NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 22 APRIL 1980

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005148708
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2010
• Case Number: F-2007-00460
• Publication Date: April 22, 1980

Director of
V:Uyl~ p-' Intelligence
APPROVED FOR RELEASE^
DATE: 01-20-2010
. ationa.l Intelligence Daily
;Pop Secret
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
 Situation Report
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Briefs and Comments
South Yemen: Change of Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
USSR - North Yemen: Soviet Military Aid . . . . . . . . . 5
Japan-Iran: Preparing for Oil Cutoff . . . . . . . . . . 6
West Germany: Economic Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Nicaragua: Mounting Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
South Africa: Declining Support for Insurgents . . . . . 10
Morocco: Breaking Diplomatic Ties . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
West Germany: Prominent Opposition Politician Dies . . . 11
NATO: Theater Nuclear Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
 Despite repeated appeals from President Bani-Sadr and other
government Leaders, clashes between Leftists and Muslim extremists
are continuing on university campuses in several cities.
yesterday to quell the fighting at one university.
In Tehran, the Revolutionary Guards had to intervene
the leftist Fedayeen has taken con-
clashes in high schools near Shiraz.
trol of parts of Tehran University and is urging all Ira-
nians to support the leftist students. The situation in
Tabriz is also said to be tense, and there have been
criticizing the regime for purging the campuses.
The clashes are spreading beyond the campuses as
Muslims organize a general attack on the left. In Tehran,
Muslim extremists reportedly burned down the office of the
pro-Soviet Tudeh Party newspaper on Saturday. The Tudeh
has agreed to close its offices at universities but is
situation.
Ayatollah Khomeini yesterday strongly endorsed a
purge of all Western and Communist influences from the
universities. By urging students to fight the left, he
probably has undercut Bani-Sadr's efforts to calm the
Elections
A prominent newspaper in Tehran quoted Interior
Ministry officials yesterday as indicating that the
second round of legislative elections will be postponed
until 9 May. Last week a senior official of the Islamic
Republic Party urged such a postponement to give the
government more time to investigate charges of vote-
tampering in the first round. (U)
1 'Pop Seeret-
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 Iraq-Iran
The fact of Sadr's execution probably also will
lead to more anti-Iraqi violence in Lebanon and other
countries. Rumors of his death have already caused seri-
ous fighting in Lebanon between the Shia Amal Movement
and the Iraqi-backed Arab Liberation Front.
The Baathist government in Iraq recently has begun
an intensive crackdown on Shia dissidents in response to
an increase in terrorism over the past few weeks.
22 April 1980
 SOUTH YEMEN: Change of Leadership
The resignation on Sunday of South Yemeni President Abd al-
Fatah Ismail, and his replacement--at Least temporarily--by Prime
Minister AU Nasir Muhammad aZ-Hasani, probably does not by itself
signal a fundrnncntrr_Z change in South Yemen's relationship with the
We have no information on the circumstances sur-
rounding Ismail's resignation. He has a history of poor
health, and his resignation for that reason--as cited by
the press in South Yemen and the USSR--is plausible.
In the past few months the factional infighting in
South Yemen has intensified as Ismail has continually
sought to maintain the influence of his fellow northern-
ers in the party and government. These efforts have
been challenged by native southerners, led by Hasani and
Defense Minister Ali Antar.
The southerners also regard Ismail's advocacy of
early unity with North Yemen as a threat to their posi-
tions. They believe that a united government would in-
clude more North Yemenis. Relations with the USSR have
apparently not been a source of dispute as both sides
seem satisfied with South Yemen's close ties to the
Soviets.
Hasani is a political chameleon, and comes from a
prominent tribal family. Although Hasani is less revo-
lutionary than the ideologue, Ismail, he has had good
relations with the Soviets.
The new president may seek better relations with
neighboring Arab states--at least on the surface. Such
a policy probably would be in line with Soviet eff
at improving relations with peninsular states.
22 April 1980
 It remains to be seen whether Hasani will stay on
top. Ali Antar, the strongman of the southern faction,
may want the presidency himself. Hasani was appointed
to the presidency only until the next meeting of the
Supreme People's Council, which is scheduled for August.
Although the Soviets have long supported Ismail,
there has been no indication that they have major reser-
vations about Hasani. They probably are concerned over
the infighting, and will use their substantial military
and economic assistance in South Yemen as leverage to
protect their position there.
4 ,pct
22 April 1980
 Saudi Arabia
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626972 4-80
 USSR - NORTI YEMEN: Soviet Military Aid
The Soviets continue to deliver military equipment and pro-
vide training for North Yemeni personnel under the provisions of
last year's $350 million military aid agreement.
Under the contract, the Soviets have delivered at
least 10 SU-22 fighter-bombers, nine MIG-21s, and up to
100 T-55 tanks.
North Yemen also has received six ZSU-23/4 self-propelled
antiaircraft guns.
SA-2 air defense missile equipment obtained from the
Soviets will be deployed at the Al Hudaydah air base.
the Soviets are planning to in-
stall a coastal radar system--consisting of six or seven
radars--extending from the Saudi border to Bab al Mandab.
