NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 9 APRIL 1980

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005148488
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2010
• Case Number: F-2007-00460
• Publication Date: April 9, 1980

Director of
W~0 Intelligence
APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:
01-20-2010
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
9 April 1980
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 Situation Report
Iran o 0 0 0 o a o o e o 0 0 o e v e o 0 ? o 0 0 o e o 1
Briefs and Comments
Syria: Assad Cracks Down a o o v o v o e v e a o 0 0 0 0 3
Cuba: Possible Large-Scale Emigration
Algeria-Netherlands: Gas Exports v o 0 0 o e e e< o> 0 6
Morocco - Western Sahara: Military Activity e o e a o 0 8
USSR - Southeast Asia: Firyubin's Overtures o 0 o e o 0 8
Special Analysis
USSR: Suppression of Dissidents e e v o a o< e e e e< 9
9 April 1980
 Iranian hardliners are confident that their political position
has been strengthened by the US sanctions.
Both Ayatollah Khomeini and the militants believe
that the break in diplomatic ties with the US advances
their efforts to eliminate American influence. The mili-
tants, moreover, probably hope that the break will under-
mine President Bani-Sadr's position and make further
negotiations with the US impossible.
Bani-Sadr told Iranians yesterday that the US moves
mean "war," suggesting that he intends to take a tougher
position toward the US in order to improve his domestic
standing. His clerical opponents, meanwhile, probably
will continue to try to reduce him to a figurehead.
Tehran has urged Iranians to prepare for sacrifices
and to maintain discipline against the US. Iran has also
threatened to cut off oil exports to any country that
backs Washington.
International Reactions
The USSR continues to place the responsibility for
the failure to resolve the hostage crisis squarely on the
US. A TASS broadcast yesterday referred to the Iranian
leadership?s readiness to solve the hostage issue as
soon as the US shows a "constructive approach." Soviet
broadcasts yesterday in Farsi cited US press reports
concerning US plans for a naval blockade. (U)
Moscow probably anticipates that the moderates in
Tehran will lose ground to hardline elements who oppose
any reconciliation with the US. The Soviets have been
concerned that Bani-Sadr and Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh
were willing to settle the hostage crisis and possibly
set the stage for improved US-Iranian relations.
9 April 1980
 Canada yesterday announced that it is consulting
with its NATO allies on "the possibility of further ac-
tion against Iran" should it continue to hold the US
hostages. (U)
Australian Foreign Minister Peacock yesterday said
that Canberra is responding to the US moves with a com-
prehensive review of all Australian relationships with
Iran. The cabinet will convene on Monday to consider de-
cisions on a new policy.
The Chinese press has reported the break in diplo-
matic ties without comment. (U)
Pakistani President Zia said yesterday that there
will be "no lack of assistance" from Islamabad for Tehran,
but he did not directly refer to the US sanctions. (U)
Relations with Iraq
Tehran and Baghdad kept up their propaganda attacks
on each other yesterday. Khomeini urged Iraqis to over-
throw the Baathist regime and Iraqi President Saddam
Husavn Promised Iraq would not be intimidated by Iran.
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9 April 1980
 President Assad's decision to use sweeping repressive measures
against his opponents in urban areas carries grave risks.
Armored and artillery units moved last weekend into
Aleppo, a stronghold of Sunni Muslim opposition to Assad's
minority Alawite regime. A 24-hour curfew has been im-
posed, and military checkpoints have been established
throughout the city. House-to-house searches for arms
and suspected dissidents apparently have resulted in
numerous arrests.
Hamah, another center of Sunni agitation in recent
weeks, has been sealed off and is said to be under a
curfew. The cities of Latakia and Idlib reportedly also
will be isolated and searched.
If largely Sunni regular Army enlisted personnel
are ordered to fight their civilian coreligionists, they
may desert with their arms to join the opposition.
Although Assad may be able to quell civil unrest in the
short run, his resort to force will only increase popular
resentment and almost certainly lead ultimately to more
widespread opposition.
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9 April 1980
 CUBA: Possible Large-Scale Emigration
The 10,000 Cubans encamped at the Peruvian Embassy in Havana
represent only a fraction of those who would leave the island if
permission were granted.
Cuba views large-scale emigration as a safety valve
for domestic discontent, in this case caused by economic
difficulties. The removal of the security force from the
Embassy last weekend probably was calculated to precipi-
tate a crisis and force the US and other countries to ac-
cept sizable numbers of new refugees.
In 1965, when Fidel Castro opened the Port of
Carmarioca to anyone who wished to leave, chaos ensued
as thousands arrived in a matter of days. Havana and
Washington subsequently agreed to an airlift that re-
sulted in the departure of 360,000 Cubans between 1965
and 1973. The Castro regime probably assumes that at
least that many would leave now if given the opportunity;
in the past year, illegal departures have increased
sharply.
Although another major exodus would be embarrassing,
it would help Havana reduce demand for scarce goods and
services and would decrease the motivation for crimes
and escape attempts. Without a major emigration, the
regime probably will have to impose even harsher repres-
sive measures, which could prompt international criticism
from the left.
Pressure is likely to build on the US to accept
many of the would-be refugees. Peru has convoked a
meeting of the Andean Pact to discuss the problem, but
probably few of the members--with the possible exce tion
of Venezuela--will accept more than a token number.
9 April 1980
 5
9 April 1980
 ALGERIA-NETHERLANDS: Gas Exports
Algeria, the Netherlands, and Norway are pressing to raise
the price of their natural gas exports, which account for a Large
share of West European supplies, to the level of crude oil prices.
