LIBERIA: SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS - SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: LIBERIA
• Keywords: LIBERIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005281829
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: March 11, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-00443
• Publication Date: September 1, 1985

Director ^f
Central
Intelligence
Liberia:
Short-Term Prospects
Special National Intelligence Estimate
APPROVED FOR
RELEASE DATE:
09-Dec-2008
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 S N I E 67-85
LIBERIA:
SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS
Information available as of 8 September 1985 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate,
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence
Board on 10 September 1985.
 THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and
the Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
 CONTENTS
Page
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 1
DISCUSSION ......................................................................................... 5
Introduction ................................................................................... 5
Threats to Stability ....................................................................... 5
The Doe Factor ..................................................................... 5
Managing the Transition ...................................................... 7
The Military and Security Forces ........................................ 7
The Economy ........................................................................ 9
Vulnerability to Outside Meddling ..................................... 9
Near-Term Outlook: Doe Hanging On ....................................... 10
Alternative Scenario 1: The Doe Regime Falls to the
Military .............................................................................. 11
Alternative Scenario 2: A Mixed Military/Civilian
Government ....................................................................... 11
US Interests ................................................................................... 11
Implications for the United States ............................................... 13
ANNEX A: Liberia's Economic Dilemma .......................................... 15
ANNEX B: Selected Biographies ......................................................... 19
s~~
 KEY JUDGMENTS
Liberia's leaders-on the eve of national elections scheduled for
October and the launching of the civilian Second Republic in January
1986-face an uncertain political future and certain continued econom-
ic decline. We believe the best any Liberian government can hope for
during the next 18 months is to move from crisis to crisis in search of
patchwork solutions that preserve a facade of political stability and
perhaps stave off Liberia's total economic unraveling. Given the
uncertain political climate and personal animosities Head of State
Samuel Doe has generated, we believe there is a better-than-even
chance of his being assassinated or overthrown during the next 18
months, the time frame of this Estimate.'
We believe the regime currently intends to complete the transition
to civilian rule more or less on schedule. However, we expect the
election/transition process to continue to be characterized by wide-
spread chicanery and outright manipulation, and that Doe will have
considerable difficulty in the near term reviving his sagging popularity
and convincing the opposition to accept the election outcome. Given his
past actions, mounting economic woes-including lack of funds to
finance the election-and growing concerns by the opposition that they
will not have a significant political voice, Doe could shift course
dramatically, delaying or canceling elections. Even after elections, any
moves toward establishing a more open and democratic political system
in the short term are not likely.
Liberia's shaky political and economic prospects have the potential
to strain seriously the "special relationship" that historically has charac-
terized US-Liberian relations. Overall, US-Liberian relations are likely
to be subject to sudden "crises" during which Monrovia lashes out at the
United States for interfering in Liberia's internal affairs, for not
providing enough economic help, for taking Liberia for granted, and/or
for "not paying enough rent" for US facilities. While Liberians of all
political persuasions will continue to look to the United States as their
principal patron and benefactor, they also are likely to become
increasingly frustrated with what they see as Washington's incessant
demands for economic responsibility and reform and "unwillingness" to
' The Department of State does not concur that there is "a better than even chance" that Doe will be
overthrown in the next 18 months. The State Department does not believe that the analysis that follows sup-
ports such a judgment nor does it permit a quantification of Doe's chances of being assassinated or
overthrown. The State Department believes that, barring a dramatic change in Liberia's political
dynamics-which the Estimate does not anticipate-or an assassination (which is unpredictable), Doe is
likely to survive the next 18 months.
JG~
 increase bilateral aid and overcome IMF conditions. As Liberia's
economic problems deepen, Liberian nationalism-which almost by
definition must take on an anti-American tone-is likely to grow.
US leverage and influence is likely to decrease at a time when
Monrovia's demands, expectations, and needs are growing. In an
attempt to boost its position vis-a-vis the United States and wring more
economic assistance from Washington, Monrovia may attempt to press
harder for renegotiating longstanding bilateral agreements. Discussions
could center on US interests that now include priority access to the Port
of Monrovia and Roberts International Airfield; communications relay
facilities for numerous US missions in Africa, Europe, and Latin
America; a Voice of America relay station; the OMEGA navigational
tracking station; and some $430 million in private US investment.
Although any regime almost certainly will seek to avoid provoking an
irreconcilable split with Washington, the negotiating atmosphere is
likely to become more contentious as Liberian demands for "fairer
compensation" increase.
In our judgment, several factors could act as catalysts for
instability:
- Erratic political leadership. Whatever Liberia's political frame-
work, we believe Doe will remain a temperamental and
impetuous leader given to quick mood changes, spur-of-the-
moment decisionmaking, and sudden policy shifts. In our
judgment, Doe neither understands nor appreciates the need for
political give and take required of democratic politics, and he
may well become increasingly intolerant of criticism of his
person, policies, and performance as the political stakes are
raised and economic prospects plummet.
- Manipulating the transition. Slipshod election procedures and
constantly changing political rules of the game that always favor
Doe and his party will seriously tarnish the credibility of the
new government and undermine Doe's personal political legiti-
macy. The civilian opposition centered in Monrovia is likely to
remain poorly organized and poorly placed to directly challenge
Doe, but public frustration with Doe's heavyhanded manipula-
tion-possibly combined with student unrest and growing eco-
nomic hardships-could spark public protests.
