A REPORT ON US-VIETNAMESE TALKS ON POWS/MIAS DURING THE NIXON, FORD, AND CARTER ADMINISTRATIONS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005359871
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2010
• Case Number: F-2009-00396
• Publication Date: September 23, 1985

C01342308
'Report 'on
US-Vietnamese Talks on POWs/MIAs
During the Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations
Prepared for Richard Childress,
National Security Council
by
TOP SECRET
NSC Multiple Sources
DE SIFY ON: OADR
T ECRET
..GM~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: NOV 2007
ff COPIES
TOP S RET
 'CO1342308
THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION 2
The Paris Peace Talks 2
The Public and the Press 3
'The Kissinger Meeting's 3
Kissinger's Statements and Proposals on POWs 5
Hanoi's Statements and Proposals on POWs 5
The Negotiations 6
After the Peace Accords 8
US POWs/MIAs in Laos 8
The Joint Economic Commission
and POW/MIA Accounting 9
POWs and the Aftermath of the Paris Accords 10
THE FORD ADMINISTRATION 11
The Montgomery Commission 12
The Meaning of the Montgomery Commission 13
Diplomatic Initiatives under the
Ford Administration 14
THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION 14
The Woodcock Presidential Commission 15
The Meaning of the Woodcock Commission 16
Diplomatic Initiatives under the
Carter Administration 17
LEGACY: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S INHERITANCE 19
TOP S
TOP SECRET
 C01342308
TOP SECRET
TO September 1985
BACKGROUND: THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION
The release of US military personnel being held as
prisoners of war in Indochina, and the accounting of those
missing in action, has been a primary interest of the US
Government since the beginning of efforts to resolve the
Vietnamese conflict. The humanitarian concern for the
well-being of US servicemen, as well as their families, has
clearly been the driving force behind the public and official
assumption that every possible effort would be made to assure
that US POWs were treated humanely by the Vietnamese and that
ultimately all POWs and MIAs would be either released or
somehow accounted for. During the mid- to late-1960s, when
the Johnson administration began its attempts to bring the
North Vietnamese to the negotiating table and end the war,
overtures were made toward arranging prisoner exchanges with
Hanoi. US strategy, from the beginning, assumed that the
POW/MIA issue could and should be dealt with as a purely
humanitarian problem, to be resolved outside discussions
intended to end the war, and hopefully through separate
channels. In addition to prisoner exchanges, the US Govern-
ment offered to arrange for a third country to receive prison-
ers for internment or transfer. The International Red Cross
was encouraged to request prisoner lists, mailing rights, and,
if possible, on-site camp inspection, from Hanoi. At the same
time, the administration publicly highlighted allegations of
Vietnamese ill-treatment of US POWs, thereby encouraging Hanoi
to act humanely with regard to prisoners.
The Vietnamese response to US POW/MIA proposals during
the late 1960s established the trend of silence, intransi-
gence, and almost total lack of humanitarian concern that
characterized Hanoi's treatment of the prisoner issue through
1980. Hanoi, for the most part, ignored proposals for pri-
soner exchanges; refused access to any party for inspection of
prisoner camp conditions; denied claims of harsh or inhumane
treatment or that the Geneva accords were applicable; repeat-
edly failed to provide the US or any third party with satis-
factory lists of prisoners; and failed to facilitate mail
service between prisoners and their families. Starting in
1967, Hanoi occasionally released small groups of prisoners
(two or three at at time), but strictly for propaganda pur-
poses. On such occasions the Vietnamese fully exploited the
international press, and they routinely used independent
(usually anti-administration) US organizations as the inter-
mediaries for the release of the prisoners.
TOP RET
BY: NSC Multiple Sources
DECLASSIF N: OADR
8PS4CRT.
 C01342308
_e____D -2-
The Johnson administration was the first to discover that
treatment of the POW issue as a humanitarian problem was
futile, since the Vietnamese were determined to deal with the
issue only to the degree that it could be used as a diplomatic
tool or as part of a quid pro quo that would benefit Hanoi.
It soon became apparent that any resolution of the POW/MIA
problem would probably have to come about as part of a general
.settlement of the war itself. For this reason,. the subject of
POWs was bound to enter into the peace talks which began in
Paris in May of 1968. Nonetheless, US strategists (at least
on paper) continued to maintain that the prisoner question was
a fundamentally unique matter that was to be considered a
pre-condition or a by-product of the peace rather than one of
the terms of a settlement.
THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION
The Paris Peace Talks'
The US Government originally hoped to avoid any linkage
of POW release to political or military issues at the talks in
Paris. US negotiating strategy thus focused on efforts to
bring about an early settlement of the POW/MIA issue prior to
and outside the general discussion of a cease-fire and with-
drawal. Unfortunately, there was virtually nothing the US
Government could offer as an incentive to the Vietnamese to be
receptive to such a plan. Suggestions for a reciprocal
release of North Vietnamese prisoners in the South were
impractical, since Hanoi refused to openly acknowledge any
military presence in the South and thus denied that any
soldiers held there were theirs. in addition, the North
Vietnamese clearly recognized the depth of US concern for the
POWs and therefore the amount of leverage the prisoners could
afford Hanoi. This alone probably made it inevitable that the
POW question would be linked to other issues. Most important-
ly, it did not take long for the US delegation to realize that
appeals to Hanoi on the basis of humanitarianism, or sug-
gestions that the Vietnamese resolve the POW question early
and separately as a gesture of goodwill that would improve the
atmosphere of the negotiations, would consistently fall on
deaf ears.
The US delegation in Paris grudgingly but quickly accept-
ed the reality of Hanoi's attitude toward the POW issue, and
proceeded to develop tactics for including prisoner release in
its discussions with the Vietnamese. As with all important
issues that were dealt with at Paris, discussion of POWs
evolved concurrently in two different fora: the semi-public
negotiations between the two formal delegations, and the
secret meetings--ultimately between Le Duc Tho and Henry
Kissinger--during which virtually all substantive conver-
sations were held. The formal sessions, which were conducted
TOP SECRET
 C01342308
-3-
largely as a front for the more sensitive secret discussions,
were often marked by exchanges of political rhetoric. US
negotiators 'repeatedly demanded that the Vietnamese provide
lists of US prisoners, allow for inspections that could verify
humane treatment, facilitate mail delivery to and from the
prisoners, and to indicate a willingness to negotiate an early
and complete release of all POWs. Hanoi's delegation ha-
bitually responded by accusing the US team of attempting to
turn the subject of the talks away from the "aggressive" and
"imperialist" war that the US had brought upon the Vietnamese
people. In their statements, Hanoi's negotiators denounced US
servicemen being held in the North as "war criminals" (and
thus not due the treatment guaranteed by the Geneva protocols)
while maintaining that all were treated well. The North
Vietnamese said little of substance about POWs through the
course of the formal negotiations, except when launching
propaganda initiatives or when alluding vaguely to the general
principles that were being discussed in the secret meetings.
