NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 30 JANUARY 1982

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005065516
• Release Decision: IPPUB U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2010
• Case Number: F-2007-00446
• Publication Date: January 30, 1982

~ZELLICelc
F~ F
,~
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Director of
Central
Intelligence
1'~~aion~.l Intelligence Daily
~'aturday
3~' January :1982'
~oirs~rrsr-
:APPROVED FOR
RELEASE^ DATE:
21-Jun-2010 "
 ' Poland: Price Increases 1
. 3
. 4
USSR-Angola: Soviet Concern Over Relations 5
s Lebanon: Presidential Politics 6
Western Europe - Turkey: Pressure On Ankara 7
. 8
. 9
~/ UssR: Chernenko's Position to
/(b USSR-Syria: Evacuation of Soviet Dependents l0
11
/Z zambia-USSR: Bartering Cobalt for Arms 11
/ 3 The Netherlands: Defense Debate . 12
Special Analysis
~~
S Poland: Agricultural Problems 13
30 January 1982
 ? POLAND: Price Increases
The regime is tr in to cushion the s ehoZo ~caZ im act of
rice increases.
Prav a s pu Zs e on y an a r2 ge
version of JaruzeZski's speech on Monday.
Food prices apparently are still scheduled to rise
~ by as much as 400 percent beginning on Monday. The
~ government is counseling people to lessen the impact
y of increases by raisinq their own food or by getting
an extra job.
Consumers have already had a taste of increases as
prices on some manufactured goods have escalated this
month. Under reform provisions effective on 1 January,
firm: have been allowed considerable latitude to pass
their. actual costs to the consumer. Shoppers also face
lowered butter rations and the start of rationing of oil,
lard, and margarine.
Comment: Despite its nervousness, the regime seems
intent on forging ahead with its plans for marketplace
austerity. This time, however, it is making every effort
~ to avoid taking consumers by surprise. The government
Z may deem it prudent to increase security around the
country.
30 January 1982
 USSR-ANGOLA: Soviet Concern Over Relations
The recent visit to Moscow of a high-level delegation from
Angola underscores the .Srn>.vts' concern about maintaining their
The group was given prominent coverage and met with
Premier Tikhonov and other top officials, A 10-year pro-
gram of economic and technical cooperation and trade was
touted as a major accomplishment of the visit.
The Soviets used the visit to instruct the Angolans
on the dangers of developing ties with the US. An article
in a Soviet weekly, for example, suggested that the US
position on Namibia sought over the long run to undermine
the SeCllrltV of Anrrnl a' c Mara; c+ ,-o,.;,,,.,
Comment: Soviet commentary and Tikhonov's assertion
of Soviet preparedness to extend security assistance
reveal Moscow's concern over the interest some Angolan
leaders have in strengthening their ties to the West and
in pursuing a settlement in Namibia. Moscow may be dis-
enchanted with President dos Santos--who may be seeking
a negotiated settlement with Angolan insurgent leader
Savimbi--and may be wooing hardliners in the government
Despite the emphasis given to the signing of economic
pacts, they are mainly promises that the two countries
would study further cooperation. Political and military
discussions probably dominated the agenda, but Moscow
may have linked new military aid to r,,~anda's firmness
30 January 1982
 LEBANON: Presidential Politics
The presidential eZectzon scheduled for next summer is already
3 shaping up as a contest betraeen the Syrians and the Christian Phalange
Most factions have been unwilling to tip their hand
toward a candidate so early in the campaign. Raymond
Edde, who lost to President Sarkis in 1976 and subsequently
went into exile in Paris after two attempts on his life,
has emerged as the early favorite of some Muslim groups
3 hoping to avoid either a Phalange- or a Syrian-backed
candidate. Edde, however, is opposed by both Bashir
Jumayyil and by the Syrians.
Many observers and political figures in Lebanon are
uneasy about the election and believe that the security
situation will deteriorate as the campaign unfolds.
They also fear that the Lebanese Front, unable to prevent
3 the election of a Syrian candidate, will try to prevent
- - r----- ~--- --- ~--? , -- ~~ - -~-----~ - ---~-- 1
new fighting between the Phalange and the Syrians.
Comment: A Shamun candidacy would be widely viewed
as a stalking-horse for the Lebanese Front, which is
concerned that the Syrians intend to push for the election
3 of a pro-Syrian candidate such as former President Sulayman
Franjiyah. In such an event, the Front might "sacrifice"
Shamun in return for a similar gesture by Damascus toward
its hardline candidate.
6
 government representatives.