- Military discontent. The military will continue to be one of the
strongest bulwarks supporting the regime and, at the same time,
one of the greatest threats to its stability. Most soldiers probably
recognize that the Doe government is the best guarantor of its
 corporate interests; however, constantly late pay, ethnic favoritism and
nepotism, few opportunities for advancement, "unequal" distribution of
economic spoils, and personal rivalries will serve as powerful rallying
points for dissident elements plotting a coup. We see no prospect that
the military's considerable command and control deficiencies can be
overcome in the short run.
- Faltering economy. Liberia's economic prospects are likely to
remain grim throughout the time frame of this Estimate. We
see no chance that Monrovia will be able to meet its internation-
al financial obligations fully, initiate and follow through on
serious and substantial economic reforms, or put its chaotic
economic decision making apparatus in order. Domestic living
conditions will continue to deteriorate as the government
attempts to pursue Band-Aid solutions that sacrifice longer term
recovery in favor of minimizing the risk of immediate domestic
unrest. Relations with international and bilateral donors-
particularly the IMF and the United States-will come under
increasing strain.
- Foreign interference. We continue to believe that the threat
from Soviet or Libyan meddling-or from any other foreign
source-will remain relatively low during the time frame of this
Estimate. The Monrovia-initiated break in diplomatic relations
will further hamper Moscow from gaining any significant
foothold. More likely, Tripoli and Moscow will move on the
margins probing for opportunities to "make life difficult" for
the United States in Liberia, perhaps by courting student groups
or selected figures among Liberia's nascent leftist opposition
parties and exiled dissidents.
Doe will remain erratic and impulsive, continuing to vacillate
between an "iron fist" strategy and one that maintains a facade of
democratic rule that tolerates little serious opposition. We believe the
Doe regime stands a better-than-even chance of being overthrown
during the time frame of this Estimate. Doe himself will remain
particularly vulnerable to assassination attempts, most likely from a lone
assassin; an individual claiming to represent a particular tribal group or
bearing a personal grudge; or a sudden, violent, hastily organized coup
similar to the one that brought Doe to power in 1980.
There are no clear-cut military front-runners to succeed Doe, nor is
there evidence of cohesive, well-organized ideological or tribal factions
currently plotting against the government. We believe, however, that
the military ultimately will play a central role in forming any new
government. Although senior officers are better equipped and more
committed than junior officers or enlisted men to carry on with
3
ZTIC~
 Liberia's traditional moderate, pro-Western orientations, we have seri-
ous reservations about their ability to maintain command and control
over the military or society at large. Should junior officers or enlisted
ranks take power, we anticipate that their initial actions would focus on
settling old scores and ensuring their own economic and political well-
being rather than tackling Liberia's substantial problems. Should Doe
fall at least partially as a result of public protests and demonstrations,
we believe the military could step in and attempt to forge a mixed civil-
ian/military coalition, including current opposition politicians, techno-
crats, and possibly exile figures.
We believe that US-Liberian bilateral relations could deteriorate in
a post-Doe era. Even should avowedly pro-Western leaders come to
power with the intention of "solidifying" the special relationship, the
political uncertainty following their takeover and unrealistic expecta-
tions of forthcoming US economic aid will create potential strains.
Moreover, any new regime will feel under immediate pressure to
establish its credibility as an independent power and find a quick
economic fix-such as moving to their own currency; these imperatives
will only further delay serious attention to Liberia's economic problems.
Such a regime eventually could find it difficult to resist taking the low
road by blaming outside powers for Liberia's economic difficulties. The
United States and the IMF would provide tempting and convenient
targets.
 DISCUSSION
1. Liberia's leaders-on the eve of national elec-
tions and the launching of the civilian Second Repub-
lic-face an uncertain political future and certain
continued economic decline.' Five years of military
rule by 34-year-old Samuel Doe-a master sergeant
when he violently seized power in 1980 from the small
Americo-Liberian elite that had governed since inde-
pendence in 1847-has done little to set the stage for
the introduction of stable civilian rule or to revive
Liberia's flagging economic fortunes. Nevertheless,
Doe is intent on manipulating the political process to
ensure his continued rule. Domestic uncertainty cou-
pled with Liberian leaders' unrealistic expectations of
US assistance almost certainly will make relations with
the United States-Liberia's principal benefactor-
more difficult and unpredictable during the next 18
months.
Threats to Stability
The Doe Factor
2. For as long as he holds office, President Doe will
remain the vulnerable focal point of Liberian politics
and the arbiter of Liberia's domestic and international
policies. After five years in office, Doe has proved
himself above all else a survivor and an unscrupulous
political infighter, capable of quickly eliminating po-
tential challengers. Doe draws his power in part from
the loyalty of the Armed Forces and in part from his
manipulation of a highly personalized political system
that surrounds the Head of State with supposedly
trusted political and ethnic Krahn loyalists, most of
whom are young, poorly educated, and self-serving.
Doe's control is reinforced by a patronage system that
even during economic hard times continues to afford
significant "economic opportunities and rewards" for
those who support him.
3. Doe clearly seeks to pattern his rule on the
"benevolent authoritarianism" of the late President
William Tubman, the grand old man of Liberian
2 Presidential and legislative elections are slated for October and
scheduled to be followed by the inauguration of the Second
Republic in January 1986.
politics who held office for over 25 years. Just as
clearly, however, Doe has yet to acquire Tubman's
political skills and personal popularity. Doe remains a
temperamental and impetuous leader given to quick
mood changes, spur-of-the-moment decisionmakin
and sudden policy shifts.
Doe's
lack of interest in and attention tote details of day-
to-day government, his lack of understanding of the
magnitude of Liberia's economic difficulties, his un-
willingness to take the initiative, and his inability or
unwillingness to recognize the longer term implica-
tions of his decisions once made detract from the
government's already limited ability to set and follow
through on a course.