Hanoi often made the bottom line explicit: they would not
discuss anything seriously, particularly POWs, without assur-
ance that US troops would be withdrawn from Vietnam.
The Public and the Press
Public opinion in the United States, was an important tool
of the US delegation in Paris, especially with regard to the
POW issue. Many of the appeals that were made to the
Vietnamese at the formal talks emphasized the demand of the
American people for a complete and satisfactory accounting for
lost and imprisoned servicemen. Public awareness campaigns
that were either encouraged or supported by the US Government
were brought to the attention of the Vietnamese in Paris, who
were also asked about reports that POWs were harshly treated.
It was clearly hoped that Hanoi would respond favorably in the
interests of receiving or retaining positive international
press. In most cases the Vietnamese responded in piecemeal or
not at all. Instead Hanoi tried to bring negative press to
the US delegation and the Nixon administration by highlighting
anti-war sentiment in the United States and by making contacts
with private US organizations or citizens, some of whom
advocated unilateral moves (or actions outside the scope of US
Government policy) to resolve the POW question. To this end,
the Vietnamese delegation in Paris met on several occasions
with relatives of POWs or'MIAs, and seemed more forthcoming in
providing information to-these individuals than to US offi-
cials. Few of these meetings, however, resulted in any
important steps toward a more complete accounting of prison-
ers, nor did the meetings the Vietnamese had with US Congress-
men or officials from other public or private organizations.
The Kissinger Meetings
"I've dealt with the North Vietnamese for a long
time. They are the worst sons-of-bitches I've ever
TOP SECRET
 C01342308
TOP-
1 X T
TOP
met. After any negotiating session with them, one is
seized with the overwhelming desire to bomb the bejeesus
out of them. They are brutal, monomaniacal, and
impervious to human emotion. To them your concern is
simply a tactical weapon. It doesn't create an
obligation or a humanitarian concern. Even the Syrians
are a joy to deal with compared to the North Vietnamese."
--Henry Kissinger
- 9 February 1974
Outside the showcase of the formal sessions between the
North Vietnamese and the US delegation, the real negotiating
was done in secret between Henry Kissinger and the agents of
Hanoi (primarily Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy, nominal head of the
North Vietnamese delegation in Paris). Kissinger's initial
approach to the POW issue reflected the original attitude of
the government in any discussion of the issue with Hanoi: he
regarded it as "a matter of simple humanitarianism" that was
not an appropriate topic for political/military negotiations.
Kissinger, however, understood the necessity of confronting
the issue in his meetings with the Vietnamese and was prepared
to deal with it in connection with the conditions.for peace.
After recognizing that there was no alternative, and resolving
to keep the Vietnamese reminded of the unique demands of the
American public on the POW question, he fully incorporated the
subject of prisoners into his conversations with Le Duc Tho.
In accepting the POW issue as an integral part of the settle-
ment, Kissinger was determined to prevent the POWs from
becoming a diplomatic pawn, and he voiced that determination
repeatedly to the Vietnamese.
One of Kissinger's main problems in devising a POW policy
for his meetings in Paris was Washington's relationship with
the Thieu government in South Vietnam. Kissinger, for exam-
ple, had little leverage in proposing prisoner exchanges,
since most prisoners held by the allies were in camps adminis-
tered by South Vietnam. This, of course, was not itself a
serious restraint on US negotiators, since Thieu was often
receptive to the idea that the release of some prisoners or
the promise of an exchange would be an incentive to Hanoi. In
any case, Hanoi generally ignored any such overtures because
the North Vietnamese refused to claim any soldiers in South
Vietnamese prisons. The larger, central problem that affected
the POW question was that which proved to be perhaps .
Kissinger's greatest obstacle to reaching a settlement in
Paris. Many of Hanoi's conditions for peace concerned the
future of the Saigon government, and thus many of the promises
that Kissinger wanted to make to Hanoi in return for a promise
to bring an end to the war in general--and a return of US
prisoners in particular--depended upon Thieu's concurrence,
which was hardly a given, since the core of Hanoi's demands
included Thieu's ouster. Thieu's understandable reluctance to
surrender either his government or his control over it, even
TOP SECRET
 C01342308 TOP SECRET
pill,
-5-
when it became obvious that Saigon's authority and legitimacy
were faltering, became a thorn in Kissinger's and Nixon's
sides that delayed the peace settlement. Agreement with Hanoi
on POWs was especially complicated by Saigon's refusal during
the later stages of the negotiations to agree to Hanoi's
demands for the release of those civilian and military person-
nel held in the South (which by that time they had implicitly
claimed). In fact much (if not most) of the difficulty that
Kissinger had in reaching a final agreement with the North
Vietnamese on the wording of the POW sections (Article 8 and
the Protocol) of the peace accords was occasioned by Saigon's
stubborn intransigence rather than Hanoi's.
Kissinger's Statements and Proposals on POWs
During his meetings with Xuan Thuy and Le Duc Tho in
1971, Kissinger habitually reiterated the US Government
request for Hanoi's agreement to an immediate release of all
prisoners on both sides, as a separate humanitarian action.
If that could not be.done, he said, release of US POWs would
have to be an integral.part of the peace settlement, according
to which the US would expect a complete list of prisoners held
throughout Indochina on the day the peace was signed, as well
as a schedule for POW release that would parallel and end at
,'ileast two months before the schedule for US' troop withdrawals.
!i In qualifying the US proposals and responding to Hanoi's,
Kissinger emphasized that he could not and would not set a
date for US troop withdrawal without a clear understanding
that such a guarantee would bring the release of US POWs. He
repeatedly told the Vietnamese that US public opinion would
not allow the POWs to be held for ransom or the demand for
4 their complete release to be compromised in any way.
Hanoi's Statements and Proposals on POWs
The North Vietnamese peace plg. ?# 8 May, 1969 (the "Ten
Points") implicitly linked the release of POWs to the paymeifT
~`of ?parations by the United States. Thy it "Eight. ,Point" .
proposal of_17 September 1.970 stated that Hanoi would be ready
to discuss the release of POWs ifwtJi States would
ate' Eo~ a`ot'1 troop;"withdrawal"by 30 June=?"3"' ?sub`se-
quent statements 3.t"becamerd.&e thata i agreement to "dis-
cuss" the release_o .p ~.$ nex ,..w ,_ p ent1y something short
ocean reement to actually ,rel, a,se,,..,them. The cen ira1 i.ni-
z.cation in the qi1"a'li`fying statements of Xuan Thuy and other
members of the North Vietnamese delegation was that the
condition of a guaranteed troop withdrawal was intended to
mean a guaranteed end to the war; basically that Hanoi would
not concern itself with the prisoner issue until the United
States, acting in good faith, met its key demands. More than
just a withdrawal deadline, these of course included a cessa-
tion of bombing over North Vietnam as well as other violations
of that country's "sovereignty and security," and a satisfac-
tory response to the PRGSVN (Provisional Revolutionary
__T*P- RRET
TOP SECRET
 001342308
FRET -6-
Government of South Vietnam) proposal to replace the.Saigon
regime. Hanoi was thus stating that US POWs would not be
released until after the war itself was over, and placing the
onus for continuity the war and hence the incarceration of the
prisoners on the government of the United States.
