the introduction of new guidance
and other improvements later in the decade,
and hence represents a step upward from
Force 3. Force 5 postulates that new, highly
accurate guidance systems, along with other
improvements, are incorporated in the weapon
systems now under development, that the
earliest possible IOCs are achieved, and that
deployment or retrofit proceeds thereafter at
about the highest rates achieved in the past.
It thus constitutes a possible case but a highly
artificial one. It is designed to show the maxi-
mum that the Soviets could theoretically
achieve under the present SAL SAL agreements
if they have highly ambitious new weapon
programs already well underway and are able
to carry them out without appreciable set-
backs or delays.
201. The inclusion in two forces of missiles
with an accuracy on the order of 0.15 nm CEP
represents a de arture from the projections of
revious ears.
TS 190620
 TOP
202. Conceptually, Forces 3 and 2, and to a
lesser extent Force 1, correspond to SALT
Force 1 of NIE 11-8-71, which illustrated a
Soviet attempt to maintain a strong retaliatory
capability throughout the decade, and Force
5 corresponds to SALT Force 2, which illus-
trated a maximum Soviet effort within the
constraints of a postulated agreement limiting
offensive weapons. The two sets of forces
differ, however, in many particulars, reflecting
such diverse factors as the
i erences
between the terms of the agreement actually
signed and those postulated for last year's
projections, the delay in full-range testing of
the new missiles under development, which
necessitated changes in postulated IOCs, and
various indications that Soviet' qualitative
goals may be somewhat higher than we
thought last year.
203. In the discussion that follows, the
summary tables show the status of the various
postulated forces as of mid-1977. The year
1977 represents the end of the near-term
period of about five years for which we are
able to project with some confidence. In
modeling these forces, however, we have fur-
ther extended the projections to 1980 and
have briefly summarized these extended pro-
jections and their rationales in the text. By
extending the projections for these three addi-
tional years, we are able to depict more clearly
the trends effected by major qualitative im-
provements-more accurate MIRVs and fol-
low-on SLBMs, for example-which do not
enter service until the mid-1970s and are not
available in significant numbers until the late
1970s.
Force 3
204. Force 3 postulates that the Soviets do
not introduce highly accurate new systems of
guidance during the period of this Estimate.
It postulates that a new generation of missiles
incorporates MIRVs and the greatest accuracy
attainable through improvement in present
systems. It further postulates that testing pro-
ceeds without significant difficulties or delays,
permitting the earliest possible IOCs, and that
deployment of new systems is carried out at
about the average rate at which comparable
systems were deployed during the buildup of
the mid- and late-1960s.
205. The new large missile in Force 3 is
postulated to have six MIRVs and an accuracy
It would initially be
deployed in the 25 new silos now under con-
struction at SS-9 complexes beginning in late
1974, so that it would first appear in the mid-
1975 operational totals. Thereafter, it would
be retrofitted into reconstructed SS-9 silos at
a rate of seven launch groups-42 silos-a
year. At this rate, deployment of the new large
missile would not be completed until the early
1980s.
206. It is postulated that a new small mis-
sile with three MIRVs and an accuracy of
would be deployed in recon-
structed SS-11 silos at a rate of about 10
launch groups-100 silos-a year starting in
late 1974, showing up initially in the mid-1975
operational totals. By 1980 about one-half of
the SS-11 force would be converted to the new
harder silos with the new small missile.
207. It is postulated that construction of Y-
class SSBNs stops at 31 units and that a total
of 18 D-class units would be completed by
mid-1976. Construction of a new class SSBN
with 18 launch tubes is assumed to start in
the new hall at Severodvinsk in 1974 with the
TS 190620
 TO
first unit appearing in the operational totals in
1977. This new class SSBN would carry a
MIRVed variant of the SS-NX-8; this missile
would also be retrofitted into the D-class late
in the decade. Ten of the new SSBNs would
be deployed by mid-1980, bringing the total
of modern submarines and missiles to 59 and
892, respectively. Three more SSBNs would
become operational in 1981, bringing the force
3-MIRV,
ILLUSTRATIVE FORCE MODEL 3*
(Mid-1977)
6-MIRV ...............
SS-11 .................................
Mod 1 ..............................
Mod 3 ..............................
New Small Missile
New Large Missile
SS-7 ....................
..............
SS-8 ..................................
SS-9 Mod 2 ...........................
ICBMs .................................
New Solid Missile
1 RV . ....................
SLBMs ..................................
H-II/SS-N-5
H-III/SS-NX-8 ........................
G/SS-NX-8 ............................
Y/SS-N-6 .........
Y/New SLBM, 1-RV,
D/SS-NX-8 ............................
New SSBN/New SLBM, 3 MIRVJ
Bombers .
Bear ASM Carrier ......................
Bear Bomber ...........................
Bison Bomber ..........................
up to totals of 62 modern submarines and 946
modern launchers. A new small SLBM with
a range of at least 2,000 nm, on which flight
testing is postulated to begin in the next few
months, would be retrofitted into the Y-class
submarine starting in 1975.
208. The SS-7 and SS-8 ICBMs would be
phased out of service by 1980, as required by
the interim agreement, under the conditions
DELIVERY
INDEPENDENTLY TARGETED
RE-ENTRY VEHICLES
1,450
2,495
180
180
9
9
162
162
109
654
680
680
(620)
(620)
(60)
(60)
60
60
670
706
8/24
24
1/6
6
1/6
6
13/208
208
12/192
192
18/216
216
105
NA
65
20
...
20
'It should be noted that some Agencies have taken issue with certain of the assumptions
on which this table is based. Their differences are noted at appropriate points earlier in the
paper.
 66 T
postulated. A new solid-propellant ICBM
would replace the SS-13 starting in 1975. The
existing heavy bomber force-less some attri-
tion-is assumed to remain operational for
the remainder of the decade.
209. This illustrative force would provide
the Soviets with strong strategic capabilities
throughout the decade. The large Soviet.
SLBM force and the low level of ABM de-
ployment in the US would ensure the Soviets
an excellent retaliatory capability. In addition,
the deployment of accurate MIRVs on ICBMs
would considerably improve Soviet counter-
force capabilities.
210. The Soviets might build something like
Force 3 if they wished to carry out vigorous
development and deployment programs with-
in the constraints of the agreement but felt
no need to take chances with advanced tech-
nology or to make an all-out effort to deploy
their new weapon systems rapidly. They might
well consider something like Force 3 as an
appropriate level of effort for maintaining
rough parity if they view US forces as devel-
oping along the lines of programmed forces
and wanted to maintain a strong deterrent
against something like the postulated US
augmented force. They might also see Force 3
as a desirable "bargaining chip" during the
follow-on SAL negotiations.
