ASSESSMENT OF THE PHOENIX PROGRAM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005347532
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: May 28, 2009
• Case Number: F-2009-00190
• Publication Date: December 16, 1968

16 December 1968
SUBJECT: Assessment of the PHOENIX Program
A. The attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI) has made
encouraging progress, but has not yet produced a significant reduction
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of the Communists' ability to carry out essential activities. VCI
operations have been disrupted in several geographic areas; an increasing
Chieu Hoi rate points to morale problems -- at least among lower ranking
personnel; and a noticeable attrition has resulted from a combination of
losses in combat and from anti- infrastructure.activities.
B. VCI attempts to revitalize and strengthen their organizations
in the major cities often have been disrupted by aggressive police work.
But government intelligence on the VCI and targeted operations against
their activities diminish significantly as one gets further from the secure
urban areas. What losses the VCI has suffered apparently have not
unduly hampered its functioning. Recent moves have been made to stream-
line the infrastructure by reclassifying cadres according to their effective-
ness and by transferring numbers of low level or inefficient cadres into
military units. It seems that VCI personnel losses are not approaching
the critical stage, nor do they appear likely to do so in the near future.
A. Communist Political Activity
1. At least since the initiation of the 1967-68 winter-
spring campaign, but more noticeably since the advent of US/NVN
negotiations in Paris, Communist political activity in South Vietnam
has received greater emphasis. Current indications portend an
APPROVED FOR
RELEASE^DATE:
21-May-2009
 even more intensive Communist political effort designed to
give the appearance of legitimacy to their position in South
Vietnam, to disrupt US/GVN pacification programs, and to
undermine and displace the GVN political structure.
2. Generally speaking, Communist political activity
is concentrated in four major fields:
a) The organization of Liberation Committees
and councils throughout South Vietnam;
b) A re-emphasis of the major importance of
the guerrilla and militia role in Peoples Revolutionary
warfare, and reconstitution of guerrilla forces depleted
or upgraded to regular status in support of the Tet and
subsequent military offensives;
c) Improving the security and streamlining the
organization of the infrastructure (VCI) from district
level down; this is supported by an increasing VC
espionage and counterintelligence effort directed against
US/GVN operations which focus on the infrastructure
plus the purge, reclassification, or transfer to military
status of unreliable, ineffective, and poorly motivated
political cadre; and
d) Allaying "illusions of peace" by emphasizing
the proximity of victory and the need to prepare for a
(decisive) 1968-69 winter-spring offensive.
1. Liberation Committees deserve special attention.
The Communists are continuing their push to create Liberation
Committees and councils throughout South Vietnam. As of
7 December 1968, 1, 835 Liberation Committees had been
reported by various sources. Of these, 1, 069 were reported
by specific location and 376 were identifiable in the COMUSMACV
Hamlet Evaluation Survey (HES). Countrywide, the identified
hamlets and villages reported as having Liberation Committees
are rated by HES criteria as: 65 percent in VC controlled areas,
15 percent in contested, and 15 percent in relatively secure
areas; unevaluated or abandoned hamlets constitute the remaining
five percent.
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 2. Liberation Committees represent the final step
in the VCI take over of villages and hamlets; they bridge the
gap between covert and overt government. It is through these
bodies that the Communists intend to claim control of the
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countryside.
C. Phung Hoang (PHOENIX) 1968 Goals
1. The three stated goals of the Phung Hoang program
for 1968 were:
a) To establish permanent offices or Province
Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers (PIOCCS)
in each of South Vietnam's 44 provinces (and three
autonomous cities).
b) To establish 200 District Intelligence and
Operations Coordination Centers (DIOCCS).
c) To neutralize 12, 000 VCI members.
2. As of 5 December 1968, 41 permanent offices/PIOCCS,
three CIOCCS (City Intelligence Operations Coordination Centers)
and 217 DIOCCS -- 173 of the last with U. S. advisors -- had been
established. Moreover, during the period 1 January - 31 October
1968 (November data is not yet available) 11, 066 identified members
of the VCI were neutralized. In terms of organizational goals,
progress has been satisfactory. However, it cannot be determined
whether the number of VC neutralized reflects an accurate picture
of losses to the VCI, especially in view of the lack of data on the
final disposition of those who were apprehended.