The Negotiations
In the PRG's ".ae3LeD Pgint_".....pr_opnsa of .Tnna hg
North Vietnamese seemincl cr-wit +PcL r selves tc~'a~PD3,,.
---reacaa ~aTwou d take place concurrent to and end at the
same time as a US withdrawal from Vietnam. Kissinger agreed
to the plan but again requested clarification that a withdraw-
al date would lead directly to POW releases. He received an
apparent "yes" from Le Duc The. By August 1971, then, essen-
tial agreement had been reached on the timetable for prisoner
release, as well as an exchange of prisoner lists. It seemed
that a withdrawal deadline would in fact bring the release of
US POWs in Vietnam. In-addition, after raising the question
of US prisoners in Laos and Cambodia, Kissinger was told that
Hanoi would "use its influence" with its allies to resolve the
problem.
Nonetheless, it was generally suspected that a promise to
withdraw all US troops would not be enough to secure the
release of US POWs, despite Hanoi's attempts to qualify its
statements to the contrary--which were confusing and seemingly
contradictory. To many, the "Seven Points" still implied a
Vietnamese readiness to merely discuss "the modalities" of
prisoner release. To most, they indicated that Hanoi would do
nothing without a guarantee that the "Vietnamization" of the
war would be stopped and that both the war and the withdrawal
would completely end within 1971. Kissinger was not prepared
at the time to promise an end to the war or an abandonment of
the Thieu government, nor to make US POWs part of any such
deal. In addition, the North Viet se__p=m!_ _ with regard
to Laos andamiodia were ambiguous, and there were growing
problems`iri aeter'minirig "the'?staE's; an,future of captured
civilians--on---either"*gfde'-- And, although it placed a low
priority- ?n-the Orel'e'ase of"'3ts p se d-iers -(and t iose of the
Vie 'ong7 field in the South, Hanoi was expected to eventually
include a demand for their release as part of a deal for US
POWs.
Needless to say, all attempts to end the war and bring a
POW release by the end of 1971 failed; negotiations to that
effect inevitably fell by the wayside. In 1972, the POW issue
was to become a test, for each side, of its diplomatic lever-
age. The Nixon admn~ stratzon'''s -faile~VJanuary lam-empt
to rescue US POWs from a camp at Son.Tay..pvidently.brought
Hanoi to a fuU.....rea.l.ization.,._.,.for,,,,.. fie first time, of the high
priority tfiat Nixon had assigned to the"" reTe"ase? of PbWs
Prior to that time, the North Vietnamese had apparently
underestimated the importance of the issue to the United
_wop SXCJMT
 C01342308
ToL?CRET
States. It is possible that much of Hanoi's inattention to
the question of POWs was simply based on their assumption that
the, matter was of no great importance. In any case, the
impact of the Son Tay raid on Hanoi's strategy was probably a
reassessment of the POW issue as one that provided it with
greater leverage it they had previously understood. Iron-
ically, Washington seemed to conclude that Hanoi's recognition
of the importance of the POWs to the United States could
increase the leverage of the American side. The US negotia-
tors.believed that Hanoi would now be more sensitive to the
effect of POW matters on its image, and thus motivate the
North Vietnamese to resolve the question in some degree of
good faith.
In late 1972, as the negotiations were approaching a
climax, Kissinger emphasized two secondary issues with regard
to POWs that had not been previously dealt with to any large
degree: the subject of American prisoners in Laos and.
Cambodia, and the question of how servicemen missing in action
would-be accounted for after the ultimate release of POWs. On
the subject of POWs held outside of North Vietnam, Le Duc Tho
informed Kissinger that there were "very few" American prison-
ers in Laos, and none in Cambodia. He repeated Hanoi's claim
that, in any case, such matters were under the jurisdiction of
the Laotian and Cambodian governments, and reminded Kissinger
of his agreement to "work out the arrangements with our
friends." With regard to MIAs, the North Vietnamese delega-
tion did not appear to offer any serious resistance to includ-
ing in the peace settlement a paragraph to the effect that
both sides would help each other in getting information about
those missing in action, and facilitate the investigation of
crash sites and the repatriation of remains.
As the negotiations drew to a close, the major stumbling
block in finalizing the POW section of the peace settlement
was the question of civilian prisoners, which was closely
related to the undetermined status of Viet Cong and other
prisoners held in South Vietnam. Since the resolution of this
problem would have to involve the parties operating on either'
side in the South--the PRG and the Saigon regime, both of
whose responsiveness to the major negotiating powers was
questionable--and because there were questions as to whether
satisfactor .resolution of the civilian prisoner issue would
Be linked to other parts of the POW agreement, discussions on
the POW matter were delayed and complicated, probably unneces-
sarily (and not because of any fundamental disagreement as to
the future of US POWs). Hanoi and Washington found it ex-
tremely difficult to come to agreement on what was to be
expected of the PRG and the Thieu government, and what the
implications were for a general settlement. By the time the
peace agreement was signed, however, the separation between
the two distinct problems of Vietnamese civilian prisoners and
US military prisoners, in terms of both obligation and time
frame, had been made. Kissinger promised that Washington
DU 2~CDET
_V 4
TOP SECRET
 C01342308
3: 0, T -8-
would do everything in its power to urge Saigon to cooperate
with the PRG in meeting the civilian prisoner requirements of
the agreement.
After the Peace Accords
Immediately after the signing of the Paris agreement,
Hanoi provided the US Government with a list of American
pr~'st~ners"'arid"released a large number of POWs. Unfortunately,
'L'?both actions fell far short of US'expectations. The list
provided was not accepted as either fully accurate or com-
plete, and little information was provided toward identifying
or locating American soldiers missing in action. Within a
month of the peace settlement,.-the North Vietnames ega to
de1"y the further release of US POWs, claiming that the US
s 3 R "wa~That'ftrifi11xs~ t art of t r mend.
comp a"inec tai ' ""tiie"`Uhite States u a to ensure,vthe
re 4_se o civilian prisonere.,._.z.. the..,.So,,thJ denial of the
c ar.. d stinct oh' 'dial had been made during the negotiat ns
between civilian ...aric n,..:._Y,...,._._,. ..__.._..... ..,,, ,,.... ,.:i^"?b ,
1~ . :i,tary.:,p.r~s oners ~:.
cease-fire aq eer nt,,,..an~1,.:.that.,t1 ...,US.:;liad:,sha lsecl Luc .. f. ids
responsibili lr. ,to enforce the peace set j meat Washington
respond'e'd by denying the a1.legat ons,. demanding the release of
US prisoners according to.the schedule that had been set, and
informing Hanoi that discussions in Paris, mine-clearing
operations, and troop withdrawals would be suspended pending
further North Vietnamese movement on POW release. In addi-
tion, both sides accused the other of impeding the activities
and progress of the Four Party Joint Military Commission,
whose responsibilities included the search for MIAs.