Algiers, which supplies about 15 percent of French
gas requirements, reportedly has suspended liquefied
natural gas shipments to France, citing technical prob-
lems at the Skidka gas liquefaction plant. It has also
cut off US gas deliveries equal to about 1 percent of
US consumption and is threatening to suspend sales to
other West European customers. The Algerians are seeking
an increase from $2 to $3 per million Btu to $6 per mil-
lion Btu--a price roughly equivalent to that of crude
Netherlands Economics Minister van Aardenne has
threatened to cut off Dutch exports to foreign customers
if they refuse to accept an increase on new export con-
tracts from an average price of $2.50 per million Btu to
about $5.50 per million Btu. The Netherlands is Western
Europe's largest supplier of natural gas, providing most
of Belgium's gas supply, 40 percent of French and West
German supplies, and about 15 percent of Italian supplies.
Norway has told oil companies that they will be
seeking parity between oil and gas prices, but thus far
no action has been taken. (U)
on pricing.
Algerian officials reportedly have also expressed
interest in forming a gas exporters' cartel. We have no
evidence that other major gas-exporting countries, in-
cluding Mexico, are yet thinking along these lines, al-
though they have taken part in informal consultations
9 April 1980
 9 April 1980
 Portugal
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 MOROCCO - WESTERN SAHARA: Military Activity
A newly assembled Moroccan task force reportedly
is preparing to relieve the garrison of Zaag in south-
eastern Morocco, where some 4,000 soldiers have been
isolated by Polisario Front guerrillas. Subordinate
units of the task force, which apparently consists of
6,000 troops, have been congregating near Goulimine for
about two weeks. Although the Moroccans hope to score a
major victory, the timing of the operation coincides
with Polisario plans to concentrate activities in the
same general area.
USSR - SOUTHEAST ASIA: Firyubin's Overtures
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin's recent
swing through Southeast Asia showed the Soviet flag
after Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua's visit to
the region last month, but it apparently accomplished
little else. Stopping in Bangkok, Singapore, Hanoi, and
Phnom Penh, Firyubin attempted to project an image of
Soviet moderation on Southeast Asian issues to counter-
act concerns within the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations about Soviet intentions after Afghanistan. While
in Bangkok and Singapore, he argued for recognition of
the Vietnamese-installed Heng Samrin government in Kampu-
chea and urged his hosts to ease strains with Vietnam
by concluding bilateral nonaggression treaties. He
repeated Moscow's position on the "irreversibility" of
the situation in Kampuchea and offered only the standard
Soviet explanations of the invasion of Afghanistan. His
visit to Singapore followed bitter attacks on Soviet ex-
pansionism by senior Singapore officials and was partic-
ularly unproductive.
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9 April 1980
 Soviet Jewish Emigration
Jan Mar May Jul Sep Nov
 USSR: Suppression of Dissidents
As relations between the US and USSR have become more strained,
Moscow has intensified its campaign against the Soviet dissident
movement. The authorities have detained more than 40 dissidents
since the crackdown began in October 1979, concentrating particularly
on human rights activists such as members of the Helsinki Act
Monitoring Group. The activists have been subjected to continual
harassment, including repeated house searches and close surveillance.
The greatest blow to the dissidents was the exile
in January of Andrey Sakharov to Gorkiy, which removed
the human rights movement's most prominent spokesman.
He is now isolated from contact with all but family
In the past, Sakharov's remarks automatically com-
manded the attention of Western correspondents in Moscow
and shaped world opinion against Soviet tactics toward
dissent. Without Sakharov, the members of the Moscow
Helsinki group believe that they are being ignored by
Western media at a time when the group is being decimated
by arrests.
There was little publicity in the West when Malva
Landa, one of the most prominent members of the Moscow
group, recently was sentenced to three years of internal
exile for "slandering the Soviet state." Trials of sev-
eral other human rights activists in custody should follow
shortly.
The Soviets had been expected to remove likely
troublemakers before the Olympics, but the severity of
this latest campaign appears aimed at paralyzing all
forms of dissent. Following Sakharov's exile, a number
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9 April 1980
 of dissident activists reportedly were warned by Soviet
officials that the action taken against Sakharov demon-
strated that the authorities are prepared to take measures
against any member of the dissident movement. Some re-
portedly were told that the authorities expect to "finish
off" the movement within a couple of months.
Dissidents Discouraged
most dissidents believe
focusing on the main problems in the USSR.
that the Soviet human rights movement will survive the
crackdown, while others are less optimistic that it will
be able to continue in its present form. The Soviet
intelligentsia has allegedly become disenchanted with
the movement, partly because the dissidents are preoc-
cupied with the arrests of their colleagues rather than
base than does dissent over human rights.
dissident movements, which apparently have a broader
In addition, the current climate of cynicism and
apathy among students has resulted in fewer young people
being drawn to the dissidents. Those who do become
activists are attracted by the nationalist and religious
the human rights movement has lost much
of its sense of purpose and is being forced into a period
of relative inactivity.
Restrictions on Jewish Emigration
Although not directly linked with the crackdown on
dissidents, new restrictions on Jewish emigration report-
edly were introduced about the same time. A reduction
in the number of visas became evident last November when
the total dropped to 3,600 from the year's monthly average
of 4,200. A slow decline has continued through March,
lowering the total for the first quarter of 1980 by more
than 25 percent as compared with the same period last
The reduction is caused primarily by a severe
cutback in emigration from the Ukraine, a result of
strict enforcement of a regulation limiting sponsorship
of emigrants to immediate family members living in Israel.
9 April 1980
 Considerable variation in emigration practices is still
apparent among the Soviet republics, however, with the
majority showing a slight increase in the number of
emigrants this year.
9 April 1980
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