Force 2
211. Force 2 postulates that the Soviets
undertake the same programs as in Force 3
but take longer to develop and deploy the
new weapon systems-either because flight
testing begins later, difficulties or delays are
encountered, or both. In all other respects,
the forces are identical, because they reflect
the same objectives and goals. Although the
discussion proceeds on this basis, the force
could also reflect a lesser sense of urgency
than Force 3.
212. In the case of the new large and new
small liquid-propellant ICBMs, both of which
appear to be at or close to the flight test
stage, Force 2 postulates that three years of
testing takes place before IOC, or one-year
more than in Force 3. The new solid-propel-
lant missile, though probably already in flight
test, appears two years later than in Force 3,
reflecting the possibility that the Soviets, who
have had less experience and success with this
type of technology than with liquid-propel-
lant systems, could encounter difficulties and
delays of the sort experienced in other solid-
propellant programs. Force 2 also depicts IOC
dates for the new SSBN and new large SLBM
which are two years later than those of Force
3, reflecting the possibility that the new con-
struction hall at Severodvinsk may not be com-
pleted as soon as we expect, that the first of
the new submarines is not as far along in plan-
ning or will take longer to construct and de-
ploy than is postulated in Force 3, or that
there may be similar delays in the new SLBM
program. Only one year's delay is postulated,
however, for IOC of the new small SLBM,
because the technical problems involved are
potentially less formidable.
213. The postulates regarding IOC are
purely illustrative and their application is to
some extent arbitrary. It is unlikely that all
new systems would take longer to reach IOC
than what we consider the minimum feasi-
ble time. Where a new technology-e.g.,
MIRVs-is being applied in more than one
program, however, delays to several might be
involved. In any event, we cannot determine
in advance which programs might lag, or
by how much; some might take even longer
to complete than depicted here. Force 2
illustrates the general point that many suc-
cessful development programs do not progress
as rapidly and smoothly as is postulated in
Force 3.
TDF-sK-Rfr_
 T ET
ILLUSTRATIVE FORCE MODEL 2'
(Mid-1977)
DELIVERY INDEPENDENTLY TARGETED
SS-7 .................................. 190 190
SS-8 .........:................. ....... 9 9
SS-9 Mod 2 ........................... 204 204
New Large
6-MIRV, 67 402
SS-11 ................................. 780 780
Mod 1 .................... :......... (720) (720)
Mod 3 .............................. (60) (60)
New Small Missile
3-MIRV, 0.25 nm CEP ................ 150 450
SS-13 ..:............ ........ .......... 30 30
New Solid Missile
1 RV, 0 ............... 30. 30
SLBMs ................................. 652 652
H-II/SS-N-5 ........................... 8/24 24
H-III/SS-NX-8 ........................ 1/6 6
G/SS-NX-8 1/6 6
Y/SS-N-6 ................. .......... 19/304 304
Y/New SLBM, 1-RV, 6/96 96
D/SS-NX-8 ........................... 18/216 216
Bombers ................................ 105 NA
Bear ASM Carrier ...................... 65
Bear Bomber .......................... 20
Bison Bomber ......................... 20 ...
'It should be noted that some Agencies have taken issue with certain of the assumptions
on which this table is based. Their differences are noted at appropriate points earlier in the
paper.
214. The strategic capabilities of Force 2
are comparable to those of Force 3. Since the
two forces reflect the same objectives and
goals, the comments made in the last section
about the reasons for adopting Force 3 and
about its strategic capabilities also apply here.
Force 1
215. The major difference between this
Force and Force 2 are that Force 1 postulates
more modest technological goals and a slower
rate of deployment for new systems. In addi
tion, it lacks the new solid-propellant ICBM
and the new SSBN provided for in Force 2.
216. In Force 1 we postulate that flight
tests for a new large ICBM and a new small
ICBM are not completed until late 1975 or
early 1976 because the Soviets encounter
problems in the final development of these
systems or because flight testing does not
 68
ILLUSTRATIVE FORCE MODEL 1*
(Mid-1977)
ICBMs .................................
SS-7 ..................................
SS-8 ..................................
SS-9 Mod 2 ...........................
New Large Missile
3-MIRV_ .................
SS-11 .................................
Mod 1 ..............................
Mod 3 ..............................
.New Small Missile
'1 RV, F-
..................
SS-13 .................................
SLBMs .................................
H-II/SS-N-5 ..........................
H-III/SS-NX-8 ....................... .
Y/New SLBM, 1-RV,
D/SS-NX-8 ...........................
Bombers ................................
Bear ASM Carrier ..................... .
Bear Bomber ..........................
Bison Bomber ........................ .
DELIVERY
1,343
1,453
66
66
9
9
213
213
55
165
850
850
(790)
(790)
(60)
(60)
90
90
60
60
8/24
24
1/6
6
10/160
160
11/176
176
23/276
276
105
NA
65
20
.
20
It should be noted that some Agencies have taken issue with certain of the assumptions
on which this table is based. Their differences are noted at appropriate points earlier in the
paper.
begin soon or both. Accordingly, as in Force
2, the first time they appear in the tables is
mid-1976.
217. The new large ICBM which is initially
deployed in Force 1 would carry only three
MIRVs with a CEP
This missile would be deployed in
.the 25 new large silos by mid-1976 and subse-
quently deployed in reconstructed SS-9 silos.
Continued development results in the intro-
duction of a new payload for the missile with
more MIRVs ( six) and better accuracy
in late 1978. About five SS-9
groups are retrofitted each year until 1980
when about one-half of the present SS-9
force would have been retrofitted with new
silos and new missiles.
218. To take account of the possibility that
the Soviets do not develop MIRVs for their
small ICBMs, we postulate development of
a new small ICBM with one RV which has a
somewhat better accurac than the SS-11 Mod
It is introduced in
late 1975 and first appears in the operational
totals in mid-1976. About six SS-11 launch
groups-60 silos-are converted each year.
219. Production of 16-tube Y-class subma-
rines is postulated to cease with the launching
 TOP
of the 31st unit. Construction of the D-class
submarine is postulated to continue at both
Severodvinsk and Komsomol'sk until 31 units
have been completed. The new hall at Se-
verodvinsk is assumed to be used either for
construction of general purpose submarines
or for overhaul of nuclear submarines.
220. This program would allow the Soviets
to build a fleet of 62 modern ballistic missile
submarines carrying a total of 868 modern
SLBMs by late 1977. The number of SLBMs
in the force falls short of the ceiling of 950
but would permit retention of some 75 hard
SS-7 and SS-8 missiles, a choice that could
be. proposed by the SRF.
. 221. A new missile about the size of the
SS-N-6 with at least a 2,000 nm range is
assumed to be retrofitted into the Y-class units.
Deployment of this missile would begin in
1975. Another new missile of about the same
size and range as the SS-NX-8 but MIRVed
would be retrofitted into the D-class subma-
rine with the first units becoming operational
in 1978.
