IRAN-IRAQ: THE BATTLE FOR BASRAH SUMMARY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005281798
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2008
• Case Number: F-2008-01415
• Publication Date: July 14, 1982

APPROVED
FOR RELEASE^
DATE: '
31-Oct-2008
 Di'RECTORA'TZ ' OP iNT ?Lth,r..N01E
14 July 1902
Zran."trag : The Rattle Pox iF.ssrah
Sum ma ray
=ith at leant 260,000 Iranian and Iraqi troops
each other, tha struggle underway near Baerah promia
largest land battle since the Korean War Iran appa
.intends to push to the Shutt at Arab opposite Baerah
a massive defeat on the Iraqi troops--an-many as eig
d'V'Oi6 ions--defe .ding the city. Tohear: undoubtedly n
defeat of this magnitude will spark the overthrow-of
President Saddcm Huesein. if a,coup ~n ?aghdad does
or the Zraai, Armu is routed, Iran mayipush its attar
$hatt.
The morale of Iraq's troops and iho' ability of
oommanders to avoid mistakes will be ore:dial to Iraq
for a successful defense. Reporting bn Iraqi troop
recent weeks has been contiadiotory. Iraqi forces wi
fighting in defense of their own soft for the first
war and may fight harder than in Iran, Troop morale
fragile, however, and is likely to plummet quickly i
Iranians achieve an early breakthrough. Iraqi comma
appear to have improved their perform&nae since the
Khorramshahr and there are weak epote:in critical ar
Iraqi defenses northeast of Basrah. Per this reason
the Iranians will be able to aohivve a breakthrough',
the Iraqis, and drive to the Shatt al:Arab, albeit a
heavy casualties.
NESA M 82 1
onfrontinq
is to be the
ently
inflicting
it reinforocd
pas viat a
Iraqi
not occur,
across the
to
is proepeote
orate in
ZZ be
ime in the
probably is
the
ders do riot
fall of
tae of the
we estimate
out maneuver
the cost of
 Sa'ckgrourid
Since late May 1981 Iranian troops have consistently
defeated the Iraqis in a series of engagements which have grown
steadily in size and ferocity. By this past spring the Iranians
were employing their forces on a large-scale. During the battle
of Oezful in March some 50,000 Iranian troops and an 4nknown
number of irregulars* launched a twos-pr.ongged assault ver 80
kilometers of the front. The fighting lasted about t o weeks.
In May some 70,000 Iranian troops, reinforced with it equlars,
mounted a two pronged offensive north of Khorramshahr along some
60 kilometers of the front. The fighting lasted four weeks.
Iraqi regular units fought hard during these att cks, but
mistakes by senior Iraqi commanders and low troop mor le,
particularly among militia and reserve forces, were c uciel to
Iran's success.';Senior Iraqi commanders `ailed to de by their
troops properly before both the battles of: Dezful and
Khorramshahr, stationing poorly trained militia and r serve
forces at critical points on the battlefield. Reserv s were
committed either too eay.ly or too late: and at the wrc,q places.
Iraqi troops, particularly the militia, and reserve forces,
apparently have been reluctant to die for Iranian to ritory
Seddam has consistently indicated he would return to Iran in a
peace settlement. hs a result& the reserve and midi is troops
often
Least as many irregulars attacking along..a 90 kilome
The troops will be supported by about '300 pieces of
400 armored vehicles. Iraq has over 100,000 reqular
supported by 250 artillery pieces and,some 900 armor
defending the city. Baghdad's forces also have cons
elaborate system of trenches, anti-tank.ditches, and
the border during the past month in addition to a fi
existing canal.
robably at
er front.
rtillery and
troops
d vehicles
ructcd an
berms along
odinq an
The exact number of irregulars involved in Irania military
operations is unknown, but apparently at least equal to the
number of regular troops involved in any offensive.
abandoned their positions at critical times.
 Iran ~lso may launch diversionary 't'acks alonq
east of Al Amarah and near )asr?e Shirin. Only modem
forces are stationed in these locations and the attad
limited.
Iran will attack all along the border opposite
Its main effort will be along three axes, An Irani'
division has been concentrated opposite as_ weakpoint
defenses about 45 kilometers northeast of Basrah whet
antitank ditch and trenches are incomplete, Once t
"gap" in the defenses the division probably will try
Iraqi defenders to the north and south. The divisio
try to reach thf, bridges across the Shatt al Arab ant
flooded canal northeast of the city, key choke point
lines of retreat..
