DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE JUNE 1985 GORBACHEV, THE NEW BROOM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005332240
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• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2008
• Case Number: F-2008-01340
• Publication Date: June 1, 1985

Central Iri dligence Agency
WZW# tfC2O5O5
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Gorbachev, the New Broom
Summary
Gorbachev has demonstrated in his first 100
days that he is the most aggressive and activist
Soviet leader since Khrushchev. He is willing to
take controversial and even unpopular decisions--
like the antialcohol campaign--and to break with
recent precedent by criticizing the actions of his
colleagues on the Politburo.
He has thrown down the gauntlet on issues as
controversial as the allocation of investment,
broadgauged management reform, and purging the
system of incompetent and corrupt officials. The
very insistence of his rhetoric allows little room
for compromise or retreat.
Gorbachev is ga ling that an attack-on corruption and inefficiency, not radical reform,
will turn the domestic situation around. While a
risky course, his prospects for success should not
be underestimated. Although his approach is
controversial, his near term prospects look good.
Unlike his immediate predecessors, he has already
managed to firm up his base of support in the
Politburo and Secretariat. He can also count on
some support from middle level officials of the
bureaucracy who were frustrated by the stagnation of
the Brezhnev era. The public as well has responded
favorably to his style, judging by initial reaction
This paper was prepared byl lof the Office of Soviet Analysis.
Carcnents and questions may be directed to the Chief,
APPROVED FOR
RELEASE DATE:
18-Nov-2008
 filtering back through Western sources. His
aggressiveness has placed?the opposition on the
defensive. His opponents are probably biding their
time hoping he makes a major misstep.
Gorbachev's Style
Gorbachev has moved to draw a sharp contrast in style to his
recent predecessors, who treated the bureaucracy gingerly and
approached change cautiously. Brezhnev and Chernenko voiced
concern about the deepening economic and morale problems in the
country, but they were not prepared to confront the bureaucracies
standing in the way of solutions. Brezhnev's solicitous attitude
toward the bureaucracy limited the power of his office as
officials came to believe they had lifetime tenure. Andropov
moved to break this mold, but he was handicapped by his poor
health and the lingering presence of Brezhnevites, including
Chernenko and Premier Tikhonov. Learning from Andropov's
experience, Gorbachev has consciously created an environment of
urgency and made clear he intends to confront problems.
Gorbachev's populist style has not been seen since
Khrushchev's frequent forays among the public and bare knuckles
approach to dealing with the bureaucracy:
-- He has visited factories in Moscow and Leningrad and found
other opportunities to rub shoulders with workers in an
effort to burnish his image as a man of the people.
Soviet television has highlighted his easy give-and-take
with ordinary citizen.
He is carefully managing public relations.
-- Gorbachev has also moved his wife Raisa into the
spotlight. She has appeared in the Soviet press and on
television,
While these traits mark Gorbachev as an unconventional
Soviet politician, it is his no-holds-barred approach to
confronting chronic domestic problems that underscores his new
style as a leader. Gorbachev may feel that an aggressive
approach is essential if he is to avoid getting bogged down like
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 Andropov. A wide spectrum of Soviet officials complained of
drift and corruption under Brezhnev and became discouraged when
Andropov's ill health caused his initiatives to lose momentum.
They provide a well-spring of potential support for Gorbachev's
approach:
-- He has instituted a sweeping crackdown on the deep-rooted
problem of alcoholism
-- He criticized his Politburo colleagues in public during
his visit to Leningrad, terming their recent decision on
the allocation of land for private plots inadequate and
dismissing objections apparently raised by his colleagues.
-- He has assailed ministers by name for lack of innovation,
laziness, and poor management and has strongly implied
that they will be removed. He has attacked the complacent
attitude toward corruption within the party bureaucracy
and called for promotion of younger and more competent
officials at all levels. While such rhetoric is not new
in itself, he has already underscored his intention to
back up his tough rhetoric with dismissals by sacking some
middle-level officials.
