THE SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO THE NATIONALIST OCCUPIED ISLANDS OFF THE COAST OF MAINLAND CHINA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005273809
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: August 25, 2008
• Case Number: F-2008-01302
• Publication Date: September 10, 1954

APPROVED FOR RELEASED
DATE: 07-18-2008
SPECiA1."
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 100-4/1-54
THE SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO THE
NATIONALIST OCCUPIED ISLANDS OFF
THE COAT OF MAINLAND .INA
(This estimate supplements Special National Intelligence
Estimate Number 100-4-54, and is a Summary thereof)
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Depdrtments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 10 September 1954. Concurring were the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director
for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. For the dissenting view
of theAssistant Chief of Staff, G-2, with respect to Chinese
Communist intentions, see footnotes to paragraphs 3 and 5.
The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC
and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of investiga-
tion, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
Retain class'n 0 Change f ify to
Declassify ? In part and exclSe as shown
EO 12356, Sec. 1.3
FCC/HOR by
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COPY N0.
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IRECTOR ONE
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 DISSEMINATION NOTICE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of
may be authorized, by the following officials within their respective departments
sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination
1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
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e. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint- Staff
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for. the Department: of"the Air Force;
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State
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3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain
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June 1953.
WARNING
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This material contains information affecting.
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794,,; the trans=
mission or revelation of which in any manner..'
1. 71
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 SUMMARY AND SUPPLEMENT TO SNIE 100-4-54:
THE SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO THE NATIONALIST
pli-
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22
OCCUPIED ISLANDS OFF THE COAST OF MAINLAND CHINA 1
We believe that:
1. The Chinese . Communist . objective is to
take over the Nationalist occupied islands at
some time, and they look upon such action
as an essential part of the,. consolidation of
their control of all China.
2. The Chinese Communists have the military
potential to seize and hold the Nationalist
occupied. islands against any defense which
the Chinese Nationalists alone can make
available. . In the case of Quemoy, which is
well defended, a successful assault would be
difficult and time consuming and would in-
volve particularly heavy losses. (The ques-
tion as to whether the Nationalist occupied
islands could be held by the Chinese Nation-
alists if the United States supplied naval and
air support, or naval, air, and ground support,
is a matter to be passed upon by the Joint
Chiefs rather than by the Intelligence Ad-
visory Committee.)
3. Peiping presently believes that an all-out
effort to take the Nationalist occupied islands
might well involve a substantial risk of war
with the US, and they will continue in this.
belief so long as sizeable US forces are main-
The Chinese Nationalists maintain regular forces
on the Tachens, Nan Chi Shan, Matsu, White
Dog, and the Quemoys (Chinmens). These is-
lands are referred to as the Nationalist occupied
islands. This phrase does not include Taiwan
and the Pescadores.
tamed in the Western Pacific. and so long as
the Chinese Communists believe that these
forces may be used to support a Nationalist
position on the Nationalist. occupied islands.
We believe that the Chinese Communists de-
sire to avoid a war with the US.2
4. Nevertheless, as long. as the Chinese Com-
munists are uncertain as to US inntentions,
they will be increasingly willing. to undertake
probing actions designed to test US intentions
and to conduct raids against the Nationalist
occupied islands, to occupy undefended ad-
jacent islands, and to increase air, naval, and
artillery activities. If such actions encounter
no appreciable US counteraction the Chinese
Communists will probably increase the scale
of their attacks even to the extent of attempt-
ing to seize major Nationalist occupied.
islands.
'The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, believes that
paragraph 3 should read as follows:
"We believe that Peiping presently estimates
that efforts to take the Nationalist occupied
islands would involve a risk of war with the US.
The Communists probably will continue to feel
that this risk exists so long as sizeable US forces
are maintained in the Western Pacific, and so
long as US policy to support Nationalist China
remains unchanged, We believe that the Chi-
nese Communists desire to avoid. war with the
US. However, we believe that in spite of the
Communist feeling that risk of war will be in-
volved, they are likely to attempt to seize some
of the Nationalist occupied islands."
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 5. The Chinese Communists would probably
be deterred from an all-out attempt to seize
the occupied islands if they were convinced
that the result of such action would be mili-
tary counteraction. by the US including at-
tacks on bases on the China mainland. They
would be so convinced if the present US guar-
antee with respect to Taiwan and the Pesca-
dores were extended to the Nationalist occu-
pied islands and were made known to the
6. In the absence of a prior US guarantee,.a
takeover of the islands by a successful Chi-
nese Communist attack . would have serious
psychological and prestige consequences for
the Chinese National Government and would
result in some loss of US prestige. However,
these consequences would be somewhat miti-
gated for the United States and possibly for
the Chinese National Government 4 if the mili-
tary garrisons and civil population of the
islands were voluntarily evacuated and the
reason for such action clearly set forth, and
if simultaneously US policy. with respect to
Taiwan and the Pescadores were reaffirmed.
If the islands should fall to the Communists
after the US Government had guaranteed
their defense, the adverse effects on the
Chinese National Government would be great-
ly intensified and US prestige throughout the
world would suffer a serious blow.
7. If, as a result of military action in regard
to these islands, the US became involved in
large-scale fighting with Communist. China,
this would have serious repercussions upon
the conduct of US policy in other parts of the
world. Moreover, it must be assumed that in
this case Communist China would do all in
its: power to make the Sino-Soviet Treaty
operative.
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, believes that
paragraph 5 should read as' follows:
"The Chinese Communists might not be deterred
from an attempt to seize some of the occupied
islands even though we announce that the result
of such action will be military counteraction by
the US including attacks on bases on. the China
mainland. They probably would not be con-
vinced of US military counteraction if the pres-
ent US guarantee with respect to Taiwan and
the Pescadores were extended to the Nationalist
occupied islands and were made known to the
Chinese Communists."
4 The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; and the
Director of Naval Intelligence, believe that these
consequences would not be mitigated for the
Chinese National Government.
s.