NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 5 APRIL 1980

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005104607
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2010
• Case Number: F-2007-00460
• Publication Date: April 5, 1980

Director of
Central
Intelligence
APPROVED FOR RELEASE^
DATE: 01-20-2010
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
5 April 1980
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 Situation Reports
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
USSR-Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Briefs and Comments
Rhodesia: Preparations for Independence . . . . . . . . . 4
South Africa: Terrorist Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Syria: Tension Continues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Turkey: Presidential Election Stalled . . . . . . . . . . 8
Mozambique: Pro-Soviet Ministers Replaced . . .
Yugoslavia: Nationalities Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Chad: Renewed Fighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Special Analysis
Nicaragua: Challenges for the Sandinistas . . . . . . . . 11
5 April 1980
 Tehran appears to be preparing for new US sanctions.
In Tehran yesterday, the emphasis in the traditional
Muslim prayers was on steadfastness and sacrifice. Aya-
tollah Khomeini reiterated that "American threats will
not make the slightest effect" on Iran's determination
to hold onto the hostages and warned that any move
against Iran wo lead to unrest in the Persian Gulf
states.
mand that Ayatollah Khomeini rule on the issue.
The Revolutionary Council's refusal on Thursday to
agree to transfer the hostages will not be easily re-
versed. The hardliners led by Ayatollah Beheshti seem
certain to continue to block any final decision and de-
Economic Activities
is skeptical that the Na-
tional Iranian Oil Company can provide the security and
labor stability necessary for the drilling program that
even oil company officials have admitted is needed to
continue present levels of production. These officials
agree that foreign assistance is needed to mobilize a
5 April 1980
 drilling program but say that Iran has two years to ac-
complish the program. Some oil buyers, however, feel
Iran has less than a year before exports fall because of
field problems.
there is little pro-
uctive oil drilling being done in Iran. Spare parts
shortages and other problems have kept all but one or
ighly
two rigs out of service. Industry sources are h
skeptical of new oil finds reported by Tehran.
of living in Iran is as high as it was before the revo-
lution in large part because of government subsidies of
food items and rising wages in many sectors.
if the US and its allies cooperate on economic
sanctions, the Iranians will turn to the USSR and East
European countries to make up shortages.
5 April 1980
 Economic Developments
Moscow agreed early this month to provide Afghanistan
with $156 million of commodity assistance without charge.
We believe much of this assistance will consist of food
and fuels. About 70 percent of the aid is scheduled for
delivery by 1 June; the remainder by the end of the
year.
This action follows several years in which Afghani-
stan has run a large trade deficit with the USSR. In
the first half of 1979, the deficit amounted to $60 mil-
lion; in 1978, nearly $100 million; and in 1977, about
$50 million. In earlier years, as part of its $1.3 bil-
lion economic aid program in Afghanistan, the USSR pro-
vided some $10 million of commodity assistance annually
3 5 April 1980
 RHODESIA: Preparations for Independence
Prime Minister - designate Mugabe, who takes office on
18 April. is concentrating on learning how the government func-
tions.
The country's new leaders, whose talents and temp-
eraments vary widely, have no experience running a gov-
ernment. Because of their years in exile, they also have
little recent first-hand knowledge of Rhodesia. Mugabe
is aware of these weaknesses and has told his cabinet to
consult with the white permanent secretaries of the rel-
evant departments before bringing problems to him.
Home Minister - designate Joshua Nkomo is frustrated
because his party's poor electoral showing does not en-
title it to a greater role in the government. Nkomo is
also bitter over the fact that control over rural local
government and the police Special Branch are being taken
away from his ministry.
Nkomo nonetheless has not threatened to pull out of
the government, and probably still harbors some hope of
replacing Mugabe if he falters. We see no parliamentary
crisis in the offing, however, that could make Nkomo an
attractive alternative.
Any successor to Mugabe would most likely come from
Mugabe's party, which largely represents the country?s
70-percent Shona-speaking majority. Tension between
Mugabe and Nkomo, however, could foster antagonism be-
tween their respective supporters. Such tension may
become more evident when the new government attempts
to make further progress toward integrating the various
armed forces in the country--Mugabe?s, Nkomo's, and the
white-led Rhodesian security forces.