The assembly passed a resolution criticizing Turkish
human rights practices, but it rejected expulsion. The
action comes a week after the EC assembly--the European
Parliament--adopted a tough resolution on Turkey. In
addition, OECD Secretary General van Lennep has post-
poned his scheduled trip to Ankara on the advice of EC
Parliamentary Assembly on Thursday not to expel Turkey.
West Europeans will keep up their political and economic
pressure on Ankara despite the decision of the Council of Europe
Comment: Although most West European governments
want to maintain links to Turkey, they feel under increas-
ing pressure to take a stronger stand against military
rule there because of growing domestic criticism and
because of Western condemnation of martial law in Poland.
Scandinavian governments, for example, now are likely to
lodge a complaint against the Turkish Government with
the European Commission on Human Rights. Hearings under-
taken by the Commission probably would last one to two
years and could result in Turkey's expulsion from the
Council of Europe.
I`
EC members are not likely to lift the suspension
on $650 million in Community aid to Turkey in the near
term. OECD members so far have kept silent on the
pledging session this spring for aid to Turkey but will
shortly have to take positions on further assistance.
The EC Ambassadors probably wanted van Lennep to post-
pone his trip to avoid publicity about the question of
Despite its initial anger over the Council of
Europe's resolution, the Turkish Government is likely
to continue to emphasize that alleged human rights
vio-
lations are vigorously investigated and prosecuted
and
that General Evren's New Year speech committed
the
com-
manders to the restoration of civilian rule by
late
1983
or early 1984. The commanders probably would
agree
to
withdraw from the Council of Europe voluntarily if it
concluded that Turkey's expulsion were imminent.
participate in European human rights hearings but would
30 January 1982
 30 January 1982
 USSR: Chernenko's Position
The state funeral yesterday for Mikhail Suslov pro-
vided further evidence that party Secretary Chernenko has
improved his leadership standing at the expense of fellow
Secretary Kirilenko. Chernenko outranked Kirilenko in
all but one of the leadership appearances during the pro-
ceedings. He usually was placed in the third spot Suslov
had occupied among Politburo members and the second spot
among secretaries. The variance in Kirilenko's placement
makes his precise rank difficult to determine.
Comment: Suslov probably had restrained President
Brezhnev's efforts to push Chernenko forward, and
Chernenko is now likely to assume new responsibilities
within the secretariat. He appears to be the leading
candidate to take over Suslov's portfolio for ideology
and relations with foreign Communist parties. Although
Chernenko is less experienced than Kirilenko in foreign
affairs, he has become increasingly prominent in this
area over the last year. He reportedly will lead the
Soviet delegation to the French Communist Party Congress
USSR-SYRIA: Evacuation of Soviet Dependents
The Soviet Embassy in Damascus early this month sent
home about 200 schoolchildren because of the continuing
threat of terrorist attacks, according to a Soviet offi-
cial in Syria. The decision was taken following the
car bombing in November that killed over 100 persons in
Damascus. The Soviet community in Syria over the past
three years has been the target of numerous terrorist
actions in which at least 16 Soviets have been killed.
These attacks have been attr;ht~te~ primarily to the
Comment: The departure of the schoolchildren appears
to have been the basis for a rumor circulating in the
Middle East that the USSR was evacuating dependents from
Damascus, Beirut, and Amman in anticipation of an Israeli
military move into southern Le
 ZAMBIA-USSR: Bartering Cobalt for Arms
:~
Zambia
is artering 500 tons of cobalt worth over $12 million
to the USSR to help pay for MIG-21s and other advanced
weapons purchased under an arms agreement worth $200 mil-
lion signed in 1979. The military agreement on inall
had called for hard currency payments.
3 Comment: The deal, apparently concluded in late
~~ 1981, comes at a time when Zambia is experiencing severe
foreign payments problems because of depressed mineral
prices for cobalt and copper. The decision to barter
cobalt also may stem from Lusaka's failure last year to
win any bids to supply cobalt for the US stockpile and
the influence of pro-Soviet officials within the Zambian
Government. The transaction will almost triple the USSR's
normal yearly purchase of Zambian cobalt and could pre-
sage similar deals.
anuary 1982
 Parliament next week will consider the defense
budget for 1982. The center-left coalition of Prime
Minister van Agt will propose to increase spending by
about 3 percent in real terms, but Defense and Finance
Ministry spokesmen are pessimistic about meeting the
NATO goal.