Gorbachev has made it clear that he believes his policies
are justified by the growing foreign and domestic problems facing
the USSR:
-- He has studded his speeches with language that evokes the
image of a crisis, and suggested that the USSR is now at a
turning point.
he has decided to raise Russian national consciousness and
to impose "super-enforcement" of order and discipline.
-- At the April Central Committee plenum, he was sharply
critical of the economic laxity under Brezhnev and the
failure to follow through on decisions which had been
taken by the leadership.
-- In his speech to the S&T conference in early June, he
warned that accelerated economic growth was an. imperative
due to the need to sustain current levels of consumption
 while making the investments in defense required by
current international tensions.
Consolidating Power
Gorbachev is using time honored methods for building his
power, advancing his allies into key leadership positions, but he
is off to a faster start than any of his recent predecessors.
More changes are likely soon:
-- By advancing three allies to full Politburo membership in
April he has probably achieved a working majority on most
issues.
-- The designation of Yegor Ligachev--one of the three
promoted--as unofficial "second secretary" isolated his
major rival, Secretary Grigoriy Romanov, who has been
nearly invisible politically.
-- KGB boss Chebrikov--who was also promoted--appears to be
another close ally, giving the General Secretary an
important advantage in exerting political pressure against
would-be Politburo opponents, most of whom are tainted by
corruption.
-- Gorbachev also placed a younger protege in charge of the
department that oversees pefsonnel appointments,-further
consolidating his control over personnel policy and
setting the groundwork for potentially sweeping personnel
changes preceding next February's party congress. He is
off to a fast pace in replacing his opponents in the
bureaucracy. He has retired one deputy premier and three
ministers, and named nine new regional party bosses and
three new Central Committee department heads.
Domestic Strategy
Using his strong political position, Gorbachev's first
priority is to push his domestic economic program. While some
Soviet officials have indicated he is sympathetic to the use of
pragmatic methods, including tapping private initiative, his
statements and actions underscore his overall commitment to the
current economic system and his determination to make it work
better. Having acknowledged the gravity of the economic problem,
Gorbachev exudes an optimism that he and his team can eliminate
waste, tighten discipline, increase the quality and quantity of
production, and accelerate economic growth. While expressing
great pride in the historical acomplishments of central planning,
he has sharply criticized its recent performance, and called for
 "revolutionary" changes in the way the sytem works.
His first priority fix is to reduce waste and. tighten
discipline, particularly among managers:
-- Gorbachev has cited cases of such waste, such as the 20
percent loss of the harvest. Figures published in the
Soviet press indicate Andropov's discipline campaign has
reduced losses in working time about 20 percent, and
Ukrainian party boss Shcherbitskiy recently announced that
the campaign had saved several hundred million rubles.
Gorbachev probably hopes to squeeze out similar resources.
-- Soviet officials indicate that Gorbachev has reinvigorated
Andropov's discipline campaign.
Gorbachev has reinitia a ocument
checks and crackdowns on drunks and deadbeats, even
threatening to fire managers who have failed to correct
such problems among their workers.
-- His speeches indicate he will extend earlier efforts to
tie pay more closely to productivity both for workers and
managers, not only rewarding good workers but penalizing--
perhaps even docking the salaries--of poor performers. F
Building from a base of improved worker discipline and
management effectivness, Gorbachev hopes to further boost long-
term growth entail a modernization of the capital base by
increased investment in machine-buildWng-and retooling existing
factories. While the effects of this approach will not be felt
for some time, he has remanded the draft Five-Year Plan for 1986-
90 to redirect it toward growth based on increased productivity
rather than expanded resources. More specifically:
-- He has called for investment in modernizing factories to
be increased from 1/3 to 1/2 of investment,* and demanded
that investment and output in civilian machine-building be
doubled. He even called for "mothballing" some new .1
construction projects, as an unusually candid admission of
a major Soviet problem in the construction sector. His
stress on conservation rather than increased output of raw
materia a indicates a heightened emphasis in this
area.