Beyond the initial POW releases, Hanoi's attempts to
satisfy US eman s for a full accounting_o -" n s..~,aere
ffw: `fi'2'ie ? POW/MIA issue was among a first casualties gf_the?
colTapSe"of the peace. agx~~ m which became apparent. hin
the f irst few., nonth.g. after? he_,, or s were s nec Kis-
singer's subsequent meetings with the Vietnamese brought no
further results; questions addressed to Hanoi on the possibil-
ity of prisoners held back went unanswered, and requests for
information on MIAs were largely ignored. For the remainder
of the Nixon Administration, as military events overtook any
hope that the Paris agreement could be upheld, humanitarian
appeals once again fell upon deaf ears in Hanoi. With the
withdrawal of US troops and the invasion of South Vietnam,
Washington was left without a quid pro quo to offer in return
for POW/MIA accounting.
US POWs/MIAs in Laos
On 2 February 1973, Hanoi provided the US delegation in
Paris with what they claimed was a list of all personnel lost
in Laos. The list was considered unacceptable for several
reasons: 1) it contained only 9 American names, whereas
approximately 350 US military and civilian personnel were
ono crrwrr
TOP SECRET
 C01342308 TOP SECRET
ECRET
listed as missing or captured in Laos; 2) it was unclear
whether the personnel on the list were dead or alive or if
those still alive were being held in North Vietnam; 3) the
list only contained prisoners who had been captured in Laos by
the North Vietnamese, and ignored those captured by the Pathet
Lao; 4) the list conflicted with reports from Pathet Lao
sources t a greater numbers of US Drys were ern e d
in Laos. In his meetings with the North Vietnamese a"f erythe
signing of the'Paris agreement, Kissinger demanded that Hanoi
fulfill its obligation to ensure that all US prisoners
throughout Indochina were released. Unfortunately, the
uncertainty of the relationships between Hanoi and Washington
and the opposing factions in Laos became an excuse--and
ultimately an explanation--for Hanoi's and Vientiane's in-
action with regard to US POWs and MIAs in Laos.
Hanoi's gblic}at4 & ..Affect the release of POWs in Laos
was more of `a general underatandin-than--an. exp ert"term of
tha-peat agreement, since it could not be assumed that the
North Vietnamese liacl "tatal~ control over Laos. In ac ition,
Laos was-xa kecTwiti inte'rna d ssen"tion" #ha "was being
resolved through negotiations in which Hanoi and Washington
were not directly involved. Thus it was extremely difficult
to influence the course of events in Laos or to make demands
on the rival factions in that country for the accounting of
missing US personnel. In the long run, Hanoi claimed that it
had lost, or had never possessed, any power to direct its
"allies" in Laos. Washington tried, mostly in vain, to obtain
information on missing US personnel directly from officials in
Laos. Even after the Lao Protocols were signed in September
1973, the US Government had no leverage in demanding informa-
tion from Vientiane. US POWs and MIAs in Laos thus met the
same fate as those in North Vietnam; appeals for help in
accounting for them came up against a crumbling stone wall.
The Joint Economic Commission and POW/MIA Accounting
Article 21 of the Paris peace agreement provided for the
establishment of a Joint (US--DRV) Economic Commission that
would supervise the implementation of the US plan to con-
tribute to the post-war reconstruction of North Vietnam. In a
30 January 1973 side-letter to Hanoi, Nixon indicated his
willingness to provide Hanoi with monetary aid, in the tenta-
tive amount of $3.25 billion, "without any political con-
ditions." During the negotiations in Paris, there was never
any direct connection made between this aid and POW release
and/or MIA accounting. However, on several occasions the US
delegation in Paris indicated to the North Vietnamese, subtly
and informally, that Washington would be more inclined to move
toward economic assistance if Hanoi would quickly and faith-
fully meets its obligations with regard to POWs. On 28
January (two days before the Nixon side-letter), Ambassador
Sullivan (head of the US delegation in Paris) told Nguyen Co
Thach (head of the Vietnamese technical team) that there would
~Q ' SECRE T
TOP SECRET
 C01342308
mW SECRET
be no note from President Nixon on economic aid until the Laos
POW list was provided to the US side. Prior to Kissinger's
trip to Hanoi in February, Le Duc Tho was notified that a
'failure to solve" the Laos prisoner issue would "have the
effect of impairing the utility" of Kissinger's visit and
'restrict his ability to discuss positive programs," which
were to include the activities of the Joint Economic Commis-
sion. Later in February Kissinger instructed Sullivan to
"tell Thach orally as your own view that if the prisoner issue
is not satisfactorily resolved, the work of the Joint Economic
Commission will be severely jeopardized."
It should be noted that Kissinger's intention here was
not necessarily, or only, to threaten Hanoi with a direct
linkage of POW release to economic aid. In his instructions
to the US delegation in Paris on 29 January, Kissinger stated
that the US "cannot proceed in the economic field as long as
there is any implication that we are ransoming our prisoners
. The domestic repercussions of not receiving the (Laos
POW] list immediately will be serious." Thus it is conceiv-
able that Kissinger did not view his instructions to Paris as
establishing a POW/aid link, but in fact a political move
designed to assure the American public that there was no link.
He hoped that the Laos list would be presented, and other
parts of the POW protocol satisfactorily fulfilled, before any
discussions of economic aid to Hanoi began.
The meetings of the Joint Economic Commisson hPgan.on 1
March 9 3 and recesse on u y, a ter the t m1aa:l work
_bAQ beencomppTUt`e?d-aiTd-tfhe`-U5' e" ha hided a :--finer
p,,z.,?o s;~ ;!% ; i? d n t s ~fnacTe izr'i iT anca~i, aaac g t re s ,~-
atteted?,,R.,.~effect a settlement in Laos. Even after the Lao
..^ n.Yi+e..,..w .. ~rl-1 v bnyl{.L..
Protocols were signe'd7 however, t' e Jt`tYl
''talks never resumed.
Thus, any suggestion of a connection between POWs/MIAs an aid
to North Vietnam through the JEC quickly became a moot point.