222. The SS-7 and SS-8 soft sites are de-
activated as SLBMs enter service but the 75
hard sites are retained in the force. The G
and H-classes are decommissioned by 1978.
The existing bomber force-less some attri-
tion-is maintained throughout the decade.
223. Force 1 would give the Soviets a good
retaliatory capability because of the increased
number of sea-based missiles and hardened
ICBM silos. Hard target capabilities would
be enhanced at the end of the decade by the
improved accuracy and additional MIRVs on
the new large missile.
224. The Soviets might build something like
Force 1 if they decide to pursue development
programs with low risks and if some of their
R&D is not as far along as postulated in Force
3. The Soviets might consider something like
Force 1 as an appropriate level of effort to
maintain a credible deterrent against pro-
grammed US forces.
Force 4
225. Force 4 postulates, like Force 3, that:
(a) the Soviets will soon begin flight testing
a new generation of missiles which incorpo-
rate MIRVs and the level of accuracy attain-
able through improvements in present sys-
tems; and (b) testing proceeds without signifi-
cant difficulties or delays, so that the earli-
est possible IOCs are achieved. It differs from
Force 3 in postulating the introduction later
in the decade of new missile systems with ac-
curacies It
also postulates that new missile systems will
be deployed at a higher rate than in Force 3.
226. The new large missile under develop-
ment is postulated to have a 6-MIRV war-
head and, initially, improvements in existing
guidance systems, resulting in a CEP
his missile would be deployed in
the 25 new large silos by mid-1975 and subse-
quently in reconstructed.SS-9 silos at a rate of
54 a year. Flight testing of a new guidance
system would begin in 1975 and be completed
in three years. This missile system-with six
MIRVs and a CEP
would enter the force in late 1978 and be de-
ployed at the same rate as the earlier system.
It first appears in the operational totals in
mid-1979.
227. A new small missile with three MIRVs
and a CEP is postulated to
be available in late 1975. It is deployed in
SS-11 silos reconstructed to the new configura-
tion described earlier. It first appears in the
mid-1976 operational totals. A follow-on mis-
sile program would involve new and highly
TS 190620
 ILLUSTRATIVE FORCE MODEL 4?
(Mid-1977)
DELIVERY
INDEPENDENTLY TARGETED
RE-ENTRY VEHICLES
SS-7 .................................. 142
142
SS-8 .................................. 9
9
SS-9 Mod 2 ........................... 126
126
New Large Missile
6-MIRY ...............
133
798
SS-11 .................................
530
530
Mod 1 ..............................
(470)
(470)
Mod 3 ...............................
(60)
(60)
New Small Missile
3-MIRV,O ...............
350
1,050
SS-13 .................................
10
10
New Solid Missile
1 RV,
50
788
H-II/SS-N-5 ..........................
8/24
24
H-III/SS-NX-8 .........................
1/6
6
G/SS-NX-8 ............................
1/6
6
Y/SS-N-6 .............................
29/464
464
D/SS-NX-8 ............:...............
19/228
228
New SSBN/New SLBM, 3 MIRV,~
1/20
60
Bombers
115
NA
Bear ASM Carrier ......................
65
...
Bear Bomber ..........................
25
Bison Bomber ..........................
25
...
'It should be noted that some Agencies have taken issue with certain of the assumptions
on which this table is based. Their differences are noted at appropriate points earlier in the
paper.
accurate techniques of guidance. Flight test-
ing would begin in 1976; the system would be
available for deployment in late 1979 and ap-
pears in the tables in 1980. We project a de-
ployment rate of 150 a year for both systems.
228. It is postulated that construction of
Y-class SSBNs stops at 31 units and that a
total of 21 D-class units would be completed
by mid-1976. The submarine building program
for Force 4 is postulated to include a new
SSBN with 20 launch tubes. Construction of
the new SSBN would start in 1974 in the new
hall at Severodvinsk. By mid-1980 the Soviets
would have 31 Y-class, 21 D-class and 10 new
class SSBNs-a total of 62 modern submarines
carrying 948 modern SLBMs.
TO
TS 190620
 TOP
229. A 3-MIRV variant of the SS-NX-8 mis-
sile with ould be de-
veloped for the new SSBN and also retrofitted
to the D-class. A new longer range (2,000 nm)
missile with three MIRVs and with a system
CEP would be developed
to replace the SS-N-6 on the Y-class com-
mencing in 1978.
230. The SS-7 and SS-8 missiles and the H-
class submarines would be phased out as the
new SSBNs are delivered. A new solid-propel-
lant ICBM replaces the SS-13 starting in 1975.
The current bomber force would be reduced
somewhat through attrition. A new intercon-
tinental bomber would be introduced in 1978
and deployed at a rate of 15 a year.
231. The deployment of Force 4 would
provide the Soviets with excellent strategic
capabilities by the late 1970s even when com-
pared with the augmented US force. The sea-
based component would provide a significant
deterrent capability by itself. The large num-
ber of accurate warheads in the ICBM force
would give the Soviets a substantial capability
to destroy hardened targets.
232. Force 4 represents a decision to press
ahead vigorously with the modernization of
strategic forces without undertaking the all-
out and highly successful effort to advance
technology portrayed in Force 5. Either for
specific purposes of counterforce targeting
or out of a general desire to catch up to the
US, the Soviets may already have decided that
they must have highly accurate MIRVs and
other force improvements as soon as possible.
Alternatively, Force 4 could represent a later
decision by the Soviets to step up their own
efforts in response to new US moves-though
they could not under these circumstances
meet the deployment time tables called for
in Force 4 unless R&D on the systems
with highly accurate MIRVs were already
underway.
Force 5 "
233. Force 5 illustrates what the Soviets
might be able to accomplish if they decided to
push the limits of their state-of-the-art in the
development of new weapon systems, and pro-
ceeded to deploy (or retrofit) these systems at
the highest rates achieved in the past. It pos-
tulates specifically that the new generation
of missiles now at or near the flight test stage
is equipped with new guidance systems pro-
viding accuracy
that new SLBMs are well along in R&D, and
that the Soviets encounter no significant dif-
ficulties or delays in any of their flight test pro-
grams. It thus assumes that the basic decisions
to undertake such ambitious programs were
initially made several years ago, and that the
Soviets enjoy an unprecedented degree of
success in meeting successive program goals.
" Dr. Ray S. Cline, the Director of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State; Vice Adm. Vincent P.
de Poix, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency;
Lt. Gen. Samuel C. Phillips, the Director, National
Security Agency; Maj. Gen. William E. Potts, the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department
of the Army; Rear Adm. Earl F. Rectanus, the Di-
rector of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy;
and Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan, Jr., the Assistant
Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, consider the
chances of Soviet forces evolving-as shown by Force 5
footnote to paragraph 54.)