3. A significant accomplishment of the Phung Hoang
program is the degree of cooperation and coordination which has
been generated at all levels, often where little or none previously
existed. This includes disparate GVN officials, agencies and
military units, and U. S. and allied agencies and military forces.
This includes also the establishment of a country-wide system
of province, autonomous city and district Intelligence and Operations
Coordinating Centers becoming increasingly capable of support to
military and territorial security as well as to anti-VCI operations.
A. Implementation of Phung Hoang
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 1. The Presidential Decree of 1 July 1968, which made
explicit the GVN sanction for the attack on the VCI, gave the
Phung Hoang program a much needed boost. It took approximately
two months for the decree to permeate through GVN channels down
to province and district operational levels, and therefore, it was
not until late August that its influence began to be felt on a nation-
wide basis.
2. Although there are still some instances of obstructionism
and lack of cooperation by local officials and agencies responsible
for conducting the attack against the VCI, there has been an overall
and continuing trend toward improved coordination within PIOCCS
and DIOCCS. There also has been an increase in number and
improvement in quality of operations conducted against the VCI.
For example, October reports show that allied and ARVN tactical
military units unilaterally accounted for 159 VCI neutralizations
(11 percent of the monthly total), exceeding their previous
accomplishments and attesting to their heightened awareness of
the importance of attacking the Communist political organization.
This favorable trend is expected to improve further as a result
of strong COMUSMACV and GVN command attention to and heavy
emphasis on Phung Hoang (and on Peoples Self-Defense). President
Thieu in visits to III and IV Corps in early December and Interior
Minister Khiem in a continuing series of visits to regions
beginning late November have exhorted Corps commanders, province
chiefs and senior police officers to press the attack on the VCI,
recognizing especially the political challenge of the VC Liberation
Committees. Khiem's trips have included inspections of DIOCCS.
1. Despite the reported neutralizations, the U. S.
intelligence community estimates the current personnel strength
of the VCI at roughly 82, 000. Of the 11, 066 VCI members reported
killed, captured or rallied between 1 January and 31 October 1968,
16. 5 percent were reported as serving in district or higher positions;
the remaining 83. 5 percent served at village or hamlet level --
most being functionaries that the VCI can easily replace. Through
September, the attrition rate of the VCI ran at a fairly static 1. 5
percent per month. In October the attrition rate rose to 1. 8 percent.
2. A review of the reports submitted during the seven-month
period April through October, shows that 583 VCI security service
cadre and 1, 387 finance/economy personnel were neutralized. Of
these totals, 171 of the security service cadre and 177 of the
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 finance/economy personnel held leadership positions and cannot
easily be replaced. Within the context of the entire Communist
infrastructure, security cadres are considered to rank in
importance behind current affairs section secretaries and deputy
secretaries and thus are highly important targets. With the vital
support role played by finance/economy cadre, any eliminations
in this category are harmful to VCI operations. Also, in October,
for the first time, VCI Liberation Committees were classified as
a top priority target and 71 committeemen, including 30 in
leadership positions, were neutralized.
3. Understandably, reports from the field continue to
include large numbers of individuals only vaguely identified.
The U. S. PHOENIX advisory staff rejects between 30 and 40
percent of the names submitted because the lack of descriptive
detail does not substantiate the individual's status in the VCI.
In October, for instance, 766 names were not accepted as
neutralized VCI; 202 were guerrillas, 50 were VC/NVA soldiers,
and 514 were classified as having provided some service for the
VCI; of the latter category 228 were potential VCI, but were not
so counted due to lack of detail concerning their actual duties.
On the brighter side, in many instances the increased pace of
anti-VCI operations has resulted also in increased contacts with
VC armed elements and attrition of both VC irregulars and VC
support elements not carried as VCI.