4. We see little prospect that Doe's political style
will significantly change under a new political frame-
work and anticipate that Liberia's domestic and inter-
national policies will continue to be colored and
shaped by the mercurial President's often fast-chang-
ing perceptions, moods, and desires. Doe's behavior, in
fact, may well become more erratic and unpredictable
as the political stakes are raised during the election
and transition periods. We do not believe, for exam-
ple, that Doe either understands or appreciates the
need for political give and take required of democratic
politics and that, as a consequence, he may well
become increasingly intolerant of criticism of his
personality, policies, or performance. This sensitivity is
5
 Figure 1
Population Density and Ethnic Composition of Liberia
ETHNIC COMPOSITION
(percent of total population)
0: . i ?,s Settlers Other
Kissi (28) (1.2)
Dey Gola(34) Kpelle
(n,)(4.5)\ f[t (I9.9)
(0.5)
Krahn
(4.7)
Kru
(8.0)
Grebo
(8.0)
Gio
(8.7)
Mano
(7.4)
MANDE
Gbandi (3a3) (3.9)-
(2.6)
POPULATION DENSITY PER
SQUARE MILE
under 40 40-90
Mixed, over 90
inhabitants per
sq. mile
DEY Tribe name
Sarpo Subtribe name
 likely to be magnified if, as we expect, his popularity
continues to fall.
Managing the Transition
5. Although Doe recognizes the importance the
United States attaches to following through on the
transition, his government's blatant manipulation of
the process thus far has seriously tarnished the credi-
bility of both the election and the transition. The
regime's failure to spell out clearly the new political
rules of the game, as well as the banning of opposition
parties, contributes to an impression that Doe sees the
elections as little more than a mechanism for ratifying
his appointment as a civilian head of state. Honest
logistic difficulties aside, election officials-underfi-
nanced, poorly trained, and uncertain of their man-
date and authority-have failed to establish political
independence from Doe. As a consequence, opposition
parties find themselves "in violation" of constantly
changing election procedures.
6. Doe's Strategy. Doe probably hopes that he will
be able to stage-manage an election-with only nomi-
nal opposition-that will boost his popularity, ensure
his victory, and legitimize his position as civilian
president. Although it is difficult to gauge Doe's
popularity throughout Liberia, evidence suggests that
he would have difficulty winning a fair election. As
such, he must rely on the power and patronage
associated with incumbency to solidify support for his
candidacy and the National Democratic Party of
Liberia (NDPL). At the same time, he will continue to
erect-with varying degrees of heavyhandedness-
electoral roadblocks to stymie opposition candidates
and parties.
7. Although the above represents Doe's ideal strate-
gy, we believe he will not hesitate to clamp down even
harder if it appears the opposition is gaining strength
or going beyond what he sees as acceptable lines of
criticism. Doe already has stated, for example, that he
will not permit those espousing broadly defined "so-
cialist" or "Communist" ideologies to stand. In a worst
case scenario, Doe could follow through on previous
threats to delay or abort the entire process by claiming
that Liberia cannot "economically" afford elections or
that Liberians are not yet "ready" for democracy.
Under this situation, Doe could well be tempted to
simply proclaim himself a civilian president, pledging
at some future date to democratize the new
government.
8. Opposition Party Strategies. In our judgment,
opposition parties will have little opportunity to seize
the political initiative or raise substantive issues. Given
the regime's actions thus far, the opposition appears
consigned for the present to react to Doe's moves and
to play a cat and mouse game, recognizing that the
regime will move quickly to deny it any political voice
or platform. Some parties may seek to ally themselves
with Doe's NDPL, while others may attempt to play
the role of loyal opposition, tempering their criticism
of Doe in hopes of gaining at least some influence in a
new government. Others may attempt to form a
united coalition, although we see little prospect that
such a coalition could endure or that Doe would allow
it to offer a serious challenge. Ultimately, opposition
parties could attempt to totally discredit the process by
boycotting the elections.
9. We believe former Foreign Minister Gabriel
Baccus Matthews-and his United People's Party-is a
pivotal civilian opposition figure, even though the
UPP has been banned from all political activity. The
ambitious Matthews appears popular among the more
politically aware citizenry of Monrovia. Although evi-
dence suggests that Matthews can "call the people into
the streets," he thus far has moved carefully, perhaps
fearing for his personal safety should he provoke
demonstrations that fail to bring down Doe, From this
perspective, Matthews may well calculate that his
interests are best served by being ready to answer the
call after others have overthrown Doe. We note,
however, that more radical or impatient supporters in
his movement may be alienated by such strategies and
could bypass Matthews, taking more risky actions that,
in turn, could provoke a political crisis.
10. It should be noted that there are other political
figures of stature and potential in Liberia. Among
them, Ellen Sirleaf Johnson, a former Finance Minis-
ter, and Amos Sawyer, leader of the Liberian People's
Party, have followings and could be called on in the
event Doe were overthrown.
The Military and Security Forces
11. Liberia's Armed Forces and security services
will remain a powerful interest group and continue to
play a central political role even under a civilian
constitution. The military, however, does not speak
with one voice, and Doe-or his successor-will be
unable to please all factions or meet all of the military's
demands and expectations. No Liberian leader can
take the loyalty of the armed forces for granted.