Vice Adm, de Poix, Maj. Gen. Potts, and Rear Adm.
Rectanus further believe the Soviets almost certainly
were not in a position 2 to 3 years ago to solve the
complex problems attendant to the development of
guidance systems capable of such accuracy in con-
junction with the development of MIRVed payloads.
They are convinced that solutions to those problems
would have been necessary 2 to 3 years ago to permit
the initiation of testing this year; such testing in turn
allowing for first deployment of the systems no earlier
than late 1975. They believe that the high DIPP pro-
jection is a better representation of maximum Soviet
ICBM and SLBM technological capability through
1980.
TS 190620
 TOP
ILLUSTRATIVE FORCE MODEL 5*
(Mid-1977)
DELIVERY INDEPENDENTLY TARGETED
VEHICLES RE-ENTRY VEHICLES
1 RV
142 142
9 9
168 168
85 1,020
580 580
(520) (520)
(60) (60)
ICBMs .................................
SS-7 ..................................
SS-8 ..................................
SS-9 Mod 2 ...........................
New Large Missile
12 MIRY ..............
SS-11 .................................
Mod 1 ..............................
Mod 3 ..............................
New Small Missile
. 3-MIRY ..............
New Solid Missile
New SSBN/New SLBM, 3 MIRV
CEP ............. ................
D/SS-NX-8 ...........................
Y/New SLBM, 3 MIRV,
SLBMs ..................................
H-II/.SS-N-5
H-III/SS-NX-8 ........................
G/SS-NX-8 ............................
Y/SS-N-6 .............................
Bear ASM Carrier ......................
Bear Bomber ..........................
Bison Bomber ..........................
TOTAL ...........................
60 60
664 1,024
8/24 24
1/6 6
1/6 6
13/208 208
10/160 480
20/240 240
115 NA
65
25 ...
25
*Certain Agencies do not believe that Force 5 should be included in this Estimate. See
their footnote to the discussion of Force 5.
234. It is postulated that a new large missile
with a highly accurate 12-MIRV warhead
will be ready for de-
ployment in the 25 new large silos in late
1975 after a 3-year test program, and the
missile first appears in the table in mid-1976.
SS-9 silos would be converted to the new
harder configuration and fitted out with the
new missile at a rate of 10 groups-60 silos-
a year.
235. The development of a highly accurate
new small missile with a CEP
=and a 3-MIRV payload would also be
completed by late 1975 and the missile would
be deployed in SS-11 silos that had been
reconstructed to the new configuration de-
scribed earlier. The deployment rate would
be about 200 per year.
236. The submarine building program would
be planned to meet the constraints posed by
TS 190620
 TO
the interim agreement and the completion of
the new construction hall at Severodvinsk. All
submarine starts at Komsomol'sk and Severod-
vinsk would be of the D-class through 1974.
A new SSBN with 20 launch tubes would be
built in the new hall at Severodvinsk beginning
in 1974, with the first unit appearing in the
operational totals in 1977. A new large SLBM
with a 3-MIRV warhead and a wholly new
guidance system would be developed for this
submarine; it would also be retrofitted into
the 21 D-class submarines starting in 1978.
Also a new small SLBM-with 3-MIRVs and
would be retro-
fitted into Y-class units starting in 1976. By
mid-1980 the Soviets would have 31 Y-class,
21 D-class, and. 10 new SSBNs, for a total
of 62 modern submarines with 948 modern
SLBMs.
237. The SS-7 and SS-8 missiles and all the
H-class and the one G-class submarines
would be phased out as the new SSBNs begin
sea trials. A new solid-propellant ICBM would
replace the SS-13 starting in 1974. The cur-
rent bomber force would be reduced some-
what through attrition. A new modern inter-
continental bomber would be developed and
deployed in the late 1970s.
238. Force 5, like Force 4, would provide
the USSR with excellent retaliatory capabilities
through the 1970s even when compared with
the augmented US force. The Soviets could
use their accurate SLBMs to target a large
number of military targets as well as to main-
tain an assured destruction capability. The
counterforce capabilities of Force 5 are greater
than those of Force 4 because of the larger
number of accurate MIRVs on ICBMs.
239. Force 5 is designed to show the maxi-
mum that we believe the Soviets could achieve
under the SAL agreement. It reflects our view
of maximum technical progress in all the
major components of the Soviet forces for
intercontinental attack. The rate and extent
of progress in development and deployment
could not be achieved unless the Soviets were
making an all-out effort, and a highly success-
ful one. It is, thus, a limiting case, and, in a
sense, an artificial one.
240. Nevertheless, Force 5 is indicative of
a direction in which Soviet planning might
go. It is probable that at least some elements
have been urging for some time that the So-
viets must move rapidly to achieve MIRVs
with high accuracies for at least a part of their
ICBM-SLBM force, to keep pace with likely
improvements in the US strategic posture and
to sustain the USSR's bargaining position in
SAL talks. Soviet inclinations to move toward
the goals of Force 5 would have been rein-
forced if they had become convinced that the
US, for its part, would make an all-out effort to
improve its position under the agreement--or,
conversely, if the Soviets saw sufficient chance
of significantly improving their position to
warrant the possibility of an adverse US re-
action. Any demonstrable progress in achiev-
ing the advanced technology called for under
Force 5 would probably strengthen the hand
of those who favored the use of the new tech-
nology.
Likely Soviet Courses of Action
241. It bears repeating that we consider
none of our projections an estimate that So-
viet forces for intercontinental attack will be
composed of the particular weapon systems
listed in the precise numbers shown. The
.projections are intended to be illustrative of
possible trends and differing emphases. Con-
sequently, the paths actually adopted by the
Soviets will inevitably differ from those we
have depicted, not only in matters of detail
but in broader aspects as well.
242. Much will depend on the outcome of
the follow-on SAL talks. A permanent treaty
replacing the interim offensive agreement
TO
TS 190620
 could contain new and more restrictive pro-
visions governing the size and characteristics
of the strategic attack forces of both sides.
This would reduce both opportunity and in-
centive for the Soviets to continue their force
buildup as originally planned.
243. Even in the absence of significantly
greater restrictions than those of the interim
agreement, the Soviets may consider it un-
necessary, now or later, to do most or all of
the things permitted them under the interim
agreement, as we have generally postulated.
For example, they might not retrofit all of
their SS-9 and SS-11 silos to the new and
harder silo configuration, or .get as close as
possible to the SSBN/SLBM totals permitted
under the interim agreement. Also, it has not
been feasible in constructing the illustrative
projections to take full account of the pos-
sibility of slippage in meeting program target
dates. The projections do not take account
of the possibility that, as in the past, some
development programs will be cancelled be-
fore completion or result in only limited de-
ployment.