C. Defining VCI
. 1. A variety of problems continue to hamper anti-VCI
operations. Two of the most serious are:
a) Lack of knowledge of who and what comprises
the VCI organization by the majority of field personnel
operating below province level; and
b) The uneven enforcement and administration
of existing GVN laws covering Communist insurgent
activities and personnel. GVN authorities often feel
that they do not have sufficient evidence to prosecute
many of the VCI suspects apprehended. And local
officials in some areas are reluctant to approve
operations against VCI suspects,
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 .2. To help reduce these obstacles, U. S. officials
developed a listing of VCI executive and significant cadre
functions which was coordinated with the GVN on 5 December.
This document will be printed bilingually and disseminated
through PHOENIX/Phung Hoang channels to field elements in
the near future. Besides helping to eliminate the existing
confusion over who and what comprises the VCI organization,
the document will provide a uniform basis for assigning
priorities and selecting targets for neutralization.
3. Equally important, the list will serve as a basis
for proposed procedural changes regarding the processing
of civilian detainees. PHOENIX staff/CORDS legal advisors
have drafted a procedural guideline for the use of the local
security committees, which would provide for uniform,
mandatory sentencing of an accused detainee, if he is determined
to be a PRP member, holds a position in the VCI, performs a
cadre function, or supports the VC. This classification guide-
line is being coordinated with the Ministry of Interior for
instructions to the local security committees, and will be
proposed to the Directorate of Military Justice, for instructions
to the various military courts. It is hoped that it will improve
administrative -judicial handling of civil detainees by standardizing
sentencing and simplifying judicial processing.
D. Judicial Processing
1. Judicial processing is one of the weakest links in
the overall attack on the VCI. This is highlighted by the number
of persons under detention who have not been judicially processed,
estimated to be as high as 21, 000. It is apparent that numbers of
innocent persons, or at least persons also have been forced to
perform tasks for the VC, have been arrested and held, sometimes
for extensive periods, without a hearing. Justifiably concerned,
the Office of the Prime Minister established special screening
committees throughout the country to review the cases of a large
number of civil detainees, and many have been released. On the
other hand, real VCI and VC supporters are being released as a
result of insufficiently severe sentences, usually on the grounds
of lack of sufficient evidence.
2. Although some VC civil defendants are brought to
trial before the military or military field courts, the vast majority
are judicially processed by the provincial security committees,
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 which are the responsibility of province chiefs and are under the
overall supervision of the Minister of Interior. The latter has
ordered these committees to meet weekly, rather than biweekly,
to speed up the hearing of new cases and reduce the backlog of
pending cases. Improved procedures and programmed increases
in the numbers of trained special police interrogators and
investigators should further enhance the efficiency of the provincial
security committees.
1. Interrogation and detention facilities are inadequate
in many areas. At the end of November 1968, there were a total
of 38, 700 civilian confinement spaces in Vietnam, and the total
incarcerated population was reported by GVN officials to be
37, 689. These figures, based on the best data available, are
considered to be accurate only for the national prison system
which holds 32, 689 prisoners and detainees. The remaining
5, 000 said to be held in national police detention facilities is an
unverifiable estimate. There are four national prisons, 37
provincial prisons and 50 existing or planned detention centers.
Although these figures indicate that there are sufficient confine-
ment spaces on a nation-wide basis, overcrowding still exists
in some provinces and poor prisoner accounting procedures
are universal.
2. A large number of VCI suspects who were detained
during a recent operation in Quang Duc Province were allowed
to commingle with other prisoners because of the poor detention
facilities in Gia Nghia. Less excusable, the same thing happened
when the prisoners were transferred to Ban Me Thuot, Darlac
Province, where adequate facilities do exist. Before proper
interrogation could be conducted, the suspects had changed their
stories, and little valid evidence could be garnered to establish
their true VCI positions or to prepare a good case for the courts
or province security committees.
3. The National Police and Minister of Interior are
cognizant of these problems. The Director of Corrections has
been authorized to transfer sentenced prisoners from one
institution to another; this authority had been reserved to province
chiefs. Space available at Con Son Island is being expanded, and
sentenced VCI and other VC political prisoners with more than
one year to serve can be moved there from mainland jails. The
criterion may be reduced to more than six months to serve. These
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 measures permit more efficient use of facilities.