12. Overall, we anticipate that the Armed Forces
will remain both one of the strongest bulwarks sup-
porting the regime and, at the same time, one of the
 greatest threats to its stability. On the one hand, a
majority of the armed forces recognize that, within the
framework of civilian rule, Doe-as a former sol-
dier-represents the securest guarantor of its corporate
interests. Moreover, although poorly articulated, we
believe the Liberian military by and large remains a
relatively conservative body that fears retribution and
a loss of privilege under a non-Doe civilian govern-
ment. On the other hand, the military has a long list of
grievances against the current regime, including late
pay, Krahn ethnic favoritism, lack of opportunities for
advancement, "unequal" distribution of economic
spoils, and personal rivalries and jealousies. Moreover,
Doe's sometimes curious political insensitivity to the
military-as evidenced by his recent decision to in-
clude the military in a plan to take half a month's
salary from all workers to fund a new nationwide
radio network-exacerbates discontent in the Army.
These issues call the loyalty of the military into
question, and any one of them could serve as a
powerful rallying point for dissident elements plotting
a coup throughout the period of this Estimate.
13. Although Liberia's 6,635-man Armed Forces
have been at political center stage since the 1980 coup,
they remain ill prepared to perform their military
mission, let alone play a constructive political role.
Among the military's more glaring deficiencies are:
- An almost total lack of discipline compounded
by nepotism, tribal differences, poor training,
irregular pay, and little chance for improvement
or advancement.
- Inadequate training and supplies that severely
restrict its ability to respond to external or inter-
nal threats.
- Extremely poor command and control seriously
hampers coordination, and routine maintenance
is rarely performed. Chronic shortages of spare
parts compound the problem.
- Competition between overmanned-but poorly
trained-security organizations operating with
ill-defined roles and missions. With the exception
of the Executive Mansion Guard, none of the
special security organizations is equipped to rap-
idly respond to a serious internal security
problem.
14. There is no prospect that these deficiencies can
be overcome in the short run. We believe disgruntled
factions within the military would have difficulty
planning, coordinating, communicating, and support-
ing a coup that tied its success to decisive and well-
Army
6,105
Enlisted
5,657
Coast Guard
442
personnel
Air Recon-
88
Warrant officers
181
naissance
Commissioned
officers
797
6,635
6,635
Organization The armed forces include the Army and the
Coast Guard. The air wing is subordinate to
the Army. The Army's major units are six
infantry battalions, an armor scout unit, and
the Executive Mansion Guard battalion.
The EMG, which includes a Special Body-
guard Unit and a Special Antiterrorist Unit
(Israeli trained), and the Military Police have
responsibility for presidential security. The
Executive Mansion Guard is equipped to
carry out its responsibilities, but organiza-
tional and disciplinary problems still limit its
capability.
Officer Corps About 90 percent of current first and second
lieutenants were enlisted men before the
1980 coup. Most captains and above were
officers before the coup. Traditional Amer-
ico-Liberian domination of the officer ranks
is quickly giving way to more diverse tribal
representation. Krahns-Doe's group-dom-
inate certain units, such as the Executive
Mansion Guard.
Education Of the total force, only about 500 have a
high school or above education; only nine
are college graduates.
US Training About 4 percent have received some formal
training in the United States, although about
5,000 have been exposed to US training
through military training teams. In 1985, 96
officers and enlisted men are scheduled to
take part in IMET programs, compared with
55 in 1984.
Israeli Israel provided a six-week training course in
Assistance basic counterterrorist techniques. Of 150
initial Liberian participants, 85 completed
the course in January 1985. Doe requested
further Israeli security assistance following
the April 1985 assassination attempt.
timed moves to capture opponents and take and hold
positions throughout Monrovia. In addition, the Krahn
domination of military intelligence and counterintelli-
gence within the Army serves as a damper against
coup plotting. However, given the questionable securi-
 ty surrounding Doe and the inability of the military to
respond quickly to challenges, we can envision a
scenario in which a relatively small group of officers
or enlisted men move with little advance planning to
eliminate Doe and topple the government.
The Economy
15. The transition to civilian rule comes against the
backdrop of a seriously worsening economic crisis
from which there is no quick or politically painless
escape. We believe that, during the time frame of this
Estimate, there is no prospect that Liberia will be able
to meet its international financial obligations fully,
initiate and follow through on serious and substantial
economic reforms, or put its chaotic economic decision
making apparatus in order. As such, Liberia's relations
with international and bilateral donors-particularly
the IMF and the United States-are likely to come
under increasing strain as Liberian leaders search for
economic solutions at no political cost to themselves.
16. Stagnant markets for iron ore and rubber, Li-
beria's principal exports, and domestic fiscal misman-
agement have placed serious strains on the economy.
Monrovia's rapidly growing debt arrears are only the
starkest indicator of Liberia's economic difficulties.
Arrears have climbed from $27 million at the end of
1984 to almost $80 million at midyear 1985 and may
reach almost $113 million by the end of September
1985. At the same time, the government has proved
unable to increase revenues or curb government ex-
penditures significantly. The US Embassy predicts that
at best Liberia will have to finance a $92 million
balance-of-payments gap during the 1985/86 fiscal
year.
17. Even a partial economic turnaround will be
stymied by chronic fiscal mismanagement, inefficien-
cy and corruption, the poor quality of economic
advisers, and their unwillingness to make decisions and
to convey to Doe the magnitude of Liberia's economic
problems. Although recent government commissions-
and consultations with the United States-have laid
out the stark economic realities and longer term
implications of the government's failure to act, Doe
and his closest advisers show no sign that they are
prepared to implement the painful but necessary
remedial measures. As such, the now familiar pattern
of stern government edicts to cut spending, reduce
payrolls, reorder priorities, and improve revenue col-
lection followed by haphazard implementation is like-
ly to continue. In our judgment, the constantly cited
excuse that reforms are impossible during an "election
year" will be replaced once the election is over by
claims that the new government must first solidify its
grip on power before it can tackle the economic
problems.
