NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005301356
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-00571
• Publication Date: July 17, 1990

APPROVED FOR
RELEASE^DATE:
01-Sep-2009
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
7 Jul}' 1990
o
CPAS N1D 94165/X
 USSR-1'4'est Germany: Green Light for Germany in NATO 1
Notes USSR: Ukraine's Sovereignty Declaration Boldest Yet
SpeciAt Anat}~ses
L'SSR: Jockeying Wiin Lithuania Over Indelxc-dence
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 Y~t.M-Y---~?--?~---~~~weapons woura ve aeproyea mere ar[er me aov~ers arav v ~ m u
no st,ecific reference to NAT'U-assigned German forces.
USSR- Green Light fox Gerrn>itty in NATO
!!'E,ST GERMANY:
Noose ;ts alliance membership and that i~our Power rights would end
pan unification. Kohl pledged to accept a military force ceiling of
?7p,000 in ,^.FE, Both leaders s,: ?ed to adopt a comprehensive treaty
hey also announced that Germany and the USSR would conclude
treaty on the withdrawal of Soviet troops over three to four years.
uring this time. Allied troops would remasn in Berlir, and only
ion-NATO German hoops could bP stationed in eastern Germany.
German unlfiicatioa.
Gorbarhev and Ht/mut Kohl opts the way for thr twa-plus four
ministerial today irs Paris to more yulckly toward a settlement ox
,~fgrsements on key security issues announced yestCrdal' b}' Mikhail
Citing the NATO summit declaration and the demands of
~~Rralpolitik, Gorbachev conceded that a united Germany cduld
- .?:_:Comment: Goroachev's decrsion to agree to leave Germany irr NATO
-~" "'apparently reflects confidence aft~:r the party congress that the
addition of a binding commitment on German troop levels gives hire
.:~ .
a security package he can sell at home. His agreement on tae tuning
,._.____..~ yof Soviet troop withdrawals and on the end of Four Power rights
indicates that he regards good reiatrons with Germany as more
? intponant than any new concessions he might gain 6y holding out.
~~ their stature as the key int.:rlocutor for both superpowers in the new
.~: withdrawal of Allied forces or nuclear ~keapons from !'Jest Germany.
? Gorbachev probably still hopes this issue ~e~i11 be addressed in future
-'bilateral agreements or in NATO's strategy review. Kohl will be
"-` ""jubilant tl?at the deal removes the last major obstacle to German
unity and vindicates his concessions to the Soviets. The Germans
almost cc~s:,.inly believe the envisaged comprehensive treaty confirms
~Kohi probably suggested tkr~y,+:e~loyment of tactical air-to-surface
missiles is highly unlikely, btrt he appai^e~itly avoided pledging the
.. Furope.
with Poland will not be ratified by then.
Moscow's shift will encourage Bonn to press for a rapid conclusion
of two plus four. 1%ohl will stress that Germany should regai:t full
sovereignty at the time of unification, althouxh a new border treaty
 'l o
 Fallout From the Ridley Aft'alr
Trade and Industry Secretary Ridley's resignation appzars unlikely to end the controversy
surrounding his remarks and has further damaged Anglo-German relations as well as
weakened Thatcher's leadership. A British newspaper on Sunday published a leaked
document detailing a roundtable discussion on Gerrra~~y hosted by Printr Minister i hatcher
Iasi spring.l'he memo's depiction of German characteristics as "aggressive, bultying" and
having a "capacity for excess'? has particularty caught. the media's eye, renewing charges that
Thatcher shares Ridley's extreme views. But the memo as a whole is well balanced in its
analysis of the risks and challenges posed by German unification. Most participants
reportedly thought, for example, that "today's Germans ware very different from their
predecessors" and that they have ro more "ambitions for physical conquest."
Thatcher, nevertheless, faces a tough challenge in dissociating herself frU?~c it;i :ley's views
' and mending her tattered public image. For more than a year, the sr~~diK have assn harping
_ on the UK's growing isolation and blaming Thatcher for the lass in British clout. Brush
"entry into the European exchange-rate mechanism, especially, is viewed as a touchstone of
Thatcher's willingness to be a good European, and she has bcrn *~ysn to task for her hostility
to Getutan unification earlier this year, ~ ~ - -
The media Also perceived a strong Washington-Bott.~ axis at work during the recent lAndon
and Houston summits, citing this as further evidence of Thatchar's toss of influence and a
weakened UC-UK "special relationship." Thatcher's caution, about unification reflects,
nevertheless, a strong undercurrent in British public opinion. Polls show twist as many
Britons as Trench or Italians, for example, would have ~~ferred a ~tvided Germany,
although a majority of Britons approve of unification.
r~
Ton
 UKc
Secretap' Rldley's rsrent gq,~'i.