F. Prisoner Accounting System
1. Another problem area is the lack of an effective
accounting and control procedure for keeping track of detainees
and prisoners from arrest, through trial, sentencing, detention
and release. The need for developing a control system is
recognized, and work on the solution to this problem is underway.
2. In most cases the final disposition of captured VCI
is not known. During the first ten months of 1968, there were
8, 275 VCI captured (of the total 11, 066 neutralized). There is
no way to determine which of those were brought to trial, which
were released or sentenced, or the place of detention of those
who were sentenced. On 24 October, a list was obtained of 127
VCI, district level or higher, who were apprehended during
August and September, and an investigation was launched by
the GVN to determine their location. As of early December,
only five had been located, and those, apparently, by accident.
The monthly neutralization reports include, at best, the last
reported location of the captured VCI. A recent analysis of the
monthly Phung Hoang neutralization reports only, on a country-
wide basis, showed that as of the time the reports were prepared
the last known place of detention of apprehended VCI was in the
following facilities: 29 percent in Provincial Interrogation
Centers, 24 percent held by National Police, 15 percent in
provincial prisons, 13 percent in sector (military) facilities,
eight percent in sub-sector facilities, and four percent in
military POW facilities. The location of the remaining seven
percent was undeterminable.
3. Other prisoners and detainees have been granted
amnesty on various religious and national holidays. For example,
on National Day, President Thieu reduced the sentences of 783
prisoners, many of whom were being held for political action.
There is no evidence that VCI cadres have been released in this
manner; however, there is justifiable concern that inadequate
investigation or slipshod screening may allow important VCI
figures to slip back into operation.
4. There are also indications that VCI cadres with
sufficient influence can prevent local officials from taking action
against them, avoid apprehension, or gain easy release after
capture. In Vinh Binh Province, local authorities prohibited a
planned operation against some important VCI suspects because
 of the latter's supposed connections at high GVN levels; similar
problems are reported in other areas.
5. Both U. S. and GVN agencies have submitted reports
on VCI suspects who are caught more than once, having somehow
slipped back into freedom. Needless to say, the government
security forces operating against the VCI are somewhat shy of
taking risks to capture VCI suspects alive, especially for the
second time. They have expressed their concern directly to
the Minister of Interior.
G. GVN Intelligence Capability
1. The effectiveness of the attack on the VCI is further
hampered by the limited professional capability of many GVN
personnel. Personnel in those agencies tasked with gathering
intelligence on the VCI and running operations against it, such
as the Police Special Branch and Military Security Service,
simply have not had the training and background for sophisticated
intelligence work. This is especially true at the district level
and below where the .responsible GVN personnel may barely be
able to read and write. Many have difficulty understanding the
requirements sent down to them, let alone fulfilling them.
2. Although the Phung Hoang program is geared primarily
to the district level, most of the talent, intelligence information
and reaction capability is at present found at province level.
Information available at province level is often not fully
disseminated down to the districts, moreover most of the districts
are still in the process of developing the data base needed to operate
effectively against the VCL For this reason, to a great extent,
operations targeted against specific individuals are not yet too
common. Most VCI personnel are picked up in sweeps, cordon
and search operations, or in ambushes on likely communication
routes.
H. Blacklists
1. Specific targeting is the ideal goal of the anti-VCI
campaign, and fruitful results have been obtained from a number
of cordon and search operations using blacklists for identification.
However, specific information is usually difficult to obtain from
areas of poor security; therefore, there is often insufficient
intelligence to target against an individual. Also, security
conditions in many areas simply do not permit small operations
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 against a specific individual. VCI cadres, particularly important
ones, often live in isolated regions or in base camps which have
strong guerrilla or regular force protection, and large military
operations are the only feasible method of attacking them.
2. A possible drawback to the large dragnets is the
unreliability of some of the blacklists. It must be assumed that
the lists do not include many key VCI figures, and at the same
time inadvertently involve innocent people. Therefore other
means are used, such as Hoi Chanh, when possible, for on-the-spot
identification.