*Soviet bureaucrats, both ministerial and party, have
traditionally called for new construction. Such projects have
been doled out to satisfy local lobbies like pork barrel
projects. In his S&T conference speech, Gorbachev condemned this
approach and insisted on focusing investment on where it was
needed most.
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 SX
Beyond this, he has been less specific on other economic
initiatives, but his statements suggests he may intend to press
even more controversial policies touching of the powers of the
bureaucracy:
-- His public statements suggests he wants to amalgamate
ministries and redirect thew and the State Planning
..Committee (Gosplan) away from day-to-day management
decisions.
-- He would like to see greater autonomy for plant managers
and will probably push for reduction of centrally dictated
indicators.
-- He has criticized intermediate management bodies that
choke off initiative, hinting that they should be
streamlined or eliminated. His aim is to eliminate some
of the massive bureaucratic apparatus that, as he
complained in his speech to the S&T conference, implements
Central Committee decisions in such a manner that after
they are finished "nothing is left of these principles."
-- He may advocate legalizing some parts of the "second
economy" and allow a limited expansion of the role of
private agriculture, despite potential ideological
opposition. He hinted at this in his Leningrad speech in
May. Gorbachev may feel some limited concessions--like
tolerating private repairmen or allowing greater access to
summer gardens for urban dwellers could help improve-the
quality of life without undermining the system or forcing
a showdown with ideological purists in theme who have
traditionally have resisted such steps.
Foreign Policy
Gorbachev's impact on foreign policy has so far been mostly
stylistic. He has revealed no urgent agenda to match his
determination to accelerate economic growth at home. Some of-his
gambits--like the INF moritorium--are stable leftovers from his
predecessor. His immediate goal has apparently been to
demonstrate to both allies and adversaries that there is now a
strong and active leader in the Kremlin. Despite the press of
domestic business, Gorbachev has received a steady stream of
European and Third World leaders. He has been more activist than
his immediate predecessors and will reportedly embark soon on a
vigorous shedule of personal diplomacy and foreign trips. He is
slated to travel to Paris in October for meetings with Mitterrand
and he may visit India later this year.
.Although he has not yet made any serious new initiative
toward the US, he has already made his presence felt on Soviet
7/RET
 policy. He reportedly ratified the return to the bargaining
table in Geneva even before Chernenko's death in March. He
softened Soviet conditions for a summit with President Reagan
soon after entering office. Since then, he has apparently
sanctioned the recent expansion of bilateral exchanges and met
with several US delegations.
In public statements and private discussions, however,
Gorbachev is clearly intent on presenting
a tough hardline image abroad and
convincing American policymakers that bilateral relations will
improve only if US policy changes. He and his colleagues
evidently do not believe an early improvement in relations is
likely:
-- A variety of sources make clear Gorbachev will concentrate
on cultivating an image of strength, not conciliation.
-- in talks with American visitors he has bristled at efforts
to raise human rights issues, demanded that the US not _
take a "carrot and stick" approach, end -insisted that -
Soviet leaders will be ready to deal only when the US
starts' treating the USSR as an equal.
-- Moscow's more recent decision to play hard to get on a
summit dovetails with this strategy.
Soviet efforts to drive wedges between the US and our allies.- He
has already spoken publicly of a "community of interest" between
the USSR and Western Europe, met with a series of European
leaders, and indicated that Moscow is now prepared to establish
political relations with the European Community:
Gorbachev has also taken a tough line within the Warsaw
Pact, reportedly sending ripples of concern through the more
Brezhnevite regimes, such as Czechoslovakia. His public
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 'statements have stressed the need for bloc unity and closer
Gor achev s tough guy attitude was meant not only for the West
but to signal to allies that he is not to be trifled with. F_
Gorbachev's early actions have also signaled strong support
for allies in Afghanistan and Central America:
-- Soviet forces in Afghanistan continue to pursue the more
aggressive military approach that we began to see last
year.