18. Doe will continue to favor Band-Aid solutions
that will allow the government to survive from crisis to
crisis and dampen the probability of domestic unrest
over more coherent, long-range strategies for econom-
ic reform and recovery. Making salary payments, for
example, will continue to be a more important priority
than curbing government spending or meeting inter-
national economic obligations. We believe that, de-
spite the government's commitment to meeting imme-
diate needs, the potential for economically inspired
civil unrest during the next 18 months will increase as
living conditions for most Liberians worsen. Although
we do not anticipate well-organized economic protests,
such as general strikes, spontaneous demonstrations-
perhaps sparked by rice shortages or salary arrears-
have the potential to mushroom and take on a general
antigovernment tone. Moreover, although the govern-
ment is well aware of the 1979 "rice riot" example, we
believe the regime would be hard pressed to contain
and control a fast-spreading demonstration.
Vulnerability to Outside Meddling
19. We continue to believe that the threat from
Soviet or Libyan meddling-or from any other foreign
source-will remain relatively low for the next 18
months. Although Moscow and Tripoli could claim
obvious benefits from the weakening of an African
nation so closely aligned with the United States,
neither, in our judgment, is willing to pledge the
resources or make the long-term commitment needed
to gain a major influencing role in Liberian domestic
affairs. (There is no evidence at present, for example,
that there are strong, well-organized, or dedicated pro-
Soviet or pro-Libyan elements in Liberia; in addition,
the Monrovia-initiated break in diplomatic relations
with Moscow will hamper any concerted Soviet effort
to gain a significant foothold.) More likely, both
Tripoli and Moscow will move on the margins probing
for opportunities-perhaps by courting student groups
or selected figures among Liberia's nascent leftist
opposition parties-to "make life difficult" for the
United States in Liberia. In addition, either Libya or
the Soviet Union could attempt to take advantage and
widen the periodic rifts between Washington and
Monrovia that flow from Doe's unpredictable
behavior.
20. Although we assess the threat of serious outside
meddling as low, the regime is likely to cite Libyan or
9
 Soviet involvement in any domestic unrest in an effort
to wring more assistance from the United States. On
the other hand, government leaders and opposition
politicians alike also are likely to continue to hint not
so subtly that they may have no choice but to turn to
other sources if the United States fails to meet Liber-
ia's needs. We expect, in fact, such threats will become
more frequent as the government's options for paper-
ing over the economic crisis narrow.
Near-Term Outlook: Doe Hanging On
21. We see no prospect that Liberia's political
climate will stabilize or economic conditions improve
during the next 18 months. The problems currently
facing the government are likely to fester, and we
believe the best the government can hope for is to
move from crisis to crisis, pursuing patchwork solu-
tions that preserve the facade of political stability and
perhaps stave off economic collapse. As such, Liberia's
domestic and international policies will continue to be
characterized by sudden zigzags and flash crises, often
over issues that on the surface appear relatively
insignificant.
22. We believe the regime currently intends to
complete the transition to civilian rule more or less on
schedule. However, we expect the election/transition
process to continue to be characterized by widespread
chicanery and outright manipulation, and that Doe
will have considerable difficulty in the near term
reviving his sagging popularity and convincing the
opposition to accept the election outcome. Given his
past actions, mounting economic woes-including lack
of funds to finance the election-and growing con-
cerns by the opposition that they will not have a
significant political voice, Doe could shift course dra-
matically, delaying or canceling elections. Even after
elections, any moves toward establishing a more open
and democratic political system in the short term are
not likely.
23. As long as Doe holds power, his political style
will remain erratic and impulsive. We believe Doe
will vacillate between an "iron fist" strategy and one
that maintains a facade of democratic rule but toler-
ates little serious opposition. Ultimately, however, Doe
is incapable of crafting and sticking to a longer term
governing strategy and he will continue to respond in a
spur-of-the-moment and emotional fashion to political
and economic issues as they arise.
24. Given the uncertain political climate and the
personal animosities Doe has generated, we believe
there is a better-than-even chance of his being assassi-
nated or overthrown during the time frame of this
Estimate.' Doe will remain particularly vulnerable to
assassination attempts, for which we are likely to have
little, if any, advance warning. Such attempts are most
likely to come from a lone assassin; an individual
claiming to represent a particular tribal group or
bearing a personal grudge; or a sudden, violent, poorly
organized coup similar to the one that brought Doe to
power in 1980. The uneven quality of Doe's security
services raises the likelihood that an attempt eventual-
ly will succeed. At present, we rate the prospect of a
more organized coup as a significantly less likely
possibility. Plotters-unsure of their ability to carry off
a successful coup-could be emboldened to try should
Doe embark on any extended foreign travel.
25. Organized civilian opposition will continue to
have difficulty seriously challenging Doe and his
government. Although tribalism will continue to play a
role in domestic politics-especially with the continu-
ing practice of Krahn favoritism-tribal conflict has
not reached the proportions it has in other West
African countries. In Monrovia, we expect that stu-
dents will continue to be a thorn in the Doe govern-
ment's side and that their ability to draw more general
support to their causes could serve as a catalyst for
widespread disturbances. Likewise, opposition parties
have yet to prove that they have the capability to seize
and hold the political initiative. Until they show more
organizational and leadership skills, we expect they
will present a visible but limited threat. Plotting by
emigre Liberians will continue, but absent domestic
allies will pose little threat.