A. Special Phung Hoang Campaign
1. A special national Phung Hoang campaign (Phung Hoang
Dong Tien) was launched on 20 October to run through 15 February
1969. Quotas have been established for each province, and all
agencies connected with the campaign have been directed to turn
their full attention to eliminating the VCI. Military commanders
are instructed to give anti-VCI operations support equal to that
given to other combat operations. Quick reaction forces are to
be made more readily available.
2. An example of the cooperation of tactical forces in
anti-VCI operations is shown in Operation MEADE RIVER, the
largest operation of this type conducted to date, which commenced
on 20 November in Quang Nam Province, I Corps. A 15 mile
cordon was set up by six USMC battalions, three ARVN battalions,
and elements of the National Police Field Force (NPFF) and a
battalion of RO.K Marines. When the cordon was secure, a sweep
was undertaken by ARVN and NPFF forces. Residents within the
cordon area were taken to a collection point for screening. The
committee at the collection point included representatives from
Chieu Hoi Psyops, Armed Propaganda Teams, Civil Affairs,
Static Census Grievance, Revolutionary Development, Public
Health, Provincial Reconnaissance Unit, NPFF and Special Police,
as well as province and district officials, province and district
Phung Hoang representatives and U. S. advisors. As of 1 December
the results of this operation were 71 VCI and 34 VC captured and
334 enemy killed, including many North Vietnamese troops and
some known significant members of the VCI.
 3. Considering that the special campaign did not begin
until 20 October, it is encouraging to note that six provinces
fulfilled or exceeded their monthly quotas within the last ten
days of the month. Overall, nearly one third more VCI were
neutralized in October (1, 459) than in September (1, 121).
4. The outlook for November, based on reports from
the provinces, is brighter. To date reports have been received
from 35 provinces plus Saigon and Danang City.. Audited, they
show an increase of about 64 percent over October. If this trend
is maintained by the thirteen provinces not yet heard from, the
total real VCI neutralizations rate for November should exceed
2, 000, or about two thirds of the deliberately high monthly goal
(3, 000) set forth in the special campaign plan.
5. According to tentative pacification planning for 1969,
the special campaign goals for Phung Hoang will be extended
throughout the year. If the monthly goal of 3, 000 can be attained
and sustained, together with the upward trend toward neutralization
of a great proportion of key leaders and cadres, and if other,
concomitant pacification and people-oriented programs, such as
self-defense, also move ahead energetically, then the VCI will be
hurt, and its political efforts blunted.
6. The setting of goals and quotas is not the whole answer,
however, for there must necessarily be an upgrading of GVN
intelligence and reaction forces both in number and quality.
Significant improvements are being carried out in training of the
Special Police, National Police Field forces and PRU, for example,
emphasizing intelligence and leadership skills. A 10, 000-man
proposed augmentation to the National Police (especially to the
Special Police) awaits National Assembly approval. Where National
Police resources are limited, province and district chiefs are being.
told to use other, available assets (RF-PF) or to call upon help
from RVNAF, U. S. or other free world military forces. Far
greater exploitation is required, too, of allied psychological
operations resources at all levels in support of Phung Hoang.
1. The VCI definitely is beset by serious problems. Most
of these are related to the pressures of the war. However, an
encouragingly increasing number of them can be attributed directly
to the anti-VCI effort. A notebook recently captured in Thua Thien
Province in I Corps. described the considerable losses among both
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 guerrillas and infrastructure personnel caused by ARVN and
allied sweep operations. Similarly, the CMD continues to be
a difficult operational area for the VCI. The strong security
situation makes traveling dangerous for VCI personnel, who
must move about lightly guarded to avoid attention, leaving
them more vulnerable. A captured report from VC Sub-Region
4 dated 29 June, complained about the shortage of personnel --
stating that more than one third of the hamlets in the sub-region
had no party members, while the quality of existing party chapters
was below par. The chapters were described as weakened by
factionalism and lack of determination. A source in Binh Chanh
District in Gia Dinh reported in early October that a VC guerrilla
platoon had been brought in, broken down, and assigned to four
villages to help rebuild the infrastructure. There has also been
a series of captured documents which label the PHOENIX
operation as a cunning, wicked plot and exhort all Liberation
Armed Forces to be wary of and strive to wipe out the "cruel
die-hard agents of aggression. "
2. Perhaps more telling is the increasing amount of
broadcast time Radio Hanoi and Liberation Radio devote to
denouncement of the allied accelerated pacification campaign.