Since the election, peace has returned to most of
the Rhodesian countryside. Although some violence con-
tinues, chiefly among rival black party supporters, cur-
fews have been lifted, road convoys discontinued, and
white reserves demobilized.
5 April 1980
 5 April 1980
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5 April 1980
 Top seevet
The attack yesterday on a police station outside
Johannesburg was the fourth against police facilities in
the past year, but the first in a white residential area.
The terrorists have been attacking in larger numbers and
using better weapons. The incident will reinforce white
South African fears of a surge in terrorist activities
following Robert Mugabe's election in Rhodesia. During
the attack, the terrorists scattered leaflets calling
for the release of an imprisoned African National Con-
gress leader. This action probably will allow the
government to crack down on several black organizations
campaigning for the release of ANC President Nelson Man-
dela, who has been imprisoned for the past 16 years.
Top s ,.t
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5 April 19H
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 Top Secret
The security situation in central and northern Syria
remains volatile, but Damascus is calm. A one-day gen-
eral strike shut down Aleppo on Monday despite the pres-
ence of the 3rd Armored Division and elite special forces.
Defense Minister Tlass and two senior Baath Party offi-
cials went to Aleppo Thursday to try to negotiate with
community leaders. Tension also remains high in Hamah,
another chronic trouble spot.
precipitate a government crisis.
After 18 ballots the Turkish parliament has yet to
elect a successor to President Koruturk, whose seven-
year term expires tomorrow. Under the constitution,
Senate Chairman Ihsan Caglayangil, a member of Prime
Minister Demirel's ruling Justice Party, will become
acting president until parliament selects a permanent
replacement. The nature and extent of Caglayangil's
powers under this arrangement are not clear, however,
and any attempt by him to exercise real authority could
able of agreeing on a compromise choice.
Lacking parliamentary majorities, Turkey's two ma-
jor parties must cooperate to garner the 318 votes needed
to elect a president. Opposition leader Ecevit has at
least indicated a willingness to consult with Demirel,
but the Prime Minister seems to be stalling in the hope
that Caglayangil or some other Justice Party member will
be elected to this prestigious post. Although the
Turkish military has so far remained aloof from the
maneuvering, the possibility of its involvement in the
election will increase if civilian leaders Prove incap-
Top sec t
5 April 1980
 MOZAMBIQUE: Pro-Soviet Ministers Replaced
President Machel on Thursday removed from the cab-
inet two of his chief pro-Soviet advisers, Planning
Minister Marcelino dos Santos and Information Minister
Jorge Rebelo, and appointed them to advisory positions
in the country's only political party. Dos Santos' re-
placement, Mario Machungo, has been deeply involved in
attempts to attract US investment to Mozambique. This
is the strongest indication to date that Machel wants
to liberalize Mozambique's economy and open the way for
improved relations with the West. The transfers are
5 April 1980
 A recent article in an influential Belgrade daily
newspaper about unrest and the trial of 50 ethnic Al-
banians in the autonomous province of Kosovo is causing
domestic problems. The party chief in Kosovo has pub-
licly condemned the article, and a spokesman for the
Foreign Secretariat stated in a press conference yester-
day that the newspaper's coverage of the events in Kosovo
was "unfounded." The government apparently wants to end
public discussion of the nationalities problem--poten-
tially the single most divisive issue the post-Tito
leadership will face. The regime may also fear that pub-
licity about the trial would cause friction with Albania,
which has sought to improve relations and reportedly
plans to send its Foreign Minister to Belgrade soon.
This would be the first visit by an Albanian official of
this level since Tirane broke relations with Belgrade in
1948.
CHAD: Renewed Fighting
the US and other countries.
French efforts to establish another truce collapsed
on Thursday, and intense fighting resumed between the
forces of Defense Minister Habre and President Goukouni.
The latest outbreak probably is the result of efforts by
Habre to prevent Goukouni from receiving reinforcements
of men and arms. Ndjamena is almost deserted, and an
estimated 100,000 Chadians have fled into northern
Cameroon. Cameroonian authorities have requested as-
sistance from international relief agencies and from
5 April 1980
 --Top rieeret-
NICARAGUA: Challenges for the Sandinistas
The Sandinistas have made major strides in developing a power
base, but continued economic disarray is causing popular resent-
ment. The need to respond to new challenges could place strains
on the collegial leadership.