In any case, no progress was made on the POW issue, either in
Vietnam or Laos, while the JEC talks were in session.
POWs and the Aftermath of the Paris Accords
rAs history shows, the Paris agreement virtually, collapsed
within weeks after itywas signed:. The North Vietnamese failed
to obse"rve"'the "case==Fire, ai~a" e schedule!o UU~u wa.t7iarawal
was delayed whine both sines exchanged accusations as to who
had violated the agreement first. The POW/MIA question was
among the ,., tost._impor:ta t problems that remained" unresolved.
when' the agreement disintegrated: - As ~~ien5 mo~3ed" towafd the
fall of Saigon, the prisoner issue became a secondary concern
for both sides. Hanoi again fell into the habit of ignoring
US appeals for humanitarianism, and it became almost inevit-
able that any further accounting for POWs and MIAs would be
extremely difficult. Despite US suppositions that additional
prisoners were still in captivity and that Hanoi had access to
further information on Us missing, both the North Vietnamese
.12
 C01342308
TOP-s~~ -11-
and the Viet Cong leadership in the South failed to provide
any noteworthy degree of assistance or substantive information
that would help account for US POWs/MIAs.
THE FORD ADMINISTRATION
After the failure of the peace accords--and ultimately
the fall of Saigon--the US side did not abandon the MIA issue.
To the American public, the fate of US MIAs was the unresolved
problem-in Indochina after the war had ended.- Largely in
response to public demands, Ford and Kissinger assigned a
greater priority to the MIA problem than had been possible
when wartime issues were more pressing. By mid-1975, however,
Washington had little leverage with Hanoi, except for that
which could be made out of Hanoi's continued hope for economic
aid. (In a series of diplomatic notes throughout 1973-74,
Kissinger and Le Duc Tho had accused each other of failing to
meet their respective obligations (as per the Paris agreement)
by trying to claim a linkage between MIA accounting and
economic aid. Both had used an implied linkage as an excuse
for not fulfilling the other's expectations.) Using the
"carrot and stick" approach, Kissinger and Ford believed that
a normalization of relations was the key quid pro quo that
Washington had to offer Hanoi in exchange for an MIA account-
ing. By dune 1975, diplomatic correspondence to examine the
possibilities was under way.
The Ford Administration's strategy in dealing with the
North Vietnamese was based on the view that "there can be no
progress toward normalizing relations between [the US and the
DRV] until Vietnam "provides us as full an accounting as
possible for all (US personnel who did not return from South-
east Asia)." As before, a direct' that aiplo
mat c re l ations fished if such arLA 0 iri was
pr'o~ 6dd was not made; an MIA accounting as instead txeateci
a cai i'iof'Tfor"ntrmalization. Thus the longstanding
conceptualization of the MIA issue as a separate, humanitarian
concern was again resurrected. Kissinger basically wished to
coax Hanoi to the negotiating table with the suggestion of
normalization, knowing that Hanoi viewed economic aid as the
next logical step. In this way Washington could at least
re-open a dialogue with Hanoi in which efforts could be made
to obtain some accounting of MIAs.
Hanoi, in the meantime, had done or said nothing that
would have conclusively assured the US Government that no live
prisoners were being held back or that Hanoi had no further
information on the missing or remains to be re atriated. On
the contrary, on certain occasions (such as in response to US
Congressional initiatives) Hanoi came forward with information
on US personnel who were killed in action or died in capti-
vity, and even repatriated some remains. After the fall of
Saigon, Hanoi had fully recognized MIA accounting as its key
diplomatic lever in dealing with the US, and made evident its
-re&. ECRET
TOP SECRET
 C01342308
intention to link it to political/military issues, especially
normalization, economic aid, and trade with the US. Hanoi's
strategy--at least in Kissinger's view--was to torment and/or
humiliate Washington with the fear of having to ransom prison-
ers and/or remains and/or information on the missing; at the
very least Hanoi was prepared to exploit the MIA issue as a
means of getting Washington to the negotiating table to
discuss economic aid.
,The Montgomery Commission
In September 1975, the House of Representatives esta-
blished the Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast
Asia, chaired by Congressman Sonny Montgomery, which was given
a one-year mandate to review POW/MIA issues. Before visiting
the North Vietnamese mission in Paris and proceeding to Hanoi
and Vientiane in December 1975, the Montgomery Committee
conferred with Kissinger, who briefed the committee
and--although he was not hopeful--encouraged their attempt to
break the US-Vietnamese deadlock. The Montgomery Commission
largely followed Kissinger's advice. In their meetings with
the Vietnamese, the members of the committee told Hanoi that
substantial US financial aid was not to be expected on the
basis of Article 21 of the treaty (which established the JEC)
because the US Government viewed Article 21 to be a statement
of intention, linked to Hanoi's implementation of the Paris
agreement, rather than a binding commitment. Kissinger by
this time viewed the Paris agreement as defunct, in light of
Hanoi's many violations of it. The Montgomery Commission
suggested to the North Vietnamese that Hanoi should hope
instead for new agreements, based especially on a normali-
zation of relations as well as other, more limited, economic
concessions (such as the lifting of US trade restrictions).
Montgomery and his fellow Congressmen, speaking on behalf of
but not for the Ford Administration, thus notified Hanoi of
the possible rewards it might expect for a more complete MIA
accounting.
1973 and said that gathering information on MIAs was extremely
difficult because of political and geographical conditions in
the countryside. The Laotian government also stated that all
US prisoners had been released in 1973, and added. that no
American MIAs were, or could be, alive in Laos. In its final
report, which was released in December 1976, the Montgomery
Commission concluded that "no Americans are still being held
alive as prisoners in Indochina, or elsewhere, as a result of
the war in Indochina" and that "a total accounting for all
2546 Americans who did not return from Southeast Asia is not
now, and never will be, possible." The Commission also
concluded however, that "each of the governments of Indochina
is~capable of providing some information of the fate and place
of burial of a number of missing Americans."
With regard to an accounting, the North Vietnamese told
the Commission that all POWs in Vietnam had been released in
T CRET
 C01342308
TOP 'SECRET
-13-
The Meaning of the Montgomery Commission
In must be noted that the Montgomery Commission was not
an executive body, nor was it authorized to either negotiate
for the Ford Administration or make executive policy. It was
created in the wake of widespread public sentiment for missing
servicemen and concern with the Government's failure to obtain
a full MIA accounting. In this sense the Commission and its
activities were a reaction to public confusion and uncer-
tainty, and not an effort to subvert executive policy. The
Commission was simply an attempt--encouraged by the White
House--to succeed where previous efforts had failed. Kis-
singer, as stated above, was not hopeful that the Commission
would accomplish much, since he knew perhaps more than anyone
else in the US Government that the North Vietnamese would be
neither forthcoming nor humanitarian in their response.