. 244. Given these limitations and qualifica-
tions, our best judgment is that the Soviets
will probably head into the resumed SAL
talks with something like the goals of Force
3, incorporating into their new systems the
best technology which can be exploited with-
out undue risk of delay or failure, and moving
promptly forward with deployment. They
probably will be forced, however, to settle
for some slippages of the type illustrated on an
across-the-boards basis in Force 2. The out-
come would thus be something between
Force 3 and Force 2.
245. Other possibilities must also be taken
into account. We may be wrong about how
close the Soviets are to unveiling a workable
MIRV system, and may be attributing to the
first MIRVs better characteristics than they
in fact will have. We could even be mis-
taken in our long-held belief that the Soviets
place great store on having MIRVs. The So-
viets might conclude that limited MIRV pro-
grams and more modest technical goals, of the
kind portrayed in Force 1, were adequate for
their needs, at least initially. They might also
believe that the US has more to gain than
the USSR from a continuing technological
race, and that .a policy of restraint along the
lines of Force 1 would facilitate the negotia-
tion of desirable restrictions on technological
change.
246. Alternately, the Soviets could have in-
corporated new techniques of guidance in
weapon systems now under development. This
could reflect a desire to have at least the
option of developing something like Force 4-
i.e., going ahead initially with more conserva-
tive design goals but laying the groundwork
for achieving very high accuracies later in the
decade. The extent of follow-through would
depend on a number of factors: the progress
of the development programs involved; the
degree of bureaucratic momentum they had
generated; and, above all, the prospects for
SAL and the extent to which the competitive
situation vis-a-vis the US appeared to require
the effort.
247. In the light of the work now going
on in guidance technology, we cannot rule
out the possibility that the Soviets are even
now seeking to achieve the high accuracies
and other technological advances depicted in
Force 5, and that the necessary R&D is al-
ready well along. We consider this highly
unlikely however. For one thing, Force 5
represents a technological leap greater than
those of the past and one which is uncharac-
teristic of the Soviets. Even if they were
willing to make the necessary effort, they
are unlikely to be as consistently successful
TOP
 TO
as the projections in Force 5 indicate. Aside
from such considerations, the Soviets would
have to recognize that the kind of buildup
depicted in Force 5 would almost certainly
be viewed with great alarm in the US and
provoke a strong reaction.
248. As we have indicated, all of the pro-
jections postulate that the interim agreement
will be extended at least through 1980. How
much more of a Soviet buildup might take
place if the interim agreement were allowed to
lapse in mid-1977 is hard to determine. Much
would depend on what programs the Soviets
were pursuing, on how much preparation had
been made in anticipation of termination, and
on the state of the US-Soviet strategic
rivalry at the time.
249. In general, the most significant changes
that the Soviets could effect would be in their
ICBM forces. The SLBM forces shown in the
tables would probably be affected very little
in the near term because in most of the forces
we. postulate that the Soviets would be fully
occupied up through the end of the decade in
building up to the SSBN/SLBM levels per-
mitted by the interim agreement. The arms
limitation agreements impose no constraints on
bombers.
250. Lifting the ban on the construction of
additional ICBM silos would not only enable
the Soviets to increase the number of ICBMs,
but also to install newer missiles without
taking sizable numbers of existing silos off
line for retrofit. Assuming sufficient advance
preparation and the availability of the missiles
for deployment, they might be able to add as
many as 120 new large ICBMs, up to 400
new small. ICBMs, and up to 300 mobile
ICBMs to the force by mid-1980, on the basis
of a two year construction time for each new
silo and deployment at the highest rate
achieved in the past. The achievement of
these numbers would require them to forego
the retrofit of existing silos unless they were
willing and able to deploy at rates higher
than those achieved in the past.
251. In sum, we are at a point of particular
uncertainty about Soviet capabilities and ob-
jectives. The provisions of the interim agree-
ment and the evidence of development ac-
tivities now under way provide a basis for
assessing the general course of current Soviet
programs. But it is still unclear what levels
of technology the Soviets are seeking and how
far and how fast they will deploy. In the
course of the next five to 10 years the Soviets
are almost certain to embark on some strategic
programs of which we now have little inkling.
As in the past, the Soviets will doubtless con-
tinue to make strategic program decisions
which we will find hard to explain in terms of
clear-cut military or political goals.
TS 190620
 TO
APPENDIX TO SECTION V
ILLUSTRATIVE FORCE MODEL PROJECTIONS
BY YEAR 1972-1980
The alternative force developments pre-
sented in this Appendix represent possible
directions that Soviet intercontinental attack
forces could take. It should be emphasized
that we consider no one of them an estimate
that Soviet intercontinental attack forces will
be composed of the particular weapon systems
in the precise numbers listed. They are in-
tended only to be illustrative models of possi-
ble trends and differing emphases, and are
developed primarily for broad policy use at
the national level. They are not intended for
defense planning purposes; projections devel-
oped for planning in the Department of De-
fense are included in the Defense Intelligence
Projections for Planning (DIPP).
TS 190620
 78 TOPER{
FORCE MODEL 3*
(mid-year)
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
ICBMs
Launchers on Line........
1627
1587
.1537
1470
1460
1450
1396
1336
1261
SS-7 ..................
190
190
190
190
190
180
126
66
0
SS-8 ..................
19
19
19
19
9
9
9
9
0
SS-9 ..................
288
288
288
246
204
162
120
78
36
Mod 1 ..............
(54)
(54)
(54)
(24)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
Mod 2 ..............
(222)
(222)
(222)
(222)
(204)
(162)
(120)
(78)
(36)
Mod 4 ..............
(12)
(12)
(12)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
New Large, 6-MIRV,
.....
0
0
0
25
67
109
151
193
235
SS-11 .................
970
1030
980
880
780
680
580
480
380
Mod 1 ..............
(970)
(970)
(920)
(820)
(720)
(620)
(.520)
(420)
(320)
Mod 3 ......... :.....
(0)
(60)
(60)
(60)
(60)
(60)
(60)
(60)
(.60)
New Small Liquid, 3-
MIRV,O
0
0
0
50
150
250
350
450
550
SS-13 .................
60
60
50
30
10
0
0
0
0
New Solid, 1-RV, 0.5
nm CEP ............
0
0
10'
30
50
60
60.
60
60
Launchers in Moderniza-
tion ...................
0
0
50
142
142
142
142
142
142
Large Silos ............
0
0
0
42
42
42
42
42
42
Small Silos ............
0
0
50
100
100
100
100
100
100
Total ICBMs........
1527
1587
1587
1612
1602
1592
1538
1478
1403
SSBNs/SLBMs
Operational..............
331424
40/508
43/532
60/616
53/652
54/670
55/700
53/700
59/810
H-II/SS-N-S..........
8/24
8/24
8/24
8/24
8/24
8/24
8/24
8/24
8/24
H-III/SS-NX-8 .......
0
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
G/SS-NX-8...........