Since their victory eight months ago over the Somoza
regime, the Sandinistas have concentrated on building their
power base in the military and security forces. Under
Humberto Ortega, the Sandinista People's Army has become
the primary security organization.
Some 100 Cuban instructors are helping transform
the disparate collection of guerrillas into a professional
military, and 200 to 300 Nicaraguan soldiers reportedly
are training in Cuba. Although poorly equipped even by
Central American standards, the Army has dealt effectively
with remnants of the National Guard.
Minister of Interior Tomas Borge--again with the
assistance of an estimated 100 Cuban advisers--has
established a formidable intelligence apparatus but has
been less successful in overseeing the development of a
police force. Partly as a result, the Sandinistas re-
cently have given new emphasis to building up a local
people's militia.
Borrowing heavily from Cuba's experience, the San-
dinistas have created mass organizations and tried to
use them to rally support for government programs. Fre-
quent purges in the local leadership of these organiza-
tions indicate that the Sandinistas continue to have
difficulty asserting central control.
Top Secret-
11
5 April 1980
 Tep t
Aided by Cuban specialists, the Sandinistas also
have given particular attention to creating a propaganda
mechanism. The government maintains a monopoly on tele-
vision broadcasting, and Radio Sandino and the Sandinista
newspaper offer a steady diet of Marxist-Leninist -
slanted news. Although Managua, continues to tolerate
private radio stations and one major independent news-
paper, press freedom has eroded in recent months.
The Sandinistas are moving toward a single-party
system dominated by the Sandinista National Liberation
Front. In mid-February the Front formalized its working
alliance with five small parties by creating the Patriotic
Bloc.
Centrist groups that did not align themselves with
the Front probably will be denied the seats assigned to
them in the quasi-legislative Council of State scheduled
to convene in May. The unity of the Front bloc has been
shaken, however, by Sandinista attacks on one of the
bloc's labor affiliates.
Economic Woes and the Private Sector
The economy remains in shambles, and increasing
numbers of Nicaraguans are blaming the Sandinistas. Many
technicians have emigrated, and businessmen have been
reluctant to rebuild without government guarantees
against nationalization. The proliferation of state
agencies has compounded production and distribution
problems.
Junta member Alfonso Robelo--an independent and an
opportunist--is attempting to take advantage of public
unrest. At a recent rally, he proclaimed the conversion
of his Nicaraguan Democratic Movement into an active
political party dedicated to ideological pluralism, free
elections, and respect for private property.
Robelo is serving as a rallying point for the middle
class and the private sector--the groups the Sandinistas
recognized at the outset as their potentially dangerous
12
5 April 1980
 adversaries. Robelo has stressed his continued commit-
ment to the revolution, however, and the Sandinistas are
unlikely to risk the political and economic costs of
ousting him from the junta.
lenging the Sandinistas' revolutionary credentials.
agitators, who have struck a sensitive nerve by chat-
The Sandinistas have made determined efforts to
expand their followers among the working class, which
they consider their natural constituency. Nonetheless,
they are meeting potentially serious opposition from
entrenched Communist labor leaders and from ultraleftist
exhortations to produce in conjunction with belt-tighten-
ing measures. The sharpest challenge to the Workers'
Central has come from the large Construction Workers'
Union, long associated with a Communist confederation.
The Sandinistas initially recruited--often by heavy-
handed means--about three-fourths of the country's orga-
nized workers into the Sandinista Workers' Central. Some
well-organized locals have resisted Sandinista incursions,
however, and labor generally is becoming impatient with
Opposition to the Sandinistas probably will inten-
sify in the months ahead. Some labor leaders, for
example, are biding their time in the belief that the
Front is becoming increasingly vulnerable. The need to
adjust in the face of new challenges could strain the
collegial leadership; the more doctrinaire Sandinistas
will press for increased repression,while others will
counsel a more pragmatic approach.
5 April 1980