Nonetheless, Kissinger utilized the Montgomery Commission as a
channel through which he could transmit hints of the Admini-
stration's policy to Hanoi, and likewise obtain first-hand
information on Hanoi's views without expending any White House
or State Department effort.
What Kissinger (and Ford) found out from the Commission
was that Hanoi was, as always, intent on using whatever POWs
or information on MIAs it possessed as leverage in hopefully
obtaining diplomatic recognition and/or economic aid. It was
with well-defined benefits in mind that Hanoi released some
MIA remains to the Montgomery Commission, stated that they had
established an agency responsible for seeking information on
other missing, and gave lip service to "a future of close
US-Vietnamese relations." The US Government, however, viewed
all of Hanoi's "concessions" as modest efforts, and, remaining
unconvinced of Vietnamese good faith, allowed only small
amounts of private humanitarian and economic assistance to go
to Vietnam in response. US strategy thus placed the ball in
Hanoi's court: Washington expecteda major effort on MIAs
before it would reciprocate with any discussion of economic
aid, normalization, or the lifting of trade restrictions.
Hanoi's attention to the Commission was based largely on
its efforts to play Congressional and US public sentiment off
that of the Administration, and in the process gain support
for the idea of US aid to Vietnam. This tactic worked to a
certain degree, since some members of the Montgomery Commis-
sion returned to Washington recommending that the White House
approve major programs of aid. Needless to say, the Admini-
stration felt no obligation to the Commission and ignored such
requests. In the meantime, the Commission's conclusions--that
their were no more live prisoners in Indochina and that a full
accounting of the missing was impossible--aggravated both
public opinion in the United States and Hanoi's perception of
official US views on the issue.
TOP S $ET
r'ni Y''"r r
ULURLI
 C01342308
TOP_ CRET -14-
Diplomatic Initiatives Under the Ford Administration
. In this context (of continued but confused deadlock)
President Ford was determined to prioritize and confront the
MIA problem in particular and the issue of relations with
Hanoi in general. Since the Montgomery Commission had report-
ed that Hanoi was willing to enter into discussions, Kissinger
(as Secretary of State) and General Brent Scowcroft (who had
succeeded Kissinger as National Security Advisor in November
1975) thus prepared new diplomatic efforts to approach the
North Vietnamese. Major US bargaining chips were to include
the possibility of direct financial assistance; the removal of
the trade embargo and controls on Vietnamese financial assets
in the West; the allowance of US oil companies to operate in
Vietnam; the resumption of bilateral talks in Paris; and US
support for Vietnamese membership in the UN. The latter issue
became an important concern in late 1976, as Hanoi was lobby-
ing for admission to the..United Nations and the US denied its
support pending simultaneous Communist support for South
Korea's membership. Kissinger perceived US support for
Vietnamese membership in the UN in much the same way as
normalization: it could only follow an MIA accounting.
After a series of difficult preparations, and delays
occasioned by the UN issue, US and Vietnamese delegations met
in Paris on 12 November 1976 to discuss any and all matters of
mutual concern, but focusing on MIAs. The meeting produced
nothing new; each side accused the other of establishing
pre-conditions (for the US, MIA accounting for normalization;
for Hanoi, a promise of aid for MIA accounting) and neither
was prepared to step aside first. The deadlock continued.
Plans were made for further meetings, but the talks never
resumed: Hanoi refused largely because of Washington's veto
of Vietnamese membership in the UN.
THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION
The Carter White House inherited the MIA issue in much
the same state as it was left at the close of the 12 November
1976 meeting in Paris. Carter, however, did not inherit the
staff that had in effect been dealing with the MIA issue since
the time of the original Paris peace talks. Without Kissinger
and Scowcroft and their assistants, Carter turned for advice
and expertise to the two main groups with an ongoing interest
in the POW MIA problem: the Montgomery Committee and the
National League of Families. His policy was thus largely
determined by the conclusions and recommendations of the
Montgomery report, and was refined and tempered to a certain
degree through his meeting with the League of Families. Both
groups, predictably, urged Carter to launch major efforts
toward obtaining as full an accounting as possible from Hanoi.
They were divided, however, over the question of status
changes for missing servicemen, which was to become a major
problem for Carter in dealing with the MIA issue. Status
 C01342308 TOP SECRET
ET
TOP alg-CRET -15-
reviews re recommended by the Montgomery Commission, and
supported by Carter, but generally opposed by the League of
Families. The controversy surrounding this particular issue
evidently forced Carter to deal with the MIA problem when he
seemingly wanted to avoid it.
Carter's leverage with Hanoi in calling for the elusive
MIA accounting was basically the same as Ford's: extremely
limited but with a few "major" bargaining chips. Carter,
however, felt more personally compelled to resolde the issue
(arguably, on the basis of his highly-idealistic approach to
foreign policy), and was perhaps more interested in normali-
zation as a distinct goal in dealing with Hanoi than Kissinger
and Ford had been. Hence, he was more inclined to make the
first move toward breaking the deadlock, rather than wait for
a major Vietnamese initiative.. It is somewhat evident,
though, that Carter perceived himself in a dilemma: he felt a
strong personal obligation to satisfy the public's (and
particularly the League, of Families') desires for resolution
of the MIA issue, but also great frustration in realizing, as
the Montgomery Commission concluded, that a total accounting
was virtually impossible no matter what degree of assistance
Hanoi was inclined to provide.
The Woodcock Presidential Commission
President Carter's vehicle for dealing with the MIA
problem was the creation of a presidential commission that
would travel to Hanoi and Vientiane to discuss MIA accounting.
The idea had been suggested by the Montgomery group and was
supported by the League of Families. In establishing the
Commission, however, Carter and his aides were perhaps more
interested in dismissing a problem that they perceived as
insoluble than in genuinely launching a major diplomatic
effort. In National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's
memo to Carter reviewing the "scenario" for the forthcoming
mission, he stated that, a "key element in the proposal is the
strictly circumscribed authority of the Commission. Its
purpose is to elicit information, not to formulate policy.
And implicitly its purpose is to help diffuse the MIA issue."
The Commission was instructed to tell the North Vietnamese
that Carter was anxious to move toward normalization as
quickly as possible and was flexible on how to proceed. Hanoi
would also be assured that the US Government recognized the
difficulties involved in MIA accounting and conceded that many
men would never be accounted for. Nonetheless, Carter expect-
ed Hanoi to move toward a more complete MIA accounting, and
was prepared to respond to Hanoi's suggestions on how to
normalize diplomatic relations.