0
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
0
0
Y/SS-N-6 .............
25/400
28/448
25/400
23/365
19/304
13/208
7/112
1/16
0
Y/New SLBM, 1-RV,
0
0
0
2/32
6/96
12/192
18/288
24/384
30/480
IJ/SS-NX-8 ...........
0
2/24
8/96
15/180
18/216
18/216
16/192
12/144
81196
D/New SLBM, 3-MIRY,
New SSBN/New SLBM,
3-MLRV
0
0
0
0
0
1/18
4/72
7/126
10/180
Submarines in Moderniza-
tion ..................
1/16
2/32
6/96
6/96
6/96
6196
8/120
12/168
9/112
Y-Class ...............
1/16
2/32
6/96
6/96
6/96
6/96
6/96
6/96
1/16
D-Class ...............
0
0
0
0
0
0
2/24
6/72
8/96
Total Modern SSBN/
SLBM .......... 26/416
32/504
39/592
46/676
49/712
50/730
53/784
56/838
59/892
Total SSBN/SLBM 34/440
42/540
49/628
56/712
59/748
60/766
63/820
.65/868
68/922
Bombers
Bear ASM Carrier...... 70
70
70
65
65
65
60
55
45
Bear Bomber .......... 35
35
30
30
25
20
15
10
5
Bison Bomber ......... 35
35
30
30
25
20
15
10
5
Bison Tanker.......... (50)
(50)
(45)
(40)
(40)
(35)
(30)
(25)
(20)
Total Bombers....... 140
140
130
125
115
105
90
75
55
* It should be noted that some Agencies have taken issue with certain of the assumptions on which this table is
based. Their differences are noted at appropriate points earlier in the paper.
TO
TS 190620
 TO - 79
FORCE MODEL 2*
(mid-year)
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
ICBMs
Launchers on Line........
1527
1587
1587
1637
1460
1460
1460
1438
1178
SS-7 ..................
190
190
190
190
190
190
190
162
108
SS-8 ..................
19
19
19
19
9
9
9
9
9
SS-9 ...................
288
288
288
288
246
204
162
120
78
Mod 1 ..............
(54)
(54)
(54)
(54)
(24)
(0)
(0)
"(0)
(0)
Mod 2 ..............
(222)
(222)
(222)
(222)
(222)
(204)
(162)
(120)
(78)
Mod 4 ..............
(12)
(12)
(12)
(12)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
New Large, 6-MIRY,
.. ..
0
0
0
0
25
67
109
151
193
SS-11 .................
970
1030
1030
980
880
780
680
580
480
Mod 1 ..............
(970)
(970)
(970)
(920)
(820)
(720)
(620)
(520)
(420)
Mod 3 ..............
(0)
(60)
(60)
(60)
(60)
(60)
(60)
(60)
(60)
New Small Liquid, 3-
MIRY
0
0
0
0
50
150
250
350
450
SS-13 .................
_
60
60
60
60
50
30
10
0
0
New Solid, 1-RY~
0 ...............
0
.0
0
0
10
30
50
60
60
Launchers in Moderniza-
tion .................
0
0
0
50
142
142
142
142
142
Large Silos ............
0
0
0
0
42
42
42
42
42
Small Silos ............
0
0
0
50
100
100
100
100
100
Total ICBMs........
1527
1587
1587
1587
1602
1602
1602
1574.
1520
SSBNs/SLBMs
Operational ..............
34/440
421540
47/596
50/616
58/662
51/652
53/652
53/664
52/670
H-II/SS-N-5..........
8/24
8/24
8/24
8/24
8/24
8/24
8/24
8/24
8/24
H-III/SS-NX-8.......
0
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
G/SS-NX-8...........
0
. 1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6'
1/6
1/6
1/6
Y/SS-N-6 ..............
26/416
30/480
29/464
25/400
23/368
19/304
13/208
7/112
1/16
Y/New SLBM, 1-RV,
D/SS-N X-8...........
0
2/24
8/96
15/180
18/216
18/216
18/216
16/192
12/144
New SSBN/New SLBM
3-MI RV.
.......
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2/36
5/90
Submarines in Moderniza-
tion .................
0
0
2132
6196
6/96
6/96
6/96
8/120
12/168
Y-Class ...............
0
0
2/32
6/96
6/96
6/96
6/96
6/96
6/96
D-Class ...............
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2/24
6/72
Total Modern. SSBN/
SLBM..........
26/416
32/504
39/592
46/676
49/712
49/712
49/712
51/745
54/802
Total SSBN/SLBM.
34/440
42/540
49/628
56/712
59/748
59/748
59/748
61/784
64/838
Bombers
Bear ASM Carrier........
70
70
70
65
65
65
60
55
45
Bear Bomber............
35
35
30
30
25
20
15
10
5
Bison Bomber ...........
35
35
30
30
25
20
15
10
5
Bison Tanker............
(50)
(50)
(45)
(40)
(40)
(35)
(30)
(25)
(20)
Total Bombers .........
140
140
130
125
115
105
90
75
55
* It should be noted that some Agencies have taken issue with certain of the assumptions on which this table is based.
Their differences are noted at appropriate points earlier in the paper.
 FORCE MODEL 1*
(mid-year)
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
ICBMs
Launchers on Line........
1527
1587
1587
1557
1427
1343
1343
1343
1364
SS-7 ..................
190
190
190
190
150
66
66
66
66
SS-8 ..................
19
19
19
19
9
9
9
9
9
SS-9 ..................
288
288
288
288
243
213
183
153
144
Mod 1 ..............
(34)
(54)
(54)
(54)
(21)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
Mod 2 ...............
(222)
(222)
(222)
(222)
(222)
(213)
(183)
(153)
(144)
Mod 4 ..............
(12)
(12)
(12)
(12)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
New Large, 3-MIR\',
.......
0
0
0
0
25
55
85
85
85
.......
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
30
60
SS- 11 .................
970
1030
1030
1000
910
850
790
730
670
Mod 1 ..............
(970)
(970)
(970)
(940)
(850)
(790)
(730)
(670)
(610)
Mod 3 ..............
(0)
(60)
(60)
(60)
(60)
(60)
(60)
(60)
(60)
New Small Liquid, 1-
RC,....
0
0
0
0
30
90
1150
210
270
SS-13 .................
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
Launchers in Moderniza-
tion .................
0
0
0
30
135
135
135
135
114
Large Silos............
0
0
0
0
45
45
45
45
24
Small Silos............
0
0
0
30
90
90
90
90
90
Total ICBMs........
1527
1587
1587
1587
1562
1478
1478
1478
1478
SSBNs/SLBMs
Operational ..............
34/440
40/508
44/548
49/600
55/676
53/642
46/636
471656
514736
H-II/SS-N-5..........
8/24
8/24
8/24
8/24
8/24
8/24
0
0
0
H-III/SS-NX-8.......