26. More seriously threatening to the regime, in our
judgment, are sporadic and probably spontaneous
public protests that-whatever their genesis-have the
potential to evolve quickly into anti-Doe demonstra-
tions. Government or NDPL confrontations with stu-
dents or opposition supporters, for example, could
spark more generalized protests in Monrovia. Given
the political and economic prognoses, we believe Doe's
popularity will continue to slide and that he will find
it difficult to resist the temptation to turn to more
authoritarian measures to maintain control. Although
The Department of State does not concur that there is "a better
than even chance" that Doe will be overthrown in the next 18
months. The State Department does not believe that the analysis
that follows supports such a judgment nor does it permit a quantifi-
cation of Doe's chances of being assassinated or overthrown. The
State Department believes that, barring a dramatic change in
Liberia's political dynamics-which the Estimate does not antici-
pate-or an assassination (which is unpredictable), Doe is likely to
survive that next 18 months.
10
 his security forces probably are marginally capable of
handling a small, spontaneous, and short-lived demon-
stration, a large-scale demonstration-even with a
modicum of organization and which lasted for more
than a short while-would quickly overtax their limit-
ed skills. In particular, we believe the unity of the
security forces and the Army could collapse quickly as
some overreacted to increasing levels of violence while
others joined the protestors.
Alternative Scenario 1:
The Doe Regime Falls to the Military
27. The most serious threat to the Doe regime
remains a military takeover, despite the lack of clear-
cut military front-runners to succeed Doe and the lack
of evidence of cohesive, well-organized ideological or
tribal factions plotting against the government. We
note, however, the reported renewed political activity
of former Gen. Thomas Quiwonkpa, once a Doe ally
and popular Chief of Staff purged by Doe following a
reported coup plot in 1983. Although difficult to gauge
the level of Quiwonkpa's support in the military, we
believe he could reemerge-perhaps with support
from disgruntled civilian politicians and factions of the
Army-as a potential successor. Although conditions
could deteriorate to the point where senior officers felt
compelled to attempt a takeover, we have serious
reservations about their ability to maintain command
and control over the military or society at large.
Nevertheless, given the lack of education, administra-
tive expertise, and leadership skills in the military, we
do not believe a senior-officer-dominated government
would prove appreciably better able to make and
enforce the difficult economic decisions required,
although such leaders are better equipped and more
committed to carrying on with Liberia's moderate,
pro-Western orientations than junior officers or enlist-
ed men. Moreover, Doe's ouster is likely to bring to the
surface tribal tensions-at the very least a strong anti-
Krahn backlash-that would further diminish the new
regime's ability to maintain order and implement new
policies.
28. We believe junior officers or enlisted ranks who
might seize power in a move similar to the one that
brought Doe to power in 1980 would do so with little
appreciation of the magnitude of or strategies for
overcoming Liberia's problems. Such a regime, in our
judgment, would concentrate its efforts on settling old
scores, ensuring their own economic and political well-
being, tackling superficial rather than substantive
problems, and demanding substantially more econom-
ic and political support from the United States. More-
over, such a regime could be tempted to take impul-
sive action with little thought to longer term conse-
quences as well as being susceptible to "easy solutions"
that could include outside promises of economic aid.
We cite as possible examples the demand to renegoti-
ate current agreements with the United States or
abandon the dollar as Liberia's currency. US ability to
influence such a regime would be limited, and we
believe the frustration level could rise over time to
such a degree that the United States would increasing-
ly find itself being made the scapegoat for Liberia's
difficulties.
Alternative Scenario 2:
A Mixed Military/Civilian Government
29. We also believe widespread and sustained pub-
lic protests and demonstrations in Monrovia could
precipitate Doe's fall. Under this scenario, we believe
the military could step in and attempt to forge a
mixed civilian/military coalition, including current
opposition politicians and technocrats. Although we
believe such a move would initially enjoy considerable
public popularity, competition for control between
civilians and the military would emerge almost imme-
diately. Moreover, we believe any initial unity would
quickly collapse into bitter rivalries as factions jock-
eyed for position. Economic reform and responsibility
would take a backseat to what would probably prove
an extended power struggle. A regime that included
leftist civilian opposition figures could also be suscepti-
ble to populist/socialist rhetoric and programs.'
US Interests
30. The "special relationship" between the United
States and Liberia-unique in Africa-dates from the
first settlement of American blacks in the late 1820s
and has been characterized by close cultural, econom-
ic, and political ties that historically has given the
United States considerable influence and leverage.
Liberians of tribal origin as well as Americo-Liberians
continue to look to the United States as a model and
patron, and as the one country Liberia can depend on
to come to its aid in times of need. Liberians tradition-
ally have valued US advice as well as assistance and
have supported US positions in international and
regional organizations such as the United Nations and
the Organization of African Unity.
' The Department of State agrees that a military/civilian govern-
ment would encounter serious difficulties. It would not necessarily
collapse, however, and could eventually lead to a more durable
coalition, particularly if encouraged to do so by influential foreign
friends of Liberia.
X11
 Figure 2
US Facilities and Access Rights in Liberia
uchanan
Robertaportj
ervrng e>;
Receiving
r .ke
~PASo
Diplomatic
y A V"OA Relay Station
BrewervilI e C
'
areysbur
g
MONROVIA I
Port of Monrovia /Diplomatic Transmitting Site
rayneavn~e~
OMEGA
Navigational
Station
North
/
Llberi/sd
'Rob its r'
International J
Airfield
I.tlartt/C
50 Kilometers
50:Miles
 31. Partly as a result of these historically close ties,
Liberia now houses the largest and most diverse
concentration of US Government assets in Africa. The
United States enjoys, for example, access rights and
facilities that would be politically impossible and
economically costly to duplicate in toto elsewhere in
Africa. We do not believe current political sensitivities
would allow any other African country to accept the
high US profile entailed in establishing extensive
communications networks such as currently exist in
Liberia.