The Commission, chaired by former UAW President Leonard
Woodcock and including Congressman Montgomery, visited Hanoi
and Vientiane during 16-20 March 1977. Its final report,
submitted to Carter on 23 March, summarized the responses the
 C01342308
TOP SECRET
Commission received in the two capitals. Hanoi told the
Commission that it too was interested in normalizing re-
lations, but emphasized that the US obligation to repair the
damage caused by the war would be a major factor in any
efforts toward establishing diplomatic relations. As the
Commission's report stated, the North Vietnamese "clearly
expect a significant contribution to their postwar economic
reconstruction." Hanoi said, however, that the separate
matters of economic aid, normalization, and MIA accounting
were all closely "interrelated" rather than directly linked.
Hanoi also agreed to establish a mechanism whereby technical
information on MIAs could be passed to US officials. Vien-
tiane likewise promised to be forthcoming and helpful, but
provided no information at the meetings.
*'7~F ETT
The Woodcock Commission concluded that the North
Vietnamese and the Laotian governments were both friendly and
sincerely anxious to improve relations with the United States.
It also recommended the the President authorize the resumption
of talks with the Vietnamese in Paris as a means of moving
toward normalization, which would offer the best context in
which to expect a full MIA accounting. The Woodcock Commis-
sion also reaffirmed the findings of the Montgomery Commission
in reporting tat "there is no evidence to indicate that any
American POWs from the Indochina conflict remain alive." The
Woodcock group apparently accepted, in good faith, Hanoi's and
Vientiane's promises to search for MIA information and remains
and pass anything that was found to the United States.
The Meaning of the Woodcock Commission
For the most part, the Woodcock mission produced nothing
new. Despite the conciliatory rhetoric and cordiality of the
meetings, neither side made any major step toward significant
bilateral agreement. The Commission's activities, "findings",
and conclusions were virtually the same as those of the
original Montgomery group. Like its predecessor, the Woodcock
Commission failed to obtain any real movement from the Viet-
namese. By 1977, of course, this came as no surprise to many
in the US Government. Indeed, many officials advocated these
approaches to the Vietnamese as merely gestures directed at
the US public; it is likely that there was virtually no
expectation of noteworthy success from the beginning. It
seems apparent that the Woodcock Commission was, at least to
some degree, actually designed to close the book on MIAs by
proving once and for all that little, if any, accounting could
be expected from Hanoi.
Carter's central intention, it would seem, was to use
the Woodcock trip primarily as an initiative in opening
normalization talks: by "diffusing" the MIA issue once and
for all, he wished to pave the way for his main goal, which
was to establish diplomatic relations with Vietnam. The
record suggests that, to this end, Woodcock and his colleagues
TOP SFCPE
TOP SECRET
 C01342308
h V i e t n a m , he always hoped that MIA accounting would be a
wit
by-product of any success that was had. His attitude toward
the MIA problem was probably a result of his frustration in
confronting (what he at least perceived as) a virtually
insoluble humanitarian problem. Carter did not lack the
concern for the MIAs and their families that was the basis for
the negotiating strategy of his two predecessors. He probably
sincerely believed that "closing the book" on the Vietnam war,
and approving status reviews that would bring compensation to
the families, would resolve the issue as decisively and
humanely as was possible. Perhaps the only key difference
between Carter's strategy re 2arding MIAs and that of his
predecessors was simply that Carter, unlike Nixon and Ford,
was prepared to seek normalization before obtaining the MIA
accounting that Hanoi was assumed to be capable of providing.
accounting presented. In his efforts to normalize relations
c
were provNed with some preordained conclusions before they
left on their trip. In addition, the Commission was instruct-
ed to raise with Hanoi the possibility of resuming talks in
Paris. A report on Hanoi's willingness to do so, as well as a
recommendation to proceed, were included in the Commission's
final report. It seems evident that Carter wished to downplay
the MIA issue, which he almost certainly recognized as a
potential obstacle in any later talks aimed at normalization.
He thus instructed the Woodcock group to emphasize, both in
their talks and in their final report, the problematic nature
of demanding a full MIA accounting and the improbability of
ever receiving it.
To say that Carter wished to defuse and dismiss the MIA
issue is not to suggest that he had no sympathy with public
sentiment on MIAs. In fact, Carter, was articular) deter-
mined to address humanitarian concerns and was extremely
Diplomatic Initiatives under the Carter Administration
Following up on the positive response received by the
Woodcock Commission in Hanoi, Carter authorized renewed State'
Department talks with the North Vietnamese in Paris. A new
series of meetings began in May 1977. The US negotiators were
instructed to offer support for Hanoi's UN bid. and the,.pros-
pect,..._ot trady th the US in return for-diplotic relations.
As in previous meetings, the North Vietnamese were told not to
expect economic aid. MIA accounting was removed as a
"pre-condition"; instead gratitude was expressed to Hanoi for
its "recent actions" in that regard (the release of remains
and the promise to the Woodcock Commission to search for
additional information, etc.) and was told that "continued
progress" on the MIA issue ws.s....ccifsx.rndff an inte`'zal part of
normal relationsTM between the two countries. As t e ta-Iks
progres' ..ed`?i piled a?33y ?tlirough the year "an" into 1978, the
MIA issue was submerged as a topic for discussion. Carter and
his staff were by this time pursuing normalization in its own
 C01342308 TOP SECRET
+ 'ldA kcal
-18-
right and, either because they had lost sight of any impor-
tance it may have had or (more likely) because they had
largely taken for granted that no further satisfaction could
be expected on the MIA question, the matter of MIA accounting
was given little more than lip service. The North Vietnamese
were periodically reminded of the importance with which the US
Government and the American people viewed the matter, but the
talks never focused on a resolution of the problem.
The negotiations themselves, as planned and expected,
focused primarily on the question of a linkage between nor-
malization and economic aid--aid that Hanoi of course expected
regardless of how the so-called "linkage" was understood.
Nothing new emerged from the talks until September 1978, when
the Vietnamese, in an uncharacteristic mood of frustration and
impatience, offered to establish diplomatic relations without
preconditions. There were, of course, many reasons for this
seemingly conciliatory move: Hanoi 1) had finally accepted,
it seems, that it could'not expect a promise of aid prior to
normalization; 2) had decided that, because of its_-kressing
economic problems, a lifting of the US trade embaC0and other
minb ` concessions would be"-desirable and acceptable short-term
achievements; 3) was, anxious fortie. _ legitimacy that rela-
tions with the US? mi,gbt..,.gyve to Vietnamese actions in
Cambodia; 4) be i.eyed..that.ec.on.om.ic aid could remain a real-
istic .....
long-term possibility for which ndrInali at' t57i`couTcl pave
the way. ~..__.,__ ...._ _.. _..._...........