One unit may already be in place at Al Hudaydah.
The Soviets have expanded their military training
program that began last October.
since late last year the number of Soviet
advisers in the country has increased from 120 to around
300. Approximately 250 North Yemenis are being trained
We expect Soviet military assistance and training
to continue at a high level. Saudi Arabia has proposed
that the Soviets be replaced with non-Communist advisers,
but Sana is unlikely to go along.
22 April 1980
 JAPAN-IRAN: Preparing for Oil Cutoff
The National Iranian Oil Company's refusal yesterday to Zoad
three Japan-bound tankers may be intended primarily to force Japa-
nese acquiescence to the $2.50 per barrel increase adopted by Iran
on 1 April.
Japan's oil companies have been under pressure from
the powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry
to rebuff the price increase in part to avoid antagoniz-
ing the US.
If Tehran completely suspends oil exports to Japan
or breaks trade relations, Japan would be in a good po-
sition to weather these developments.
Iran yesterday warned Tokyo that the substantial
Japanese investment in the huge petrochemical complex
not yet completed at Bandar Khomeini may be lost if
Japan goes along with US-proposed sanctions. Such warn-
ings have been frequent, however, as the project has
lagged, and Japanese officials so far, appear to be
taking this latest threat in stride.
22 April 1980
 West Germany: Selected Economic Indicators
Real GNP Growth Consumer Price Inflation Unemployment Rate Current Account Balance
Percent Percent Percent Billion US $
1 1 -11.7 1
 WEST GERMANY: Economic Growth
With elections scheduled for October, Chancellor Schmidt's
government wants to put a sharp limit on unfavorable economic trends
cost of imports, especially oil.
West German measures against inflation probably will
slow economic growth to only about 2 percent in 1980.
Although the country has an enviable record on inflation
and unemployment, Schmidt is concerned about the 5- to
5.5-percent increase expected in consumer prices and the
upward drift in unemployment. Prospects appear fairly
good for holding wage increases within a range that will
not add substantially to price increases, but Bonn can do
little about the major cause of inflation--the rising
that can be exploited by the opposition.
ance from environmentalists.
The government is planning no basic changes in its
energy program, which has so far worked well in holding
down oil consumption. The government also has been
counting on increasing the use of coal and nuclear
energy, but this strategy is encountering stiff resist-
cally critical figure of 1 million.
Schmidt is likely to take fiscal measures to stimu-
late renewed growth in 1981. Assuming oil prices rise
no more than 10 percent next year, inflation should drop
to less than 5 percent. Unemployment, on the other hand,
probably will get worse, perhaps approaching the politi-
22 April 1980
 22 April 1980
 NICARAGUA: Mounting Opposition
Opposition to the Sandinistas continues to build on several
fronts.
The private sector also may attempt to capitalize
on what is likely to be increased international criticism
of widening judicial irregularities. Nicaragua's
"popular tribunals"--under public pressure to punish
the approximately 7,500 former members of the National
Guard and Somoza associates--are handing down stiff
penalties with little regard for legal safeguards.
La Prensa, the only major independent newspaper, was
closed temporarily over the weekend when its pro-Sandinista
workers seized control. The newspaper is owned by the
Chamorro family, and its takeover was linked to the
resignation of junta member Violeta De Chamorro on
Saturday and to the family's decision to take a line
more vigorously independent of the government.
22 April-_19B-0
 SOUTH AFRICA: Declining Support for Insurgents
South African insurgency Leaders are dismayed at the failure
of the Presidents of the Frontline States to move immediately from
success in, Zimbabwe to vigorous support for the insurgency against
Pretoria.
South Africa's neighbors fear economic and military
reprisals from Pretoria. Zimbabwe's Prime Mini
Mugabe wants to rebuild his country's economy
and has publicly stated
that he will not provide staaina bases for South African
liberation movements.
Mozambique's President Machel, who also wants to
improve economic conditions, has curtailed African
National Congress activity
Botswana has been moving South African refugees,
including African National Congress cadre, to a reset-
tlement camp far from the border, thereby hampering
infiltration into South Africa and preventing African
National Congress recruits from moving on to training
in other countries.
Several black African nations that are not econom-
ically dependent upon South Africa are more inclined to
aid the liberation movements, but they are disenchanted
with the factional strife among the insurgents--particu-
larly the Pan-Africanist Congress--and the apparent lack
of domestic support for both exile groups.
Both groups may believe that they must carry out
spectacular operations in South Africa or risk losing
foreign support. Recent attacks against a bank and
several police stations have demonstrated that internally
based guerrillas are still able occasionally to circumvent
elaborate South African security.
22 April 1980
 Top Seer-et-_
MOROCCO: Breaking Diplomatic Ties
Morocco has broken diplomatic relations with Libya
and recalled its Ambassador to Syria following the deci-
sion of the radical Arab Steadfastness Front last week
to recognize the Polisario Front's exile Saharan Demo-
cratic Arab Republic. In addition, Moroccan Foreign
Minister Boucetta announced yesterday that Rabat will
break relations with Cuba, which recognized the Saharan
Democratic Arab Republic last January following the Non-
aligned Summit in Havana. Although the Palestine
Liberation Organization also endorsed the radicals' de-
cision on the government-in-exile, Morocco evidently
will hold off on any action against the PLO until an
envoy from Yasir Arafat has had a chance to explain the
PLO's action.