Comment: The government, which is divided on the
issue of cruise missile basing, is trying to compensate
by adhering to its commitment to NATO's conventional
deterrent. Although it is likely to win approval for
spending levels close to 3 percent, defense appropria-
tions probably will be cut later this year when the
deepening recession creates additional pressure on the
budget.
12 30 January 1982
 POLAND: Agricultural Problems
The martzaZ Zara regime has not yet formulated an agricultural
policy that mill gain it the support of private farmers and ensure
adequate food supplies. The government has alternated threats of
~ 1 compulsory deliveries with offers of increased procurement prices
`~ and other incentives. Farmers should begin to make decisions soon
about their production for this year, and the regime must move
quickly if it hopes to encourage them to increase output.
One of the regime's main challenges continues to be
satisfying the population's food demands. Before the
imposition of martial law, meat procurements from private
farmers did not
i
i
cover rat
on
ng requirements.
Grain procurements were only one-third of state
needs, even though Poland had an above-average grain
crop last year. The regime was importing meat and grain
7 to help cover the gap, but still failed at times to meet
A drop in procurements following the imposition of
martial law prompted threats of making deliveries compul-
1 sory. The government wanted to maintain food supplies
~' f1 ~"1 ~ t t n f n n rt t t l a r r o n r. +- i r, r. +- ~ m_ ,- a- ;, l l -.
Initially, however, the threats did not have the
intended effect. Some farmers--who may have thought
collectivization would follow forced deliveries--
yreportedly killed livestock and buried food supplies
Moderates in the regime seem to have successfully
argued against collectivization. The government prob-
ably realized that the rapid elimination of the private
13
30 January 1982
 sector--which provides about 75 percent of agricultural
production and 70 percent of total state procurements--
would severely disrupt food supplies and provoke prolonged
resistance among farmers.
Nonetheless, the regime has kept pressure on the
farmers. For the first time, it is threatening legal
action if farmers do not fulfill grain contracts signed
with the state. The government also is refusing to
sell farmers seeds and fertilizers unless thev have made
sufficient grain sales to the state.
The increase in early January in prices of fertil-
izers and tractors probably deepened farmers' mistrust,
even though the regime has promised to compensate by
raising prices paid for agricultural goods when consumer
prices are raised in February. The new prices are part
of an effort to place a more realistic value on agricul-
tural supplies.
Positive Measures
The government also has offered inducements, promis-
ing to extend credit to farmers for purchase of supplies
and to make any future increases in livestock and grain
procurement prices retroactive to November. In addition,
3 it is offering up to a 20-percent premium for the timely
/~ fulfillment of grain contracts. Farmers who deliver
noncontracted grain will receive in payment "grain bonds"
redeemable in 1983-85 at prices in effect at that time,
plus interest.
The regime has attempted to show its support of pri-
vate farmers by submitting to parliament some measures
~ introduced before martial law. These include bills to
S liberalize farm inheritance and pensions and to increase
the maximum allowable farm size.
The martial law regime's combination of threats
and promises has yielded mixed results. The state has
purchased only 63 percent of the grain it will need by
j mid-.February.
30 January 1982
 In December, the government had to rely on Soviet
meat deliveries to fill one-fourth of its rationing com-
mitment. Although the regime subsequently claimed that
meat procurements have improved enough to cover completely
its lower rationing commitments in January, the increases
may reflect initial distress slaughtering of chickens
because of fodder shortages or the sale of animals long
overdue for slaughter.
Threats by the regime also may have helped keep
up livestock procurements. Military operations groups
circulating recently in the countryside apparently put
pressure on farmers to fill their contracts.
The regime's reassurance will not easily dispel
the farmers' apprehensions. Many farmers may take a
wait-and-see attitude, and those who are nervous about
the future of private agriculture may cut back produc-
tion to cover only the needs of their families and close
friends.
Passive resistance by private farmers would seri-
ously compound the regime's agricultural problems. In
any case, the existing shortages of seeds, fertilizers,
tractor spare parts, and pesticides will limit crop yields
in 1982. The prospect of future downturns will put pres-
sure on the regime to use more forceful methods or to be
more sensitive to the farmers' needs and concerns.
Historically, the Polish farmer has responded more
to inducements than threats. The old formula of raising
procurement prices to increase production may not work
today because of the lack of consumer goods to buy.
If the retail price reform does bring stability to
the marketplace and an increase in the amount of goods
in the countryside, however, the regime may be able to
cajole some farmers into selling at least part of the
reduced quantities that are produced this year. If not,
the regime out of "frustration" could resort to forced
deliveries, which could move it toward adopting other
15
30 January 1982