32. At present the United States, through unpub-
lished agreements, enjoys priority access to the Port of
Monrovia and Roberts International Airfield, both
built by the United States during World War II. In
33. Other US interests in Liberia include a Voice of
America (VOA) relay station that broadcasts all of
VOA's programming to Sub-Saharan Africa. Technical
reasons require a West African location for the trans-
mitter, which would cost as much as $60 million and
take at least five years to replace. Liberia also now
operates and maintains-points of considerable pres-
tige to the government-the OMEGA navigational
tracking station, which operates in conjunction with six
other stations located in other parts of the world.
While OMEGA will be phased out between the late
1980s and 2010 and be replaced with a worldwide
satellite system, until then, the 700-acre (3 square
kilometer) site outside Monrovia will continue to be a
critical part of the worldwide network serving ships
and aircraft of all nationalities. The United States
continues to fund the Liberia station completely. Its
loss would seriously curtail OMEGA service to both
the North and South Atlantic. Construction of a
replacement station would cost $10-12 million and
would take one to two years.
34. Private US economic investment in Liberia-
estimated at some $430 million and concentrated in
the iron ore and rubber industries-is second only to
Nigeria in black Africa. Thirty percent of Liberia's
total imports in 1981 came from the United States, and
US commercial banks continue to dominate Liberian
banking. In addition, shipping under the Liberian flag
of convenience-66 percent of all foreign-registry US
merchant ships fly the Liberian flag-is important to
US transportation interests, allowing major savings in
taxes and labor costs.
Implications for the United States
35. We believe the "special relationship" between
Monrovia and Washington will come under increasing
strain during the next 18 months. First and foremost,
Liberians of all political persuasions will continue to
believe that the US role as patron and benefactor
requires Washington to come to Monrovia's economic
rescue whatever the cost. At the same time, Liberian
leaders are likely to become increasingly alert for and
sensitive to signs of outside interference in domestic
politics.
36. In our judgment, US leverage and influence
with Doe or a successor regime is likely to decrease at
a time when Monrovia's demands for economic help
and support are increasing. While any regime almost
certainly will seek to avoid provoking an irreconcilable
split with Washington, the negotiating atmosphere is
likely to become more contentious. In particular, we
believe Liberian leaders will become increasingly frus-
trated with what they see as Washington's unwilling-
ness to overcome IMF conditions and to increase
economic assistance to an important "African ally."
This frustration will be compounded as the gap be-
tween Washington's demands for economic responsi-
bility and reform and Monrovia's economic perfor-
mance widens. We anticipate a rise in Liberian
nationalism-which almost by definition must take on
an anti-American tone-as Monrovia recognizes that it
has no choice but to listen to and at least attempt to re-
spond to Washington's concerns.
37. As long as Doe holds office, these growing
strains are likely to be manifest in sudden "crises," not
dissimilar from those in the past. We believe, for
example, that Doe will continue at times to lash out at
Washington for "undermining" his presidency, for not
providing enough economic help, for "taking advan-
tage" of Liberia, and/or for "not paying enough rent"
for US facilities. Whatever the ostensible cause, Doe is
likely to continue to believe that he can quickly
threaten, back off, and then paper over differences
with no adverse consequences. Although we believe
this will remain the standard pattern of a Doe civilian
presidency, we believe heightened political tensions
coupled with economic decline increase the possibility
13
SEEREL
 that Doe could be moved to take more precipitate
action with longer term consequences.
38. We believe that, in the short run at the very
least, US-Liberian bilateral relations could deteriorate
in a post-Doe era. Even if avowedly pro-Western
leaders come to power with the intention of "solidi-
fying" the special relationship, the political uncertain-
ty following their takeover and unrealistic expectations
of forthcoming economic aid will create potential
strains. Moreover, any new regime will feel under
immediate pressure to establish its credibility as an
independent power and find a quick economic fix-
such as moving to their own currency; these will only
further delay serious attention to Liberia's economic
problems. Such a regime eventually could find it
difficult to resist taking the low road by blaming
outside powers for Liberia's economic difficulties. The
United States and the IMF would provide tempting
and convenient targets.
 ANNEX A
LIBERIA'S ECONOMIC DILEMMA
1. Like most African nations, Liberia has a dual
economy, with a "modern" sector operating alongside
subsistence agriculture. Liberia's modern sector con-
sists largely of foreign-owned iron ore mines, rubber
plantations, banks, and insurance companies, together
with small domestic commercial and industrial
operations.
2. Unlike most African nations, however, this mod-
ern sector encompasses a surprisingly large share of
society. According to the US Embassy, more than 40
percent of Liberia's 2.2 million people are in the
modern sector, compared with 25 percent for the rest
of Africa. As a consequence, the problems that have
plagued Liberia's economy in the past half dozen
years-whether caused by adverse external conditions
or ill-conceived domestic policies-hit wide and deep.
3. The most striking development in Liberia's eco-
nomic picture in the past several years is the rapid
falloff in total export earnings from a peak of $613
million in 1980 to $434 million last year. Liberia's open
economy depends on mineral and agricultural exports;
after a brief commodities "miniboom" in the mid-
1970s, prices for these exports tumbled with the onset
of recession in the early 1980s in Liberia's primary
Gross foreign reserves
(year end)
55
5
8
Disbursed debt
510
Percent
613
725
Debt service ratio percent
of exports
14
6
7
a Data may not add to total shown because of rounding.
b Projections are based on CIA economic model of Liberia and assume a continuation of the present economic prices.
c Including US $25 million under an oil facility refinanced with debt to London Club banks.