A second thrust probably will be made by two in
divisions close' to the Shatt al Arab. The northern
these two divis:zons will try to. reach they bridges ac
flooded canal, t:hile the southern most division trie
south of the canal. An advance of about ten kilomet
the border
t Iranian
ks will he
asrah, but
armored
n Iraq's
e both the
rough this
to roll?un
also may
across the
on Iraqi
antry
most of
oss the
to advance
rs south of
the canal would flank nearly all Iraqi defenses fartler north and
threaten-,the roads leading from Aaarah to the Iraqi orces.
A third, and probably less Intense push, likely will he made
by an armored 'division against the Iraqi forces fart test north
along the border. The attack will be aimed at pinni g down these
forces. Tehran probably does not expect a hreakthro qh here
beoause Iraqi defenses in this sector area well preps ed.
Iran probably will not push beyond the Shatt al Arab
opposite Basrah, in the initial phases of its attack unless the
Iraqis collapse quickly. There is no indication thr+ the
Iranians are preparing the types of bridges needed t cross the
Shett. In addition, if the Iranians esnc.ounter stubh rn Iraqi
resistance and the fighting is prolonged, Tehran's f rtes would
need time to reqroup and resupply before' crossing th Shatt.
The Iranians probably hope that sin advance to the Shatt and
a crushing defeat for the Iraqi Army will spark a coup against
Saddam Hussein or possibly a Shia uprising in Bassrah to that
event Iranian units could enter the city unopposed. In any case,
the city, Iraq's second largest, would he comuletel at the a cZ
of Iranian artillery fire from across the Shatt.
lq~
 Should Saddam not Nil, Lhs : I. ?r s..4..,..
whether to cross the Shatt or to move forces north an
Iraq east of Al ? A;:;h or nu:, , = Tf the
cross the Shatt tFley likely will swine &out.hand west
to surround it. They probably will try to avoid a di
on the city itself to avoid inflictinq a large number
casualties on Iraqi Shia civilians-'the very people I
to be liberating--and to avoid costly street fightinq
advance south and. west of the city probably would res
numbers of Iraqi civilian end military r#-fugees flees
Kuwait, Iranian forces arriving at the Kuwaiti border
Iranians movinq into Iraq's main oilfields in the sou
Unless the Iraqi Army collapses, there is almost
of an Iranian advance toward the Shia holy shrines at
logistic difficulties.
Karbala or an advance on Baghdad in the near term be
I~ca~ i Pros ects
Iraq's chances of staving off defeat rest on th
its commanders to avoid making crucial mistakes and
of its troops. The outlook is not good. Iraqi comm
not made any move to close the "gap" in their defens
the possiblity exists that the weak point is actually
is not likely based on Iraq's performance In the war
Baghdad also has let the Iranians achieve a numerics
in artillery, and Iranian use of Artillery is fax mo
than Iraq's. Moreover, the Iraqis may have failed t
substantially reinforce their armored units around 8
ARCido
push into
Tranians do
of the city
ect assault
of
an " claims
An
it. in large
q into
and the
h.
no chance
Najaf or
use of
ability of
n the tibut ale
nde'rs have
S. Although
a trap, this
thus far.
superiority ?
e effective
crack Infantry troops,~a crucial failing in past battles.
Although reporting has been contradictory, Iraq
morale probably has improved somewhat since the with
Iran and Baghdad's forces will he defendinq their ow
for the first time in the war. Nonetheless, morale
quickly should the Iranians achieve a breakthrough a
units once-again find themselves outflanked, forced
or surrounded.
If the Iraqis hold inititally, however, a long
battle is likely to ensue. The concentration of Ira
around Basrah is greater than in any previous battle
numbers of reinforcements are available and concentr
artillery lire and bombing attacks could inflict mas
on the Iranians and force Tehran to rethink its stra
rx~.~;.+r.fa=fit ..;~~ ~ :i!?~
I' Ilr, ; .i
troop
rawal from
territory
ill plummet
d Iraqi
o retreat,
ruelinq
I forces
[.a rqe
ted
ive I
eqy?
 ..... rcri :.Ilon. under
niS1nf Antitank dllch
Territory held by Iraq
e