Ironically, the US response was to stall ltimately,
abandon talks, l1ke- ise for several possible reasons--one
of them a significt_-development with regard to MIAs. First,
Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance had as_sumed that
Hanoi would not be ready for normalization before Washington
had dealt conclusively with the issue of relations with China,
which was still undecided. There was also the concern that a
hasty establishment of diplomatic ties with Vietnam, especial-
ly in light of events in Cambodia, would be viewed suspicious-
ly by other countries, especially the Soviet Union and the
ASEAN states,
SECRET
TOP SECRET
 C01342308 TOP SECRET
i '.,; c iua
-19-
With the talks in Paris went t e best c annel
through w ich Hanoi could be confronted with the new evidence.
Thus, the communications deadlock between Washington and Hanoi
was restored. Yet another chance for progress on the MIA
issue was lost.
LEGACY: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S INHERITANCE
A general survey of the POW/MIA issue throughout the
1970s will reveal, at first glance, very little of substance.
The conclusions to be drawn are simple and straightforward.
The question of prisoners and missing was an important one
during the Paris peace talks, but it was not, as far as US
personnel were concerned, particularly problematic. It was,
in any case, a secondary concern: troop withdrawals, the cease
fire, and the future of the Saigon government were the over-
riding concerns of the negotiators up to 1973 (and again in
1975). After the signing of the Paris agreement and the
initial prisoner releases, questions about the status and
whereabouts of personnel who remained unaccounted
for--combined with suspicions that Hanoi was not doing all it
could--gave the POW/MIA issue greater priority and more
attention. But the simultaneous collapse of the peace agree-
ment strained and eventually closed many of the lines of
communication with Hanoi, thus making it increasingly dif-
ficult to obtain satisfaction from the Vietnamese in account-
ing for the missing. Channels of communication with Laos and
Cambodia, which had never really been open, also fell victim
to the events of 1973-75.
From 1973-1980, Hanoi continually denied that it was
withholding prisoners, remains, or information and constantly
reiterated its promise to help account for the missing. But
the occasional repatriation of small sets of remains, and
Hanoi's apparent lack of concern for the fate of US MIAs, kept
the US Government and the American people from taking
Vietnamese statements at face value. For all practical
purposes, Hanoi did nothing during the period 1973-1980 which
seemed to constitute any effort to provide a full accounting,
nor did Hanoi do anything which would have assured the US of
its concern, sincerity, or good faith. Nearly all of Hanoi's
actions during the 1970s suggested that, whether prisoners or
information were being held back or not, the Vietnamese
perceived missing US personnel as primarily--if not
y--a poteni"a""] bargaining c"liip ' Eo be used as diplo-
matic-T verage': " I,n_?add-i ;. :~p.e, io3-waa punctuated"?by
incidents of live prison"':'_
that- 'Hanoi ~erap~shad more_nformaton onthe~missingthans.
was providing. In sum, the Nixon, Ford, and Carter admini
stTh ions were characterized by: 1) on the American side, a
constant demand for an accounting from Hanoi, driven by the
public desire for satisfaction but coupled with the official
'OP SECATrT
 C01342308
LT
?IET -20-
feeling that little could be expected from Hanoi in the way of
sincere efforts to provide it; and 2 on t e Vietnamese side,
no real sympathy for American humanitarian concerns and
virtual y no substantial efforts to either provide a full
accounting or convince the US Government of the sincerity of
Hanoi's claims that it was doing all it could.
Nonetheless, the record--as summarized by this
paper--shows that, despite the standstill in progress toward
an MIA accounting from 1973 until 1980, the'4IA issue was
neither dormant nor forgotten. Largely because public opinion
demanded it, the issue continued to be the subject of ongoing
high-level interest, and was directly confronted during
infrequent but key episodes during those years. After the
collapse of the Paris peace talks, the MIA issue was pursued
by the three successive administrations as a unique, humani-
tarian problem that could and should be resolved independently
of any other bilateral concerns of the US and Vietnam.
Unfortunately, Hanoi was generally intent upon linking MIA
accounting to major concessions that it wanted from the United
States, especially reparations for the war in the form of
economic aid. Neither side was prepared to compromise or to
make any friendly gesture that would break the deadlock
(except for President Carter's 1977-79 attempts to normalize
relations with Hanoi, which ultimately failed). The result of
this stalemate, as time passed, was the downplaying, and
ultimately the near-dismissal, of the MIA problem: 1) on the
American side, because of what was evidently a deliberate
effort to "close the book' on MIAs and move on to other
subjects in US-DRV relations; and 2) on the Vietnamese side,
probably because their strategy of linking it to other topics
had failed and because the US Government had apparently lost
me rest.
--Taus, it-va-s at e c ose o e ate-1970s' nadir
o t e MIA issue, and at the beginning of a period of renewed
interest in confronting the problem decisively, that the
Reagan Administration took charge of US-Vietnamese relations.
POSTSCRIPT: THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE
In March 1976, the US Embassy in Paris prepared a report
that was presented to General Brent Scowcroft, then National
Security Advisor and responsible for formulating US policy
with regard to the MIA issue, which summarized conversations
with French officials on the French historical experience in
obtaining an MIA accounting from the North Vietnamese. The
report stated that at that time, twenty-two years after the
end of the French Indochina war, the French Government was
still involved in inconclusive and unsatisfactory efforts to
obtain information on French soldiers who had never been
TOP SECRET
 C01342308
-21-
accounted for, to repatriate the remains of those who had been
killed in action or died in captivity, and to gain access to
Vietnam so that searches could be conducted. The Vietnamese
had been slow in providing the French with what little satis-
faction they did, and were in fact exacting monetary payments
from France for information, remains, and search efforts.
"The French experience casts serious doubt on whether Vietnam
will ever be willing to allow us to search for MIAs or will be
able to locate remains of men who died outside the Hanoi area.
it also indicates that we will have'to pay a significant
political and financial price for those remains that the
Vietnamese would return." In the memorandum he prepared for
President Ford, Scowcroft said that the French experience had
"grave implications for our effort to fully account for those
Americans still listed as missing in Southeast Asia.
Moreover, it calls into serious question North Vietnam's
ability and willingness to provide this accounting."
Scowcroft concluded that., the US Government should "not place
any reliance on North Vietnam's promises or statements of
goodwill."
The Reagan Administration has, since 1982, been able to
bring Hanoi to the negotiating table to discuss the MIA
problem with prospects for movement toward a satisfactory
accounting that are clearly unprecedented. The French expe-
rience outlined above, however, might caution against any
assumption that Hanoi has either forgotten the past or has
undergone a change of heart. Hanoi has probably been forth-
coming on the MIA issue because of its long-overdue recog-
nition that it is in the DRV's national interest. But it is
certainly possible, if not likely, that the North Vietnamese
have ulterior motives or, at the very least, other cards up
their sleeve. Hanoi may finally be willing to give the US
Government and the American people the satisfaction they have
demanded for over a decade, but it may not yet have shown us
the final price tag.