-- He met Nicaraguan leader Ortega only days after the US
Congress turned down the President's original request for
aid to the Contras and pledged increased oil deliveries to
bolster the regime.
Opposition to Gorbachev's Juggernaut?
Opposition to Gorbachev for now appears disorganized. The
old guard in the Politburo--such as Premier Tikhonov, Moscow
party boss Grishin or republic bosses Shcherbitskiy and Kunayev--
are probably on the defensive due to charges of mismanagement or
corruption in their organizations. Secretary Romanov, a
potential focus for opposition, has been outfOmnked by
Gorbachev's personnel moves and probably is no longer an
effective rallying point.
As a result, those threatened by Gorbachev at the Central
Committee level lack an effective spokesman. While they can
resist by footdragging on his policies, he can probably remove
them if they don't appear to be falling into line. Many elderly
Brezhnev-era holdovers may well find it easier to retire than
fight.
Despite his strong position, Gorbachev does not have an
entirely free hand. Other Politburo members can still slow up
his initiatives. Independents or even allies might balk at some
aspects of Gorbachev's freewheeling style. There are some signs,
moreover, that Gorbachev's initiatives have already been watered
down or met resistance:
-- Judging from his remarks in Leningrad, the Politburo
rejected his more far reaching propoals for expansion of
garden plots, evidently on the grounds that this ammounts
to encouraging private enterprise.
SESL'RET
 -- Some evidence suggests that the timing of a US-Soviet
summit has become entangled in leadership politics.
AW .-
Soviet media treatment of Gorbachev's speeches suggests that
his policy agenda is meeting some high-level resistance:
-- Press-versions of Gorbachev's speech in Leningrad toned
down his criticism of the Politburo decison on extending
the private plots.
-- Published versions also eliminated references to
Gorbachev's personal sponsorship or support of economic
reform initiatives.
-- On some occasions, the media have published full accounts
of his speeches only after a delay of several days. F_
Nonetheless, the strength of Gorbachev's position suggests
that his detractors will have to wait until he makes a major
misstep or overreaches on a controversial issue in order to give
them an opportunity to coalesce. The real test may come when
evidence begins to roll in on the success or failure of his
program.
 Can Gorbachev Succeed Where Khrushchev Failed?
Gorbachev's efforts to force greater efficiency out of the
system is still a risky gamble, despite the disorganized state of
resistance. Khrushchev, for instance, succeeded for nearly ten
years in keeping the opposition on the defensive through endless
reorganizations and campaigns, but eventually he alienated his
own supporters. Khrushchev's approach was so helter skelter that
the bureaucrats often could not discern what he really wanted
them to do.
Having witnessed Khrushchev's mistakes, Gorbachev's signals
are likely to be much clearer and more consistent. Yet, a number
of these clear signals are likely to produce resistance.
Gorbachev's investment strategy may cause him the most problems
with the bureaucracy. The allocation of investment is closely
tied to the power of officialdom, who can dole out "pork barrel"
projects as a kind of political payment for loyalty. By sharply
reducing investment funds in some sectors and requiring a new
appraoch to management, moreover, Gorbachev's approach is bound
to alienate many in the bureaucracy upon whom he must depend for
policy implementation. While he can use the power of hiring and
firing to discipline this group, such an approach--as Khrushchev
discovered--potentially has its cost in terms of production and
political support.
Gorbachev's call for faster economic growth may also come
back to haunt him. Efforts to reconstruct existing factories may
lead to declining output at a time when he is proposing a return
to higher economic growth rates. While his four pe en-t growth
prediction for the next Five Year Plan may not be entirely out of
reach, it forces managers into the position of choosing between
increasing output and reequipping their factories. Massive
shifts in investment priorities could also create bottlenecks and
disruptions in the economy. For instance, shifting resouces from
energy extraction--at a time when both coal and oil output is
declining--to the production of more energy efficient machinery
might exacerbate the energy balance in the short term.