"``~""`"~"""`"'"~'"^~"~"feasiblc. Thatcher will probably go atonA with Mayor's decision on
. Kurd Cautions ors EuropeAn Integration
Foreign Secretar~~ l~urd warned in an inttrylew S~rnday that French and
West German pressurelor rapid Economic and Monetary Union (E!-.?~t ~
should be eased; his treat of a 'Ywo rpeed" ~'wropt probably was made
.ta slow EC intsgretioe and counter aay presamptiox that the UK can bt
to jell the EC, particularly the French, into a more serious
.Comment: Hurd, one of the Cabinet's staunchest "Europeanists,"
has for now reversed his opposition to a two-speed track on European
integration, hoping to slow integration. A slower pace would make it
easier for him to argue for continued strong British participation in
the EC. Hurd and Chancellor of the Exchequer Major have been
{ ~_- :disappointed by tkc Community`s cool reaction to Londan's
~' alternative praposat to the Dtlors' plan for EMU and probably hope
,; ,.,,,A better reception for London's alternative EMU would streng~hct<
' ~""'~ Kurd's ca>e for British entry into the exchange-rate mechanism this
:~ ? . ~ ? fail, a move he believes would bolster British influence in Eurq~,
- ~~ .Major-who has hinted at entry this fall-worries nevertheless that
+too .,arty an entry might derail economic recovery, jeopardizing Tory
y.
chances at the ticxt general election. Inflation in the UK is near;y
double the EC average and mu3t come down before British entry is
~Pa~ is probably will take a softer tine on the t1K's EMU proposal
in coming months to encourage more movement in London toward
.support !'or integration. The French, however, are stilt committed to
the Delors' plan and probably hope to win British approval for the
idea of a European central bank and common currency before
,~rcein$ to slow the rocess.
., ,,. ~ ..,_.~~,~,,.,.u:.~
 - .-?- .x..- .~ _ ...
.~yT~"y~~ia ~.,.~i-~a'=~~.s=v~_~ .--v~.:isii.;c.c-;:"j;~:\4oscow; the Lithuanians have said they
w!.ll propose such an arrangement to h4osG~. Estonian and Latvian
?military.
Moscow qnd Yilnlrrs will apparently toter preliminary talks with
objectikes that differ fwndamentally, su est~n drat the road toward
formal ntgotiations will bt contentious
Before negotiations, the Lithuanians apparent:y want Moscow to
acknowledge brat Soviet law does not apply in the rcpub~i~ and that
the goal of the dialogue is Lithuania's indepcndencc. Gorbachev,
hoa~cver, apparently hopes to move qu~rkly to formal negotiations an
? Vgreatcr autonomy for Lithuania withi
only through the Soviet secession law.
In preliminary talks, which ma}~ begin as early as this week,
Lithuanian Presidcttt Landsbergis and many republic legislators want
to pin down the scope of formal negotiations. They also want to gain
Moscow's agreement on a venue for the negotiations. They intend as
well to ask Moscow to end remaining restrictions on the republic such
as those on :oreign economic contacts and travel visas for furc;ign
~, ~Gorbachev's Strategy
Gorbachev continues to insist that Lithuania comply with Soviet law
the Soviet secession law to gain independence.
if it wants independence, Litlauanian Prime Minister I'runskiene said
publicly last month that Gorbachev had indicated to htr his
willingness to accept having Lithuanian Eaw remain in force in the
republic. Premier R~~xhkov, however, who will head Moscow's
negotiating team, told the CPSCJ Congress that Lithuania must follow
Gorbachev appears intent on deferring negotiations with Estonia and
Latvia? As preparations for talks with Lithuania have accelerated,
 Moscow has been silent about the possibility of bilateral negotiations
with 1>stania and Latvia and, according to Prunskicne has reacted
ttcgativcly to suggestions of three-plus-one talks
Gorbachev's tough approach na doubt comes from concern about
a ripple effect on other republics and the probably futi[c hope that
with more time he can persuade the Batts to settle for substantial
autonomy within the union. He may also hope that, by lifting the
economic blockade and quickly sclectinga negotiating team, he can
increase Wcstcr:t and internal political pressure on the Lithuanians to
negotiate on his terms. His apparent unwillingness to open talks with
the Estonians and Latvians probably reflects his hope they wi~f
moderate, th
Lithuanians.
If Moscow refuses a negotiating formula that excludes the republic
~ ~ . from the secession law, Landsbergis and the majority of Lithuanian
?legislators as well as such moderates as Prunskiene are likely to refuse
to begin formal negotiations. Instead, they are likely to continue to
,:: "`'try to build political and economic contacts with other republics,
increase international support for their cause, and hope that problems
throughout the USSR will force Gorbachev to soften iris Baltic policy.
"~":'~tnclusion on the agenda at the CSCE summit,
_~,,,.~*n~~:.~.,,;:~,,,pbut may block Baltic l,articipation.
-? -~ -A refusal by Moscow to include Eston:a and Latvia in :~xgotiations or
an offer that they participate if they adhere to Soviet law is likely to
? be greeted by those republics with similar defiance, although they will
? ? have to proceed more carefully because of tl?.eir mo~?e complicated
ethnic situations.
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l7 July I99U