0
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
0
0
0
G/SS-NX-8 ...........
0
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
0
0
0
0
Y/SS-N-6 .............
26/416
28/448
26/416
22/352
18/288
10/160
4/64
0-
0
Y/New SLBM, 1-RV,
0
0
0
2/32
7/112
11/176
17/272
23/368
31/496
D - X-8...........
0
2/24
8/96
15/180
20/240
23/276
23/276
16/192
8/96
0
0
2/24
8/96
121/144
Submarines in Moderniza-
lion .................
0
2/32
5/80
7/112
8/120
161232
16/232
15/212
11/132
Y-Class ...............
0
2/32
5/80
7/112
6/96
10/160
10/160
8/128
0
1)-Class ...............
0
0
0
0
2/24
6/72
6/72
7/84
11/132
Total Modern SSBN/
S LB M ..........
26/416
32/504
39/592
46/676
53/760
60/844
62/868
62/868
62/868
Total SSBN/SLBM.
34/440
42/540
49/628
56/712
63/796
69/874
62/868
62/868
62/868
Bombers
Bear AS M Carrier........
70
70
70
65
65
65
60
55
45
Bear Bomber............
35
35
30
30
25
20
15
10
5
Bison Bomber ...........
. 35
35
30
30
25
20
15
10
5
Bison Tanker............
(;50)
(50)
(45)
(40)
(40)
(35)
(30)
(25)
(20)
Total Bombers.........
140
140
130
125
115
105
90
75
55
* It should be noted that some Agencies have taken issue with certain of the assumptions on which this table is based.
Their differences are noted at appropriate points earlier in the paper.
 TOPS
FORCE MODEL 4*
(mid-year)
ICBMs
Launchers on Line........
1527
1587
1537
1408
1370
1350
1290
1235
1235
SS-7 ..................
190
190
190
190
162
142
82
36
0
SS-8 ..................
19
19
19
19
9
9
9
0
0
SS-9 ..................
288
288
288
234
180
126
72
18
0
Mod 1 ...............
(54)
(54)
(54)
(12)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
Mod 2 ..............
(222)
(222)
(222)
(222)
(180)
(126)
(72)
(18)
(0)
Mod 4. .. ...........
(12)
(12)
(12)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
New Large, 6-MIRE",
.....
0
0
0
25
79
133
187
211
211
......
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
30
84
SS-11 .........:........
970
1030
980
830
680
530
380
230
80
Mod 1 ...............
(970)
(970)
(920)
(770)
(620)
(470)
(320) .
(170)
(20)
Mod 3 ..............
(0)
(60)
(60)
(60)
(60)
(60)
(60)
(60)
(60)
New Small Liquid, 3-
New Small Liquid, 3-
MIRV,F
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
100
SS-13 .............
60
60
60
50
30
10
0
0
0
New Solid, 1-RV7 ~
0 ...............
0
0
0
10
30
50
60
60
60
Launchers in Moderniza-
tion .................
0
0
50
204
E04
204
204
204
168
Large Silos ............
0
0
0
54
54
54
54
54
18
Small Silos ............
0
0
50
150
150
150
150
150
150
Total ICBMs........
1527
1587
1587
1612
1574
1554
1494
1439
1403
SSBNs/SLBMs
Operational ..............
34/440
42/540
49/628
56/712
60/752
591748
58/744
58/774
50/780
H-II/SS-N-S..........
8/24
8/24
8/24
8/24
8/24
8/24
8/24
8/24
0
H-III/SS-NX-8.......
0
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
0
G/SS-NX-8...........
0
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
0
0
Y/SS-N-6 .............
26/416
30/480
31/496
31/496
29/464
29/464
23/368
17/272
11/176
New SSBN/New SLBM
0
0
0
0
0
1/20
4/80
7/140
10/200
Submarines in Moderniza-
tion .................
0
0
0
0
2/32
4/56
8/120
10/144
12/168
Y-Class ...............
0
0
0
0
2/32
2/32
6/96
6/96
6/96
D-Class ...............
0
0
0
0
0
2/24
2/24
4/48
6/72
Total Modern SSBN/
SLB M..........
26/416
32/504
39/592
46/676
52/748
53/768
56/828
59/888
62/948
Total SSBN/SLBM.
34/440
42/540
49/628
56/712
62/784
63/804
66/864
68/918
62/948
Bombers
Bear ASM Carrier...:....
70
70
70
65
65
65
60
60
55
Bear Bomber ............
35
35
30
30
25
25
20
20
15
Bison Bomber ...........
35.
35
30
30
25
25
20
20
15
Bison Tanker............
(50)
(50)
(45)
(40)
(40)
(35)
(30)
(25)
(20)
New Bomber ............
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
15
30
Total Bombers.........
140
140
130
125
115
115
105
115
115
*It should be noted that some Agencies have taken issue with certain of the assumptions on which this table is based.
Their differences are noted at appropriate points earlier in the paper.
TS 190620
 FORCE MODEL 5*
(mid-year)
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
1CBM
Launchers on Line........ 1517' 158, 1587 1537 1314 1294 1218 1143 1235
SS-7 .................. 190 190 190 190 162 142 66 0 fl
SS-8 .................. 19 19 19 19 9 9 9 0 0
SS-9 .................. 288 288 298 288 228 16S 108 48 0
Mod 1 .............. (54) (54) (54) (54) (6) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Mod2.............. (222) (222) (222) (222) (222) (168) 1108) 148) (0)
Mod 4 .............. (12) (12) (12) (12) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
New Large, 12-MIRY,
0 1) 0 0 25 85 145 20.5 265
88-1 ................. 970
Mod I .............. (970)
Mod 3 .............. (0)
New Small Liquid, 3-
1030 103(1 980 780 580 380 180 60
(970) (970) (920) (720) (520) (320) (120) (0)
(60) (60) (60) (60) (60) (60) (60) (60)
MIRE' 0 0 0 0 5(1 250 450 630 850
SS-13 ................. (10 61) 50 30 10 11 0 0 0
New Solid, 1-RY
.............. 0 0 10 :30 1 50 60 110 60 Ell
Launchers in. Moderniza-
tion ................. 0 0 tl 50 260 260 260 260 168
Large Silos.,.......... 0 0 0 0 60 60 60 60 48
Small Silos ............ 0 (1 (I 50 200 200 200 200 120
Total ICBMs........ 1527 1587 1:587 1587 1574 1554 1478 1403 1403
SSBNs/SLBMs
Operational .............. .34/440 42/540 49/624 55/692 54/656 54/664 .55/714 55/794 56/876
H-II/SS-N-5 .......... 8/24 8/24 8/24 8/24 9/24 9/24 8/24 4/12 0
H-III/SS-NN-8........ 0 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 11
G/SS-N X-8 ........... 0 1 /6 1/6 1,16 1/6 V6 0 (I 0
Y/SS-N-6 ............. 26/416 30/480 30/480 29/464 21/336 13/208 5/80 0 Cl
Y/New SLBM, 3-MIRC,
.............