Gorbachev will have to carefully calibrate his policies in
order to avoid pitfalls in a system where emphasizing specific
priorities at the top frequently translates into slackened effort
on other areas. The prospects for a radical reorientation of
Soviet managers toward quality rather than quantity are also not
good--it runs counter to the approach of the last 55 years. But,
Andropov's experience demonstrated that a concerted effort on
management discipline--backed by the threat of firing--can
probably have beneficial effects.
Looking Ahead
With the urgent rhetoric and ambitious agenda he has set so
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 SRET
far, Gorbachev will be under the gun to show continuing evidence
of momentum or else risk allowing potential opponents to draw
together and work against him.
Consolidating power. Gorbachev is likely to be elected
President at next week's Supreme Soviet session. He might also
advance other allies into junior slots in the leadership at a
plenum preceding the Supreme Soviet. Gorbachev will almost
certainly use the party elections campaign before the party
congress next year to replace many Brezhnev holdovers among
regional party and government leaders. Party Secretary Romanov,
once Gorbachev's major rival, is already in decline, and a recent
smear campaign linking him to Gorbachev's opponents may be
intended to pave the way for his removal.
Gorbachev will continue to oust symbols of the Brezhnev old
guard in the economic bureaucracy. The ministers he named at the
S&T conference are almost certain to go. Gorbachev's attacks on
the ministries have made Premier Tikhonov's position increasingly
untenable, and he could be gracefully eased out even before the
party congress. The retirement of Gosplan chief Baybakov, a
symbol of resistance to change since the Brezhnev era, would send
a strong message to the bureaucracy.
Domestic Agenda. If Gorbachev wants to signal a new tone,
he could defer the traditional summer vacation and work.on
getting the draft Five Year Plan and party program in shape for
the congress. The draft program might be unveiled at the next
plenum and should certainly echo his themes of increased
discipline and technological progress. When the draftf the
economic plan is made public, it should reflect his demands for
ink ed economic growth'rates and a new investment strategy.
He could also make additional forays outside of Moscow to
demonstrate his leadership and activism. He is currently
visiting the Ukrainian capital Kiev and might undertake a visit
to somewhere in Siberia to further increase his exposure. He
could use these trips to keep up the rhetorical pressure on the
Foreign Policy. We will probably begin to see a growing
Gorbachev impact on foreign policy. Gromyko's influence will
decline further from its high point in the Chernenko regime. A
meeting with President Reagan would also burnish his image as a
statesman, and an early move by Moscow to arrange a summit cannot
His activism may also be reflected in bolder efforts to put
pressure on current US policy. We could, for example, see more
skillful attempts to woo Tokyo by exploiting trade frictions
between the US and Japan, or a symbolic gesture toward Beijing
designed to disrupt Sino-US relations. New initiatives to
undermine NATO cooperation on SDI and COCOM restrictions are also
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 likely.
7/RET
 Signals of Setback for Gorbachev
Opponents will be looking for opportunities to slow
Gorbachev's momentum. An early indicator of political
difficulties would be his failure to get the Presidency. While
there may be reasons for a General Secretary to delay assumption
of the Presidency--Andropov may have for instance--Gorbachev
would have to consider the cost of losing political momentum,
especially when he so clearly linked the offices of General
Secretary and President in nominating Chernenko as chief of state
last year.
On
balance, however, Gorbachev woui probably still enefit
more from holding both posts, and it would facilitate his
enagement in personal summitry with foreign heads of
state.
Another sign of resistance would be delays in the
publication of the draft Five Year Plan or party.program or the
failure of the drafts to show new approaches.to.econoaaic and
social policy. If Gorbachev fails to follow upon his tough
rhetoric by firing the ministers he has criticized, it would be
widely read in the USSR as a setback. He has made personnel
turnover a major issue,-and failure to make changes in the top
echelon of the party and ministries would signify that his
Politburo colleagues are unwilling to go along.
END BOX
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