15
Z
 European and American markets. IMF data show that
the prices for Liberia's key iron ore, rubber, and
timber exports are down 12, 23, and 17 percent,
respectively, from their 1980 highs.
4. Liberia's export performance also has been hit by
the direct ties between the Liberian and US dollars.
Under normal circumstances, ties to the dollar are
stabilizing, but the 45-percent real appreciation of the
Liberian dollar since June 1979 has severely weakened
export-sector profits. We estimate that Liberia's real
GDP has declined by almost one-fourth and real per
capita GDP by one-third since 1979.
5. Both the Tolbert and Doe governments' misguid-
ed economic policies must share the blame for Liber-
ia's current precarious financial position. Massive for-
eign borrowing to cover lavish expenditures associated
with the July 1979 Organization of African Unity
conference in Monrovia increased Liberia's foreign
debt by 50 percent to $510 million at the same time its
ability to service debt through exports was declining
(see figure 3). Further, since Doe came to power,
sluggish revenue collections, growing government
Figure 3
Liberia: Foreign Debt and Export Revenue
a Estimated.
b Projected.
wages, and the cycle of rising debt service (see figure
4) have forced Liberia to sustain a high level of foreign
borrowing to cover its own budget deficits. Indeed,
just to service its debt, the government virtually
exhausted its foreign exchange reserves last year-as
of June 1984, the National Bank of Liberia had only
$2.5 million on hand, according to Embassy reporting.
6. We expect Liberia's financial crisis to deepen.
Preliminary IMF data for the Liberian 1984/85 fiscal
year, which ended in June, show a rapidly deteriorat-
ing situation:
- Only $192 million was collected in revenues
against a target of $245 million. This was mostly
consumed by the government's expanded pay-
roll, which totaled $125 million.
- Government spending of $389 million that in-
cludes an additional $48 million, mostly to meet
"unidentified expenditures."
- The government had to repatriate nearly all of
the $50 million of revenues earned through ship
16
 Figure 4
Liberia: Medium- and Long-Term Debt Service
a Estimated.
b Projected.
Confidential
306446 8.85
registry, mining royalties and rubber concession
taxes, and stumpage fees that are paid abroad.
- The government amassed domestic arrears of
$101 million to vendors, parastatals, and to civil-
ian and military personnel.
- Arrears on external obligations rose from $23
million on 31 December 1984 to almost $80
million as of 30 June.
7. In our judgment, these problems will worsen over
the next year. Although the IMF and the Liberian
Government project FY 1985/86 revenues at $225
million, inflows are currently averaging only $13
million a month. Less offshore revenue will be avail-
able, according to the US Embassy, because maritime
revenues have been mortgaged through early 1986 and
mining royalties and rubber concession taxes through
1985. Moreover, Liberia's $41 million in arrears to the
IMF make discussions on a new standby agreement
impossible. Liberia's record of arrears to the fund is
similar to that of Vietnam, Guyana, and Nicaragua,
and Liberia may be formally declared ineligible to use
IMF resources.
8. If this occurs, Monrovia will be required to pay
off all arrears to the IMF, and a special IMF board
meeting will be necessary for the country to again be
eligible to receive IMF credit. We estimate that
arrears to the IMF could reach $59 million by the end
of 1985. Other multilateral lending organizations such
as the World Bank and the African Development Bank
already have suspended project assistance due to the
accumulated arrears. Commercial banks and other
bilateral lenders will also view the Fund's action as a
signal to further reduce official and private lending to
Liberia. Banking sources report US banks have already
begun to cut lines of trade credit to the private sector
in Liberia.
9. If these revenue and spending trends continue,
Liberia will be, faced with a government deficit of at
least $164 million in FY 1985/86. In our judgment,
international banks and trade financiers will not pro-
vide that level of credit. The result is likely to be
mounting arrears and more desperate Liberian re-
quests for comprehensive debt rescheduling and in-
creased foreign aid.
17
SEC";--
 10. Barring such financial restructuring, the Doe
government could try something drastic and ill con-
ceived. The government has begun to release a portion
of the $20 million in $5 Liberian coins held by the
National Bank of Liberia. Given the political pressure
to bring government salaries current and the need to
increase liquidity in the banking sector, the govern-
ment may be tempted to release additional coins. If
the temptation proves too great, the government will
solve one problem but create many more.
11. The addition of $20 million in new coins would
reduce the value of the $32 million already in circula-
tion. As a result, prices denominated in Liberian
dollars would rise. Capital flight would increase, and
the Liberian dollar would trade at an increasing
discount, in effect, severing the link between the US
and Liberian dollars. Moreover, if the injection of new
coins causes prices to double, we estimate the real
GDP will decline by more than 11 percent in both
1986 and 1987. Stagnant exports and declining domes-
tic revenues would cause the fiscal deficit for 1986 to
increase from $160 million to more than $255 million.
12. With its currency no longer tied to the US
dollar, the government would be forced to manage an
independent monetary system. The actual economic
effects of switching to a local currency would depend
to a great extent on the management of the transition.
Liberia's present fiscal crisis, its lack of economic
expertise, and the present political uncertainty indi-
cate that the transition would be chaotic. It would
result in rapid inflation, commodity smuggling, capital
flight, and massive subsidization in order to control the
price of food-a veritable Pandora's box of economic
problems the Doe government is ill equipped to
handle.
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