New SSBN/New SLBM
V, E
........ 0 0 0 0 0 1/20 5/100 9/180 10/200
Submarines in Moderniza-
tion ................. 0 0 1116 2/32 8/128 9/140 111164 111152 61,2
Y-Class ............... 0 0 1/I6 2/32 8/128 8/128 8/128 5/80 0
1)-Class ............... 0 0 (1 0 (1 1/12 3/36 6/72 6/72
Total Modern SSBN/
SLBM .......... 26/416 32/504 40/604 47/683 52/748 53/768 57/845 61/928 62/948
Total SSBN/SLBM. 34/440 42/540 50/640 57/724 62/784 (13/804 66/878 66/946 62/948
Bombers
Bear ASM Carrier........ 70 70. 70 (15 65 65 60 60 55
Bear Bomber. .-. .. .... 35 35 30 30 25 25 2(1 20 15
Bison Bomber ............ 35 35 30 30 25 25 20 20 15
Bison Tanker............ (50) (50) (45) (40) (40) (35) (30) (25) (20)
New Bomber ............ 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 15 30
Total Bombers......... 140 140 130 125 115 115 105 11.5 115
*For the views of Dr. Ray S. Cline, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; Vice Adm.
Vincent P. de Poix, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; Lt. Gen. Samuel C. Phillips, the Director, National
Security Agency; Maj. Gen. William E. Potts, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army:
Rear Adm. Earl F. Rectanns, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; and Maj. Gen. George
J. Keegan, Jr., the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, on this Force Model see their footnotes to the discussion of
Force 5.
TS 190620
 APPENDIX
GLOSSARY OF MISSILE TERMS
TS 190620
 TOP
GLOSSARY OF MISSILE TERMS
NOTE: Except for minor changes in the definition of a nuclear
system, this Appendix is reproduced verbatim from NIE
11-8-71.
DEPRESSED TRAJECTORY ICBM (DICBM)
An ICBM system launched on a trajectory
having a much lower apogee than one
launched on a normal ICBM trajectory.
FRACTIONAL ORBIT BOMBARDMENT
SYSTEM (FOBS)
A FOBS is placed into orbit and deorbited
on the target prior to completion of the first
revolution. Its operational and control re-
quirements are like those for an ICBM;
i.e., it is deployed on the ground, targeted
prior to launch, and launched with intent to
attack. This concept is contrasted with a
multiple orbit bombardment system (MOBS)
which would be deployed in space, launched
into orbit with no immediate commitment to
attack, targeted after launch, or retargeted as
necessary.
INERTIAL GUIDANCE SYSTEM
A guidance system that is completely con-
tained within the missile and has no link with
a ground station after launch. Two principal
elements of such guidance systems are:
Accelerometer-A device that measures the
missile's acceleration in a given direction.
Three accelerometers mounted at right angles
to each other can measure the entire accelera-
tion profile of a missile's powered flight.
Gyroscope-A device that measures devia-
tion of the missile away from a reference di-
rection. Three gyroscopes mounted at right
angles to each other can measure any move-
ment of the missile during powered ,flight.
OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Alert Rate-The percentage of the opera-
tional missile force that is maintained in a con-
dition of readiness.
Circular Error Probable (CEP)-A conven-
tional index of accuracy defined as the radius
of a circle centered on the intended target,
within which 50 percent of the arriving mis-
 86 TOP
sile warheads are expected to fall. The other
50 percent of successfully arriving warheads
are expected to detonate within 3r CEPs of
the target.
Initial Operational Capability (IOC)-The
date on which the first operational unit is
equipped with its weapons and capable of
carrying out an attack.
Maximum Operational Range (nm )-
(Air-to-Surface Systems)-Slant range
between the launching aircraft and the target
at the time of missile launch.
(Surface-to-Surface Systems)-Maxim um
range under operational conditions with war-
head weight indicated. In the case of ballistic
missiles the maximum range figures disregard
the effect of the earth's rotation.
Reaction Time-The time required to
launch from a given readiness condition. The
time required is a function of the type of sys-
tem, the mode of deployment (i.e., hard or
soft), and the checkout procedures used.
Refire Time-The time required to launch
a second missile from the same launcher.
RE-ENTRY VEHICLES AND WARHEADS
Re-entry Vehicle (RV)-That part of a mis-
sile which carries the warhead and is designed
to survive re-entry into the earth's atmosphere
and detonate on target.
Multiple Independently-Targetable RVs
(MIRVs)-Two or more RVs in a single mis-
sile payload package, with each RV capable
of being directed at a separate aiming point.
Maneuverable RV (MaRV)-An RV which
has the capability to maneuver during free
flight or re-entry.
Multiple RVs (MRVs)-Two or more RVs
in a single missile payload package. The in-
dividual RVs are dispersed but not indepen-
dently-targeted or maneuvered.
Retrofire-A technique whereby the RV is
deorbited or is deboosted out of a normal
ballistic trajectory.
Ballistic Coefficient (beta)-An RV char-
acteristic whose value is a function of the RV
weight and shape and is defined as the weight
of the RV divided by its drag coefficient and
area. The speed with which an RV passes
through the atmosphere increases as the bal-
listic coefficient increases. An RV having a
higher ballistic coefficient is less susceptible
to the re-entry error induced by the. effects
of wind and density in the atmosphere. Re-
entry vehicles with lower ballistic coefficients
are less susceptible to the effects of prior
nuclear bursts in the impact area, e.g., wind,
dust, debris; are more adaptable to hardening
against the radiation effects of attacking
ABMs; and facilitate the design and pack-
aging of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear System Weight-The weight, in a
warhead, of the nuclear materials, high ex-
plosives, radiation case, and channel filler
only.
Warhead Weight-The weight of the nu-
clear system of an explosive device and of its
safing, arming, fuzing, and firing mechanism.
RV Weight-The weight of the warhead
plus necessary shielding and structure, of any
internal penetration aids that may be present,
and of any other necessary or desired com-
ponents of the RV including hardening. .
Throw Weight-The weight of that part of
the missile above the last booster stage. In
TS 190620
 the case of MIRVs or MRVs, for example,
throw weight would include the weight of
the MIRV or MRV release mechanism as well
as that of the RVs.
RELIABILITIES
Force Reliability-The percentage of the
operational missile force that, in the absence
of countermeasures, will successfully detonate
in the target area. This is the product of alert
rate and weapon system reliability.
Weapon System Reliability-The percent-
age of the alert missiles that will successfully
detonate within 3.5 CEPs of their targets.
This is the product of launch, in-flight, and
warhead reliabilities.
TOP