WEST GERMANY: Prominent Opposition Politician Dies
The death on Sunday of Heinrich Koeppler, Christian
Democratic leader in North Rhine-Westphalia, will make
it more difficult for the party to unseat Chancellor
Schmidt's Social Democrats in the state election on
11 May--a contest widely regarded as a key indicator of
the federal vote in October. Kurt Biedenkopf, who is
likely to take over as opposition leader, is known for
his national ambitions and is less popular than Koeppler.
Biedenkopf also was an early prominent supporter of Franz
Josef Strauss for federal chancellor.
22 April 1980
 The future of NATO Theater Nuclear Force modernization is
being further clouded by Zack of progress on arms control, West
European fears that East-West difficulties could destroy detente,
and continuing political opposition in the countries in which the
missiles would be deployed. The aZZies still insist that the de-
cision made in December to modernize their Zong-range theater nu-
clear forces is linked to offers to negotiate with the Soviets on
limiting such weapons. While the aZZies blame the USSR for Zack
of progress on theater nuclear arms control, they are equally con-
cerned about US nonratification of SALT II, and they fear the US
reaction to Afghanistan could spill over into European security
issues.
Signaling West German eagerness to resume arms con-
trol talks, Chancellor Schmidt has proposed that both
sides freeze theater nuclear deployment "for a number of
years" while arms control negotiations take place.
Schmidt hopes to establish himself as the peace candidate
in the elections this October. Conservative opposition
leader Franz Josef Strauss has attacked Schmidt's new
initiative as a snub to NATO and the US.
The Chancellor maintains that his proposal does not
alter the NATO decision. The government has "clarified"
that Schmidt wants a halt in the Soviet theater nuclear
buildup over the next three years, before NATO's new mis-
siles are ready.
Schmidt may hope to demonstrate either that the
Soviets are willing to discuss theater nuclear forces
despite NATO's modernization decision or that Moscow is
not serious about arms control. He may reason that either
conclusion could increase support in NATO for theater nu-
clear modernization.
22 April-19W
 On the other hand, Schmidt may believe that the
present international atmosphere requires a shift in arms
control policies by both sides and that some new offer is
necessary to follow up NATO's offer in December to nego-
tiate theater nuclear limits. Schmidt cites both US non-
ratification of SALT II and Soviet unwillingness to
discuss long-range theater nuclear forces as obstacles
to the arms control process, and his new proposal for a
freeze conceivably could reflect a genuine retreat on
the question of deployment.
A freeze was specifically rejected during last
year's debate because it would be extremely difficult to
reverse. All allies would have to agree that arms con-
trol progress had been so minimal that NATO should end
the freeze.
Schmidt's initiative also may reflect differences
with the US. Last fall Bonn and Washington argued
whether the modernization decision should stress produc-
tion or deployment but finally agreed that arms control
progress might change deployment levels. Schmidt may
now see a need to reemphasize to the US and USSR the
link between arms control and deployment.
The Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy have their own
political problems with the issue and will watch Schmidt's'
position carefully. These three are the only allies that
can satisfy the West German condition for acceptance of
new missiles, that at least one other continental power
share basing responsibility.
The Hague is most unlikely to accept basing. Bel-
gium is no closer to basing the weapons than it was in
December, when it delayed its decision for six months.
Schmidt's recent statements will encourage Belgian offi-
cials to call for further postponement of their decision.
22 pApr-iI-PYN
 clear program.
Only Italy, therefore, now satisfies the West German
requirement. Continued Italian acceptance of basing de-
pends to a great extent on the Italian Communist Party's
continued tacit support for the Alliance's theater nu-
the vote.
Last year the Italian Communists voted against the
program in parliament, but consciously restricted their
opposition in order not to scuttle Italian participation.
Although Socialist Party leaders officially supported
theater nuclear participation, nearly half of the So-
cialist parliamentary delegation apparently defected on
The Italian Communist Party and many Socialists are
concerned about both superpowers' contributions to the
European regional arms race, and both oppose SS-20 de-
ployments and have urged Moscow to freeze them. The
Communists will continue to withhold support for Moscow's
position on NATO's modernization as long as the Soviets
remain intransigent on theater nuclear arms control.
Communist participation in the government.
Since the Italian Government cannot count on the
support of all Socialists, the Italian Communist Party
will exploit its theater nuclear position to strengthen
its claim to be a reliable NATO partner. The party may
even try to bargain for the lifting of US objections to
If Moscow were to accept Schmidt's proposal and
were to offer an SS-20 freeze, however, the Italian
Communist Party might oppose theater nuclear moderniza-
tion, especially if SALT II is still not ratified. The
Italian Government is already worried that the Soviets
might offer an SS-20 freeze this spring.
22 April 1980