(APC). A Liberation Radio commentary of 3 December called
for the implementation of the Peoples Liberation Armed Force
(PLAF) command's order to "crush the head of the venomous
snake PHOENIX. " The Communists have ordered all Peoples
Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) "to resolutely smash the
U. S. -puppet rural pacification scheme, annihilate and completely
disintegrate enerriy pacification teams and to annihilate PHOENIX
teams, " which are composed of spies and intelligence agents.
3. VC concern is further evidenced in an order for a
guerrilla and terrorist campaign to "seek out, eliminate and
utterly destroy" South Vietnamese central, district and local
officials, American-South Vietnamese pacification teams working
in rural and village areas, and allied search-and-destroy units.
Even the 27 November 1968 issue of Red Star has picked up the
theme noting that accelerated pacification is actually an American
escalation of the war.
C. VCI Residual Capability
1. Nonetheless, the VCI continue to exercise control of
varying degrees of effectiveness over large segments of the
population and to use this control to marshal support for their
 combat and political operations. Their traditional activities
of tax collecting, proselyting and propaganda, intelligence,
and guerrilla and labor force recruitment are continuing at
acceptable levels, and they have undertaken a widespread
aggressive campaign to establish Liberation Committees and
councils.
2. The Communists place a high priority on recon-
stituting their infrastructure losses and appear able to do so --
at least to the point that thus far their problems are not
approaching the critical stage. Nor at this time does this
seem likely to occur in the near future. For, despite the
number of lower-level VCI neutralized, the hard core command
cadres remain largely unhurt and inadequately identified for
effective action against them.
A. Are there, then, steps which can be taken to improve our
combined effort to destroy or neutralize the VCI. The answer is "yes, if
and of course some of these already are under way.
1. We must continue the present strategy of combined,
coordinated action to destroy or drive back VC/NVA Main Forces,
to extend and consolidate territorial security and pacification,
and to destroy or neutralize the VCI. These actions are inter-
dependent.
2. We need still further GVN command emphasis on
Phung Hoang operations, particularly to insure the assignment
and allocation of top-flight personnel and reaction forces to
exploit intelligence against selected targets.
3. Concurrently with increased emphasis on targeted
operations (as opposed to programming, organization and
facilities), the GVN must, with our assistance, provide
stepped-up training and indoctrination of personnel earmarked
for Phung Hoang roles.
4. Concurrently, we must somehow see to it that both
civilian and military U. S. personnel designated as PHOENIX
advisors are qualified intelligence officers with backgrounds in
counterintelligence, positive intelligence collection, or police
intelligence investigation operations. A maximum number of
these individuals should be trained in the Vietnamese language.
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 The absence of language ability, particularly at the DIOCC
level, is the greatest single bar to effectiveness.
5. We must give greater heed to providing necessary,
flexible support to operations at district and province level,
in terms of temporary or short-term detention facilities
adjacent to DIOCCS or district police offices; of intelligence
and support contingency funds; of assignment of additional
intelligence NCOS in priority areas of heaviest operational
activity; and of additional helicopter support for sustained
operations.
6. We must take and are taking urgent measures to
instruct and orient Vietnamese, U. S. and other free world
personnel in the identification and modus operandi of the
VCI, and in the roles which our various forces and agencies
can best play, and in the techniques found by current experience
to be most productive in VCI neutralizations.
7. Finally, and possibly most important, the lessons
learned by all GVN agencies participating in the Phung Hoang
program now may serve as the glue to hold them together when
they are forced to fight the political machinations of the VCI
in the post hostilities period.